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SCIENTIFIC MASCULINITY AND NATIONAL IMAGES IN JAPANESE SPECULATIVE CINEMA

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DOCTORAL DISSERTATION

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ABSTRACT

Science and technology have been paramount features of any modernized nation. In Japan they played an important role in the modernization and militarization of the nation, as well as its democratization and subsequent economic growth. Science and technology highlight the promises of a better tomorrow and future utopia, but their application can also present ethical issues. In fiction, they have historically played a significant role. Fictions of science continue to exert power via important multimedia platforms for considerations of the role of science and technology in our world. And, because of their importance for the development, ideologies and policies of any nation, these considerations can be correlated with the deliberation of the role of a nation in the world, including its internal and external images and imaginings.

In Japan, narratives of the weird, fantastic and horrific have been present for centuries, culminating in the popularity of Japanese horror cinema with the worldwide success of *Ringu* (1998). In Japanese cinema studies, however, the study of these narratives is still limited, especially with regard to scientific narratives. This thesis is an attempt to remedy this situation. I will look into the way images of Japanese nationhood are mediated through male characters that are associated with science and technology. I argue that by analyzing these characters within their respective contexts and the general framework of both the history of science and technology as well as Japan's postwar policies, it is possible to understand how the films deal with various, sometimes contradicting self-projected images of the Japanese nation. My study is located at an intersection of four particular fields: the study of Japanese cinema, the study of horror and the fantastic, the study of Japanese masculinities and the study of the history of Japanese science. The following films will be analyzed: *Gojira* (1954), *Chikyū bōeigun* (The Mysterians, 1957), *Bijo to ekitainingen* (The H-man, 1958), *Densō ningen* (The Secret of the Telegian, 1960), *Gasu ningen daiichi-gō* (The Human Vapor, 1960), *Matango* (1963), *Tanin no kao* (The Face of Another, 1964), *Kairo* (Pulse, 2001), *Sakebi* (Retribution, 2006), *Doppelgänger* (2006), the *Tetsuo* series (1988, 1992, 2009) and the three *HAYABUSA* films (2012).

I will start by redefining "horror" and "science fiction" as "speculative cinema" (*kaiki eiga*), a cross-generic mode that as an umbrella term enables the analysis of both supernatural tales and more scientifically inclined works. In order to theorize the concept, I will draw from previous literature on the weird and the fantastic. Torben Grodal's (2009) biocultural framework will be also utilized in order to provide one possible explanation for the prevalence of certain motifs worldwide. Next, I will highlight the role of men as functional tools for the mediation of national images. This is done by theorizing the notion of "scientific masculinity," a type of masculinity that contributes to the creation of knowledge, as defined by Erica Lorraine Milam and Robert A. Nye

(2015). Scientific masculinity is a trope with a function—to mediate images of nationhood by calling for advancements of science and technology. The Frankenstein myth is present in almost all of the fictions, as manifested in Sharalyn Orbaugh's (2007) so-called *Frankenstein Syndrome*. Shimura Miyoko's (2008) concept of *otoko no kaijin*, the male phantom, is also useful. In order to understand scientific masculinity, I will draw both from the history of science and from studies on masculinity. Understanding the role of hegemonic masculinity (Connell, 1995) is particularly important, as it works as an ideological reference point for the fictional, non-hegemonic characters. This creates an interdisciplinary theoretical model that contributes to the understanding of the function of scientific masculinity as a representation of a certain national image.

The results of this thesis suggest that Japanese speculative cinema engages in the process of dissecting national images—and ideals—on screen. This is accomplished by the use of scientifically minded masculine agents which subvert, challenge and negotiate ideologies that have contributed to Japan's postwar history. Because of the importance of science and technology for social policies at various points in history, they provide a fine context for the dissecting of these ideas. It is clear that *kaiki eiga* actively participates in negotiating a multitude of salient national images—imperialist, pacifist, racial, technological, economic and, last but not least, patriarchal. These images reflect the changes that Japanese society has undergone since the Pacific War, as well as those that the society should undergo, according to the filmmakers.

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Japan has been a part of my 36-year old life for more than two decades already. It all started innocently enough in the 2nd grade of junior high school when my dear friend Katri introduced the world of gaming to me. As an avid fan of fantasy literature, I soon went on to buy *Final Fantasy VII*. This was the point of no return – I was hooked on the absolutely wonderful world of the gameplay which led to the discovery of anime and manga back in the days before the spread of Japanese popular culture around the world. One thing led to another and I soon found myself as a high school exchange student in Funabashi, Chiba, and finally as a Japanese language and culture major at the University of Helsinki in 2004.

Since then, my interest in anime and manga has spread into a vast interest in the contemporary Japanese society itself. I became interested in the workings of the family and gender in Japan in general and, more particularly, in cinema. During this process, the interest in the family structure of Japan has transformed into a large-scale interest of the development of science and technology in Japan, and how this discourse is tied with notions of gender, nation and popular culture. If I was to play *Final Fantasy VII* now, I suspect the experience would be all the more tremendous and stunning because of my understanding of the underlying themes.

My research has been funded by the Kone Foundation, The Finnish Concordia Fund and the Japanese Association for University Women. I would like to express my deepest gratitude to each and every one of these institutions for giving me the chance to pursue this path. I am grateful for all the conversations and warm meetings with the members of JAUW in Tokyo. I am privileged to have been able to present my research to the finest of Japanese female scholars and share my thoughts with them. At Waseda University I would like to thank Professor Morita Norimasa, with whose support I have been able to continuously conduct research there as a visiting researcher. This has also been made possible because of the support of Doctoral School for the Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, and the Chancellor at the University of Helsinki.

The process of writing a thesis monograph can be simultaneously exciting, tedious, frustrating, exhilarating and downright absurd. My two supervisors, Professor Henry Bacon and Docent Bart Gaens, have always been there for me, guiding me through the process with their insightful comments and a healthy dose of much-welcomed criticism. The process has been at times tiring for all of us, so I am very grateful for all the time and effort that you have put on this thesis. You have shared my joys and sorrows and I have greatly enjoyed our conversations. Henry, thank you for always pushing me to further develop my argumentation and critical thinking. It is because of you that I have been able to keep much of nonsense (that I am quite fond of myself) out of this scholarly

work. Bart, you have been my valuable support in Japanese studies, being a mirror to my ideas about contemporary Japan. In addition, I must mention that I would not have been able to achieve this doctorate had it not been for my younger years: the piano lessons taught by Liisa Ukkonen, and the Japanese classes taught by Uemura Yukako. Liisa and Yukako, you have taught me that perseverance leads to amazing results. This is now a skill that I value above all.

I have also had the pleasure of having two sharp minds as my preliminary examiners. Emeritus Reader Dolores Martinez and Associate Professor Rikke Schubart, thank you for going through my manuscript and taking the time to provide me with useful comments and criticism in order to make this even better a thesis. Knowing that you have read this work with a critical eye and yet come to the conclusion that it is a useful and valuable work gives me great pleasure and confidence in my future. I am also deeply grateful for Professor Martinez for finding the topic of such an interest as to have promised to serve as my opponent. I hope the experience will be memorable for both of us during this time of a coronavirus pandemic. In addition, thank you for the efforts of Academy Research Fellow Outi J. Hakola and University Lecturer Tiina Airaksinen, who have agreed to serve as the faculty representatives.

During my time as a doctoral student, I have attended many conferences and workshops, and received much appreciated feedback. There are a few encounters in particular that remain in my mind. First, for everyone who attended our European Association for Japanese Studies PhD workshop in Edinburgh in 2015 – thank you! This shared experience, the knowing that I was not alone with my pains of creation was of immense help. It is from this workshop that I also became acquainted with Anna Vainio and Tine Walravens, two bright minds that I now have the pleasure of calling my friends. I miss hiking the Japanese mountains with you! I also embrace the words of my mentor from the workshop, Dr. Sharon Kinsella, who suggested I "immerse myself in the kaikiness of the films". I definitely did that. I would also like to express my thanks to late Dr. Romit Dasgupta whom I only met briefly but whose kind and knowledgeable words and sheer enthusiasm about my topic steered me towards the direction where I was finally able to conclude my thesis. Your passing away in 2018 was much too early. Thank you for everyone at the Renvall Seminar for taking your time to read and comment on my work, as well as my colleagues from both Japanese studies and other fields – Outi Smedlund, Pilvi Posio, Lasse Lehtonen, Eija Niskanen, Aleksi Järvelä, Miika Pölkki, Laeticia Söderman, Rasmus Paltschik, Valtteri Vuorikoski, Joonas Kirsi, Ito Sanae, Saana Svärd, Liselotte Snijders, Tuukka Hämäläinen, Heimo Laamanen, Riikka Länsisalmi, Okamoto Takeshi – for being my academic and Japan-related support when needed.

I have also had the pleasure of working in one particular powerhouse team outside academia during my dissertations project. Eija Niskanen, Jenni Peisa and everyone at the Helsinki Cine Aasia team – we have surely created one of the best film festivals in Helsinki through our continuous effort and

enthusiasm! It has been a great pleasure to have been able to share this journey with you. Also, my colleagues at My Suomi and Hajime Solutions deserve to be mentioned here. Thank you for always supportively listening to my ranting about the horrors of finishing one's thesis while working. Hanna Jämsä, I will not forget how I received a text message from you in the middle of the night in which you had drafted how the topic of my thesis appeared to you. This is great dedication!

There is of course life outside academia. My childhood friends Liina, Sonia, Katri, Annis, Krista and Kaisu, as well as all other dear friends I have met along the way – Sanna, Virpi, Ulla, Minna, Piret and Johanna and the sauna ladies at our block – thank you for being there during all these years. Especially Sonia, thank you for not only your friendship, but also for all the challenging questions about my research as well as for the page layout of this thesis. My *mamatomo* Peike, Jenni and Inkeri: we have exchanged countless messages almost every day now for almost four years. You have always listened to my anxieties about how to mix motherhood and research, never failing to cheer me up when life just seemed to be too much with dissertation deadlines and, for example, a sick child. I am extremely grateful to have all you smart ladies in my life. Also, my friends and second family in Japan – Akari, Miki, Kaori, Yumi and the Yoshinari family – your presence has made fieldwork periods even better.

This thesis would not have been possible without the continuous support of my parents and my family. Vilho Jussila, I met you in September 2011 just a month after I had been accepted to complete my PhD degree. This dissertation has always been there with us as long as we have been together. Thank you for always asking me the right questions, pushing me or just simply giving my head a rest when needed. You have been overjoyed for my success, always proud and supportive. Nonetheless, I am so very happy to finally shed this third wheel from our marriage. Finally, to my amazing daughter Linnea Eerolainen: had you not been there to balance my life and to force me to learn the skill of prioritizing, I think I would still be writing.

Helsinki, July 2020
Leena Eerolainen

CONTENTS

A NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION

In this thesis I will follow the Japanese name order where family name precedes the given name. This is applied to all Japanese names regardless of the language of the source material (English or Japanese). However, if a Japanese person has a last name other than a Japanese one, or a first name other than a Japanese one, I have decided to follow the Western name order although the source material is in Japanese.

I use the revised Hepburn system in romanizing Japanese, using the macron for *ou* (ō) and *uu* (ū). I will also use these for words such as *nō,* which is often transliterated as Noh. However, internationally established city names such as Tokyo and Osaka will be written without the macron. For the term *sarariiman*, I have decided not to use the macron, since the word itself is a neologism from the English language. I have refrained from using the kanji for Japanese terminology in order to maintain the approachability of the text. The only exception is when I need to differentiate between the terms *henshin* (変身) and *henshin* (変心), the words for physical and psychological metamorphoses.

I refer to my primary sources using their Japanese names, providing a translation the first time I mention them. One reason for this is to avoid mixing the Japanese originals with their American remakes. Hence I talk about *Honogurai mizu no soko kara* instead of *Dark Water*. However, direct citations from the films I have written in English.

1 INTRODUCTION

> *"That's why I can't let people know until I find a peaceful use for the power. I'll destroy all the data I've compiled and kill myself."*[1]

Japanese *kaiki eiga,* or speculative cinema, is filled with characters that deal with concerns regarding science and technology.[2] More often than not, these are representative of larger social and moral concerns. In *Gojira* (1954), Dr. Serizawa kills himself in order to make sure that no one can use the weapon he has developed. In *Gasu ningen daiichi-gō* (The Human Vapor, 1960), military scientist Dr. Niki is killed by the subject of his experiment. *Matango* (1963) locks up academic protagonist Kenji in a psychiatric hospital, whereas *Doppelgänger* (2005), with its overworked research scientist Dr. Hayasaki, is a liberation fantasy of an overworked contemporary man. *Tetsuo* (1988, 1993, 2009), in turn, dissects the identity of the common salaryman by making its subjects pure, raw technology, providing a destructive escape from the everyday.[3] And then there is *Kairo* (Pulse, 2001), in which all technology is seen as inherently alienating—a far stretch from the image of Japan as a technological wonderland.

In this thesis I will analyze fictions of science and their portrayals of national images. Science and technology are important and interesting vehicles for analyzing national subjectivity because, as Tessa Morris-Suzuki states, "Science and technology are the products of society; their evolution not only depends on the intellectual traditions from which they spring, but is also shaped in every generation of social structures and social conflicts."[4] Many fictions of science belong to the realm of the weird, the fantastic and the horrific. These genres have permeated Japanese society for years as written

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[1] Dr. Serizawa in *Gojira* (1954).

[2] I am indebted to Dr. Sharon Kinsella who, as my personal supervisor at the European Association for Japanese Studies Doctoral Seminar in Edinburgh in 2015, suggested I immerse myself in the "*kaikiness*" of the films, thus directing my thought toward not considering it as a genre but rather something like a mood. In this thesis, I will follow the definition of the word *kaiki* as "suspicious and strange thing or being," "uncanny and eerie shape and form," "grotesque" (Shōgakukan *Dejitaru Daijiten*). The term has been used in translations of Western scholarly works of horror cinema; for example, David Skal's *Monster Show: The Cultural History of Horror* (1993) discusses in Japanese "the cultural history of kaiki films" (Japanese translation by Tochigi Reiko in 1998).

[3] As transliterated from Japanese, 'salaryman' is *sarariiman*, but I have decided on using the English spelling. Salaryman generally means a white-collar worker in a large company. A more detailed description will be provided in Section 3.3.

[4] Tessa Morris-Suzuki, "Fuzzy Logic: Science, Technology, and Postmodernity in Japan," in *Japanese Encounters With Postmodernity*, eds., Johann P. Arnason and Yoshio Sugimoto (London and New York: Kegan Paul International, 1995), 125.

texts, folk tales, stage art, religious beliefs or films.[5] In fact, Japanese arts have tended to be particularly concerned with interrogating the notion of separateness and highlighting the fluidity of boundaries. Tropes of metamorphosis and phantasmagoria of all kinds characterize many modern literary texts, theater and art.[6] Within the long history of Japanese cinema, weird and fantastic films comprise an intriguing, yet underanalyzed, branch.[7] Still, to paraphrase Uchiyama Kazuki, when cinema was introduced in Japan at the end of the 19th century, it became a link between modern rationality and traditional folk beliefs. In the darkness of the cinema, the spectator was whisked away to worlds previously unseen to the human eye.[8] In her famous essay *The Imagination of Disaster* (2009 [1965]), Susan Sontag points out that compared to literature, cinema has a unique strength in its "immediate representation of the extraordinary."[9] This inherent capability of portraying weird phenomena was due to the various cinematic techniques, such as chiaroscuro lighting, overlapping figures, stop motion, montage and double exposure, as well as the ability to bend time and space. This was made possible by healthy monetary support from film studios, since the audience proved willing to pay for these titillating spectacles.[10]

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[5] Leena Eerolainen, "Oh the Horror! Genre and the fantastic mode in Japanese *kaiki eiga*," *Asia in Focus* 3 (2016): 37.

[6] Susan J. Napier, "When the Machines Stop*:* Fantasy, Reality and Terminal Identity in *Neon Genesis Evangelion* and *Serial Experiments: Lain*," in *Robot, Ghosts and Wired Dreams: Japanese Science Fiction from Origins to Anime*, ed. Christopher Bolton, Istvan Csicsery-Ronay and Tatsumi Takayuki (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 2007), 39; here phantasmagoria means "a confused group of real or imagined images that change quickly" (https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/phantasmagoria).

[7] According to Uchiyama Kazuki, as early as between 1910 and 1926 there were various *kaidan* film adaptations, the most popular of which were *Yotsuya kaidan* (10 times), *Botan dōrō* (7 times), *Banshū sarayashiki* (4 times), *Shin-sarayashiki* (4 times), *Banchō sarayashiki* (3 times), *Nabeshimaneko* (7 times), *Okazakineko* (3 times), *Arima kaibyōden* (7 times) and *Kyūbi no kitsune* (5 times) (Uchiyama, Kazuki 内山一樹, "Nihon eiga no kaiki to gensō" 日本映画の怪奇と幻想 [The fantastic and the weird of Japanese cinema], in *Kaiki to gensō e no kairo: Kaidan kara J-horaa e* 回帰と幻想への回路ー怪談からJホラーへ [Route to the weird and fantastic: From kaidan to J-horror], ed. Uchiyama Kazuki 内山一樹 (Tokyo: Shinwasha, 2008), 10). Unfortunately, only a few of these early films have gained scholarly attention, with much of the research focusing on postwar films, partly due to the limited or total lack of availability of prints.

[8] Uchiyama, ibid.

[9] Susan Sontag, "The Imagination of Disaster," in *Hibakusha Cinema: Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and the Nuclear Image in Japanese Film*, ed. Mick Broderick (London and New York: Routledge, 2009), 41.

[10] Uchiyama, "Kaiki to gensō," 10; Stephen Neale, *Genre* (London: British Film Institute, 1980), 43–44; Torben Grodal, *Embodied Visions – Evolution, Emotion, Culture, and Film* (Oxford University Press, 2009), 100; Shimura Miyoko 志村三代子, "Hōrō suru fukuinhei – Kurosawa eiga no naka no yūrei o chūshin ni" 放浪する復員兵ー黒澤映画の中の幽霊を中心に [Wandering demilitarized soldiers: Ghosts in Kurosawa's films], in *Kaii – yōkai bunka no dentō to sōzō. Uchi to soto no shiten kara* 怪異・妖怪文

1.1 OBJECTIVES AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The overall aim of this thesis is to analyze how characters in Japanese speculative films, including the contexts they refer to, are functionally used in order to represent images of nationhood. My study is located at an intersection of four particular fields: the study of Japanese cinema, the study of horror and the fantastic, the study of Japanese masculinities and the study of the history of Japanese science. The common denominator of these four themes in the films discussed in this thesis is science. This is a study of fictions of science, of fictional scientists who by definition are male and, finally, of how these fictional portrayals intersect with real-life policies, incidents and the general history of science. By analyzing how these strands are combined in fictions of science, it is possible to understand how these fictions mediate national images.

Film analysis as a part of mass media and popular culture studies has an important status for the understanding of society, because as representations "film texts correspond to societal structures, through which relations of dominance and power also become manifest in texts."[11] According to Dolores Martinez, "the mass media have both a political, or ideological, dimension and a deeper, more symbolic and psychological aspect which allow the messages they convey to mean different things to different people at different times and to be shaped, re-worked and re-formulated over time."[12] This explains why films belonging to the same category (*kaiki*) manifest a multitude of meanings. As Martinez further notes, mass media in particular and popular culture in general are sites of *negotiation* where national histories, presents and futures are engaged with while simultaneously reconsidering various gendered, class and astatus identities.[13] Media mediates a nation and is hence the best way to discuss one. [14] Furthermore, Turner states that "since ideologies are observable in material form only in the practices, behaviors, institutions and texts in society, the need to examine these material forms seemed to be extremely pressing."[15] It is by analyzing their meaning that it is possible to become aware of the hidden realities beneath the surface of everyday life.

化の伝統と創造。ウチとソトの視点から [The Tradition and Creation of Yokai Culture: From the Viewpoint of Inside and Outside], ed. Komatsu Kazuhiko 小松和彦 (Kyoto: Kokusai bunka kenkyū sentaa, 2015), 219; Yoshikawa Kōzō 吉川圭三 "Horaa eiga ron" ホラー映画論 [The theory of horror film], *GHIBLI Neppū* ジブリ『熱風』 (2012): 115.

[11] Lothar Mikos, "Analysis of Film," in *The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Data Analysis (*London: SAGE Publications, Inc., 2014), 414.

[12] D.P. Martinez, "Introduction," in *The Worlds of Japanese Popular Culture: Gender, Shifting Boundaries and Global Cultures*, ed. D.P. Martinez (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 2.

[13] Ibid. 14.

[14] Ibid., 15.

[15] Graeme Turner, *British Cultural Studies: An Introduction* (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), 25.

At the very root of this study is the assumption that societal anxieties and national concerns are represented in *kaiki* cinema as embodiments of scientific masculinity. There are three main objectives in this thesis that correspond to three specific gaps in research. First, I want to redefine the notion of *kaiki eiga* as an umbrella term under which it is possible to locate works that contain both supernatural and scientific elements. Mieke Bal proposes that "[w]hile groping to define … what a particular concept may mean, we gain insight into what it can do. It is in the groping that the valuable work lies."[16] Thus, these definitions offer but entry points to the world of the mysterious, weird, marvelous and fantastic, used in different ways in different media and in different eras. Conceptualizing these films as *kaiki* will allow us to include more films than the more narrow term of horror. In addition, this thesis aims to promote the overall presence of fictions of science within Japanese film history.

Second, this thesis contributes to the "need for new ways of thinking about maleness."[17] Steve Neale (1992) has argued in his famous article "Masculinity as a Spectacle" that despite the fact that heterosexual masculinity is identified as a structuring norm, discussions about gender in cinema have tended to center on the representation of women.[18] Although the situation has greatly changed, this still seems to be the case in horror film studies. This has to do with the overarching presence of the female ghost in Japanese horror and the wider discourse of Barbara Creed's "monstrous feminine."[19] This approach not only excludes works of a varied nature, but also to a large extent the study of men. There is, however, a prominent body of fictions of science in Japanese cinema, where masculinities are used as vessels for negotiating the changing social paradigms. The aim of this thesis is to complement the numerous studies that have emphasized the role of women and children within the study of Japanese weird narratives.

Third, Susan Sontag proposes that science fiction places ethical value on décor and things, not on people.[20] I argue otherwise. Characters are important

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[16] Mieke Bal, *Traveling Concepts in the Humanities: A Rough Guide* (Toronto, Buffalo and London: University of Toronto Press, 2002), 17.

[17] Brian Attebery, *Decoding Gender in Science Fiction* (New York and London: Routledge, 2002), 13.

[18] Steve Neale, "Masculinity as a Spectacle," *Screen* 24, no. 6 (1983): 9, 19; He interprets this as a problem of familiarity: women are seen as a problematic mystery and a source of anxiety as opposed to the perceived familiarity of the ideal masculine norm. This has created a situation which has not promoted the study of masculinities either inside or outside cinema (ibid.).

[19] Barbara Creed, "Horror and the Monstrous-Feminine: An Imaginary Abjection," in *The Dread of Difference*, ed. Barry Keith Grant (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1996), 35–36. The monstrous feminine is a concept constructed within and by a patriarchal and phallocentric ideology. It is related to the problem of sexual difference. Creed's understanding of the abject is derived from the works of Julia Kristeva, although she criticizes her work on several points. (Ibid.)

[20] Sontag, "Imagination of Disaster," 44.

for plot structure and narrative, as they call on and reflect the viewers' "meanings and concepts of self, person and identity circulating in society and the everyday world."[21] In this thesis I will focus on how male characters as scientists and engineers function also as representations of ethical values, national identities or images of nationhood in cinema. Hence, this thesis also participates in what can be referred to as "cultural responses to scientific developments," a field that should receive more attention from scholars.[22] Science and technology enabled Japan's industrialization, its economic growth and its emergence as a technological superpower. The notion is closely intertwined with the nation's history, prevalent in the images projected by the nation. This alone makes the analysis of fictions of science important. In fact, as pointed out by Sontag, science fiction films are not "about science, they are about disaster, concerned with the aesthetics of destruction."[23] According to Napier, a vision of disaster can be anything from social and material to spiritual. It is, nonetheless, insistent in its "concern with difference" and "fundamentally involved with the problem of identity."[24] This thesis will provide a timely discussion on how masculinities, cinematic representations and societal changes as negotiated through tropes of science and technology are interrelated, and how social anxieties are questioned through the cinematic fantastic.

To summarize, this thesis is guided by three key research questions:

1) What is kaiki and how should it be defined in order to make it a useful concept for film studies?
2) How should scientific masculinity be defined so that it can be used as a functional tool to reflect on images of nationhood? To put this differently, how are cinematic characters related to science used as functional vessels for negotiating social concerns, national images and national subjectivities?
3) What are the particular contexts or social frameworks within which this dissecting of national images takes place? In other words, what kinds of contexts do the characters appear in and what is the role of men in those particular contexts?

The importance of defining and understanding the role of scientific masculinity lies in the ability of the concept to shed light on the important role

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[21] Mikos, "Analysis of Film," 416. A plot is "everything visibly and audibly present in the film" and a narrative "a chain of events in cause-effect relationship occurring in time and space" (David Bordwell and Kristin Thompson, *Film Art: An Introduction* [New York: McGraw Hill, 2004], 69, 71).

[22] Kawana Sari, "Mad Scientists and Their Prey: Bioethics, Murder and Fiction in Interwar Japan," *The Journal of Japanese Studies* 31, no. 1 (2005): 91.

[23] Sontag, "Imagination of Disaster," 41.

[24] Susan J. Napier, "Panic Sites: The Japanese Imagination of Disaster from Godzilla to Akira," *Journal of Japanese Studies* 19, no. 2 (1993): 229–230.

of science and technology for Japan's nation-building project, and how masculinities have been paramount features in that process. With men and technology being all-encompassing features of society, it is necessary to consider their relationship and function in fiction.

1.2 CORE CONCEPTS

To be able to analyze both characters and contexts, the argumentation in this thesis revolves around a few key concepts: scientific masculinity, hegemonic and hybrid masculinities, *kaiki eiga,* and, to some extent, nation. Whenever studying any film genre, it is necessary to pay attention to the matter of what to include and exclude, and what the selection criteria are for this.[25] A conscious choice on the part of the researcher is needed. I have decided to group the films discussed here under the term "*kaiki*," defined here as speculative fiction. Finnish fantasy literature scholar and critic Vesa Sisättö has discussed speculative fiction in a few accounts. In an interview with Laura Andersson (2007), he defines it as an all-encompassing form of fantasy literature, which itself is based on a deviation from what is considered "reality."[26] This is close to a definition of the fantastic as "any conscious departure from consensus reality,"[27] and also conforms to Eric S. Rabkin's suggestion that "[f]antastic worlds … come alive for us as alternatives to the real world."[28] To speculate is to promote alternatives. *Kaiki eiga* as a speculative form of filmmaking is thus a neutral umbrella term for fictions that speculate in the most varied of ways. It is important to utilize this concept not only in order to include many films that have previously been difficult to categorize but also to see how fantastic narratives are used for portraying the real world.

Characters draw their impact and force from the social realities they are grounded in.[29] A core concept in mediating the importance of science for conveying feelings about national concerns is that of *scientific masculinity*. Erica Lorraine Milam and Robert A. Nye define scientific masculinity broadly as any type of masculinity that contributes to the creation of knowledge. There are two other important sub-definitions. First, scientific masculinity is not limited to laboratories. Second, agents of scientific masculinity can

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[25] J.P. Telotte, *Science Fiction Film* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 8.

[26] Laura Andersson, "Scifiä vai spekulatiivista fiktiota?" [Scifi or speculative fiction?], *Kulttuurivihkot* 6 (2007): 30.

[27] Susan Napier, *The Fantastic in Modern Japanese Literature*: *The Subversion of Modernity* (New York and London: Routledge, 1996), 9; see also Kathryn Hume, *Fantasy/Mimesis: Responses to Reality in Western Literature* (New York and London: Methuen, Inc, 1984), 21.

[28] Eric Rabkin, "Introduction," in *Fantastic Worlds: Myths, Tales, and Stories*, ed. Eric S. Rabkin (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), 1.

[29] Attebery, *Decoding Gender*, 10, 38.

simultaneously also occupy other roles such as family men.[30] In *kaiki eiga*, scientific masculinity is often used to convey an impression of "science-abilities," "tech-savviness" or, in some cases, just a direct and straightforward link with technologies and machines. The fluidity of the concept, as Milam and Nye point out, allows for the exploration of many different types of characters that could otherwise be difficult to include under the same analysis.[31] The importance of scientific masculinity lies in its applicability: it works as a notion under which to locate many of the male characters in the films that manifest similar thematic concerns and share the quest of knowledge-seeking, although they might seem different on the surface level. In addition, it provides a lens for analyzing the function of "science" in the films, as opposed to the "supernatural" elements of tales that center on the feminine.

In order to understand scientific masculinity, it is important to establish a point of reference. In Japan, negotiating masculinity is a process of navigating both the historical ideal of a powerful male dominating subordinate members of society and the perceived emasculation in the aftermath of the Pacific War, a feeling that was intensified in the 1990s due to the recession.[32] In this thesis, these shifts will be dissected through the use of such concepts as *hegemonic and hybrid masculinities*. Hegemony, a term used by Antonio Gramsci, in general means "the cultural dynamic by which a group claims and sustains a leading position in social life."[33] A successful claim to authority is the mark of hegemony. Hegemonic masculinity refers to a culturally privileged group of men that maintains a successful claim to patriarchy, emphasizing the dominant position of men vis-à-vis the subordinate position of women and other men. In addition, it is a time-space practice, a configuration qua cultural idea that "embodies the *currently accepted answer*" (italics mine) to the claim to power.[34] It is thus subject to change. Interrelated models include complicit,

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[30] Erica Lorraine Milam and Robert A. Nye, "Introduction," *OSIRIS: Scientific Masculinities* 30, no. 1 (2015): 1–2, 5.

[31] Ibid.

[32] Valerie Wee, *Japanese Horror Cinema and Their American Remakes* (New York: Routledge, 2014), 126.

[33] R.W. Connell, *Masculinites* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005), 77.

[34] Tokuhiro Yoko, *Marriage in Contemporary Japan* (Oxon and New York: Routledge, 2010), 58; R.W. Connell and James Messerschmidt, "Hegemonic Masculinity: Rethinking the Concept," *Gender & Society* 19, no. 6 (December 2005): 852–853; James Messerschmidt, *Hegemonic Masculinities and Camouflaged Politics* (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2010), 44–46; Michael A. Messner, "The Masculinity of the Governator: Muscle and Compassion in American Politics," *Gender and Society* 21, no. 4 (2007): 462; Demetrakis Z. Demetriou, "Connell's Concept of Hegemonic Masculinity: A Critique," *Theory and Society* 30, no. 3 (2001): 340, 342–343; see also Sabine Frühstück and Anne Walthall, "Introduction," in *Recreating Japanese Men*, ed. Sabine Frühstück and Anne Walthall (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 2011), 2.

subordinated and marginalized masculinities.[35] Hybrid masculinities, in turn, are used to describe models that include a combination of attributes, some of which might be ones not generally associated with being masculine, such as being overly emotional. Hybrid masculinities do not, however, threaten or oppose hegemonic masculinity. In fact, quite the opposite. Messner talks about "a configuration of symbols that forge a masculinity that is useful for securing power among men who already have it."[36] It is merely a new combination of attributes that results in the overall domination of patriarchy.

Finally, a central concept used here is that of *nation*. This thesis is not an exploration of *nationalism* as such, but of national images. As Benedict Anderson notes, "nation, nationality and nationalism – all have proved notoriously difficult to define, let alone analyse."[37] According to Anderson, nation is "an imagined political community … imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign."[38] It is imagined because people from different locations between the borders of a nation are able to imagine a community they all belong to, despite never really meeting each other. Because of the borders—or boundaries—this community is also limited. And having its roots in the era of Enlightenment and Revolution, or in the Japanese case in the period right after the Meiji Restoration, it is also sovereign. Finally, nation is a community that is limited because of its borders and boundaries, based on a feeling of "deep horizontal comradeship" despite the presence of exploitation and inequality that are a part of every society in the world.[39]

I admit there is a thin line between nationalism and national images, especially if nationalism is defined in Michael Billig's terms as the "ideological means by which nation-states are reproduced."[40] It is possible to see the films discussed here as participating in this ideological reproduction, either promoting or negating some national images and values. Anderson suggested mass media as a premium way for the idea of an imagined community, or a nation, to spread. Martinez calls these narratives that are circulated in mass media myths: they are not false history but rather "a series of continually re-worked narrations which reflect and reinforce the values of constantly changing societies."[41] In other words, mass media narratives are an important aspect of modern nationalism,[42] contributing directly to the creation of

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[35] Jeff Hearn, "From hegemonic masculinity to hegemony of men," *Feminist Theory* 5, no. 1 (2004): 55; Connell, *Masculinities*, 76–81.

[36] Messner, "The Governator," 473.

[37] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (New York: Verso, 2006), 3.

[38] Ibid., 6.

[39] Ibid., 6–7.

[40] Michael Billig, *Banal Nationalism* (London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi: SAGE Publications, 1995), 6.

[41] Martinez, "Introduction," 3.

[42] Ibid., 11.

Anderson's imagined community.[43] However, to call the films "nationalist" because of their imagining of a certain national image requires theoretical knowledge that is outside the scope of this thesis, and hence I will stick to the present definition of a nation in my simplified use of the term "national image."

In the works discussed here, science and technology are used in a way that results in the emergence of "anomalous bodies and subjectivities." This is due to the centrality of the so-called *Frankenstein Syndrome*.[44] In addition, not only the syndrome but the Frankenstein myth itself is a suitable analytical concept for the exploration of Japan's national identity in the postwar period. The myth, according to Andrew Bartlett, is based on a so-called victimary attitude where "the victims of the mad scientist suffer terribly [but] are far from being innocent themselves."[45] This ties the Frankenstein metaphor together with Japan's history and representations of national identities. The films clearly present images of the Japanese nation as both Frankenstein and his monster, both aggressor and victim.[46] Characters embodying scientific masculinity serve this role in the films. In addition, analyzing Japanese narratives through this universal concept yields understanding of the fact that although I discuss products of Japanese culture here, it should be contantly kept in mind that the themes present in the films are but culture-specific manifestations of universal themes. I am aware of the issue of not engaging with films from other cultural spheres here, but unfortunately the scope of my study does not allow for a broader cross-cultural comparison.

1.3 METHODOLOGY

The core concepts defined above influence the methodology of this thesis. Films reflect both the conditions and structures of society and individual life.[47] However, film as a subject of study can be deceiving in its easy approachability.

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[43] For a critique about the easy applicability of Anderson's concept," see Jussi Pakkasvirta, "Mitä Anderson tarkoittikaan 'kuvitellulla yhteisöllä'?," *Tieteessä tapahtuu* 37, no. 6 (2019): 49–52, https://journal.fi/tt/article/view/87248.

[44] Sharalyn Orbaugh, "Sex and the Single Cyborg: Japanese Popular Culture Experiments in Subjectivity," in *Robot Ghosts and Wired Dreams: Japanese Science Fiction from Origins to Anime*, ed. Christopher Bolton, Istvan Csicsery-Ronay and Tatsumi Takayuki (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 2007), 175.

[45] Andrew Bartlett, *Mad Scientist, Impossible Human: An Essay in Generative Anthropology* (Aurora, Colo: The Davies Group, Publishers, 2014), 17.

[46] For a discussion about the prevalence of the victim attitude within the "postmemory" generation, see Takenaka Akiko, "Japanese Memories of the Asia-Pacific War: Analyzing the Revisionist Turn Post-1995," *The Asia-Pacific Journal/Japan Focus* 14, no. 20 (2016).

[47] Mikos, "Analysis of Film," 409.

To distinguish between common opinions and academic analyses can be especially troublesome with Japanese-language source material, where the ending "*-ron*" (the theory of -) is used quite freely.

In this thesis I will utilize a widely interdisciplinary framework for the analysis of the films at hand. My research is exploratory and qualitative, aimed at locating some main principles in a field that has previously been under-researched. I will incorporate an inductive approach with an aim of developing a new framework for understanding certain phenomena. The construction of the conceptual framework has first and foremost stemmed from the need to analyze certain salient features of a number of films, rather than trying to incorporate a body of works into an already existing theoretical framework—something that Standish sees as a general temptation for scholars.[48] This has entailed revising how certain basic notions in film studies can best be applied to Japanese cinema.

Based on my general definition of *kaiki eiga*, I selected 16 films for analysis.[49] These films can be roughly divided into two periods: the postwar period (1950s/1960s) and the contemporary period (1990s/2000s).[50] The reason for this overall division is the relative invisibility of scientific masculinity in cinema during the in-between period. The reception of these films has also varied, ranging from the vast contemporary audience (9,610,000) of *Gojira*[51] to the quite modest worldwide box office of the *Henshin ningen* films. The material thus consists of a wide selection of films from different points in history and from various budgetary spheres, in order to demonstrate that the connection between science, masculinity and national subjectivities and images has indeed been a prominent and important, albeit under-analyzed, feature of 20th- and 21st-century Japanese cinema.

In addition, the classification of these films generally conforms to the *prototype theory* of categorization, as suggested by George Lakoff.[52] This is an answer to the classical view where categories are defined "in terms of common

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[48] Isolde Standish, *Myth and Masculinity in the Japanese Cinema – Towards a Political Reading of the "Tragic Hero"* (Oxon: Routledge, 2000), 15.

[49] See Section 1.3 for further discussion about the films themselves.

[50] All in all, *Nihon tokusatsu gensō eiga zenshū* (A complete listing of Japanese special effects and fantastic films) lists 603 films released between 1948 and 1996. It is noteworthy that such films were released by and large before the war and also after 1997. For summaries of the plots of the films included here, see Appendix 1.

[51] See https://godzilla.jp/history.html. This corresponds to about 10 percent of the population of Japan in 1954. By 2004, fifty years after the series was inaugurated, 28 films had been produced and seen by a total of 99,250,000 people (Katō Norihiro, "Goodbye Gozilla, Hello Kitty – The Meanings of Japanese Cuteness," *The American Interest* Autumn (2006), https://www.the-american-interest.com/2006/09/01/goodbye-godzilla-hello-kitty/).

[52] George Lakoff, *Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal about the Mind* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1987).

properties of their members."[53] According to Lakoff, categorization itself is a combination of "human experience and imagination" and to change a concept of a category is "to change not only our concept of the mind, but also our understanding of the world."[54] Hence, redefining a group of horror films as speculative cinema contributes to a new understanding of the world. If the classical view emphasized the common properties of the members of a category, suggesting also that the members are thus equal in status, prototype theory shows asymmetries between members and within categories.[55] Lakoff argues that concepts are understood via idealized cognitive models (ICMs) that "may fit one's understanding of the world either perfectly, very well, pretty well, somewhat well, pretty badly, badly, or not at all."[56] A film deviates from the prototypical concept of *kaiki* if the ICM does not fit the world of the spectator perfectly or the film referred to deviates from the meaning of the concept itself. But it is also noteworthy that even if not every aspect of the film accords with the definition of *kaiki*, the concept can still be applied as is the case with the *HAYABUSA* films. These are the so-called "extensions of the central model," which feature both the aspects of the central model (*kaiki* as defined above) and "certain principles of extension."[57] The prototype model explains why the works analyzed here might greatly differ in some aspects, while still being included in the same category; for example, to some degree they all include things such as "scientific masculinity" and are based on "deviations from consensus reality."

I interpret the plots and characters of the films against general ideological trends and concerns related to notions of nation, science and genre in Japanese society. This is despite the fact that those responsible for the original texts may not have been aware that "ideological inventories of their society" were being reproduced.[58] According to Mikos, there are five categories that can become the focus of research, or what he calls the cognitive purpose of a study: content and representation; narration and dramaturgy; characters and actors; aesthetics and configuration; and contexts.[59] I am principally concerned with characters and the contexts in which they appear and are represented. In other words, I analyze how characters related to science mediate certain societal ideas and ideologies in constructing a certain national subjectivity.

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[53] Lakoff, *Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things,* xii.

[54] Ibid., 8–9.

[55] Ibid., 40.

[56] Ibid., 70.

[57] Ibid., 70-71, 91.

[58] Stuart Hall, "The rediscovery of 'ideology': return of the repressed in media studies," in *Culture, Society and the Media*, ed. Michael Gurevitch, Tony Bennet, James Curran and Janet Woollacott (Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005), 68.

[59] Mikos, "Analysis of Film," 412–413.

Fictional characters and how they fit into everyday contexts of reference are, in general, interpreted according to experiences and common knowledge.[60] They "show us how a culture delimits its own boundaries, how it sees itself; what it respects and desires."[61] They mediate cultural meanings in a narrative and embody specific meanings during different cultural moments and in different cultural discourses. By unpacking these discourses, it is possible to uncover unconscious ideologies that abound in representations of the weird.[62] Characters can be seen as functional entities: inventions that are transmitted culturally in order to perform certain functions, not something that just come to the individual mind. Torben Grodal speaks of "functional bundles," universally understandable mental units that are invented and widely communicated, travel across cultures and symbolize themes that are central to human existence all over the world.[63]

As functional bundles, characters not only convey feelings and ideologies that are culture-specific but also reveal some universal concerns. According to Grodal's bioculturalist framework, universal story material is always molded by cultural biases and interests.[64] He calls this the "historical specificity of universalism," where universal forms have specific cultural variations.[65] To

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[60] Mikos, "Study of Film," 417.

[61] Asa Simon Mittman, "Introduction: The Impact of Monsters and Monster Studies," in *The Ashgate Research Companion to Monsters and the Monstrous*, ed. Asa Simon Mittman and Peter Dendle (Dorchester: Ashgate Publishing, 2013), 13.

[62] Michael Dylan Foster, *Pandemonium and the Parade: Japanese Monsters and the Culture of Yōkai* (Berkeley, Los Angeles & London: University of California Press, 2009), 3; I define discourse here as a "socially produced group of ideas or ways of thinking that can be tracked down to individual texts or groups of texts, but that also demand to be located within wider historical and social structures or relations (Graeme Turner, *British Cultural Studies: An Introduction*. [London and New York: Routledge, 1996], 30).

[63] Grodal, *Embodied Visions*, 32–33, 55. Grodal represents a stance that is quite different from the other scholars cited in this work. Although he calls his approach "biocultural," it is definitely more biological than cultural. While I generally adhere to a more social constructionist understanding of culture, Grodal's biocultural theory helps to explain why some narratives and characters have spread and gained ground in different types of societies around the world. It is exactly through this perceived universality that one is forced to pay special attention to the moments during which culture-specific proceedings are taking place.

[64] Grodal, *Embodied Visions*, 18.

[65] Ibid. Grodal's universality is based on the biological development of the human race over thousands and thousands of years. He proposes that central features of the film experience and aesthetics are determined by basic architecture of the brain and the functions it was made to serve. An embodied approach presupposes that human experiences are linked to concrete specifications of the embodied mind. Thus, in order to understand visions of the world in real life and on film, we need to reconstruct the invisible embodied brain (and its feelings), to see how it supports and motivates visual and aural perceptions, and comprehend how its construction molds what is experienced (Grodal, ibid., 145–146). It is in this embodied brain where biological universality is located.

understand the emergence of themes during a particular time requires an understanding of the underlying cultural components.[66] Basic universal biological attributes affect our preference to see and experience certain motifs on screen. It is from this biology-based universality that cultural expressions emerge, representing specific developments and outgrowths. There are two prime examples of this in my thesis. First, *kaiki eiga* is a form of the fantastic and the weird that deals with universal concerns and uses universal functional bundles, but locates them strictly within the Japanese cultural context. Second, scientific masculinity is a notion found in cultures all over the world. Its representations in Japanese *kaiki eiga*, however, deal with culture-specific concerns.

Locating universal anxieties within culture-specific imagery is an antidote to the unfortunate analysis of essentialized Japaneseness. The bioculturalist stance differs from that of Ian Buruma (1984) and Gregory Barrett (1989), who state that these characters are not to be found in other cultures, and often locate their roots within Japanese culture only. Barrett, for example, analyzes characters as "personified representations of factors considered basic to filmic expressions of Japanese culture."[67] Based on this reading, characters are ultimately culture-specific constructions that, over decades and in the works of various directors, have been used to create a sense of familiarity and continuity. But, as I propose, they are also products in a long line of universal representations whose prominence can be explained by the function they serve.

In relation to the analysis of characters, the notion of *signifying practice* is required: "the more active labor of making things mean … of selecting and presenting, of structuring and shaping: not merely the transmitting of an already-existing meaning."[68] As Standish puts it, "the meaning a spectator constructs from the chain of cinematic signifiers, both verbal and visual, is dependent on not only the construction of the film's narrative and mise-en-scène, but also the socio-political context of the spectator's own viewing perspective."[69] In my analysis, these contexts appear as the socio-political situation of Japan during the release of the films. I will explain and refer to these extra-diegetic contexts with the aim of providing "the other text," which

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[66] Mathias Clasen, "Monsters Evolve: A Biocultural Approach to Horror Stories," *Review of General Psychology* 16, no. 2 (2012): 224.

[67] These include "the inevitable human conditions of suffering and death, parts of the life-cycle initiation, the moral problems of guilt and forgiveness, and the ideals of sincerity, loyalty, courage, justice, purity and self-sacrifice" (Gregory Barrett, *Archetypes in Japanese Film: The Sociopolitical and Religious Significance of the Principal Heroes and Heroines* [Cranbury: Associated University Presses, 1989], 19, 77). It could be argued, however, that many of the attributes highlighted by Barrett are in fact quite universal and more telling of the human mind in general, instead of the Japanese mentality in particular.

[68] Hall, "Rediscovery of ideology," 60.

[69] Standish, *Myth and Masculinity*, 4. Mise-en-scène means "putting into the scene" things that appear in the film frame (Bordwell and Thompson, *Film Art*, 176).

helps locate the meaning of the film and its characters. As Mizuno Hiromi suggests, in order to track "a critical history of fantasy," there must be a process of locating "meanings, ambiguities, and possibilities … between the text and the context."[70] Contexts work as "the other" texts that, when put together with the text in question, produce meaning and make particular texts meaningful.[71] Consequently, meaning is only acquired in relation to a specific context which in itself is always changing in meaning.[72] The interpretation of the context is ultimately what enables different analyses of the same filmic material.[73] In fact, the very nature of storytelling demands that ideas be embodied in characters within social contexts.[74] Contexts create culture-specific layers for characters that are often transnational, globally circulated and partially localized. Thus, masculine characters must be regarded within their designated institutional contexts: the state, the workplace and the family. Personal practices abound from institutional practices.[75]

On a formalist note, Bordwell and Thompson suggest four basic ways of locating multiple layers of meanings present in film: referential, explicit, implicit and symptomatic.[76] All of the films analyzed in this thesis can be addressed according to this multileveled model. Referential meaning works to establish the diegesis as a comprehensive world. This layer is strong in the films, as they work with real-life environments and locations with a twist of the fantastic. Explicitly the films are about the morality of science,[77] and implicitly they refer to the history of science in Japan. Finally, the most interesting layer—the symptomatic—is constructed of ideologies, "a particular set of social values."[78] In my analysis, this symptomatic layer can be divided along two axes: national image and gender. Particular sets of social values lie behind the way the films discuss national images and gender. To analyze the relationship between these two becomes the real target of analysis, mediated by the presence of scientific masculinity.

In addition, fictions of science present particular levels of meaning-making. In his "Has the Empire Sunk Yet? The Pacific in Japanese Science Fiction,"

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[70] Mizuno Hiromi, "When Pacifist Japan Fights: Historicizing Desires in Anime," *Mechademia* 2 (2007): 104.

[71] John Storey, *Cultural Theory and Popular Culture: An Introduction* (London: Routledge, 2015), 23.

[72] Ibid., 15.

[73] Mikos, "Analysis of Film," 420.

[74] Attebery, *Decoding Gender*, 11.

[75] R.W. Connell, "The big picture: Masculinities in recent world history," *Theory and Society* 22 (1993): 602.

[76] Bordwell and Thompson, *Film Art*, 55–57.

[77] According to Honda Ishirō himself, *Gojira* is a portrayal of the conscience of a scientist (quoted in Takeuchi, Hiroshi 竹内博, *Tokusatsu o meguru hitobito: Nihon eiga Shōwa no jidai* 特撮をめぐる—昭和の時代 [The people of tokusatsu: Japanese film, Shōwa period] [Tokyo: Waizu shuppan, 2011], 14).

[78] Bordwell and Thompson, ibid., 57.

Schnellbächer argues that first there is "realism on the level of technical plausibility." [79] Fictions of science offer wondrous portrayals of fictional technological innovations which, in fact, often have a real-life anchor point. In the films this is referred to in the actual history of science and technology in Japan, as well as what kinds of innovations and policies have been made. Second, fictions of science portray the reactions of (political) institutions to social events. These events are negotiated in relation to agents—principally male—that represent institutions. In other words, individual reactions can be seen as representative of a larger whole, contributing to the overall discussion about the events themselves. Finally, "the narrative dramatizes the emotions created by these events," which creates an affective level linked with questions of identity. [80] This is linked with the question of positive and negative representations. All the male agents that work within "the realistic-scientific" space are coded either positively or negatively by the narrative. Consequently, the narrative positions them as representations of favorable or unfavorable national images.

1.4 THE SELECTION OF FILMS

The films I have selected for analysis correspond to the definition of *kaiki* discussed above. My aim has also been to include a wide array of works from different periods of time and different directors in order to make the results of this thesis as comprehensive as possible. I pay close attention especially to Honda Ishirō's (1911–1993) films, starting with his paramount *Gojira* (1954). Honda continued with *Chikyū bōeigun* (The Mysterians, 1957) and the *Henshin ningen* series. The latter—*Bijo to ekitainingen* (The H-man, 1958), *Densō ningen* (The Secret of the Telegian, 1960) and *Gasu ningen daiichi-gō* (The Human Vapor, 1960)—was a part of Tōhō's *tokusatsu* film cycle. The second film in the set was directed by Fukuda Jun (1923–2000). *Matango* (1963) is often promoted as a spin-off sequel of the series and also featured in this thesis. I also include Teshigahara Hiroshi's (1927–2001) *Tanin no kao* (The Face of Another, 1964), which is based on a book by Abe Kōbō (1924–1993), rarely analyzed within horror film studies but definitely manifesting themes which are similar to other films from that period, including the Mad Scientist motif. All of the films here are explicitly concerned with the issue of science without conscience. Consequently, the light in which science and scientific masculinities are portrayed contributes to the discussion about Japan's national images during the changing times.

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[79] Thomas Schnellbächer, "Has the Empire Sunk Yet? The Pacific in Japanese Science Fiction," in *Robot Ghosts and Wired Dreams: Japanese Science Fiction from Origins to Anime*, ed. Christopher Bolton et al. (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 2007), 38

[80] Ibid., 39.

If Honda was a prominent figure in the vast field of Japanese speculative cinema, more recently Kurosawa Kiyoshi (b. 1955) and Tsukamoto Shinya (b. 1960) have created characters that are linked to the techno-scientific narrative. Interviewed by Michael Crandol, Kurosawa Kiyoshi states that his films do not belong to the genre of kaiki.[81] I do not agree. His films especially are highly speculative in nature. Whereas scientific experimentations in the films of the previous era often resulted in an external metamorphosis of a character, the contemporary era portrays mental deviation, or so-called "mentalmorphosis." Instead of creating external freaks in line with the Frankenstein narrative, contemporary representations of scientific masculinity deal with inner grotesques, presenting yet another image of the nation. This is a shift from *henshin* (変身) to *henshin* (変心). I have included *Kairo* (Pulse, 2001), *Sakebi* (Retribution, 2006) and *Doppelgänger* (2006) from Kurosawa, and the *Tetsuo* series (1988, 1992, 2009) from Tsukamoto.

In order to illuminate the various, sometimes contrasting ideals of nationhood that the films promote, I have also decided to include three *HAYABUSA* films that were released in 2012.[82] I admit that in this case I am slightly stretching the notion of *kaiki*, as these films are based on a journey of an actual space probe. Although fully situated in "our world," the films nonetheless offer a form of cinematic fantasy where reality is challenged, altered, reflected and extended. These three films, *HAYABUSA* (20th Century Fox, 2011), *Hayabusa – haruka naru kikan* (Hayabusa – the long return home, Tōei, 2012) and *Okaeri Hayabusa* (Welcome back, Hayabusa, Shōchiku, 2012), hence succumb to the prototype theory.

1.5 CHALLENGES AND LIMITATIONS

It is clear that film studies, including the study of Japanese cinema, has challenges and limitations. Mikos suggests that film studies is inherently inter- or transdisciplinary. This means that there is a need to acknowledge the importance of many, sometimes oppositional, theoretical perceptions for a comprehensive understanding of the subject matter.[83] Although providing the

[81] Michael Crandol, "Nightmares from the Past: 'Kaiki eiga' and the Dawn of Japanese Horror Cinema," (PhD Diss., University of Minnesota, 2015), 52–53.

[82] When referring to the three *HAYABUSA* films as a cluster, I will capitalize the letters according to the original name of the probe.

[83] Carl Plantinga and Greg M. Smith, "Introduction," in *Passionate Views: Film, Cognition, and Emotion*, ed. Carl Plantinga and Greg M. Smith (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 15; David Bordwell and Noël Carroll, *Post-Theory: Reconstructing Film Studies* (Madison and London: University of Wisconsin, Kindle Edition, 2012 [1996]). This can be seen in Adam Lowenstein's recent study on surrealism and digital media, in which he uses psychoanalytic and cognitivist frameworks simultaneously; see Adam Lowenstein, *Dreaming of Cinema: Spectatorship, Surrealism, and the Age of Digital Media* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015).

best means for a comprehensive study, this approach is also one of the weightiest tasks. First, in order to understand the full meaning of a particular film, it is necessary to familiarize oneself with the history of science in Japan, Japan's postwar social conditions, general studies on masculinities and gender and, finally, the history of Japanese cinema in general and studies on horror, science fiction and the fantastic in particular.[84] Needless to say, an exploration of any of these fields would make a dissertation of its own. This thesis thus represents but a scratch of the surface of what could become a lifelong career. However, it is exactly in this "scratching" that the novelty value of this thesis lies. It is the process of combining all of the aforementioned themes that creates a framework where new meanings can be located.

Second, when discussing national images within Japanese studies, one must tread carefully. Yoshimoto Mitsuhiro has criticized earlier studies on Japanese cinema where, according to him, "stereotypes of the Japanese national character and culture essence are routinely used to explain thematic motifs, formal features, and contextual backgrounds of Japanese films."[85] By this he seems to refer to the incorporation of ideas of *nihonjinron* into academic discussion. *Nihonjinron* came to the fore in the 1960s and reached wide popularity in the 1970s, connecting the period of economic growth with inquiries into what it means to be Japanese.[86] It can be defined as "a body of discourse which purports to demonstrate Japan's cultural differences from other cultures and Japan's cultural uniqueness in the world and thus tries to establish Japan's cultural identity."[87] Manabe and Befu come to the conclusion that *nihonjinron* is the worldview of an older male with a higher standard of living; while this worldview and the ideology of the establishment may be espoused by less than a majority in a numerical sense, those who espouse it are in the majority in the political sense.[88]

It is noteworthy that this idea of "Japaneseness" was based on ignoring the "Others" of Japan, instead drawing a parallel between the past and present

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[84] I define "postwar Japan" here, in accord with John Dower, as equivalent to the latter part of the Showa period (1945–1989), which he sees as a popular and reasonable equation; see John Dower, "The Useful War," *Daedalus* 199, no. 3 (Summer, 1990): 68.

[85] Yoshimoto Mitsuhiro, *Kurosawa: Film Studies and Japanese Cinema* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000), 10.

[86] Roger Goodman, "New Research Trends in the Anthropology and Sociology of Japan," *Japan aktuell – Journal of Current Japanese Affairs* 3 (2006), 64. The theoretical predecessors of *nihonjinron*, however, have been around for centuries. The "uniqueness" of Japan was perhaps first introduced by the Meiji Government in their establishing of an imperial ideology that emphasized the distinctiveness of the Japanese nation; see Mizuno Hiromi, *Science for the Empire: Scientific Nationalism in Modern Japan* (Stanford: Standford University Press, 2009), 2–3.

[87] Manabe Kazufumi and Befu Harumi, "Japanese Cultural Identity – An Empirical Investigation of Nihonjinron," *Japanstudien 4* (1993): 124.

[88] Ibid., 100.

Japanese.[89] The "Others" in this case refer to minorities within Japan. Within the international framework the Anglo-Americans, or *ōbeijin*, have generally been the reference point. *Nihonjinron* is generally considered a publishing genre because it "lacks the internal coherence to qualify as a system of knowledge" that is required of a discourse.[90] As Ivy notes, the conclusion of what it means to be Japanese may be positive or negative, but it is still a sign of the uniqueness of the Japanese.[91] *Nihonjinron*, as noted by many, is not unique as a discourse of national identity, but the amount of publications about Japan's uniqueness, or the historical materials used to recreate a national culture, can often be considered so.[92] Thus, in research one must be careful with one's sources, because there is always the risk of ending up portraying Japan in an essentialist light.[93]

Finally, in addition to literature and film, anime, too, is a prominent medium within which techno-scientific narratives play a large role. Starting with the paramount *Astroboy*, various images abound. *Neon Genesis Evangelion* offers an outlook on scientific femininity with its emphasis on female scientists, such as Akagi Ritsuko or Shinji's late mother Ikari Yui. In addition, there is also a vast body of anime or manga adaptations that deal with scientific matters. I have, however, decided to exclude live action films that are based on anime or manga, such as *Cutie Honey* (2004, 2016), *Yatterman* (2009), *Sky High* (2003), *Casshern* (2004), and anime films such as *Akira* (1988) and *Kōkaku kidōtai* (Ghost in the Shell, 1995, also based on

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[89] Funabiki Takeo 船曳健夫, *'Nihonjinron' saikō* 「日本人論」再考 [Reassessing Nihonjinron] (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 2010), 4, 7.

[90] Chris Burgess, "The 'illusion' of homogeneous Japan and national character: Discourse as a tool to transcend the 'myth' vs. 'reality' binary," *The Asia – Pacific Journal: Japan Focus* 8, no. 9 (2010): 2, 4; Marilyn Ivy, *Discourses of the Vanishing: Modernity, Phantasm, Japan* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1995), 2. In more scholarly literature, see Doi Takeo 土井武夫, *Amae no kōzō* 甘えの構造 [The anatomy of dependence] (Tokyo: Kōbundō, 1973); Nakane Chie 中根千枝, *Tateshakai no ningen kankei* 縦社会の人間関係・単一社会の理論 [Human relations in a vertical society] (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1967); and Ruth Benedict, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture* (Boston and New York: A Mariner Book, 2005 [1946]) for widespread notions and concepts about "Japaneseness."

[91] Ivy, *Discourses*, 2. As Ivy further suggests, the targets are also the Japanese themselves, not Westerners.

[92] Burgess, "Nihonjinron," 3; Sugimoto Yoshio, *An Introduction to Japanese Society* (Cambridge, New York, Port Melbourne, Madrid and Cape Town: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 2.

[93] The study of Japan has had its roots in a line of thought that has constantly compared it to "the West." This is true of some of the earliest accounts of Japan, made by Basil Hall Chamberlain, George B. Sansom and Edwin O. Reischauer, who all isolate a so-called Japanese essence, an essential Japan (Richard H. Minear, "Orientalism and the Study of Japan," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 39, no. 3 [1980], 511–514).

manga),[94] although many thematic similarities are to be found between *kaiki eiga* and anime. Some scholars include anime as part and parcel of Japanese cinema, "within expanded cinema studies" as Lamarre states, [95] whereas others analyze it as a clearly separate medium with its own traditions, rules and limitations. I agree with the latter stance, although thematic anime studies do provide interesting viewpoints to consider and take into account.

1.6 THESIS STRUCTURE

This thesis is divided into eight main chapters which form two distinct parts. Chapters 2 and 3 identify the research gaps, frame the research questions, and create a conceptual framework within which the issue of scientific masculinity as a representation of national images may be approached. Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7 form the core analysis of this thesis, which is divided thematically according to four different national images addressed by the films: Japan as a militarist nation, Japan as a pacifist nation, Japan as an economic superpower ("Japan as No. 1")[96] and Japan as a technological superpower.

Chapter 2 is concerned with genre. I will discuss previous literature on Japanese horror cinema with the aim of locating some obvious gaps in the research. The chapter illuminates the need to (re)define the notion of *kaiki eiga*. The aim of this chapter is not only to shed light on the way Japanese horror has been analyzed in the recent past, but also to illuminate the general framework within which my analysis works. I will conclude the chapter with my definition of *kaiki* as speculative fiction.

In Chapter 3, gender becomes the main concern. I will first point out how gender is present, and has been analyzed, with regard to a variety of speculative fictions. Once a background has been established for the study of gender, I will move on to theorizations of the topic with the aim of providing a suitable toolkit for analysis by highlighting and defining concepts such as hegemonic masculinity and hybrid masculinity, as well as their roles and representations in Japan. Finally, I will illuminate the overall role that the history of science and technology has had in Japan, as this provides a framework for an understanding of the concept of scientific masculinity.

In Chapter 4, I will analyze narratives that mediate Japan's militarist past through the figure of the scientist. These narratives most clearly derive from

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[94] This is mostly due to the page count of this thesis but also because, as Lamarre points out, there is a certain specificity in anime that is due to its nature as a medium combining cinema (moving image) and art (drawing/painting), art "techniques" (drawing, painting, compositional techniques, and so forth) and film "apparatuses" (the movie camera and film projector) (Thomas Lamarre, *Anime Machine: A Media Theory of Animation* [Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 2009]: 12, 16).

[95] Lamarre, *Anime Machine*, xxii.

[96] Referring to Ezra Vogel's famous book *Japan as No. 1: Lessons for America* (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1979).

the universal Mad Scientist motif, dealing with topics such as Japan's human experimentation projects, warfare and weapon development. Many of the films utilize the notion of *fukuinhei*, the demilitarized, returning soldier—a Japanese-style return of the repressed. Chapter 5, in turn, is a positive antithesis to the narratives of the previous chapter, highlighting images and stories where scientifically minded men often not only solve problems that Japan is dealing with but also become symbolic saviors of the whole world. In many cases, pacifism is suggested through narratives of a nuclear threat or a worldwide threat spreading from Japan.

Economic nationalism and the image of Japan as No. 1 are dissected in Chapter 6.[97] This is achieved by deconstructing the *daikokubashira*[98] ideology. Many films quite directly challenge the notion of "working," providing alternative role models or narratives of escape from the ideal that Japan's economic growth was based upon. On the other hand, there are also narratives that, highlighting the dissolution of paternity in the family, become larger representations of the dissolution of patriarchy itself.

Chapter 7 continues with this theme, placing the discourse within the framework of technological nationalism. I will point out how robot policies are used as real-life reference points for fictional narratives and how technological nationalism and the idea of the building of the science-technological superpower find their fictional representations. I will also point out how gender roles within the sphere of technology are slowly beginning to be questioned and the traditional hierarchy subverted.

[97] Economic nationalism can be defined as "economic policies which are adopted to defend and strengthen the state against foreign competition" (James Mayall, *Nationalism and International Society* [Cambridge, New York, Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1990], 72).

[98] Daikokubashira means the central (supporting) pillar of the house and here refers to the role of the male breadwinner.

2 GENRE AND THE STUDY OF *KAIKI EIGA*

This chapter deals with issues regarding genre. According to most critics, genres provide the formulas that drive production; they constitute the structures that define individual mainstream films. For example, programming decisions are based primarily on generic criteria, and the interpretations of generic films depend directly on the audience's generic expectations. All of these aspects are covered by the single term "genre," although its meaning remains confusing.[1] This confusion is present also in the way Japanese horror cinema has been theorized, analyzed and categorized previously.

Horrific, weird and fantastic narratives have been a popular category in Japanese cinema for decades. In fact, Japanese cinema has experienced three such booms during its history: the 1910s, the 1950s and the 1990s. There are two differing opinions on the prevalence of horror and supernatural tales. First, there is the idea that horror booms tend to appear within certain periods of time: with no imminent crises looming on the horizon, people are able to enjoy fictional horror; alternatively, as horror films are often cheap to make, economic downturns also provide an opportunity for the production of these films. By contrast, others see that the popularity of horror and sci-fi films correlates with times of economic and political anxiety because they allow the expression of the "sense of powerlessness and anxiety that correlates with times of depression, recession [...] galloping inflation and national confusion."[2] In addition, there is another explanation to be considered in relation to the popularity cycles of horror. In "desensitization through habituation," a certain style attracts until habituations set in and the style becomes worn. Once a certain period has elapsed, the desensitization disappears and a forgotten older style may be find renewed interest.[3]

In this chapter, I will first point out how general confusion around the term "genre" has contributed to what works have been included in analysis of "Japanese horror." I will introduce two notions, J-horror and Asia Extreme, and look at how these have created some boundaries for what is considered

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[1] Rick Altman, *Film/Genre* (London: British Film Institute, 1999), 11, 14.

[2] See Eerolainen, "Oh the Horror!," 40. The quote is from Noël Carroll, "Nightmare and the Horror Film: The Symbolic Biology of Fantastic Beings," in *Film Quarterly: Forty Years – A Selection*, ed. Brian Henderson and Ann Martin (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1999), 159. This statement is echoed in Yomota Inuhiko's *Kaiki eiga tengoku Ajia* 怪奇映画天国アジア [Asia, the paradise of weird films] (Tokyo: Hakushūsha, 2009), in which he states that not only Japan but also South Korea and other countries in Southeast Asia have produced a wide range of horror films, especially in the early 2000s. Common for all of them is that they went through serious financial crises and political changes (Yomota, ibid., 281).

[3] Grodal, *Embodied Visions*, 49.

horror. This is done in order to highlight the need for a more all-encompassing category. In the second subchapter, I critique previous research for inconsistencies that are partly related to the genre issue, as well as the obviously essentialist outlook that some studies have. Third, based on the obvious gaps in research, I will add my own interpretation of the word *kaiki*, proposing that it should be used as a starting point for analysis of weird, fantastic and horrific narratives on screen. It should be noted, however, that "genre" does provide an easy concept that instantly addresses potential spectators and allows for the exchange of words and ideas in everyday conversation, despite all its shortcomings.

2.1 GENRE CONCERNS

Despite its prevalence, much of the previous research in both Japan and the West has tended to overlook the presence of *kaiki*. Anderson and Richie mention ghost and monster films for a total of two pages in their seminal work on Japanese film, stating that "the stories are all alike … The films are made cheaply and unimaginatively," while the audience nonetheless responds to this "well-known stimulus."[4] For them, ghost stories were for the masses to enjoy but not for scholars to analyze. Instead, previous studies have concentrated on directors,[5] Japanese cinema as "Other" from Western cinema,[6] genres and

[4] Joseph Anderson and Donald Richie, *The Japanese Film: Art and Industry* (Princeton and New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1982), 262.

[5] On Kurosawa Akira, see Stephen Prince, *The Warrior's Camera: The Cinema of Akira Kurosawa* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991); Donald Richie, *The Films of Akira Kurosawa* (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1965); Yoshimoto, *Kurosawa*. On Ozu Yasujirō, see Donald Richie, *OZU* (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1974); Woojeong Joo, *The Cinema of Ozu Yasujiro: Histories of the Everyday* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2017); Wayne Stein and Marc DiPauolo, eds., *Ozu International: Essays on the Global Influences of a Japanese Auteur* (New York, London, New Delhi and Sydney: Bloomsbury Academic, 2015); Choi Jinhee, ed., *Reorienting Ozu: A Master and His Influence* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).

[6] See, for example, Noël Burch's canonical *To the Distant Observer: Form and meaning in the Japanese Cinema* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1979).

eras,[7] and the industry in relation to general history.[8] Recently, many volumes discuss Japanese cinema and its individual films from a multitude of perspectives.[9] These are but a few of the approaches to be found in the lively scene that comprises Japanese film studies in the West. Naturally, some of the most encompassing volumes on Japanese film history are published in Japanese,[10] despite Yoshimoto Mitsuhiro's (2000, 2006) argument that the Japanese government has not been willing to admit cinema as a significant part of Japanese culture.[11] A similar point is made by Aaron Gerow, who suggests that "after the industry went into decline in the late 1960s and subsidies were needed, the Japanese government did not intervene in part because of long-held beliefs that film was merely a crass entertainment unworthy of government support."[12] Hence, not only *kaiki eiga* but cinema at

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[7] On period dramas, see Darrell William Davis, *Picturing Japaneseness: Monumental Style, National Identity, Japanese Film* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); on classical Japanese cinema during the Golden Age, see Catherine Russel, *Classical Japanese Cinema Revisited* (New York and London: Continuum, 2011); on *nuuberu boogu* and cinema of the 1960s and 1970s, see David Desser, *Eros Plus Massacre: An Introduction to the Japanese New Wave Cinema* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1988) and Isolde Standish, *Politics, Porn and Protest: Japanese Avant-Garde Cinema in the 1960s and 1970s* (London and New York: Continuum, 2011); on the "new" New Wave, see Tom Mes and Jasper Sharp, *The Midnight Eye Guide to New Japanese Film* (Berkeley: Stone Bridge Press, 2005).

[8] See Isolde Standish, *A New History of Japanese Cinema: A Century of Narrative Film* (New York and London: Continuum, 2007); Donald Richie, *A Hundred Years of Japanese Cinema* (Tokyo, New York and London: Kodansha International, 2001); Anderson and Richie, *The Japanese Film*.

[9] See Arthur Nolletti, Jr. and David Desser, eds., *Reframing Japanese Cinema: Authorship, Genre, History* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1992); Keiko I. McDonald, *Reading a Japanese Film: Cinema in Context* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2006); Julian Stringer and Alastair Phillips, eds., *Japanese Cinema: Texts and Contexts* (London and New York: Routledge, 2007); Dennis Washburn and Carole Cavanaugh, eds., *Word and Image in Japanese Cinema* (Cambridge, New York, Melbourne and Madrid: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Daisuke Miyao, ed., *The Oxford Handbook of Japanese Cinema* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2014).

[10] See Aaron Gerow, ed., *Nihon eiga wa ikiteiru* 日本映画史は生きている [Japanese cinema is alive], an eight-volume series named no doubt after the current "crisis" in Japanese cinema and the apparently bleak future it has been projected to have in public discourse. See also the thematically arranged 15-volume *Nihon eigashi sōsho* 日本映画史叢書, Satō Tadao's four-volume series *Nihon eigashi* 日本映画史 and the three-volume *Nihon eiga no kyoshōtachi* 日本映画史巨匠達.

[11] Yoshimoto, *Kurosawa*, 43. His critique stems from a view that Japanese cultural studies is mainly concerned with "the institutional legitimation of Japanese literature programs and Japanese studies" where "the wholesale incorporation of film … will erode the luster of Japanese culture as high culture" (ibid., 42). See also Yoshimoto Mitsuhiro, "The University, Disciplines, National Identity: Why is There No Film Studies in Japan?," *The South Atlantic Quarterly* 99, no. 4 (2000): 697–713.

[12] Aaron Gerow, "Recent Film Policy and the Fate of Film Criticism in Japan," *Midnight Eye*, July 11, 2006. www.midnighteye.com/features/recent-film-policy-and-the-fate-of-film-criticism-in-japan/.

large could be seen as a form of mass culture unworthy of support or scholarly attention.

A newly found scholarly interest in Japanese horror cinema appeared in the wake of the success of the original *Ringu* and the subsequent Hollywood adaptations of contemporary Japanese horror films. Some have tried to paint a historical overview from the early 1950s to the 2000s,[13] possibly highlighting the role of Japan's traditional stage arts,[14] whereas others have concentrated on contemporary works.[15] There are comparative studies between Japanese horror cinema and the horror cinema traditions of other nations,[16] as well as between Japanese horror films and their American remakes.[17] There are also many texts regarding individual works, such as *Gojira* (1954),[18] *Ringu* (1997)[19]

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[13] See Colette Balmain, *Introduction to Japanese Horror Film* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2008); Jay McRoy, ed., *Japanese Horror Cinema* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005); Eerolainen, "Oh the Horror!"

[14] See Richard J. Hand, "Aesthetics of Cruelty: Traditional Japanese Theatre and the Horror Film," in Jay McRoy, ed., *Japanese Horror Cinema* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005), 18–28; Jay McRoy, *Nightmare Japan*: *Contemporary Japanese Horror Cinema* (Amsterdam and New York: Rodopi, 2008); Balmain, *Japanese Horror*; Yau Shuk-ting Kinnia, "A "Horrible" Legacy: *Noh* and J-horror," in Yau Shuk-ting Kinnia, ed., *East Asian Cinema and Cultural Heritage: From China, Hong Kong, Taiwan to Japan and South Korea* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 101-124; Kyōko Hirano "The Rise of Japanese Horror Films: Yotsuya Ghost Story (Yotsuya Kaidan), Demonic Men, and Victimized Women," in Alisa Freedman and Toby Slade, eds., *Introducing Japanese Popular Culture* (London and New York: Routledge, 2017), 204-215; Hirose Ai, "*Eiga 'Yotsuya kaidan' kō: Nakagawa Nobuo no jikkenteki kaikihyōgen*" 映画『四谷怪談』考：中川信夫の実験的怪奇表現 [A study of Yotsuya Kaidan: In a case of Nakagawa Nobuo's experimental expression of horror], *Shōkei gakuin daigaku kiyō* 尚絅学院大学紀要 61, no. 62 (2011): 47–62.

[15] See McRoy, *Nightmare Japan*; Jim Harper, *Flowers from Hell – The Modern Japanese Horror Film* (Hereford: Noir Publishing, 2009); Iles, *The Crisis of Identity*.

[16] See Choi Jinhee and Mitsuyo Wada-Marciano, eds., *Horror to the Extreme: Changing Boundaries in Asian Cinema* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2009); Steven T. Brown, *Japanese Horror and the Transnational Cinema of Sensations* (Basingstoke and Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019); Park Myoungsook, "Hollywood's Remake Practices under the Copyright Regime: French Films and Japanese Horror Films," in *Fear, Cultural Anxiety, and Transformation: Horror, Science Fiction and Fantasy Films Remade*, ed. by Scott A. Lukas and John Marmysz (Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2009), 107-128.

[17] See Wee, *American Remakes*; Adam Lowenstein, *Dreaming of Cinema*; Sarah Arnold, *Maternal Horror Film: Melodrama and Motherhood* (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).

[18] See Chon Noriega, "Godzilla and the Japanese Nightmare: When 'Them!' Is U.S.," in *Cinema Journal* 27, no. 1 (1987); Yomota Inuhiko, "The Menace from the South Seas: Honda Ishiro's Godzilla (1954)," in *Texts and Contexts*, ed. Julian Stringer and Alastair Phillips; Schnellbächer, "Has the Empire Sunk Yet?"

[19] For a comprehensive volume-length study on the *Ringu*-phenomenon alone, see Kristen Lacefield, ed., *The Scary Screen: Media Anxiety in* The Ring (London and New York: Routledge, 2010); see also Leena Eerolainen, "Perheonnea ja sorretun kostoa," http://widerscreen.fi/2009-2/perheonnea-ja-

and *Kairo* (2001).[20] Many works concentrate on markers of historical trauma[21] and, recently, the curse that spreads through technological devices is highlighted as a metaphor for a virus.[22] A few recent PhD dissertations, too, provide valuable discussions on the topic.[23]

In Japanese, horror has been analyzed by the filmmakers themselves[24] in relation to wider Asian horror traditions,[25] as well as Japan's own cultural traditions and folklore.[26] Family forms one important theme.[27] One of the paramount books in the field is Uchiyama Kazuki's edited volume *Kaiki to*

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sorretun-kostoa/, accessed December 5, 2015; Washitani Hana 鷲谷花, *"Ringu" sanbusaku to onnatachi no media kūkan: kaibutsuka suru "onna," muku no "chichi"* 『リング』三部作と女たちのメディア空間―怪物化する「女」、無垢の「父」[The "*Ringu*" trilogy and the media space of women: Women who become-monstrous and immaculate fathers], in *Kaiki to gensō e no kairo: Kaidan kara J-horaa e* 怪奇と幻想への回路―階段から J ホラーへ [The route to the weird and fantastic: From kaidan to J-horror], ed. Uchiyama Kazuki 内山一樹 (Tokyo: Shinwasha, 2008), 195–224.

[20] See Steven T. Brown, *Tokyo Cyberpunk: Posthumanism in Japanese Visual Culture* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); Wee, *American Remakes*.

[21] See Linnie Blake, *The Wounds of Nations: Horror Cinema, Historical Trauma and National Identity* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005); Adam Lowenstein, *Shocking Representations: Historical Trauma, National Cinema, and the Modern Horror Film* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005); Fabio Rambelli, "Gods, Dragons, Catfish, and Godzilla: Fragments for a History of Religious Views on Natural Disasters in Japan," in *When the Tsunami Came to Shore: Culture and Disaster in Japan*, ed. Roy Starrs (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 50-69.

[22] See Carlos Rojas, "Viral Contagion in the Ringu Intertext," in *The Oxford Handbook of Japanese Cinema*, ed. Miyao Daisuke (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 416–437.

[23] For an analysis of horror films made in Asia, see Danny Boey, *The national specificity of horror sources in Asian horror cinema (*PhD Diss., Queensland University of Technology, 2012); for a discussion about the figure of the cyborg in science fiction and horror, see Lan Kuo-Wei, *Technofetishism of posthuman bodies: Representations of cyborgs, ghosts, and monsters in contemporary Japanese science fiction film and animation (*PhD Diss., University of Sussex, 2012*);* for an analysis of the monstrous child in both literature and film, see Lindsay Nelson, *Embracing the Demon: Monstrous Children in Japanese Literature and Cinema, 1946–2008* (PhD Diss., University of Southern California, 2012).

[24] See, for example, the various writings of Kurosawa Kiyoshi.

[25] Yomota, *Kaiki eiga tengoku*.

[26] See Ōshima Kiyoaki 大島清明, *J-horaa no yūrei kenkyū* J ホラーの幽霊研究 [Ghost research of J-horror] (Tokyo: Akiyama shoten, 2010); see also Ichiyanagi Hirotaka 一柳廣孝 and Yoshida Morio's 吉田司雄 contribution to the field in their edited series *Naitomea sōsho* ナイトメア叢書 (Seikyūsha, eight volumes published between 2005 and 2012), which includes volumes on horror film, Japanese horror, mutating women, *yōkai*, weird literature et cetera.

[27] For discussion about the family in Japanese horror cinema in a book that was published in the field of sociology, see Leena Eerolainen, "Kazoku no shiten kara mita J-horaa" 家族の視点から見た J ホラー [J-horror from the viewpoint of the family], in *Media kontentsu-ron* [メディア・コンテンツ論, Theory of media contents], ed. Endō, Hideki 遠藤英樹 and Okamoto, Takeshi 岡本健 (Kyoto: Nakanishiya-shuppan, 2016), 123-140; see also Washitani, "Ringu sanbusaku."

gensō e no kairo (The road to the weird and the fantastic, 2008).[28] Uchiyama's volume provides academic essays and readings of a multitude of films throughout the history of *kaiki eiga* in Japan, including many films not featuring in Western scholarship of Japanese horror. Still, despite the few volumes described above, the study of Japanese horror films has not been a part of the larger film studies circle in Japan. Recently, however, a change has been promoted by Hirano Kyōko, author of *Mr. Smith Goes to Tokyo: Japanese Cinema under the American Occupation, 1945–1952* (1994), a brilliant and well-known study on Occupation-era Japanese cinema. In her book *Nihon no eigashi, 10 no teema* (Ten themes in Japanese film history, 2014), she proposes that J-horror is to be taken seriously as a part of Japanese film history and, thus, as a topic of serious academic consideration. A similar stance is promoted by Yomota Inuhiko, whose fieldwork in Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand shows that Japanese cinema is known there in the form of films or series like *Gegege no Kitarō* (originally a *yōkai* [spectre] manga series created by Mizuki Shigeru in the 1960s) or *Ringu* (1998). These countries are known for the richness of their own fantastic and supernatural storylines and a similarly long tradition of public performances of mysterious tales, which also explains the popularity of Japanese horror.[29]

2.1.1 J-HORROR

The emergence of J-horror collided with the overall promotion of Japanese popular culture outside Japan's borders. This soft power, or "Gross National Cool" as Douglas McGray (2002) calls it, was seen to be of growing importance to Japan's economy, international relations and image abroad.[30] Suddenly Japanese popular culture became a worldwide wonder with J-horror in tow. Interestingly enough, however, there also exists a deep-rooted tendency toward protectionism: a representative of the Cool Japan fund has explicitly

[28] In Japanese, *gensō* means fantasy. According to a search in the collections of the National Diet Library in Japan, the notion of "*gensō eiga*" is rarely used alone but rather combined with words such as *kyōfu*, *kaiki* or *tokusatsu*, suggesting the inherent similarity of all of these terms.

[29] Yomota, *Kaiki eiga*, 51–52, 281.

[30] "Cool Japan," a notion coined by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry in 2002, adapted various film-related policies such as the "Plan for Promoting Japanese Film and Image Media," proposed by the Committee on Film Promotion, which was coined "by the Agency for Cultural Affairs but had participants from various ministries and film institutions" (Gerow, "Recent Film Policy"). These strategies were not, however, central to the Cool Japan strategy. As suggested by Adam Torel, it is apparent that it has still left much to hope for: "It's only cooperating with the really big companies. Representatives of the Cool Japan Fund haven't even talked to the producers of mid-budget films" ("Fixing Japanese cinema's image problem," Tokyo International Film Festival 2015 roundtable session). This emphasis on other forms of popular culture, such as anime and manga, is interesting considering the fact that Japan has one of the most prominent film industries in the world. For a general definition and a summary of meanings of popular culture, see Storey, *Cultural Theory*, 5–13.

stated that "I think it's most important to present something that is authentically Japanese to the world market. We should be proud of our old-fashioned style of film-making."[31]

Japanese horror cinema and the consequent study of it emerged in an environment in which the polarized nature of the Japanese film business was becoming explicit. Japanese horror cinema, as well as other works that drew from its popularity, has been an important cultural export, despite the unwillingness on the part of the government to admit it. Together with the popularity of anime and manga, it has increasingly led to the recognition of Japanese popular culture as a suitable and "serious" topic for academic analysis, at least beyond Japan's borders. However, in general the field of study is still undervalued and popular culture as a study choice is often questioned.[32] Even so, Japanese horror is interesting not only because of its worldwide popularity, but also because it might be telling of what is sometimes referred to as a crisis in the Japanese film business, often seen to go hand in hand with the emergence of the *seisakuiinkai* system.[33] Beyond Japan's borders the field continues to exert its power, although the J-horror phenomenon itself is starting to wane twenty years after its initial appearance.[34] The recycling of old narratives in works such as *Sadako 3D 2* (Hanabusa Tsutomu, 2013) or *Sadako vs. Kayako* (Shiraishi Kōji, 2016) is representative of the way in which old film cycles and especially popular manga adaptations have been squeezing original productions out of the Top 20 of Japanese films since 2004 in the quest for profit.[35] They are also representative of the process of desensitization through habituation also present in the multiple sequel trend in American horror cinema.

The problematic nature of J-horror is symbolized by the question of the roots of J-horror. "Japanese horror" often appears as synonymous with "J-

[31] Nagai Nobuhiro, "Fixing Japanese cinema's image problem," Tokyo International Film Festival, 2015.

[32] Personal communication with numerous academics in Japan.

[33] Defined by Joo, Denison and Furukawa as "groups of Japanese companies that come together in order to produce a particular franchise through 'media mix' strategies. They dominate the media production landscape in Japan, creating sometimes long-standing collectives that reduce competition as companies join together to create pre-planned media franchises" (Joo Woojeong, Denison Rayna and Furukawa Hiroko, "Manga Movies Project Report: Transmedia Japanese Franchising," AHRC Research Project [University of East Anglia, 2013]), 2.

[34] See, e.g., a call for chapters in an H-Net mailing list on April 20, 2019 for an edited volume *Japanese Horror: New Critical Approaches to History, Narratives and Aesthetics*, ed. Subashish Bhattacharjee, Ananya Saha and Fernardo Gabriel Pagnoni Berns.

[35] Joo, Denison and Furukawa, "Manga Media Report," 22. The critique here undoubtedly questions the quality of these films as compared to "the golden oldies," since it has been these sorts of adaptations that have allowed Japanese films to retake a majority box office share in their home market since 2006.

horror." The two should not, however, be confused.[36] While Japanese horror has been around for several decades, even centuries, J-horror has commonly come to mean Japanese horror films from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s, and even more narrow definitions are readily available.[37] J-horror has its roots in the aftermath of the collapse of the studio system. In 1961, Japanese studios were responsible for releasing altogether 547 films. Ten years later the number of studio-released films had fallen to 160, with a total of 367 films being released. Like elsewhere in the world, falling audience rates were largely blamed on the emergence of television. However, this did not mean that Japanese film studios ceased to exist, despite frequent mentions of the collapse of the studio system. Rather, instead of producing films, studios started concentrating on distributing them. As a result, directors became *independent* as filmmakers but increasingly *dependent* on multimedia financing and distribution by the major film companies.[38]

After the decline of studio-made films, new currents appeared in the film industry. Alternative and cheaper production models were founded with many self-funded projects and concentration on direct-to-video (V-Cinema) releases in the 1980s.[39] This progress was directly related to the emergence of J-horror. As Kurosawa Kiyoshi points out in an interview, low budgets were central to the creation of J-horror's atmospheric creepiness: "You look at a J-horror movie and you see that it's all about how the characters have relationships to people dead and alive, to inanimate objects and folklore and their living spaces." He continues: "The Japanese often attach their darkest emotions—and fears—to seemingly trivial phenomena. This is the secret to making really scary movies on a very low budget."[40]

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[36] Ichiyanagi and Yoshida's edited volume *Horaa Japanesuku no genzai* ("The contemporary Japanese horror," 2005) illustrates the multimedial nature of Japanese horror and provides an exemplary entry point into its various manifestations, from literature to film to storytelling practices.

[37] McRoy, *Nightmare Japan*, 8–9; Zahlten and Kimata applaud Tsuruta Norio for reinvigorating *kaidan* as one of Japanese cinema's most durable and economically viable film genres with his *Hontō ni atta kowai hanashi* (Scary True Stories, 1991) saga, shifting the emphasis from the bloody spectacles of the 1980s to intense atmospheric tension based on showing less. They explain that "not only did he turn the horror methodology around 180 degrees, but also established extremely successful and resilient storylines and iconography, influencing all the big names in Japanese horror cinema today" (Alexander Zahlten and Kimata Kimihiko, "Norio Tsuruta," last modified December 20, 2005, http://www.midnighteye.com/interviews/norio-tsuruta/).

[38] Mitsuyo Wada-Marciano, "J-horror: New Media's Impact on Contemporary Japanese Horror Cinema," in *Horror of the Extreme: Changing Boundaries in Asian Cinema*, eds. Choi Jinhee and Mitsuyo Wada-Marciano (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2009), 16.

[39] *Jishu eiga*, for example, are completely funded, produced and distributed by the directors and their production teams. Not having to pay for studio personnel, the production costs are often lower. *Jishu eiga* can be considered a hit if enough money is made to produce the next film.

[40] *The Japan Times*, October 21, 2015.

The filmmakers themselves often talked about *japaniizu horaa*, deliberately using the word in *katakana* as opposed to "*Nihon no horaa.*" This places the J-horror movement against the backdrop of the "J-culture," despite the renowned scriptwriter Takahashi Hiroshi arguing that there was a feeling of unease about the use of the letter. For Takahashi, J-horror is a "hybrid form of cinema that combines particular subgenre of the *kaidan* [ghost story] tradition … with elements drawn from non-Japanese cinematic traditions."[41] As Kinoshita points out, J-horror is not a genre *per se*, but rather a body of works with a definable historical background and thematic concerns; it may be described as a local movement in the late 1990s that was comprised of films, TV series and film critiques from filmmakers, and it placed particular emphasis on everyday life and media.[42] According to Kurosawa, J-horror specifically refers to a group of relatively low-budget horror films made in Japan which concentrate aesthetically on the low-key production of atmospheric and psychological fear, capitalizing on urban legends proliferated through mass media and popular culture.[43]

One of the narrowest definitions of J-horror is that *Japaniizu horaa* includes the works based on Suzuki Kōji's hit novels, which were shown in double bills and became popular because of their end-of-a-millenium (seikimatsu) mood.[44] This *seikimatsu* mood could be described as the anxiety toward recent happenings and the general societal unease.[45] Writings of the filmmakers themselves, most of whom belong to the same generation, became an integral part of the movement,[46] much like the writers of modern Japanese pulp fiction, who "gathered within the space of supposedly 'lowly' pulp not

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[41] See Brown, *Cinema of Sensations*, 5.

[42] With regard to the latter, it is similar to the *nuuberu baagu* (Nouvelle Vague, New Wave) movement of the 1960s, where directors created thematically like-minded films that were informed by both the changing Japanese society and film studio policies.

[43] For analysis of Kurosawa Kiyoshi's statements, see Kinoshita Chika, "The Mummy Complex: Kurosawa Kiyoshi's Loft and J-horror," in *Horror of the Extreme: Changing Boundaries in Asian Cinema*, ed. Choi Jinhee and Mitsuyo Wada-Marciano (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2009), 103–105. It should be noted, however, that the spreading of fear through mass media was present even in the films of the 1950s. *Henshin ningen* films, for example, regularly narrate the story through newspaper images.

[44] See Ōshima, *Yūrei kenkyū*, 33.

[45] Yoshikawa, "Horaaeiga-ron," 117.

[46] Kinoshita, "Mummy Complex," 104–105; Brown summarizes that Kurosawa Kiyoshi was college friends with the director Nakata Hideo and a roommate of the scriptwriter Takahashi Hiroshi, as well as a teacher and mentor to Shimizu Takashi (Brown, *Cinema of Sensations*, 29). Kurosawa, Nakata and Shimizu Takashi all began their careers as V-Cinema directors and lacked the extensive 35-mm training formerly provided by studios. They were thus quick to embrace new media, whether through digital media or computer editing, in order to trim their production budgets and schedules (Wada-Marciano, "New Media's Impact," 18).

only to express their own opinions but also to exchange sophisticated and potentially subversive ideas with others."[47]

2.1.2 ASIA EXTREME

The metamorphosis of Japanese horror from a folkloric notion to a multicultural profitable commodity was paralleled with the establishment of the so-called "Asia Extreme," a DVD label from Tartan that was flexible enough to include a range of Asian films that seemed exportable.[48] Wada-Marciano points out that this led to a distortion in the Western-based analysis of Japanese horror because the non-horror films of the 1960s were packaged as precursors to J-horror. *Onibaba* (Shindō Kaneto, 1964), for example, was originally marketed as *minwa mono* (folktale film) or *dokuritsu puro* (independent film), but it is now categorized as horror in Lowenstein's (2005) analysis of its being an allegory of Hiroshima. Wada-Marciano criticizes the way the forerunners of Western research on Japanese horror cinema tend to ignore the historical context of the genre, including such works as Masumura Yasuzō's *Mojū* and Ōshima Nagisa's *Ai no koriida*.[49] As the following delightful quotation from Jasper Sharp's suggests,

> *why so many studies so far have delimited the subject by looking at "the origins, themes and conventions of Japanese horror cinema from 1950 to date (Balmain 2008)" when works based on the kaidan such as Yotsuya kaidan were being made in the 1910s, early German precursors to the genre such as The Golem (1915), The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari (1920) and The Student of Prague (1913) were making it to Japan within years of their domestic releases, and the ero-guro literary genre led by writers like Edogawa Rampo thrived in the 1920s. And why, oh why, do so many insist on looking at Nikkatsu Roman Porno films such as the Angel Guts series as being made for the horror market?*[50]

For Wada-Marciano, this is not solely a matter of genre categorization, but a failure in acknowledging certain connections among text, its historical context, and the discursive subject.[51] This is ultimately why she criticizes McRoy's

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[47] Kawana, "Mad Scientists," 119.

[48] Choi Jinhee and Mitsuyo Wada-Marciano, "Introduction," in *Horror to the Extreme: Changing Boundaries in Asian Cinema*, eds. Jinhee Choi and Mitsuyo Wada-Marciano (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2009), 5. It can be seen as a complementary category of J-horror, encompassing directors like Miike Takashi and Tsukamoto Shinya, whose works are often labeled as "horror" but who are not part of the J-horror movement itself.

[49] Wada-Marciano, "New Media's Impact," 33, 37.

[50] Jasper Sharp, review of *Introduction to Japanese Horror Film* by Colette Balmain, last modified March 9, 2009, http://www.midnighteye.com/books/introduction-to-japanese-horror-film/.

[51] Wada-Marciano, ibid., 34.

Japanese Horror Cinema. Although Wada-Marciano does not deny McRoy's editorial achievements and the quality of individual essays in the volume, she points out that the contributors take the view of what constitutes Japanese horror cinema far beyond the historic context of the genre. Mizoguchi Kenji's *Ugetsu monogatari*, Kurosawa Akira's *Kumonosu-jō* or Fukasaku Kinji's *Battle Royale* were never associated with the horror genre with a reference to either the films' production or distribution in Japan.[52] More recently, although Nakata Hideo's *Gekijōrei* (Ghost Theatre, 2015) was marketed as J-horror, it belongs more to the *kaiki* category of the strange and fantastic, as scriptwriter Takahashi Hiroshi (2015) points out. So does *Zan'e* (The Inerasable, Nakamura Yoshihiro, 2015), which contains a terrific sense of mystery. Furthermore, what of Kurosawa Kiyoshi? As I have pointed out, "Kurosawa is often called 'a horror film director', but in light of the expectations delivered by this moniker, these films are sure to disappoint: *Akarui mirai* (2003) has weirdly multiplying medusas, but that does not make a film horrific. *Doppelgänger* (2003) almost becomes a farce when the battle of the minds between the protagonist and his alter ego accelerates, or when the protagonist gets chased by an enormous disco ball."[53]

As the above attests, "Asia Extreme" has not only become synonymous with J-horror but also representative of the image of 21st-century Japanese cinema in the West. This is simply because the image of a national cinema is largely constituted by the works that are distributed beyond its borders. The basic statement visible in *Horror of the Extreme* is that J-horror, used by the filmmakers themselves, becomes something close to a production category, whereas Asia Extreme is used as a distribution term. They are similar in that both emerged in relation to the collapse of the studio system, with new media and global DVD distribution boosting their popularity.

2.2 ESSENTIALISM AND INCONSISTENCIES IN PREVIOUS RESEARCH

In Japanese (horror) film studies, essentialism unfortunately—and hopefully unintentionally—manifests in a plethora of ways. Valerie Wee argues that Japanese horror film incorporates an unquestioning acceptance of supernatural things, as opposed to Western horror where logic and medical/scientific explanations are emphasized. [54] This statement is problematic. It seems to argue that Japanese horror does not include works that are concerned with the scientific. In other words, only works that belong to the category of the supernatural can be called horror. Japanese horror cinema, however, includes works where the role of science plays an important

[52] Wada-Marciano, "New Media's Impact," 34.

[53] Eerolainen, "Oh the Horror!," 41.

[54] Wee, *American Remakes*, 40.

part, a trajectory that has its roots in literature. In addition, Wee's study reconstructs a model of seeing ongoing tensions between premodern and modern as a crisis troubling Japan even today. This is what Harootunian refers to as an image of "an unmoving social order at the heart of a society in constant motion."[55] Claims regarding the feudal remnants in modern Japanese society virtually eliminate historical specificity.[56] This correlates directly with the key ideas of *nihonjinron*: Japan is forever haunted by its nostalgic past, producing a spatio-temporal cultural hybrid unlike any other country in the world. This seems to suggest that the main societal concern in Japan is the past instead of anxiety for tomorrow,[57] as proposed by Lowenstein's framing of *Ringu* as a representation of "the connections and tensions between the modern and premodern, domestic and global."[58] However, as Jasper Sharp emphasizes, one does not need to stay in the country long before recognizing that "the Japanese problems" are in fact the problems of any post-industrial society.[59] This is an important statement. In this thesis I focus on Japanese society, but one should constantly bear in mind that the concerns present in the films are by no means limited to Japan.

There is also the issue of Japan as a nation defined by a trauma. First, despite horror cinema being a popular genre even before WWII, McRoy argues it was because of the war's traumatic end that Japan experienced "an explosion of tales of terror and apocalypse."[60] This national trauma is seen to be present in a plethora of works, all of which are also open to other interpretations. Many see *Onibaba* manifesting a structure in which a country (Japan) is torn between two leaders (the Emperor and General Douglas MacArthur), who represent the lingering past and the present.[61] Linnie Blake, in turn, analyzes *Ringu* as decoding "the traumatic changes wrought to Japanese society and hence national self-image by the militaristic build-up to the Second World War and its apocalyptic closure," if set against and read in the light of both the classics of postwar Japanese horror and Gore Verbinski's Hollywood remake.[62]

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[55] Harry Harootunian, *Overcome by Modernity: History, Culture and Community in Interwar Japan* (New Jersey and Oxfordshire: Princeton University Press, 2000), 316.

[56] Yoshimoto, ibid., 18–19.

[57] For a discussion of phantasms that haunt the Japanese society of today without any trace of essentialism, see Marilyn Ivy's key study *Discourses of the Vanishing: Modernity, Phantasm, Japan* (1995).

[58] Lowenstein, *Dreaming of Cinema*, 81–82.

[59] Sharp, "Introduction to Japanese horror film."

[60] McRoy, *Nightmare Japan*, 6.

[61] Lowenstein, *Shocking Representations*, 91; Jyotsna Kapur, "The Return of History and Horror: Onibaba and the Atomic Bomb," in *Horror International*, eds. Steven Jay Schneider and Tony Williams (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2005), 92.

[62] Blake, *Wounds of Nations*, 10.

McRoy draws a relationship between Japan's status as the only nation to have suffered a direct attack by atomic weapons and scenes of annihilations of major cities by monsters in film.[63] Statements like these are problematic on two accounts. First, as Japanese cinema embraced its second Golden Era in the 1950s, there was an explosion of film production in general. Naturally, the amount of genre films rose as well. I would rather agree with Yomota's proposal that after WWII the Japanese horror genre was influenced by modern ideas and began to have more diversity. [64] According to this interpretation, World War II was one, albeit very grave, incident that molded and shaped the film culture of the time, but it was by no means the only source of inspiration in horror. Second, these statements run the risk of trivializing prewar products of the horror genre. Although Japan's experience may have paved the way for definitive scenes that reverberate in the audience, this statement refuses to acknowledge the history of Japanese monster movies (and horror) as a transnational localized product.[65] Not many scholars who propose the connection between Hiroshima and Japanese horror have taken the earlier Japanese *kaiki eiga* from the 1910s and 1920s into account. It was during these two decades, however, when Japanese film started to show overtly subjective, psychological anxieties associated with German expressionism: increasingly disorienting and fragmented visuals, a growing disruption of linearity, ambiguity, dislocation, self-reflexive questioning, and so forth.[66] These influences are rarely discussed, however. This tendency to ignore the influence of early European horror and to locate the roots of Japanese horror in its tradition of ghost stories is an interesting contrast to the way in which general Japanese film histories "typically stress the foreign origins of the movie camera."[67]

A tendency to construct Japan as a perverse and/or violent nation is also present. In previous literature on horror, Colette Balmain makes whopping generalizations when saying that much of Japanese horror, especially in the 1970s and 1980s, was concerned with sexual violence, issues around gender representations, and "*the theme of rape as a major trope of Japanese culture"* (italics mine).[68] Sharp strongly criticizes this orientalist stance, according to which there is an inherent layer of violence within the Japanese people and the Japanese social body that must be somehow made visible.[69] A similar theme

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[63] McRoy, *Nightmare Japan*, 7–8.

[64] Yomota, *Tengoku Ajia*, 49.

[65] Unfortunately there is no space for a more detailed analysis of horror and science fiction motifs according to theories of globalization and localization. While it is not the central point of this thesis, it definitely offers an interesting direction in which this research could be developed in the future.

[66] Wee, *American Remakes*, 36.

[67] Lamarre, *Anime Machine*, 14.

[68] Balmain, *Japanese Horror*, 8. See Section 3.2 for a brief look into the rape allegory regarding Japanese national identity.

[69] See Sharp, "Introduction to Japanese Horror Film."

is echoed in McRoy, who cites Jack Hunter (1998) that "the evisceration of the female body is reminiscent of rituals like '*hara kira*' (sic), an ancient act in which female votives would offer up the 'flower' of their entrails and blood by a self-inflicted knife wound."[70] These kind of statements construct a stereotype where "extreme" Asian films "represent the inscrutable, violently irrational Orient."[71] In addition, narratives of female mutilation are not anything new. Kawana points out that, in fact, as early as the 1920s Edogawa Rampo and other detective writers had their women (*moga*, the new representations of young urban female consumers) slaughtered and dismembered, with their body parts showcased publicly. According to Kawana, modernity took the *moga* "out of the confines of the home onto the streets, only to be watched, stalked and killed."[72] It is thus interesting that many critics see the emergence of such narratives as due to some inherent layer of "Japaneseness," rather than the filmmakers being influenced by previous works. Therefore, academic research that generates "sweeping statements on Japanese culture made without any consideration for its relationship to social practices and history"[73] should be rebutted.

Finally, one dangerous path is to use Japanese cultural concepts without an understanding of the contexts in which they appear. As Kuwayama points out, many of the emic (original) Japanese concepts first appeared within the *nihonjinron* genre.[74] Language unfortunately often ties previous research to *nihonjinron*-esque ideas. Yoshimoto argues that there is a lack of Japanese-speaking scholars who are able to conduct fieldwork and research in Japanese and provide an accurate commentary on society, which is both visible in and acts as a backdrop for films.[75] Wee, for example, falls into the trap of embracing a seemingly non-critical acceptance of Japanese cultural concepts as a basis for interpretation. Concepts such as *giri*, *ninjō*, *amae*, *mujō*, *uchi*, *soto*, *honne* and *tatemae* are frequently used to explain the main concerns of each film.[76] As Yoshimoto points out, "the haunting effect of the essentialized Japaneseness often reinforces the national stereotypes."[77] This is "the inversion of question and answer; that is, what should be scrutinized through a careful analysis of films is used precisely as the answer to interpretive

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[70] See McRoy, *Nightmare Japan*, 24.

[71] Brown, *Cinema of Sensations*, 18. He proposes use of the term "cinema of cruelty" (ibid.).

[72] Kawana Sari, *Murder Most Modern: Detective Fiction and Japanese Culture* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008), 70.

[73] Yoshimoto, *Kurosawa*, 11.

[74] Kuwayama, "Japan's Emic Conceptions," in *The Cambridge Companion to Modern Japanese Culture*, ed. Yoshio Sugimoto (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 44.

[75] See Yoshimoto, *Kurosawa*.

[76] These can be translated as *giri* = obligations, *ninjō* = emotions, *amae* = co-dependence, *mujō* = impermanence, *uchi* and *soto* = inside and outside circles, *honne* and *tatemae* = true feelings and the façade.

[77] Yoshimoto, ibid., 18.

questions raised by those films."[78] Although my study also discusses Japanese national images, I will steer away from concepts that are used to discuss the nature of the Japanese themselves. National images should be explored, investigated, crystallized and engaged with, all the while remembering that they are as heterogeneous and constructed as the people, as cultural beings.

Apart from essentialism, inconsistencies in previous research should also be highlighted. As I have shown, many films that are included in the "horror" category have not originally been considered horror. They have nonetheless become part and parcel of the (mostly Western) scholarship on Japanese horror. Colette Balmain, for example, discusses the rape-revenge film and Japanese slashers, as well as Japanese zombie, cannibal and living dead films. What is noteworthy is that Balmain defines the films in Western terms. The Japanese language discourse does not mention rape-revenge, nor does it mention Balmain's category of *kaidan pinku eiga*. "Japanese horror" could benefit from a stance that regards it as an interpretative and imaginary category that contains works with some horrific aspects.

Furthermore, a vast body of works is largely missing from the previous English-language research and, consequently, from the history of actual Japanese horror cinema. This probably has to do with the definition of monsters and the monstrous. When analyzing representations of cinematic monsters, it is possible to say that one is contributing to the larger interdisciplinary field of monster studies. Jeffrey Jerome Cohen's edited volume *Monster Theory: Reading Culture* (1996) is one of earliest books dedicated to a thorough dissecting of monsters as cultural signs. This stance is continued in Asa Simon Mittman and Peter J. Dendle's *The Ashgate Research Companion to Monsters and the Monstrous* (2013). Essays in the former scrutinize the monster as "a code of pattern or a presence or an absence that unsettles what has been constructed to be received as natural."[79] The latter continues from this, analyzing the impact and meaning of monsters in various cultures. Other definitions include monster as "the extreme version of marginalization" whose boundaries overlap with the ones constituting a culture.[80] In addition, they can be seen as "phantasmagoric and weird

[78] Yoshimoto, *Kurosawa*, 18.. This stance is visible in Stein's discussions about the figure of the vampire in Japan. He suggests that the tragic ending becomes a Japanese way of ending a movie because the Japanese audiences desire this "savoring of exquisite pain and grief of mortality," leading to the incorporation of *mono no aware* (the impermanence of things) as the key component of the vampire (Stein, "Enter the Dracula," 246). It is one thing to say that the Eastern vampire differs from its Western counterpart because of its tragic nature, which can be related to Eastern folklore, and another to state that Japanese audiences (as opposed to Western audiences) desire savoring of pain (that cannot be understood by other people). One has to be very careful with one's words.

[79] Jeffrey Jerome Cohen, "Preface: In a Time of Monsters," in *Monster Theory: Reading Culture*, ed. Jeffrey Jerome Cohen (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), ix.

[80] Ibid.

existences,"[81] "cultural constructions of the threatening Other that may, inexplicably and with no warning, appear in our midst,"[82] "surprisingly lively metaphors for comprehending broader national-cultural paradigms"[83] or as "embodiments of a certain cultural moment – of a time, a feeling and a place"[84] and "a fearful phenomenon or the spiritual entity that causes it."[85]

Kaiki eiga includes two categories of monsters that rarely appear in English scholarship. *Kaibyō* or *bakeneko* (ghost cat) films are explored in detail by Shimura Miyoko (1999, 2001, 2008) before her immersion into the study of *otoko no kaijin* (male phantoms). Some *kaibyō* films, such as *Yabu no naka no kuroneko* (Shindō Kaneto, 1968), have been discussed in relation to *kaidan* or Balmain's "Edo gothic,"[86] but these have mainly been studies that concentrate on the theme of revenge, which is similar to other films incorporating the avenging spirit motif. According to Shimura, *kaibyō* films have seen three distinctive phases in the history of Japanese cinema: early trick pictures (26 films), between 1937 and 1940 (21 films) and between 1953 and 1958 (13 films). Originally the cat was a *kigurumi* (a person wearing a fluffy costume). This changed as the cat became a distinguishable female, changing its role from a secondary figure in the early films to a central one.[87] Later *bakeneko* films are explicitly concerned with femininity, relying heavily on the status of the actresses who performed the roles of the cat. "Vamp actresses," as Shimura calls them, were made to perform as cats during the second boom. Their outlook was feminine, but their movements derived from *chambara* (sword-fighting) films, highlighting the general anxiety concerning an active female transformation. The female body was emphasized over the monstrosity of the cat.[88]

Yōkai films form another under-analyzed subcategory of *kaiki*. Yōkai erupted onto the popular culture stage during the latter third of the Edo period.[89] Whereas supernatural elements had been a staple of Japanese stories

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[81] Stéphane Audeguy スタフェヌ・オーデギー, *Monstaa no rekishi* モンスターの歴史 "Les Monstres: Si loin et si proches," transl. Endō Yukari 遠藤ゆかり (Tokyo: Sōgensha, 2010), 18.

[82] Foster, *Pandemonium*, 22–23.

[83] Ibid., 26.

[84] Jeffrey Jerome Cohen, "Monster Culture: Seven Theses," in *Monster Theory: Reading Culture*, ed. Jeffrey Jerome Cohen (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 4.

[85] Komatsu Kazuhiko, "Supernatural Apparitions and Domestic Life in Japan," *The Japan Foundation Newsletter* XXVII, no. 1 (1999): 2.

[86] See Balmain, *Introduction to Japanese Horror Cinema*. I find the emphasis on the periodization (Edo) insignificant because, as seen in the discourses promoted by Komatsu and Shimura, *kaidan* should be first and foremost regarded as a subgenre of *jidaigeki*, which are most often located in the Edo era.

[87] Shimura Miyoko, "Onna ga neko ni naru toki," "女が猫になるとき," [When a woman becomes a cat]." *Iconics – Eizōgaku 映像学* 67 (2001), 42.

[88] Shimura, "Onna ga neko ni naru toki," 43–48.

[89] Foster, *Pandemonium*, 17. Komatsu Kazuhiko (2015: 47–51) proposes five different periods of the appearance of *yōkai*: 1) between the 12th and 15th centuries in the form of literature; 2) between the 14th

for centuries, the Meiji period with its framework of rational scientific thinking offered a perfect environment for more academic discussions about the nature of *yōkai*.[90] Friedman suggests that the Japanese monster has one of the most active lives worldwide, one feature of which is its role in intellectual culture.[91] However, despite having been a prominent presence in Japanese popular cultural history, such monsters seem to be analyzed only within the field of *yōkaigaku*, not horror film studies.

In cinema, Daiei was responsible for a series of *yōkai* films. Shimura points out that in the strict studio system, Daiei's knowhow of monster films was accessed through business mergers, combining Nikkatsu's tradition of *hengemono* and Shinkō Kinema's ghost cat narratives.[92] In the wake of a Mizuki-influenced *yōkai* boom in manga and television, *Yōkai daisensō* (The Great Yokai War/Big Monster War, 1968) became a hit.[93] However, as noted by both Papp and Shimura, *yōkai* films ultimately came to be targeted at children, much like the later installations in the *Gojira* series, leading to their exclusion from horror film studies.[94] Recently, however, the *yōkai* film *Kuchisake-onna* (2007) again highlighted the thin line between *yōkai* and horror. *Kuchisake-onna* first appeared in the 1970s as an urban legend and soon came to be regarded as *yōkai*. This "reveals a nostalgic desire for continuity with the premodern referential landscape, between the past and the present, the rural and the urban, the local and the national."[95] To construct *Kuchisake-onna* as *yōkai* worked to exclude it from analysis of Japanese horror.

Whereas the films belonging to the J-horror movement have been overemphasized, some important works such as *Eko eko azarak* (Satō Shimako, 1996) or *Tomie* (Oikawa Ataru, 1999) hardly appear. *Eko eko azarak* provides a window into Japanese occult films and, consequently, explorations of occultism in Japan. It is directed by one of Japan's few female horror film directors. Ōbayashi Nobuhiko's *Hausu* (House, 1977) is mentioned, but I am

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and 16th centuries; 3) the 16th and 17th centuries; 4) the early Meiji period; 5) and the end of the 20th century and contemporary times.

[90] Foster, *Pandemonium*, 204.

[91] Friedman, "Foreword," xxxiv. He points out that even today monsters appear in books, films, stories, comics, video games and websites (ibid.).

[92] Shimura Miyoko 志村三代子, "Daiei no yōkaieiga: 'Yōkai sanbusaku' on chūshin ni" "大映の妖怪映画—「妖怪三部作」を中心に," [Daiei's yōkai films: Regarding the Yōkai trilogy" in *Kaiki to gensō e no kairo: kaidan kara J-horaa e* 回帰と幻想への回路ー怪談からJホラーへ [Route to the weird and fantastic: From kaidan to J-horror], ed. Uchiyama Kazuki 内山一樹 (Tokyo: Shinwasha, 2008), 125.

[93] See Zilia Papp, "Monsters at War: The Great Yōkai Wars, 1968–2005," *Mechademia* 4 War/Time (2009); Shimura, "Daiei no yōkaieiga."

[94] In order to attract younger viewers, *Gojira* were distributed in double bills with *Hamtarō* anime; see William Tsutsui, *Godzilla on My Mind: Fifty Years of The King of Monsters* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2004), 87.

[95] Foster, *Pandemonium*, 186.

yet to read a full-fledged scholarly analysis of the film which would provide both thematic and stylistic material in abundance. In addition, even though national trauma is seen to manifest itself in a plethora of works, interestingly many works explicitly concerned with WWII, such as the *Henshin ningen* trilogy, are almost completely omitted from previous analysis.[96] *Kyūketsuki Goke Midoro* (Goke, Body Snatcher from Hell, 1968), a film utilizing the famous body snatcher motif, is rarely mentioned, as are the vampire films by Shin-Tōhō.

2.3 *KAIKI EIGA* AS SPECULATIVE FICTION

While many previous studies work extremely well on a detailed case-study level, there are many moments of confusion related to the general understanding of what to include in an analysis of horror. The films by Sion Sono provide an example. There are various faint elements that can be derived from supernatural films and which are buried deep within the structure of his films, although not many of the films can be called horror *as such*.[97] As Barry Keith Grant points out, the notion of "horror" is too versatile and complex to be encapsulated by any one theory or interpretation.[98] The same assumption is made by Rabkin in his discussions of the fantastic, which he argues is "too large to constitute a single genre."[99] Timothy Iles does not even try, rather lumping together "mystery, detective thriller and horror" in his analysis of identity in Japanese film.[100] As becomes clear in my analysis, often this is not the case. Torben Grodal talks about "genres such as science fiction or horror, which involve the significant use of 'nonstandard physics' or fantastic and supernatural scenes."[101]

Regarding the difference between science fiction and horror, J.P. Telotte suggests that science fiction actually belongs to the category of the fantastic,

[96] *Henshin ningen* films have even been distributed in the U.S., but as science fiction, not as "Asia Extreme." This simple fact may be the reason behind their relative invisibility in and omission from the analysis of Japanese "horror."

[97] Luca Calderini, "Daisan no shisen," 第三の視線 [The Third Perspective], in *Kaosu no kami, Sono Shion* カオスの神、園子温 [Sono Sion, the God of Chaos], ed. Dario Tommasi and Franco Picollo, transl. Maruyama Shōko (Tokyo: Firumuaatosha, 2012), 103–104.

[98] Barry Keith Grant, "Introduction," in *The Dread of Difference*, ed. Barry Keith Grant (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1996), 8.

[99] Eric S. Rabkin, *Theœ Fantastic in Literature* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), quoted in Rosemary Jackson, *Fantasy: The Literature of Subversion* (London and New York: Methuen, 1981), 13.

[100] See Timothy Iles, *The Crisis of Identity in Contemporary Japanese Cinema: Personal, Cultural, National* (Leiden & Boston: Koninklijke Brill NV, 2008).

[101] Grodal, *Embodied Visions*, 97.

dealing with various inconsistencies and hesitations.[102] In addition, although science fiction sports an iconography that calls for analysis of it as a separate entity, there are nonetheless many moments when "the form seems to bulk into the realm of horror."[103] To make a complicated matter very simple, Attebery defines science fiction as a genre that challenges standard notions of nature and culture.[104] According to him, science fiction could be negotiated as an "attitude or stance" toward contemporary technoscientific reality, less concerned with "fully imagined cultural futures" and more concerned with "the technoscientific features of the everyday."[105] Larsen points out that there is universal interest in fictions of science, because in many cases they present us with a mirror image through which to examine our own mortality as well as ethicality.[106] As can be seen, there are as many definitions as researchers.

Michael Dylan Foster criticizes horror film scholar Andrew Tudor for asking "Why horror?" instead of "Why do these people like horror in this place at this particular time?"[107] Motifs flow from country to another, gaining culture-specific meanings and, in the process, possibly losing some of the old ones. Some are more successful than others because semantic fields "vary markedly from culture to culture,"[108] and translating them is always rough because different sense-making systems may not provide exact equivalents.[109] In Japan, based on *kaiki*/mystery/horror film trailers from the 1950s, it is apparent that words such as *kaiki*, *kyōfu*, *misemono*, *torikku*, *kaii* and *senritsu* are used interchangeably. All of these mean varying degrees of horrific and fantastic phenomena. Yoshikawa speaks of crossovers between horror, monster films, ghost stories, mystery and science fiction.[110]

A popular approach offering a basis for study has been to divide the study of Japanese horror along two axes: the avenging spirit narrative, *kaidan*, and the disaster narrative or the *daikaijū eiga* (giant monster film).[111] This is

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[102] Telotte, *Science Fiction Film*, 10–16; see 123–178 for detailed case studies of each category.

[103] Ibid., 4–5. He speaks especially of films such as the *Alien* cycle, in which the threat occurs within a context associated with science fiction.

[104] Attebery, *Decoding Gender*, 11.

[105] Brian Attebery, "The Fantastic," in *The Oxford Handbook of Science Fiction*, ed. Rob Latham, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 143.

[106] Kristine Larsen, "Frankenstein's Legacy: The Mad Scientist Remade," in *Vader, Voldemort and Other Villains: Essays on Evil in Popular Media*, ed. Jamey Heit (North Carolina: McFarland & Company, Inc., 2011), 46–63, 48.

[107] Foster, *Pandemonium*, 20.

[108] Ibid.

[109] Alan McKee, *Textual Analysis: A Beginner's Guide* (London and Thousand Oaks: Sage Publishing, 2003), 6.

[110] Yoshikawa, "Horaaeiga-ron," 116.

[111] McRoy, *Nightmare Japan*, 6; Balmain, *Japanese Horror*, 49; Anderson and Richie, *The Japanese Film*, 261. According to this interpretation, giant monsters often mean destruction, providing

commonly debunked by Japanese spectators. In my discussions with Japanese friends and colleagues, all systematically refused to use the word "horror" or even its Japanese counterpart *kyōfu* for monster films, calling them *tokusatsu* (special effects) films instead. In addition, *kaidan*, ghost stories, have traditionally been considered an altogether different category of storytelling. As Noriko T. Reider explains, these tales of the strange became especially popular in the Edo/Tokugawa period (1600–1867), which is generally considered a peaceful one in Japanese history. They were often told as a form of early urban legends and collected into anthologies, and they are often adaptations of Chinese stories. The Japanese refer to ghost stories by the word *kaidan*, in which *kai* means "strange, mysterious, rare, or bewitching apparition" and *dan* in turn refers to "talk" or "recited narrative." Thus, *kaidan* are "stories broadly modeled as tales of the supernatural, which are sometimes surrealistic and may strike us as strange, weird and frightening."[112] In trying to trace the definition of *kaidan*, Edogawa Rampo concludes that mystery is more important than horror. If we are to define *kaidan* like this, about half of Japan's detective fiction actually belongs to the category of *kaidan*.[113] With regard to cinema, Satō Tadao continues, stating that Kurosawa Kiyoshi's works, such as *CURE* (1997), *Charisma* (1999) and *Akarui mirai* (2003), can only be explained in terms of *kaidan*, despite not including ghost characters.[114]

The ubiquitous presence of the vengeful spirit motif in Japanese *kaiki eiga* has led to the situation where ghosts seem to provide an instant index of horror.[115] In film studies, Noël Carroll's *The Symbolic Biology of Fantastic Beings* (1981) and *The Philosophy of Horror: Or, Paradoxes of the Heart*

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a representation for the ever-lingering effect of World War II. Ghosts, in turn, are used to negotiate gender concerns in a changing social environment.

[112] Noriko T. Reider, "The Appeal of 'Kaidan', Tales of the Strange," *Asian Folklore Studies* 59, no. 2 (2000): 266; Noriko T. Reider, "The Emergence of 'Kaidan-shū' The Collection of Tales of the Strange and Mysterious in the Edo Period," *Asian Folklore Studies* 60, no. 1 (2001): 80, 90; One of the most famous anthologies is without doubt *Kwaidan: Stories and Studies of Strange Things* (1904) by Lafcadio Hearn, or Koizumi Yakumo, as he is known in Japan. Even the paramount *Ugetsu monogatari*, created by Ueda Akinari (1734–1809), borrows from both Japanese and Chinese sources (Henry Hughes, "Familiarity of the Strange: Japan's Gothic Tradition," *Criticism* 42, no. 1 [2000]: 66). Other sources include Buddhist teachings and Japanese folklore.

[113] Edogawa Rampo 江戸川乱歩, "Kaidan nyūmon" 怪談入門 [Introduction to kaidan], in *Edogawa Rampo Korekushon IV: Henshin ganbō* 江戸川乱歩コレクション・IV　変身願望 [Edogawa Rampo Collection 4: The will to metamorphose], ed. Shimpo Hirohisa 新保博久 and Yamamae Yuzuru 山前譲 (Tokyo: Kawade bunko, 1994), 102

[114] Satō Tadao 佐藤忠雄, "Eizō bunka to wa nanika (6) Kaidan to horaa" 映像文化とは何か（６）怪談とホラー [What is Film Culture? (6) Kaidan and horror], *Kōhyō* 好評 1 (2005): 108.

[115] A motif is defined here as "any significant repeated element in a film" (Bordwell and Thompson, *Film Art*, 61).

(1990) are some of the most quoted studies of screen monstrosity.[116] His theorizations often form the basis for dissecting monstrosity, especially if a dichotomy is made between Freudian and cognitive approaches.[117] Carroll famously suggested that monsters are category mistakes: cognitive threats to common knowledge, unknown to ordinary social intercourse.[118] In other words, as Cohen points out, they are "a category that is itself a kind of limit case, an extreme version of marginalization, an abject epistemological device basic to the mechanics of deviance construction and identity formation" and an "ontological liminality" that "refuses easy categorization."[119] For Carroll, the source of horror is a so-called "paradox of the heart": we know the monster is not real but still we feel intense fear. This is especially true of the J-horror films that brought with them a whole new representation of a cinematic ghost. However, as I have argued elsewhere (2016), the presence of a ghost might be horrific but it does not automatically make a film horror. In Ōbayashi Nobuhiko's *Ijintachi to no natsu* (1988), the protagonist spends most of his time with benevolent ghosts. There is a malevolent entity, but the overall tone of the film is one of mystery. Ōbayashi uses ghosts as metaphors for the chaining effect of nostalgia.[120] In *Ugetsu monogatari*, both benevolent and malevolent spirits are present, but reality is presented as more horrendous than any ghost. If we want to call *Ugetsu* horror, it is because of its unfair and horrifying treatment of its women, not because of the emergence of a ghost.[121]

It is clear that the division of *kaidan* and *daikaijū eiga* offers a framework in which to locate much of the earlier research on Japanese horror, if not the vast field of the subject matter itself. This is reminiscent of a general tendency in Japanese film scholarship "to stay within pre-established discursive

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[116] It is notable how Carroll's stance in *Philosophy of Horror* differs greatly from his earlier theoretical approach of "Symbolic Biology", in which he heavily based his interpretations on a psychoanalytic framework despite acknowledging that the application of psychoanalysis is hardly unproblematic.

[117] For more studies on cinematic monsters, see for example James Twitchell, *Dreadful Pleasures: An Anatomy of Modern Horror* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985); Joseph D. Andriano, *Immortal Monster: The Mythological Evolution of the Fantastic Beast in Modern Fiction and Film* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1999); Clasen, "Monsters Evolve"; George Ochoa, *Deformed and Destructive Beings: The Purpose of Horror Films* (Jefferson: McFarland & Company, 2011); Kimberley McMahon-Coleman and Roslyn Weaver, *Werewolves and Other Shapeshifters in Popular Culture: A Thematic Analysis of Recent Depictions* (Jefferson, North Carolina and London: McFarland & Company, 2012)

[118] Noël Carroll, *The Philosophy of Horror or Paradoxes of the Heart* (London: Routledge, 1990), 34–35.

[119] Cohen, "Preface," ix; Cohen, "Seven Theses," 6.

[120] Rex Baylon, "Film Review: Nobuhiko Obayashi's 'The Discarnates,'" last modified November 14, 2015, http://www.meniscuszine.com/articles/2015111437648/film-review-nobuhiko-obayashis-the-discarnates/.

[121] Eerolainen, "Oh the Horror," 40.

traditions."[122] As Laeticia Söderman suggests, our text-related built-in models set us on a certain route of interpretation, allowing us to overlook the signposts inherent in the text itself. This is a common problem in every field that concerns the interpretation of texts. For Söderman, the process of rethinking and renewing enables us to shed more light on the questions that interest us, as well as to avoid ideas from becoming stagnant and to offer fresh and original interpretative angles.[123] Hence, limiting research only to the genre of horror will not reveal the whole potential that this vast body of fantastic films has to offer. As Napier points out, both monsters and ghosts belong to the realm of the fantastic.[124] The division of these narratives into separate categories is but artificial.

In Western academia, classical studies of the strange and extraordinary are best exemplified by studies of the fantastic.[125] Many critics see fantasy as a separable, peripheral phenomenon as opposed to the "real."[126] It is exactly because of this departure from consensus reality that fantasy becomes such a valuable mirror of reality. Napier points out that while all fiction inherently defamiliarizes the "real," the very *raison d'être* of fantastic fiction is the contrast it provides to the real. All of the works she analyzes maintain a varied and complex relationship to reality; in her case, this comprises the history, society and official ideology of twentieth-century Japan.[127] In fact, Figal sees Japanese modernity as having been born of fantasy and embodying transformation, a change of modes, and thus being akin to the root definition of *bakemono* (a thing that metamorphoses). As early as the Meiji period, when Japan embarked on its path to recognition by other nations, the popular fantastic beliefs of the common folk provided an imaginary enemy that could

[122] Standish, *Myth and Masculinity*, 10–11.

[123] Laeticia Söderman, "Medieval Buddhist Textuality: *Kyōgyōshinshō* as Literature," in *Rethinking "Japanese Studies" from Practices in the Nordic Region* 日本研究参考―北欧の実践から, eds. Liu Jianhui and Sano Mayuko (Kyoto: International Research Center for Japanese Studies, 2014), 105–107.

[124] Napier, *The Fantastic*, 95.

[125] See Tzvetan Todorov, *The Fantastic: A Structural Approach to a Literary Genre* (New York: Cornell University, 1975); Amaryll Chanady, *Magical Realism and The Fantastic: Resolved Versus Unresolved Antimony* (New York: Garland, 1985); Jackson, *The Literature of Subversion*; Kathryn Hume, *Fantasy and Mimesis*.

[126] Hume, ibid., 8.

[127] Susan J. Napier, "Meet me on the other side: Strategies of Otherness in modern Japanese literature," in *Representing the Other in Modern Japanese Literature: A Critical Approach*, ed. Rachael Hutchinson and Mark Williams (Oxon: Routledge 2007), 5.

be conquered with new national-scientific ideologies.[128] In particular, *yōkai* were used as real political tools instead of mere fictional tales.[129]

In Japan, *kaiki* is the term for weird, fantastic, horrific and mysterious phenomena, and it can be roughly translated as "the fantastic." Originally from literature studies, *kaiki shōsetsu* (weird novels) has been the native term for fictions of the strange and/or extraordinary.[130] *Kaiki shōsetsu* emerged when Chinese ghost stories came to be recycled as *kaidan* in Japan and the genre departed from the earlier Buddhist moral *setsuwa* tales. In literature, writers such as Nanboku Tsuruya (1755–1829) and Ueda Akinari (1734–1809) were important for the establishment of the genre, followed by modern writers such as Izumi Kyōka (1873–1939). Before WWII, *kaiki* literature was mainly marketed within detective fiction, but after the war, especially because of the writings of Hoshi Shinichi (1926–1997), it became more widely disseminated.[131]

Regarding film, *kaiki eiga* as a concept has been defined previously by Michael Crandol in his Ph.D dissertation "Nightmares from the Past: 'Kaiki eiga' and the Dawn of Japanese Horror Cinema" (2015). It is noteworthy that our understanding of the term differs greatly. Crandol discusses *kaiki* as a genre that has, to some degree, influenced J-horror and generally falls under Tzvetan Todorov's notion of "the marvelous."[132] For Crandol, *kaiki* is an old generic label which relies on "the sense of the stylized, anti-realistic atmosphere evoked by artificial sets."[133] Furthermore, "the word *kaiki* by definition points to an atmosphere of the strange and bizarre, rather than the emotional affect of horror"; to conclude, he says that "an essential ingredient of *kaiki* is its evocation of an Othered time and place, a world spatially alien or removed from our own mundane, contemporary existence."[134] Crandol places

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[128] Gerald Figal, *Civilization and Monsters: Spirits of Modernity in Meiji Japan* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1999), 7, 14; Figal is also aware that associating something "fantastic" and "supernatural" with the production of modernity in Japan can be connected to the "cultural chauvinism associated with *nihonjinron*," but, as he states, there is a difference between exploring the sources of *nihonjinron* and endorsing them (ibid.).

[129] Mittman, "Introduction," xxxiv; Yomota, Inuhiko 四方田犬彦, "Tō-Ajia no kaikieiga wa sakihokoru" 東アジアに怪奇映画は咲き誇る [East Asian kaiki eiga are blooming], *FUKUOKA UNESCO* 47 (2011): 1–2; Words such as *obake* or *yōkai* are extremely difficult to translate. Even though *yōkai* is the word of choice in contemporary discourse, other terms such as *bakemono*, the more childish *obake*, and the more academic-sounding *kaii genshō* are also in use. This is related to the way a culture defines non-human things and how these things are accepted as part of society (Yomota, "Tō-Ajia no kaiki eiga," 2; Foster, *Pandemonium*, 5).

[130] Hughes, *Gothic Tradition*, 60.

[131] Kida Junichirō 紀田順一郎, *Gensō to kaiki no jidai* 幻想と怪奇の時代 [The times of the weird and the strange] (Tokyo: Shōraisha, 2007), 225, 233–234.

[132] Crandol, *Kaiki eiga*, 14, 46–48.

[133] Ibid., 48.

[134] Ibid., 53.

kaiki into the past era of filmmaking, a nostalgic and atmospheric subgenre of the fantastic-horrific.

As Bowers notes, many of the problems of definition arise because of the frequent difficulty of placing texts into narrowly defined genres and categories.[135] In horror film studies, there is a tendency to draw a straight line between the ghost films of the 1950s and their contemporary "counterparts," but, as Komatsu Kazuhiko argues, they cannot be said to belong to the same genre *as such*, as they portray entirely different eras.[136] By this, Komatsu refers to the widely acknowledged division of Japanese film into *jidaigeki* (period drama) and *gendaigeki* (contemporary drama).[137] Komatsu's argument makes sense if one is adamant in analyzing Japanese cinema according to this division, but as I myself have suggested, a lot of confusion around this matter could be solved by placing these works under the moniker *kaiki*. Like Outi Hakola points out in her dissertation, generic narrations need to be understood as dynamic and functional cultural processes.[138] She states that "any group of films may at any time be generically redefined by contemporary critics" and that "one of the founding principles of genre study is the importance of reading texts in the context of other similar texts."[139] In this thesis, this cinematic context is "speculation."

In my opinion, the closest definition for *kaiki eiga* is "speculative cinema." Speculation is to jump into the unknown[140] and, as author Margaret Atwood suggests, to narrate things that could happen.[141] Anne Leinonen speaks of the narratives of "what ifs" and the narratives of alternative histories.[142] In addition, speculative fiction is concerned both with the representation of alternatives and the investigation of these very alternatives: it is a mode suited to exploring and transgressing boundaries.[143] It allows us to study how social realities are deconstructed, challenged and criticized. It inverts elements of this world, recombining its features into new models in order to produce

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[135] Maggie Ann Bowers, *Magic(al) Realism* (London and New York: Routledge, 2004), 29.

[136] Personal interview, October 16, 2014 at Nichibunken, Kyoto.

[137] Shimura Miyoko points out that *kaidan* films are not a subgenre of horror, but of *jidaigeki* (2010).

[138] Outi Hakola, "Rhetoric of Death and Generic Addressing of Viewers in American Living Dead Films" (PhD Diss., University of Turku, 2011), 23.

[139] Altman, *Film/Genre*, 81.

[140] Vesa Sisättö, "Tieteis- ja fantasiakirjallisuus" [Science and fantasy literature], in *Suomennoskirjallisuuden historia 1* [The history of literature translated into Finnish], ed. H.K. Riikanen, Urpo Kovala, Pekka Kujamäki and Outi Paloposki (Jyväskylä: Gummerus, 2007), 496.

[141] Suvi Ahola, "Kanadan lintunainen palasi 1960-luvulle" [The Bird Woman of Canada Returned to the 1960s], *Helsingin Sanomat*, April 22, 2007, https://www.hs.fi/kulttuuri/art-2000004477408.html.

[142] Andersson, "Scifiä vai spekulatiivista fiktiota," 30. This approach would solve, for example, the critique of including works such as *Battle Royale* into *kaiki eiga*.

[143] Lois Zamora Parkinson and Wendy B. Faris, "Introduction: Daiquiri Birds and Flaubertian Parrot(ie)s," in *Magical Realism: Theory, History, Community*, ed. Lois Parkinson Zamora and Wendy B. Faris (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003), 6.

something strange, unfamiliar and *apparently* "new," "other" and different.[144] It may allow us to see the world from a perspective outside of that which has attained consensus in society.[145] It can be seen "as a site of difference, one that privileges the alien, the illusory, and the irrational in contrast to a vision … that subsumes all difference under a bland rubric of homogeneity, materialism, and rationality."[146]

Leinonen argues that the difference between the fantastic and speculative fiction is that for established authors to use the notion of speculative fiction is to place themselves outside so-called entertainment fiction.[147] This links the concept to hierarchies of genres. Even Vesa Sisättö admits that speculative fiction is free from the load of images carried, for example, by science fiction,[148] or the fantastic. Speculative fiction works the best as an umbrella term. It allows for the investigation of a varied group of fictions—or genres—together without any artificial boundaries.[149] Moreover, it is to be seen as a mode. Jeoff King has proposed that comedy is a mode—a manner of presentation.[150] The same can be stated of speculative fiction. This is my interpretation and an answer to one of the fundamental problems in the selection of the speculative material: the difficulty in deciding whether these works form in a meaningful sense a genre, a mode, a cultural concept or an attitude toward reality.[151] I see speculative fiction as "something more than a particular kind of narrative complex … an archive of stories with particular themes, motifs, and figures."[152] What I refer to here as modality has previously been defined as something that "assumes different generic forms" and "from which a number of related genres emerge." [153] However, instead of saying that speculative cinema assumes different generic forms or is a source for many genres, I propose we call it a mode. Speculative fiction includes a variety of sub-categorical concepts that "are difficult to consider in terms of one unifying genre" and should thus be "seen as constituting particular narrative modes."[154] These narrative modes

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[144] Jackson, *Literature of Subversion*, 8.

[145] Nick Lacey, *Image and Representation: Key concepts in media studies* (New York: Palgrave, 1998), 109.

[146] Napier, *The Fantastic*, 223.

[147] Andersson, ibid., 30.

[148] Ibid.

[149] Ibid. Kristine Larsen does this effortlessly in locating the paramount Mad Scientist motif in, for example, the literary works of J.R.R. Tolkien (see "Frankenstein's Legacy").

[150] Jeoff King, *Film Comedy* (London and New York: Wallflower Press, 2005), 2.

[151] Chanady, *Magical Realism*, 1; Luis Leal, "Magical Realism in Spanish American Literature (1967)," in *Magical Realism: Theory, History, Community*, ed. Lois Parkinson Zamora and Wendy B. Faris (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003), 132; Bowers, *Mgic(al) Realism*, 3.

[152] Veronica Hollinger, "Genre vs. Mode," in *The Oxford Handbook of Science Fiction*, ed. Rob Latham (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 139–140.

[153] Jackson, *Literature of Subversion*, 7, 35.

[154] Bowers, *Magic(al) Realism*, 3.

can be present across many genres, but they are not genres *per se*. Therefore, speculative cinema is a cross-generic umbrella category within which to locate a wide selection of thematically similar films, despite their differing surface levels.

Of course, using an umbrella term such as *kaiki* or "speculative fiction" is also subject to critique. Vesa Sisättö argues that using "speculative fiction" brings nothing new to the critique. For him, the old terminology still works the best: fantasy for works that contain supernatural elements and science fiction for the ones where the world is based on scientific thought.[155] However, as the discussion around supernatural femininity and scientific masculinity in the next chapter demonstrates, Sisättö is over-simplifying. Also, as Bowers argues, many scholars settle for an umbrella term that becomes their working definition.[156] But is this necessarily a bad thing? I do not think so. If properly justified, using these new working terms promotes fresh and innovative ways of approaching old material.

2.4 CONCLUSIONS

This chapter illuminated how Japanese horror cinema has been studied in the past, as well as some general themes and trends present in the analyses. Much of the previous literature can be addressed from the viewpoint of "a genre." It is apparent that using the Western concept of "horror" as the basis for analysis is flawed and leads to a distorted view of the vast field of horrific cinema in Japan. This chapter has demonstrated that many scholars mix the production category of J-horror with Japanese horror or, more in detail, the distribution label of Asia Extreme. It is clear that this textual presupposition has affected the way in which many important works are in fact omitted from previous research. In addition, some of the previous studies end up broadcasting a distinctively essentialist stance, which, especially in the light of *nihonjinron* theories, is a disconcerting feature. Japanese horror cinema is seen as a manifestation of merely Japanese traits and some inherent notion of "Japaneseness," instead of being regarded as a truly transnational and multimedial category of filmmaking. This thesis thus proposes a departure from the notion of horror in favor of developing a new outlook on these films, in order to gain truly new insights. This new outlook, *kaiki*, is a term that not only functions as an answer to the general confusion around genre that I discussed in this chapter, but it can also be seen as a methodological starting point for selecting the films for analysis.

[155] Sisättö, "Tieteis- ja fantasiakirjallisuus," 32.

[156] Bowers, *Magic(al) Realism*, 5.

3 GENDER AND FICTIONS OF SCIENCE

One of the central arguments this thesis makes is that fictional characters in Japanese speculative cinema are used to convey an idea of a certain national image and identity. This calls for an understanding of three specific frameworks: speculative cinema, fictional characters, and national images, all of which are imagined within the field of science and technology.

This chapter is divided into three main parts. In the first subchapter I will address how gender has been discussed within studies of the weird in Japan. Japanese cinema knows many genres that promote certain types of gender representations but in *kaiki eiga* this representation is quite strictly divided into scientific masculinity and supernatural femininity.[1] The notion of gender can be defined as a methodological tool, "a way of assigning social and psychological meaning to sexual difference" and "usually conceived as a pair of mutually exclusive 'opposites': masculine and feminine."[2] Hence, differing social and psychological meanings are assigned to both men and women by coding them as feminine or masculine. As Attebery argues regarding science fiction, "most signs … such as robots and psychic powers, can function as gender markers."[3] This subchapter also illustrates how gender conventions of *kaiki eiga* draw comprehensively from literature, cinema, folklore and other traditions of popular culture worldwide.

The second subchapter defines my main theoretical concepts regarding masculinities, the study of which in general is a vast area.[4] I will establish

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[1] *Jidaigeki* (period drama), *hahamono* (mother films) and *yakuza* and *matatabimono* films (gangster and traveler films) are all known for their emphasis on either one of the sexes. In addition, the works of Mizoguchi Kenji and Naruse Mikio have called for discussions on women, whereas Kurosawa Akira's films mainly concern representations of men. In addition, see Satō Tadao 佐藤忠雄, *Nimaime no kenkyū – Haiyū to bunka* 二枚目の研究—俳優と文化 [The research on nimaime – actors and culture] (Tokyo: Chikuma shobō, 1984), 19–33 for discussions about *tachiyaku* types such as Mifune Toshirō; for Ishihara Yūjirō, see Michael Raine, "Ishihara Yūjirō: Youth, Celebrity and the Male Body in Late-1950s Japan," in *Word and Image in Japanese Cinema*, ed. Dennis Washburn and Carolyn Cavanaugh (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 202–225; Yomota Inuhiko 四方田犬彦, *Nihon eiga to sengo no shinwa* 日本映画と戦後の神話 [Japanese films and postwar legends] (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 2000), 154–156 for studies on actors and their roles.

[2] Attebery, *Decoding Gender*, 9–10.

[3] Ibid., 6.

[4] For a comprehensive take on the subject, see Michael S. Kimmel, Jeff Hearn and Raewyn Connell, eds., *The Handbook of Studies on Men and Masculinities* (Thousand Oaks, London, New Delhi: SAGE Publications, 2005); R.W. Connell, *Masculinities* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005 [1995]); Watanabe Tsuneo 渡辺恒夫, *Danseigaku no chosen/Y no higeki* 男性学の挑戦・Yの悲劇 [The challenges in the study of masculinities – the tragedy of Y] (Tokyo: Shinyōsha, 1989); Jack Kahn, *An Introduction to Masculinities* (Malden, Oxford and West Sussex: Wiley Blackwell, 2005). On hegemonic masculinities,

hegemonic masculinity as the underlining ideological construct that the films constantly, but often implicitly, refer to. Hegemonic masculinity as a theoretical concept is well suited to exploring Japanese masculinities because of the strong emphasis on the salaryman ideal and the gender-based division of labor. Related to the concept is hybrid masculinity, which at first might seem to challenge the ideal of hegemonic masculinity but on closer inspection often ends up reinforcing it. Although no salarymen *as such* appear in the films, the ideal is often implicitly engaged with. Hegemonic masculinity as the dominant ideology structures our way of seeing and is the surface against which alternative ideologies are posited.[5] As Frühstück and Walthall suggest, "distinct modes of masculinity become visible only if pitched against an actual or imagined Other."[6] The films present hegemonic masculinity not only as "an ideological reference group,"[7] but ultimately as something Other, too. To construct hegemonic masculinity as Other is an interesting idea and in accord with the interpretation of *kaiki* as something subversive. This will be further analyzed in the forthcoming chapters.

Finally, the third subchapter will address the connection between masculinity and science. Science and technology provide a valuable site through which national images can be dissected, challenged and reconstructed, because in the films they often serves as a metaphor for national images. Furthermore, national images and ideas about masculinity are manifest in embodiments of scientific masculinity. Depending on the cinematic function of scientific masculinity—which differs in each film—it intersects with this ideal in order to create images of positive and negative masculinities and, consequently, of national identities. The third subchapter will thus illuminate the discourse around science and technology in Japan, as well as focus on the subsequent importance and definition of scientific masculinity.

3.1 SUPERNATURAL FEMININITY AND SCIENTIFIC MASCULINITY

According to Vivian Sobchack, both science fiction and horror deal with chaos that threatens "the order of things," but in different ways. Horror includes moral chaos and disruption of the natural order, and a threat to the harmony of the hearth and home, whereas sci-fi is frequently about social chaos, disruption of (man-made) social order, and a threat to civilized society.[8]

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see Connell, *Masculinities*; Mike Donaldson, "What is hegemonic masculinity?," *Theory and Society* 22 (1993): 643–657.

[5] Lacey, *Image and Representation*, 104.

[6] Frühstück and Walthall, "Introduction," 7.

[7] Sugimoto, *Japanese Society*, 40.

[8] Vivian Carol Sobchack, *The Limits of Infinity: The American Science Fiction Film* (New York: A.S. Barnes, 1980), quoted in Vivian Sobchack, "Bringing it all back home: Family economy and generic

Supernatural femininity and scientific masculinity correspond to this suggestion. Edogawa Rampo, in turn, makes a difference between detective stories and *kaidan* in the Japanese context, theorizing that, despite being inherently similar, the former is rational and the latter is irrational. As Grodal points out, modern science has increased the fear evoked by the loss of control associated with any supernatural violation of natural laws. [9] However, irregular detective fiction (*henkaku tantei shōsetsu*) mixes these.[10]

Edogawa's assertion is important in two ways. First, it blurs the line between science fiction, detective stories and ghost stories, suggesting the underlining presence of the *kaiki* mode. Second, it seems to provide one possible explanation for the preference for scientific masculinity and supernatural femininity. Both are used for the same purposes, but when the narrative requires a rational outlook, the expressive behavior is coded as rational and scientific masculinity is preferred, whereas storylines regarding beliefs associated with supernatural traditions and elements are "irrational" and the expressive behavior is thus coded as feminine.

Another explanation is provided by Kume Yoriko, who draws from Saitō's ideas on representations of girls' and boys' worlds in anime. This is also related to the notion of metamorphosis. In general, previous studies on transformation feature analyses on literature, [11] folklore, [12] anime and superheroes,[13] as well as the aforementioned discourse on *yōkai*. In particular, horror film studies are abundant with discussion about metamorphosis.[14] One

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exchange," in *The Dread of Difference*, ed. Keith Grant Barry (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1996), 144. As an example of the difficulty in differentiating between these two genres, Attebery argues that Mary Shelley's *Frankenstein* is generally considered a precursor of modern sci-fi (ibid., 17), whereas the analysis of many others locates the monster itself in horror film studies.

[9] Grodal, *Embodied Visions*, 105.

[10] Edogawa, "Kaidan nyūmon," 98–100; Edogawa suggests that originally in Japan there has been no "supernatural," only *kaidan*.

[11] See Kawana, "Mad Scientists" and *Murder Most Modern*; Nakamura, *Monstrous Bodies*.

[12] Hayao Kawai. *Dreams, Myths and Fairy Tales in Japan* (Einsedeln: Daimon, 1995).

[13] Susan J. Napier, *Anime from Akira to Princess Mononoke: Experiencing Contemporary Japanese Animation* (New York: Palgrave, 2001); Susan J. Napier, "The Frenzy of Metamorphosis: The Body in Japanese Pornographic Animation," in *Word and Image in Japanese Cinema*, ed. Dennis Washburn and Carole Cavanaugh (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 342–365; Saitō, *Kōittenron*; Tom Gill, "Transformational Magic: Some Japanese Superheroes and Monsters," in *The Worlds of Japanese Popular Culture: Gender, Shifting Boundaries and Global Cultures*, ed. D. P. Martinez (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 33–55; Kume, "Henshin suru hiiroo."

[14] See Hand, "Aesthetics of Cruelty"; Ian Conrich, "Metal-Morphosis: Post-Industrial Crisis and the Tormented Body in the Tetsuo Films," in *Japanese Horror Cinema*, ed. Jay McRoy (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005), 96–106; Brown, *Tokyo Cyberpunk*; Ōkubo Tomoyasu 大久保智康, "Henshin ningen no tokuisei: Tōhō Henshin Ningen shiriizu o megutte" 変身人間の特異性－東宝"変心人間シリーズ"をめぐって [Exceptional mutants: About Tōhō's *henshin ningen* series], in *Kaiki to gensō e no kairo: Kaidan kara J-horaa e* 怪奇と幻想への回路－階段から J ホラーへ [Route to the weird and

of the most illustrative works is Ichiyanagi Hirotaka and Yoshida Morio's edited volume *Onna wa henshin suru* (2008), which provides short essays, interviews and scholarly case studies about female mutation mainly (but not only) in Japanese cultural products.

Kume posits that girls' and boys' worlds in popular culture are two distinct cultural zones representative of two discrete cultural spheres in Japanese society: the private and the public. Supernatural femininity is used as a functional trope to discuss matters within the private sphere, whereas scientific masculinity appears in narratives that deal with the public one. According to Kume, boys' and girls' worlds function as imitations of their mothers' and fathers' lives: girls are taught to fall in love and concentrate on all private matters, whereas boys are taught to "combat" the very public enemy.

Supernatural femininity often manifests in *mahō shōjo* (magical girl) narratives that consist of the so-called "girls' sphere."[15] This is the culture of *Cinderella* and *Snow White*, romances where an unlikely girl is given an opportunity of marrying a prince. In the girls' world, metamorphosis (*henshin*) takes place as *keshō*, or make-up, as the girls are transformed into adult females. However, in the "boys' sphere," *henshin* is called *busō*, a momentarily suiting-up of an individual in a special combat outfit. According to Saitō, this is traditional *henshin*, reminiscent of the earlier *henshin hero* plays (*henshin hiiroo mono*) based on legends, such as *Momotarō*, where heroes fight monsters and destroy the enemy.[16] In contemporary *kaiki* works, science provides the means for combat and the victory of young men. Kume argues that ultimately these *henshin* heroes exist only to socialize us into Japanese culture and normative gender roles, which for boys is that of a corporate soldier.[17] Thus, scientific masculinity and supernatural femininity correspond to some distinctive features of both genres and society.

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fantastic: From kaidan to J-horror], ed. Uchiyama Kazuki 内山一樹 (Tokyo: Shinwasha, 2008), 101–124; Shimura, "Daiei no yōkai eiga."

[15] Saitō Minako 斎藤美奈子, *Kōittenron – Anime, tokusatsu, denki no hiroinzō* 紅一点論—アニメ・特撮・伝記のヒロイン増 [A splash of scarlet: Heroines in anime, tokusatsu and legends] (Tokyo: Chikuma bunko, 2001), 11.

[16] Ibid., 11–12, 20, 27–28.

[17] Kume Yoriko 久米依子, "Henshin suru hiiroo no yukue – sakusō suru jendaa to sabukaruchaa" 変身するヒーローの行方・錯綜するするジェンダーとサブカルチャー [Where is the henshin hero going? Subculture and the complicated gender], in *Onna wa henshin suru* 女は変身する [Metamorphosing women], ed. Ichiyanagi Hirotaka 一柳廣孝 and Yoshida Morio 吉田司雄 (Tokyo: Seikyōsha, 2008), 161–168. In horror film studies, see Carol J. Clover, *Men, Women and Chainsaws: Gender in the Modern Horror Film* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1992) for a book-length study about the function of characters and the boundaries it imposes on the representation of gender.

3.1.1 VENGEFUL GHOSTS

Issues of gender are central to the horror genre, whether one prefers to examine horror films in terms of universal fears or culture-specific anxieties.[18] McRoy states that supernatural forces in the *kaidan* films often assume the form of a wronged, primarily female entity.[19] This interest in femininity is not merely academic; on a popular level, Shoji Kaori of *The Japan Times* has articulated these fears in an article called "Female fears at the dead center of J-horror."[20] *Kaiki to gensō e no kairo* promotes "the women of *kaidan"* as one of the central themes around which discourses can be structured. According to Park Myoungsook, Japanese horror includes what he calls "the three semantics of horror": the virus structure, the female avenger and "the culturally specific signification of the female high school student." [21] The emergence of young victims and aggressors highlights "the growing social anxiety regarding the growing divide between older (conservative) generation and the new generations rejecting traditional ideas." [22] However, Park's suggestions underscores the presence of and emphasis on the feminine in Japanese horror film studies. While it cannot be denied that female avengers and schoolgirls both appear as central figures in many of the stories, proposing them as central to the semantics of horror in Japanese culture poses a risk of downplaying the role of masculinity.[23]

The approach on the study of femininity in *kaidan* has been twofold: to concentrate on canonical works such as *Tōkaidō Yotsuya kaidan* (The Ghost Story of Yotsuya, Nakagawa Nobuo, 1959), *Ringu*, *Honogurai mizu no soko kara* (Dark Water, Nakata Hideo, 2002) and *Juon* (The Grudge, Shimizu Takashi, 2003), and to emphasize the central role of motherhood and children in the narratives. This concern is present as early as the *Yotsuya kaidan* narratives. Kinoshita Keisuke's version of 1949 emphasized the wife aspect of being a female because of the postwar times of poverty and scarcity during

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[18] Grant, "Introduction," 7. Torben Grodal states that the tendency within film and literary studies to describe all bodily phenomena in sexual terms is extremely misleading (*Embodied Visions*, 86).

[19] McRoy, *Nightmare Japan*, 6. A broader interpretation of the avenging spirit motif incorporates films like *Audition*; see McRoy, "Introduction," in *Japanese Horror Cinema*, ed. Jay McRoy (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005), 3.

[20] Special in *The Japan Times*, October 21, 2015.

[21] Park, *Hollywood's Remake Practices*, 119. During the emergence of the first J-horror films, youth problems revolved around "deviant" high school femininities: the *enjo kōsai* phenomenon (compensated dating), *gyaru* and so forth. Hence the importance of emphasizing this particular motif.

[22] Wee, *American Remakes*, 72–73. However, these concerns about wild young girls are nothing new. Young women such as *moga*, *panpan* girls or *shōjo* have always been at the heart of cultural and sociological debate, with their actions being both cheered on and argued about; see Sharon Kinsella, "Narratives and Statistics: How Compensated Dating (*enjo kōsai*) Was Sold," in *Sociology of the Japanese Youth: From Returnees to NEETs*, eds. Roger Goodman, Imoto Yuki and Tuukka Toivonen (Oxon and New York: Routledge, 2012), 54–80.

[23] Park, ibid.

which it was released. Nakagawa Nobuo's version, released ten years afterwards, in turn painted a picture of a strong union between Oiwa and her child, having been released during an era when Japan's economy had started to grow and new children were gladly welcomed. Becoming a mother is seen as an important part of being a woman in Japan, even so important that if one willingly or unwillingly does not manage to achieve this ideal, the whole society is considered to suffer.[24] The appearance of an avenging female *yūrei* (ghost) or *onryō* (avenging spirit) has led to extensive literature within horror film studies on the role and status of women in Japanese society.[25] In addition, research on the monstrous mother prevails because of its direct consequences for their children, imaginary or real.[26]

Attebery points out that "the need for a more equitable treatment of women is always a part of the gender picture."[27] This resentment that the ghost in Japanese horror narratives represents can be seen as a Japanese equivalent to rebellious sentiments. It is not merely about being a mother, but being a woman in a highly patriarchal society. Barrett states that "the grudge borne one man could be extended to include a male-dominated society that oppresses women."[28] As Samuel L. Leiter states, "one of the chief ways in which women who have been trampled on become empowered is to turn into vengeful spirits after they have died. The entire world of selfish, unfaithful

[24] According to Barrett, the ghost of Lady Wakasa in *Ugetsu monogatari* is a *muenbotoke*, a spirit without descendants to remember her; due to having missed out on an important part of life, she bears a grudge against the living (Barrett, *Archetypes*, 103).

[25] See Eerolainen, "Perheonnea ja sorretun kostoa" and "Kazoku no shiten"; Kinoshita, "The Mummy Complex"; Washitani, "Ringu sanbusaku"; Balmain, *Japanese Horror*; Wee, *American Remakes*; Hirano, "Yotsuya Ghost Story"; Yokoyama Yasuko 横山泰子, "Yotsuya kaidan eiga no Oiwa-tachi: Kabuki to wakare, betsu no onna e" 四谷怪談映画のお岩たち—歌舞伎と別れ、別の女へ [Oiwas of the Yotsuya Kaidan films: From kabuki to another woman], in *Kaiki to gensō e no kairo: Kaidan kara J-horaa e* 怪奇と幻想への回路—階段から J ホラーへ [Route to the weird and fantastic: From kaidan to J-horror], ed. Uchiyama Kazuki 内山一樹 (Tokyo: Shinwasha, 2008), 145–170; Shimura, "Yōkai sanbusaku"; Robert Hyland, "A Politics of Excess: Violence and Violation in Miike Takashi's *Audition*," in *Horror to the Extreme: Changing Boundaries in Asian Cinema*, ed. Choi Jinhee and Mitsuyo Wada-Marciano (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2009), 199–218. This interest in femininity is not merely academic: on a popular level, Kaori Shoji of *The Japan Times* has articulated these fears in an article called *Female fears at the dead center of J-horror* (Special to *The Japan Times*, October 21, 2015).

[26] See the narratives of Asakawa and her son in *Ringu*, Kayoko and her son in *Juon*, Shibata Reiko and her mother in *Sakebi*, Michi and her mother in *Kairo*, the intertwined relationships between various daughters and mothers in *Chakushin ari*, etc.

[27] Attebery, *Decoding Gender*, 13.

[28] Barrett, *Archetypes*, 98.

husbands and lovers must take cover when one of these women comes back from the other world to seek revenge on those who have wronged her."[29]

Vengeful spirits are also analyzed as cultural tropes (or archetypes, as Barrett calls them). A woman with a vengeful mission appears both in Kurosawa Akira's *Ran* (1985) and in Miike Takashi's *Audition* (1999), but only the latter is considered horror. Gregory Barrett also points out that the *Sasori* series of the 1970s was in fact representative of the vengeful spirit archetype.[30] Similarly, the *Inoshika Ochō* films (1973) could be included. Still, although a spirit appears, I am yet to see Kurosawa's masterpiece *Rashōmon* (1950) analyzed as horror.[31] Ghosts can be mere hallucinations, as is the case with Kinoshita Keisuke's two-part *Shinshaku: Yotsuya kaidan* (The Ghost Story of Yotsuya: A New Interpretation, 1949), released during the Occupation era. Kinoshita received production permission because he situated the story firmly in postwar Japan, with Oiwa being only a hallucination of a sad man.[32] This illustrates how the production of films—not only horror—was affected because of the censorship practiced by the General Headquarters (GHQ) after the end of the war.[33] Especially *kaidan* were put under strict regulation because they were considered a part of the *jidaigeki* genre, the films of which were in many cases banned because of their emphasis on questions of loyalty, dedication and self-sacrifice.

In many cases, the anger of a ghost is tied to the notion of a disease or a virus, as noted by Park (2009) and Ōshima (2012). Nakamura has discussed this in relation to literature where men, touched by monstrous women, are disfigured and hybridized, turning into monsters. According to her, diseases came to be narrated with a rhetoric of fear that portrayed them as "enemies" that invaded healthy bodies. The discovery of bacteria only assured people that

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[29] Samuel L Leiter, "From Gay to *Gei:* The *Onnagata* and the Creation of *Kabuki's* Female Characters," in *A Kabuki Reader: History and performance*, ed. Samuel L. Leiter (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2002), 225.

[30] See Barrett, *Archetypes*, 113–115.

[31] Eerolainen, "Oh the Horror," 40.

[32] Keiko I. McDonald, *Japanese Classical Theatre in Films* (London and Toronto: Associated University Press, 1994), 89.

[33] Of course, this was not the first time that the Japanese film business was strictly regulated. Previous to World War II, the Japanese government had assumed control of the Japanese film industry because, as Richie proceeds to quote a nameless authority, "films are like bullets which we cannot give to the private sector" (Richie, *Japanese Cinema*, 96; Hirano Kyōko, *Mr. Smith Goes to Tokyo: Japanese Cinema Under the American Occupation, 1945–1952* [US: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1992], 15). A new "Film Law" was enforced in 1939, according to which the government was given absolute power to decide the fate of any film studio and actor and make directors convey the imperialistic strategy (Satō Tadao, *Currents in Japanese Cinema* [Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1982], 100–101; Hirano, *Mr. Smith*, 16).

it was impossible to detect the enemy with one's own eyes.[34] To code this "disease-ness" as feminine highlights the fact that women are not dangerous only because they are women but because of their power to shake the gender hierarchy to its core.[35] Park sees as a general worry that Japanese society as a whole is the target of an avenging spirit in the narrative.[36] Ōshima calls this the logic of *utsuru kaidan*, in which fear becomes reality once the story ends.[37] This strategy draws heavily on urban legends and *jitsuwasei* (being seemingly based on a true story).[38] Ultimately horrific is the steady dissolution of a stable identity, morphing into the very opposite.[39] The horror of the films comes ultimately from how their diegetic world works as a twisted mirror for the contemporary society—what is perceived as "natural" is nothing but a well-constructed simulacrum. Horror springs from the logical deduction that, as the film mirrors our own world, anyone in the system can be the next monster—even the spectator himself. Anyone is easily infected.

In *kaidan*, the monster is not only a double of the main female protagonist—the monster is the female protagonist. This corresponds to Linda Williams's (1996) insights about the affinity between monster and woman.[40] This personification of the monstrous is achieved through *henshin*, where a previous beauty is transformed into a hideous ghost. This is possibly best exemplified by Oiwa's transformation in the *Yotsuya kaidan* narratives. This emphasizes explicitly the role of the feminine in the process of the personification of the monstrous because, as Hand states, "the perfect woman [...] is dignified, graceful and demure, but her antithesis is unruly and hideous."[41] The aforementioned argument draws a parallel between Japanese ghost narratives and a more general tradition of stories that feature a transformation or a metamorphosis, where protagonists transform from

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[34] Nakamura Miri, *Monstrous Bodies: The Rise of the Uncanny in Modern Japan* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015), 19.

[35] Ibid. 29.

[36] Park, *Remake Practices*, 119.

[37] Ōshima, *Yūrei kenkyū*, 52, 90.

[38] Iwasaka and Toelken define this as a "storytelling tradition set in everyday settings that exemplify many of the narrative traits associated with legends, whether urban or rural" (Iwasaka Michiko and Barre Toelken, *Ghosts and the Japanese: Cultural Experience in Japanese Death Legends* [Logan: Utah State University Press, 1994], 58).

[39] Wee, *American Remakes*, 198, 200.

[40] See Linda Williams, "When the Woman Looks," in *The Dread of Difference*, ed. Barry Keith Grant (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1996), 15–34.

[41] Examples of this monstrous-feminine abound in classical Japanese theater, and the demonic women in the *nō kyōjo-mono* or *shūnen-mono* subcategories, or the *akujo* (evil women) or *dokufu* (poison ladies) in kabuki are great icons of their respective forms (Hand, "Aesthetics of Cruelty," 24).

inside out "as a spectacle of growth, enormity and excess."[42] For women, many times the transformation is supernatural: they transform into ghosts, from beautiful women into animals and birds, or from normal schoolgirls into magically endowed girls and witches.

However, there are few works that allow for the so-called techno-scientific transformation of the female protagonist. Women-as-cyborgs become important manifestations of the theme. Recently, supernatural femininity has found its champion in anime and manga, although there are many series that include works that make use of the techno-scientific metamorphosis, too. Technological femininity—the merging of woman with a machine—also became a popular motif in the 21st-century *kaiki eiga* by Iguchi Noboru and Nishimura Yoshihiro, such as *Kataude mashin gaaru* (The Machine Girl, 2008), *Sentō shōjo: Chi no tekkamen densetsu* (Mutant Girls Squad, 2010), and *Helldriver* (2010). However, scientific femininity is still but a minor presence in *kaiki eiga*, despite history containing many female explorers and research scientists. A delightful exception is Kurosawa Kiyoshi's *Kairo*. Although outside the scope of this study, a further inquiry into these films is needed.

Supernatural women do not represent the haunting premodern behind Japan's modernity but can be seen as functional entities used to question how these modern ideologies have affected the Japanese masculinities. It is a process of challenging and questioning the persuasive image of Japanese hegemonic masculinity. When power and authority assigned to men "by the patriarchal social order are seriously undermined by national traumas [...] their masculinity is brought to crisis" and femininity is both "the actual victim and a symbolic symptom of that crisis."[43] Thus, to emphasize monstrous females in fact works to dissect not only the threat of emerging, alternative masculinities, but also, as Connell notes in her theorization discussed above, the way femininity can pose a threat to the hegemonic masculinity. In *kaiki eiga*, masculinity is thus under attack from both genders. It is through strong, supernatural women that masculine ideals and ideologies of power are dissolved. If scientific masculinity and supernatural femininity appear within the same film, the demise of the rational scientific masculinity is in many cases due to this supernatural female agent. This role of women in facilitating male action is visible not only in cinema but society at large.[44]

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[42] Ian Conrich, "Metal-Morphosis: Post-Industrial Crisis and the Tormented Body in the Tetsuo Films," in *Japanese Horror Cinema*, ed. Jay McRoy (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005), 99.

[43] Cho Eunsun, "*The Stray Bullet* and the Crisis of Korean Masculinity," in *South Korean Golden Age Melodrama: Gender, Genre and National Cinema*, ed. Kathleen McHugh and Nancy Abelmann (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2005), 99, 101

[44] See Anne Allison, *Nightwork: Sexuality, Pleasure and Corporate Masculinity in a Tokyo Hostess Club* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1994) for a discussion about the role of hostesses; Amy Borovoy, *The Too-Good Wife* (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of

3.1.2 DADS AND MAD SCIENTISTS

Media as a cultural institution "often portrays men as active people and the main characters of the story."[45] Regarding the study of Japanese (speculative) cinema, men and masculinities are yet to receive the attention given to women. An early attempt to discuss men in Japanese cinema is provided by Satō Tadao, one of the paramount Japanese critics of Japanese cinema. Satō (1984) suggests that *jidaigeki* and *gendaigeki* prefer different types of masculinities, which are representative of two differing models of historical-ideal masculinities: in Japan, *bushidō* (the way of the samurai) emphasized man's loyalty toward his master and absolute compliance, whereas in the West *kishidō* (the way of the knight) emphasized love stories and a man's love that conquers all. These were combined with gendered types from *kabuki*, leading to a situation where the protagonist of *jidaigeki* is *tachiyaku*, strong and able, skilled, smart and loyal above anything else. However, his loyalty is directed to his master, not his wife. The *gendaigeki* equivalent of *tachiyaku* is *nimaime*, a sweet and innocent character who was created as entertainment for female spectators and consequently spent his time whispering sweet nothings into the ear of the female protagonist. Unfortunately, the *nimaime* was also weak—a characteristic that often resulted in the heroine's untimely death.[46] Recently, fictional representations of the salaryman have received their fair share,[47] as have fictional representations of other types of alternative masculinities.[48]

One of the most comprehensive studies on gender representations in Japanese cinema is provided by Gregory Barrett in his *Archetypes*, where all

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California Press, 2005) for an analysis of the role that wives play in their husbands' drinking habits; and Ogasawara Yuko, *Office Ladies and Salaried Men: Power, Gender and Work in Japanese Companies* (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1998) for an outline of the way that office ladies can in fact significantly affect the working results of the salarymen in the same companies.

[45] Kahn, *Introduction to Masculinities*, 25.

[46] Satō, *Nimaime no kenkyū*, 19–47.

[47] See, for example, Bart Gaens, "(R)emasculation of the Salaryman: Representations of Japanese White-Collar Employees in the Manga *Shima Kōsaku*," in *New Perspectives from Japan and China. vol. 27*, ed. Iwatake Mikako, (Helsinki: Renvall Institute Publications, 2010), 222–246; Ishiguro, Kuniko and Peter Matanle, "Sarariiman manga ni miru danjo no raifu kōsu: 'Shima Kōsaku' 'Sarariiman Kintarō' shiriisu kara no kōsatsu," (サラリーマンマンガにみる男女のライフコース–『島耕作』『サラリーマン金太郎』シリーズからの考察, Understanding men's and women's life courses through salaryman manga: Case studies from the Shima Kosaku and Salaryman Kintaro series), in *Raifu kōsu sentaku no yukue – Nihon to Doitsu no shigoto ・ie ・sumai* ライフコース選択の行方–日本とドイツの仕事・家・住まい [Beyond a Standardized Life Course: Biographical Choices about Work, Family and Housing in Japan and Germany], ed. Tanaka Hiromi, Maren Godzik, and Kristina Iwata-Weickgenannt (Tokyo: Shinyōsha, 2013); Shinjitsu Ichirō 真実一郎, *Sarariiman manga no sengoshi* サラリーマン漫画の戦後史 [The postwar history of salaryman manga] (Tokyo: Yōsensha, 2010).

[48] On *nagaremono*, see Standish, *Myth and Masculinity* and Yoko Tokuhiro, *Marriage in Contemporary Japan* (Oxon and New York: Routledge, 2010); on *Otoko wa tsurai yo*, see Yomota, *Sengo no shinwa* and Ian Buruma, *A Japanese Mirror* (Croydon: Atlantic Book, 2012 [1984]).

of the archetypes are discussed as culturally significant functional components situated along the gender axis.[49] Barrett has created a vocabulary with which to discuss characters and their relationship to society. According to him, this relationship can be conservative, problematic or oppositional.[50] A similar approach is visible in Ian Buruma's *A Japanese Mirror* (2012 [1984]), a book about heroes and villains as they appear in the products of Japanese popular culture and contribute to the process "in which Japanese imagine and reimagine themselves."[51] Although Barrett's and Buruma's studies can be criticized on various accounts, they nonetheless promote a stance that is close to mine: exploring the functionality of characters as vessels for reflecting national concerns. Isolde Standish's *Myth and Masculinity in the Japanese Cinema: Towards a Political Reading of the "Tragic Hero"* (2000) should also be noted. It is one of the few book-length studies on men in Japanese cinema to date. Her aim has been to "use a political analysis on how masculine subjectivity interacts with the past in the light of the present, in relation to the 'tragic hero' narrative structure dominant in Japanese film."[52] Hence, much like me, she concentrates on a narrative trope and its social function, emphasizing the molding of these traditional types to answer certain political needs at specific moments in history.

In horror cinema, men have received prominently less attention. As pointed out above, ghosts in Japanese horror are mainly women. Balmain points out that male ghosts tend to be secondary figures to the vengeful *yūrei* or ghosts of warriors long dead.[53] One type of supernatural male monster was introduced in the form of a vampire, but, as Mittman notes, monstrosity does not necessarily "translate to others' Others."[54] Stein (2009) points out that due to Japan having no traditional vampire folklore, some of the initial attempts

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[49] According to Barrett, the archetypes are: the Loyal Retainer and the Tormented Lord, the Chaste Warrior, the Yakuza Hero, the Wanderer, the Vengeful Spirit, the All-Suffering Female and the Weak Passive Male, the Prodigal Son, the Forgiving Parent and the Self-Sacrificing Sister.

[50] Barrett, *Archetypes*, 20: Barrett proposes that secularization has played an important role in the shift in the representations of characters. Especially during the Occupation, ideals of freedom and individual autonomy, as opposed to authoritarianism and submission, were promoted (ibid., 179).

[51] Buruma, *Japanese Mirror*, xi. As Buruma himself notes in the preface for the latest edition (written in 2012), his was a study that, during its publication, probably provided the average person with an interesting view of Japanese society, shedding light on characters and phenomena such as *yakuza*, Takarazuka, the *Chūshingura* tale et cetera. Nowadays, however, these belong to the mainstay of Japanese cultural studies, which may consequently make his book look outdated or even naïve.

[52] Standish, *Myth and Masculinity*, 2.

[53] Balmain, *Japanese Horror*, 83, 85. One exception of a male ghost protagonist is to be found in Ōshima Nagisa's *Ai no bōrei* (Empire of Passion, 1978) but, as Balmain notes, the male ghost who was murdered by his wife and her lover appears as a sympathetic figure, appearing in an unthreatening manner, unlike most female *yūrei*. Balmain suggests that the real difference between him and the female ghosts is the fact that he has not come to terms with his death (ibid.).

[54] Mittman, "Introduction," 5–7.

to implement Dracula narratives were both critical and financial failures because the lustful figure of a Western vampire did not translate to the Japanese audience.[55] Only when Japanese vampires started to possess the characteristics of wandering spirits, which made them doomed tragic figures, were the directors on the right track. To Westerners, death itself is horrifying, but to the Japanese and other Asian cultures influenced by Buddhism, a more terrible fate is getting trapped in the liminal space between life and death.[56] Should we apply Grodal's terminology to Stein's arguments, the Japanese lacked the innate mental dispositions that would have allowed for the vampire to succeed in its original meaning. In Attebery's terms, these would have been presuppositions and a social constructivist reading would speak of culturally informed mental dispositions.

Satō's dichotomy paints a simple picture of masculinities in Japanese cinema. In relation to horror, Shimura introduces yet another term: *otoko no kaijin*, a male phantom or male monster.[57] Tsukamoto Shinya refers to them as *futsū saizu no kaijin*, phantoms of regular size.[58] What is common for the relatively less-known films utilizing the male phantom motif is that they are not situated in the past like many of the *kaidan* films before the contemporary J-horror movement; instead, they reflect the social conditions of the postwar society. One prominent expression is the problematic portrayal of fatherhood, which has found its place in previous research. Hyland proposes that in Miike Takashi's *Audition*, patriarchy is portrayed as monstrous, but, unable to face its own monstrosity, it consequently projects that monstrosity upon the innocent woman, Asami. Proposing a Jungian reading, he sees Asami as the *anima* of patriarchal Japan, the inner woman within a masculine society that plays on masculine fears. The hegemony needs to be reinforced and the woman contained.[59] In *Juon*, the murder of Kayako at the hands of her husband Takeo is, according to Valerie Wee, a representation of "patriarchal anger" during an era in which both genders are expected to undergo a change. *Juon* describes this paternal anxiety and the "loss of power, control, and dominance," creating a tangible site of failure that infects all that come into

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[55] Kida suggests that this is first and foremost due to a differing religious basis (*Gensō to kaiki*, 235).

[56] See Wayne Stein, "Enter the Dracula: The Silent Screams and Cultural Crossroads of Japanese and Hong Kong Cinema," in *Draculas, Vampires and Other Undead Forms: Essays on gender, race and culture*, ed. John Edgar Browning and Caroline Joan Picart (Maryland, Toronto, New York and Plymouth: Scarecrow Press, 2009), 235–260; see also Inoue Yoshitaka 井上嘉孝, "Gendai Nihon ni okeru kyūketsuki imeeji ni tsuite" "現代日本における吸血鬼イメージについて" [The images of vampires in modern Japan], *Kyōto daigaku daigakuin kyōikugaku kenkyūka fuzoku rinmatsukyōiku jissen kenkyūsentaa kiyō* 14 (2010), 36–50 for further analysis of the vampire in Japan.

[57] Shimura, "Hōrō suru," 220.

[58] This term comes from his short film of the same name, released in 1986.

[59] Hyland, "Politics of Excess," 205, 215. According to Jung, the *persona* is masculine and the *anima* feminine: the *persona* is "the self constructed in transactions with the social environment," while the *anima* is "the self formed in the unconscious out of repressed elements" (Connell, *Masculinities*, 12).

contact with it.[60] Thus, it negotiates "the consequences for society when men and fathers feel threatened by socioeconomic, political, and ideological changes."[61] Finally, Washitani makes a similar point in claiming that *Ringu* is ultimately about paternity. As an antidote to the spreading curse, the film promotes fathers as necessary figures for the purification of the feminine, helping them (through self-sacrifice) and guaranteeing their sanctity. Through that process, in the aftermath of Sadako being murdered by her own father, they restore the authoritative power of the male-dominated society. Consequently, the traditional view of family is also restored.[62]

Otoko no kaijin have a long history in Japan and are also an importance presence in fictions of science, as many prewar writers already started implementing scientific ideas into their works.[63] Kawana points out that although works in the detective genre have been popular in Japan ever since the late 19th century, "the genre itself has defied rigid categorization and resisted strict definition."[64] Nakamura Miri defines irregular detective fiction, *henkaku tantei shōsetsu*, as a genre that "differed from the more objective and rational methods of regular detective fiction (honkaku tantei shōsetsu)" and which, because of its scientific themes, "is now treated as the forerunner of contemporary Japanese science fiction."[65]

Scientific masculinity and irregular detective fiction have also gained popularity due to the rise of "*eroguro nonsense,"* or erotic-grotesque nonsense. Nakamura explains that there was a huge consumer market for everything bizarre, which "un-doubtedly affected these popular writers' decision to depict a 'nightmare of machines' rather than the 'utopian dream'."[66] Detective fiction, according to Kawana, tried to make sense of the modernizing world, becoming "antidotes to the modern epidemics of angst and anxiety, the roots of which remained obscured in the shadows of everyday life."[67] From Grodal's biocultural point of view, the popularity of crime fictions stems from their aim to provide orientation and moral surveillance in the new social jungle and also activate a series of innate dispositions, like hiding from dangerous others.[68]

Science fiction scholar Tatsumi Takayuki (2000) places Japanese science fiction writers into four main generational groups. He notes that the first

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[60] Wee, *American Remakes*, 123–133.

[61] Ibid.

[62] Washitani, "Ringu sanbusaku," 201–214, 218.

[63] See Edogawa, "Kaidan nyūmon" and Nakamura Miri, "Horror and Machines in Prewar Japan: The Mechanical Uncanny in Yumeno Kyusaku's Dogura Magura," in *Robot Ghosts and Wired Dreams: Japanese Science Fiction from Origins to Anime*, ed. Christopher Bolton, Istvan Csicsery-Ronay, Jr. and Tatsumi Takayuki (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 2007), 3–26.

[64] Kawana, *Murder Most Modern*, 1.

[65] Nakamura, "Horror and Machines," 4.

[66] Nakamura, ibid., 9.

[67] Kawana, *Murder Most Modern,* 8.

[68] Grodal, *Embodied Visions*, 8.

generation appeared in the 1960s with names such as Abe Kōbō, Komatsu Sakyō and Hoshi Shinichi.[69] Their original works have also regularly provided source material for films such as *Tanin no kao* and *Nihon chibotsu*. Hoshi Shinichi, known for his very short science fiction stories, also scripted Honda Ishirō's *Matango*. Thus, in tracing the origins of "Japanese horror"—or the fantastic, as I would prefer to call it—it is necessary to take into account its connection with literature. If the filmmakers were influenced by American and European film history, the influence was doubled, because as Tatsumi points out, many of these "founding fathers" of Japanese science fiction literature were influenced by 1950s Anglo-American sci-fi.[70] As opposed to detective fiction, Tatsumi sees the origins of Japanese science fiction *as an organized movement* [italics mine] belonging to the 1950s and the successful publication of *Uchūjin* and *Hayakawa's SF Magazine*. There are thus similarities between this and the J-horror movement. Many of the prewar writers, such as Yumeno Kyūsaku and Unno Jūza, incorporated styles that "ranged from scientific fantasy to sociopolitical extrapolation."[71] Especially Unno Jūza is an important figure for the understanding of the earlier manifestations of the Mad Scientist motif in Japan. Unno, who was a government engineer, was interested in creating stories with the theme of improving the human body. In *Fushū* (1934), Muroto was a surgeon who aimed to create a superhuman. He ends up operating on his own body, creating a monster in the process. In addition, the question of using the unlimited power of technology for engineering a superman becomes central in *Hae otoko* (Fly Man), where Dr. Shiota experiments on a corpse that later becomes the villain of the story.[72] Similar narratives abound in the works I will analyze in this thesis, although not within the J-horror movement.

As the above attests, the Mad Scientist was a central feature of Japanese science fiction, too. In the universal "Mad Scientist" narrative, "Prominent but deranged agents of science—such as research scientists, engineers, and doctors—started to appear more often as serial killers than as models of scientific morality."[73] Generally speaking, the Mad Scientist narrative is based on distinctive features: immoral intent, immoral methodology and an immoral result from an experiment carried out in secret.[74] John Rieder traces the origins of "the deviant renegade scientist" to the late 20th century and to

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[69] Tatsumi, "Generations and Controversies: An Overview of Japanese Science Fiction, 1957–1997," *Science Fiction Studies* 27, no. 1 (2000): 105.

[70] Ibid., 106. Tatsumi argues that the second generation appeared in the 1970s, the third in the 1980s and the fourth in the late 1980s and 1990s. All of these have distinctive concerns, ranging from New Wave ideologies to (pre-) cyberpunk, cyborg feminism and "yaoi politics" (ibid., 106).

[71] Tatsumi, "Generations and Controversies," 105.

[72] Kawana, "Mad Scientists," 113, 115–116.

[73] Ibid., 89.

[74] Larsen, "Frankenstein's Legacy: The Mad Scientist Remade," 47–48.

Stevenson's Dr. Jekyll, Wells's Dr. Moreau or Shelley's Victor Frankenstein.[75] In fact, Rieder sees Victor Frankenstein as the very first *modern* mad scientist, differing in essence from his predecessor Faust. Whereas Faust operated within the Christian universe and gained knowledge and power through his deal with the devil, Frankenstein (and his contemporaries) were secular figures: "The framework of his desire is not the supernatural realm of the unholy alliance but rather the resolutely modern and secular arena of the professional career… Just as Victor Frankenstein is a secular transformation of Faust, his creation myth, and its failure is a version of the Fall."[76] Andrew Bartlett, too, recognizes the similarities between modern mad scientist narratives and the Faust legend, with their shared thematic concern with forbidden knowledge. Faust, however, is contextualized within "theistic supernaturalism," not "atheistic materialism."[77]

Bartlett (2014) has analyzed the so-called "Frankenstein myth" in detail. According to him, at the core of the storyline "a mad scientist plays God by trying to re-enact the origin of the human, and disastrously fails."[78] He calls these scientists "dramatic embodiments of scientism," also referring to them as vain scientists; they are above all overconfident in their own abilities and scientific powers.[79] In addition to the presence of the mad/vain scientist and the monster created by him—an impossible human—the works incorporating the Frankenstein myth have a distinctive narrative pattern: an experiment, partial success, a defect, dialogue, violent revenge, and death. These are components that originally appeared in Mary Shelley's *Frankenstein* and, according to Bartlett, must appear in all of its variations. In addition, the Mad Scientist must aim to create an especially anthropomorphic monster with whom he has a conversation.[80] As Rieder also points out, "The scientist-creature dyad is without question an item of standard science fiction equipment picked up from the sf stockroom."[81]

The Mad Scientist "disregards the ethical considerations and regulations of society in general, professional organizations, and the scientist's nation."[82] It is used to criticize the widely embraced notion of scientism, the "unconditional faith in science and its agents."[83] More to the point, Bartlett points out that the Mad Scientist narrative and the Frankenstein myth criticize the notion of

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[75] John Rieder, "The Mad Scientist, The Failed Experiment, and the Queer Family of Man: *Sirius, Frankenstein,* and the SF Stockroom," in *Parabolas of Science Fiction*, ed. Veronica Hollinger and Brian Attebery, (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 2013), 93.

[76] Rieder, "The Mad Scientist," 93–95.

[77] Bartlett, *Mad Scientist*, 22.

[78] Ibid., 6.

[79] Ibid., 9.

[80] Ibid., 19, 22.

[81] Rieder, ibid., 92.

[82] Larsen, "Frankenstein's Legacy: The Mad Scientist Remade," 47–48.

[83] Kawana, "Mad Scientists," 90.

scientism—not science—which he sees as "a reductionist ideology based on a metaphysical position neither required nor necessitated by the practices and institutions of scientific research itself."[84] The films in this thesis illuminate the general role of scientific masculinity, which appears as criticism of scientism, providing an important new outlook on the study of masculinities within Japanese cinema, as well as pointing out the influence of literature that has often been ignored in previous studies.

3.2 CONCEPTUALIZING MASCULINITY: THE HEGEMONIC SALARYMAN

The emergence of the women's liberation movement in the West in the late 1960s resulted in the first wave of research about gender and sex roles. The issue of gender was further highlighted by the advent of gay movement, leading to overall "cultural turbulence around themes of masculinity." [85] Previously masculinity had been present in research but not as the real target of analysis. In Japan, the popularity of the studies on the Japanese lifetime employment system provides a fine example of this. [86] These studies emphasize men but not their masculinities, defined by Connell as "*historical configurations of practice* structured by gender relations."[87] Since then, the need of problematizing the "concept of 'men' as a category" has become evident.[88]

The concept of hegemonic masculinity is one of the main theoretical concepts of masculinity studies, originating as late as the 1980s in Australia.[89] It started out with a narrow conceptual model that became a widely used framework between the late 1980s and early 2000s.[90] It emerged as an answer to the realization that masculinities and femininities are plural phenomena: there is never only one.[91] Hegemony itself refers to "the cultural dynamic by which a group claims and sustains a leading position in social life," leading to a situation where the attributes of this particular group are culturally exalted. The notion originates from the writings of Antonio Gramsci, who in the 1920s

[84] Bartlett, *Mad Scientist*, 25, 32.

[85] Connell, "The big picture," 597–598.

[86] Ogasawara, *Office Ladies*, 3.

[87] Connell, *Masculinities*, 44.

[88] Romit Dasgupta, *Re-reading the Salaryman in Japan: Crafting Masculinities* (London and New York: Routledge, 2007), 5–6; see also Tokuhiro, *Marriage in Contemporary Japan*, 54.

[89] While here I speak of masculinity studies, some scholars use men's studies or critical studies of men instead. Connell and Messerschmidt state that these can all be used interchangeably, even though opposing opinions abound ("Rethinking the concept," 829–830).

[90] Ibid., 835.

[91] See Connell, *Masculinities*; Cynthia Cockburn and Susan Ormrod, *Gender and Technology in the Making* (London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: SAGE Publications, 1993), 5.

and 1930s theorized that the most powerful method of rule for a dominant class is to gain the consent of the masses: if the working classes did not feel oppressed, they were willing to consent to the rule of the dominant classes.[92] The cultural and ideological relations between ruling and subordinate classes thus have less to do with the domination of the latter and more with "the struggle for hegemony – that is, for moral, cultural, intellectual and, thereby, political leadership over the whole society."[93]

As a concept, hegemonic masculinity is as influential as it is criticized.[94] Being generally subordinate to Gramsci's definition, it means the domination of a particular type of masculinity over women and other men, referring to "the pattern of practice that allowed men's dominance … to continue."[95] However, as societies develop, hegemonic masculinity also finds new forms. The hegemonization of one particular form of masculinity is a result of a process that takes place in specific socio-historical contexts with individuals making use of context-specific gender practices in order to "achieve an ascendant position in relation to other men and women." [96] As Connell and Messerschmidt emphasize, hegemonic masculinity is never ahistorical nor static; it is continuously challenged by the other, produced and reproduced in social practice, open to changes and, most importantly, subject to the general public's situational consent.[97] Sexual and racial differences, too, are important for the ideal of hegemonic masculinity. Hegemonic masculinity suggests that men comply with social norms of masculinity by subordinating women and marginalizing other men. These are referred to as external and internal hegemonies.[98]

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[92] Lacey, *Image and Representation*, 113.

[93] Tony Bennett, "Popular Culture and the 'Turn to Gramsci,'" in *Cultural Theory and Popular Culture: A Reader*, ed. John Storey (Essex: Pearson Education Limited, 2009), 84; Connell and Messerschmidt note that, in fact, much of the critique toward the concept of hegemonic masculinity itself stems from the way in which Gramsci used hegemony as a representation of the dynamics of structural change that involved whole classes, whereas gender studies in general are not focused on large-scale historical change. A clear focus is needed in order to avoid reduction of the term into a simple model of cultural control ("Rethinking the concept," 831).

[94] For a summary about strands of criticism and an answer to those, see Connell and Messerschmidt, "Rethinking the concept."

[95] Connell and Messerschmidt, "Rethinking the concept," 832.

[96] Justin Charlebois, *Japanese Femininities* (Oxon and New York: Routledge: 2014), 21.

[97] Tokuhiro, *Contemporary Japanese Marriage*, 58; Connell and Messerschmidt, "Rethinking the concept," 852–853; Messerschmidt, *Hegemonic Masculinities*, 44–46; Messner, "The Governator," 462; Demetriou, "A Critique," 340.

[98] Kahn, *Introduction to Masculinities*, 31; Demetriou, "A Critique," 341; Connell and Messerschmidt, "Rethinking the concept," 844.

In Japan, negotiations of masculinity are divided into discussions of its hegemonic manifestations[99] and, more recently, the ways in which hegemony is challenged.[100] In addition, some scholars discuss more specific attributes that may define a certain kind of masculine self, which can be further situated still within the dualism of the salaryman hegemony and its alternatives.[101]

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[99] See Allison, *Nightwork*; Ogasawara, *Office Ladies*; Tomoko Hidaka, *Salaryman Masculinity: Continuity and Change in Hegemonic Masculinity in Japan* (The Netherlands: Brill, 2010); Taga Futoshi, "East Asian Masculinities," in *The Handbook of Studies on Men and Masculinities*, eds. Michael S. Kimmel, Jack Hearn and Raewyn Connell (Thousand Oaks, London and New Delhi: SAGE Publications), 129–140; Gordon Mathews, "Being a Man in a Straitened Japan: The View from Twenty Years Later," in *Capturing Contemporary Japan: Differentiation and Uncertainty*, eds. Sachiko Kawano, Glenda Roberts, Susan Orpett Long (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2014), 60–80; Mark McLelland, "Salarymen doing Queer: Gay men and the heterosexual public sphere," in *Genders, transgenders and sexualities in Japan*, eds. Romit Dasgupta, and Mark McLelland (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 78–88; Kaizuma Keiko and Hosoya Makoto 海妻径子, 細谷実. "Sekusharuna homosooshariti no yume to zasetsu: Sengo taishū shakai, tennōsei, Mishima Yukio セクシャルなホモソーシャリティの夢と挫折・戦後大周社会、天皇制、三島由紀夫" [Disappointing dream of sexual homosociality: Postwar large public, the emperor system, Mishima Yukio], in *Danseishi 3: "Otokorashisa" no gendaishi"* 男性史 3「男らしさ」の現代史 [The history of masculinities 3: Contemporary history of "manliness"], eds. Abe, Tsunehisa 阿部 恒久, Amano Shōko 天野 正子, Obinata Sumio 大日方 純夫 (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai hyōronsha, 2006); see also the lifelong work of Romit Dasgupta for a comprehensive take on the subject.

[100] Emma E. Cook, *Reconstructing Adult Masculinites: Part-time work in Contemporary Japan* (London and New York: Routledge, 2006); Tom Gill, *Men of Uncertainty: The Social Organization of Day Laborers in Contemporary Japan* (New York: State University of New York Press, 2001); Justin Charlebois, "Herbivore Masculinity as an Oppositional Form of Masculinity," *Culture Society & Masculinities* 5, no. 1 (2013): 89–104. See also the following edited volumes: James E. Roberson and Nobue Suzuki, eds., *Men and Masculinities in Contemporary Japan: Dislocating the Salaryman Doxa* (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2005); Sabine Frühstück and Anne Walthall, eds., *Recreating Japanese Men* (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 2011); Birgitte Steger and Angelica Koch, eds., *Cool Japanese Men: Studying New Masculinities at Cambridge* (Zürich: LIT Verlag, 2017); Tanaka Toshiyuki 田中俊之, *Danseigaku no shintenkai* 男性学の新展開 [New directions of masculinity studies] (Tokyo: Seikyūsha, 2009); Itō, Kimio 伊藤公雄, "Danseigaku no tanjō, dansei no jikotankyū. Otoko no sei mo hitotsu de wa nai" 男性学の誕生 男性の自己探求 男の性も一つではない [The mirth of masculinity studies, The quest for self. There is not only one masculinity], in *Danseigaku – Shinpen, Nihon no feminizumu 12* 男性学―新編 日本のフェミニズム 12 [Masculinity studies: New edition of Japanese Feminism 12], ed. Amano Shōko 天野正子 et al., (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1995), 77–108; Taga Futoshi 多賀太, *Dansei no jendaa keisei: "Otokorashisa" no yuragi no nakade* 男性のジェンダー形成：「男らしさ」の揺らぎのなかで [The gender formation of men: Fluctuating 'manliness' Tokyo: Tokyokan shuppan, 2001.

[101] See Paul A Christensen, *Japan, Alcoholism, and Masculinity: Suffering Sobriety in Tokyo* (Maryland and London: Lexington Books, 2015); Jonathan D. Mackintosh, *Homosexuality and Manliness in Postwar Japan* (London and New York: Routledge, 2010). See also the work of Mark McLelland for comprehensive overview in the field.

Overall, it can be deduced that masculinity has started to become problematized partly due to the collapse of the virtues of postwar capitalism that constituted the baseline for class and gender claims in Japan.[102]

Harding points out that "gender appears only in culturally specific forms."[103] In Japanese, 'masculinity' can be translated as *otokorashisa*, or manliness. One of the leading figures of Japanese masculinity studies, Itō Kimio, has provided one of the first studies on masculinities in his "*Otokorashisa" no yukue* (1996 [1993]), wherein he discusses what he calls the crisis of masculinity vis-à-vis femininity, a trajectory that was created by the Women's Liberation Movement. Itō's main point, that men in many cases are forced to change although social institutions, is yet to be acknowledged. He has also penned an article "Otoko no sei mo hitotsu dewa nai" as a contribution to a book on Japanese feminism, emphasizing the plurality of masculinities. "Other" masculinities constitute important minority groups that act as a counterpart to the hegemonic ideology.[104]

Culture offers different ways of representing masculinities, as well as different ways of being masculine. In Japan, the construction of masculinity has historically been closely related to the needs of the state,[105] and a level of self-sacrifice and social embeddedness is needed. [106] Taga Futoshi has translated hegemonic masculinity as *ichininmae no otoko*—the exemplary man. This exemplary ideal requires a man to marry a female, support his family through his economic power and, as the head of the family, take responsibility for it.[107] In the postwar society, this took place in the figure of

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[102] Romit Dasgupta, "Creating Corporate Warriors: The "salaryman" and masculinity in Japan," in *Asian Masculinities: The meaning and practice of manhood in China and Japan*, eds. Kam Louie and Morris Low (London & New York: Routledge, 2003), 131; David Slater and Stuart W. Galbraith, "Re-narrating Social Class and Masculinity in Neoliberal Japan," in *Electronic Journal of Contemporary Japanese Studies*, last modified September 30, 2011, https://japanesestudies.org.uk/articles/2011/SlaterGalbraith.html.

[103] Sandra Harding, *The Science Question in Feminism* (Itchaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1986), 17.

[104] What I describe here as "minorities" are the masculinities that function as opposition to the salaryman. Thus, although constituting an important image of a Japanese male and being a minority in Japan, homosexuals are not mentioned here, as being homosexual does not rule out being a salaryman, too. Homosexuality could be analyzed as an opposition to the functional bundle of Husband-Father, but since these two already accommodate the same status as anti-hegemonic masculine ideologies, the theme will not be discussed further in this thesis.

[105] Morris Low, "The Emperor's Sons Go to War: Competing Masculinities in modern Japan," in *Asian Masculinites: The meaning and practice of manhood in China and Japan*, eds. Kam Louie and Morris Low (London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 91.

[106] Slater and Galbraith, "Re-narrating Social Class."

[107] Taga Futoshi 多賀太, *Dansei mondai no jidai? Sakusō suru jendaa to kyōiku poritikusu* 男子問題の時代? 錯綜するジェンダーと教育のポリティクス [The era of men's problems? Educational politics and the complicated gender] (Tokyo: Gakubusha, 2016), 12.

the salaryman. The salaryman is an embodiment of a form of masculinity that is culturally and politically specific, a figure that has ruled the popular understanding of Japanese masculinity from the start of the period of high growth until the 1990s and the Lost Decade.[108] Through the economic activity of the salaryman, emasculated postwar Japanese men regained their power; because of this, the working man came to occupy the role of "the most prominent symbol of heterosexual adult Japanese masculinity."[109]

Generally speaking, the salaryman was representative of Japan's new middle class, a white-collar, male company employee in the private sector who was able to reap the benefits of lifetime employment, seniority-based wages and corporate paternalism by expressing loyalty, diligence, dedication and self-sacrifice.[110] As Sugimoto explicates, he "embodies all the stereotypical images associated with the Japanese corporate employee: loyalty to his company, subservience to the hierarchical order of his enterprise, devotion to his work, a long and industrious working life, and job security in his career."[111] While the term was originally used to specifically refer to middle-class, white-collar workers of large companies, many company workers or civil servants who receive a monthly salary call themselves salarymen.[112]

The discourse and hegemonization of the salaryman began building up during the prewar years, even as early as the 1920s. However, it was correlated with a lower social standing until the 1960s, when there was a rapid increase of households with salaried workers. Becoming a salaryman became the blueprint for Japanese masculinity in the postwar decades, with the term being naturalized in the 1950s, replacing the earlier *gekkyū tori* (monthly earner) of the early Showa period. For better or worse, the salaryman embodied the so-called "New Japanese Male."[113] The creation of the salaryman could be an extension of so-called "samuraization."[114] The term not only points to the fact that in the late Tokugawa period many redundant samurai became the predecessors of white-collar workers, but also refers to a process through which such characteristics as loyalty, perseverance and diligence, said to be

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[108] The period of high growth itself is generally agreed to have lasted from 1955 until 1973 (Charlebois, *Japanese Femininities*, 1; Shinjitsu, *Sarariiman manga*, 36).

[109] Low, "Emperor's Sons," 95; Cook, *Adult Masculinities*, 33.

[110] Tokuhiro, *Contemporary Japanese Marriage*, 55; Romit Dasgupta, "Performing Masculinities? The 'Salaryman' at Work and Play," *Japanese Studies* 20, no. 2 (2000): 192; Dower, "Useful War," 59; Charlebois, ibid., 1.

[111] Sugimoto *Japanese Society*, 40.

[112] Hidaka, *Salaryman Masculinity*, 1.

[113] Romit Dasgupta, "Emotional Spaces and Places of Salaryman Anxiety in *Tokyo Sonata*," *Japanese Studies* 31, no. 3 (2011): 375; Hidaka, *Salaryman masculinity*, 2; Dasgupta, "Creating Corporate Warriors," 121.

[114] See Burgess, "Homogeneous Japan," 10; Low, "Emperor's Sons," 81; Dasgupta, "Creating corporate warriors," 120; Ezra Vogel, *Japan's New Middle Class: The Salary Man and His Family in a Tokyo Suburb* (Berkeley, Los Angeles and Oxford: University of California Press, 1963), 5.

held by elite samurai, were gradually extended through propaganda, education, and regulation to cover the whole of the population in order to create a national ideology.[115]

To directly call salarymen contemporary-era samurai, however, is nothing but ahistorical reductionism, which does not take into account the gaps between different periods.[116] It seems to be a manifestation of *nihonjinron*. Still, as processes "salarymanization" and "samuraization" are not so different after all. In addition, they are not "monolithic ideals but rather indefinite notions containing contradictory elements."[117] Thus, although Roberson and Suzuki are correct in stating that "samuraization" as a term should be avoided due to its connections with *nihonjinron*, the process itself—namely, the embracing of the connection between the state and the ideal masculinity—is similar. As Morris Low suggests, throughout the process of Japan's modernization, men were linked to the state through "rigid constructions of the masculine" in institutions that promoted conformity, discipline and submission.[118] The way salarymen were tied to the company resembles this strategy. However, Hidaka states that this kind of corporate masculinity, which derives from the power of the company, is ultimately the most vulnerable.[119] Power in this hegemonic model lies with the company: "the disguise of the corporate warrior hides the experience of the company-tamed submissive salaryman."[120] This is apparent in the comments made by Dower and Sugimoto that "[m]uch of the genuinely innovative entrepreneurial energy that lies behind Japan's postwar economic takeoff … has come from … smaller

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[115] Vogel, *The Salary Man*, 5; Befu Harumi, *Japan, An Anthropological Introduction* (San Francisco and London: Chandler, 1971), 32, 52. Of course, as Burgess notes, it was no coincidence that the traits such as loyalty and obedience were highlighted; samuraization, in fact, imposed a model of behavior that made control and coercion easier in the name of national unity ("Homogeneous Japan," 10).

[116] Frühstück and Walthall, "Introduction," 1; James A. Roberson and Suzuki Nobue, "Introduction," in *Men and Masculinities in Contemporary Japan: Dislocating the Salaryman Doxa*, ed. James Roberson and Suzuki Nobue (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 6. This is well demonstrated by Dower. To paraphrase, the Japanese employment system is seen as something unique, resonating with some deep, peculiar cultural understructure of the "Japanese culture." This understructure embodies the old Confucian values of harmony and hierarchy with an emphasis on the master-apprentice relationships of feudal merchant houses, as well as 'familial' values that transcend Confucianism and reflect some quintessentially Japanese consciousness of the *ie* (household). But, as Dower points out, the three distinct features of the Japanese system (lifetime employment, seniority-based wages, and company or enterprise unions) only apply to the salaryman (i.e., workers in large enterprises). They do not reflect any old cultural legacy but "the peculiarities of a dualistic labor force," which only become fixed in the 1950s ("Useful War," 59).

[117] Tokuhiro, *Contemporary Japanese Marriage*, 57.

[118] Low, "Emperor's Sons," 83.

[119] Hidaka, *Salaryman Masculinity*, 2.

[120] Ibid. 181.

enterprises"[121] and that "though powerful and influential, large corporations constitute a very small minority of the businesses in Japan."[122]

The self-evident image of the salaryman came to be doubted in the 1980s. Psychologist Watanabe Tsuneo published his *Datsu dansei no jidai* (Escaping the age of men) as early as 1986.[123] This "escape" is recalled, for example, by a recent book that summarizes contemporary men's anxieties around themes that range from childrearing to work and marital relations, stemming from actual discussions at a men's help phone line.[124] During the Lost Decade, the system upon which salaryman masculinity was based became difficult to sustain. Suddenly the whole idea of "defining oneself by one's economic status" was "revealed not only as problematic, but also as meaningless."[125] With the economic stagnation of the 1990s and 2000s, the ideal started to change and its grip "on the emotion-scape of urban Japan" dissolved. [126] Rising unemployment rates forced middle-aged men in particular to doubt their identities.[127] Consequently, popular culture presented images of "the often pathetic and even morally suspect salaryman" in the 1980s and 1990s.[128]

The salaryman ideal is nonetheless important for any discussion about Japanese men, because it is generally considered a hegemonic form of masculinity.[129] These men, as Romit Dasgupta argues, came to represent both corporate and masculine ideals. The salaryman *was* the everyman, the one responsible for the postwar economic miracle and, more importantly, the one who was both the beneficiary and the victim of the fallouts of this system.[130] Roberson and Suzuki promote a multifocal approach on salaryman masculinity, proposing that he can simultaneously be seen as a social symbol,

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[121] Dower, "Useful War," 58. He continues that under the war economy, smaller enterprises flourished, developing effective networks of political and bureaucratic patronage and responding supportively to the militaristic rule. This support was further cultivated by the conservative politicians of the to-be-formed Liberal Democratic Party in 1955.

[122] Sugimoto, *Japanese Society*, 86.

[123] See Tokuhiro, *Contemporary Japanese Marriage*, 64.

[124] Hamada Tomotaka 橘木俊詔, ed., *Dansei wa nani o nayamu no ka. Dansei senyō sōdanmadoguchi kara miru shinri to shien* 男性は何を悩むのか。男性専用相談窓口から見る心理と支援 [What are men concerned about? Psychology and support from the viewpoint of an all-male's helpdesk] (Kyoto: Minerva shobō, 2018).

[125] Rachael Hutchinson and Mark Williams, "Introduction: Self and Other in Modern Japanese Literature," in *Representing the Other in Modern Japanese Literature: A Critical Approach*, eds. Rachael Hutchinson and Mark Williams (New York and London: Routledge, 2006), 1.

[126] Dasgupta, "Emotional Spaces," 376; Taga, "East Asian Masculinities," 134.

[127] Marcus Rebick, "Changes in the workplace and their impact on the family," in *The Changing Japanese Family*, ed. Marcus Rebick and Takenaka Ayumi (London: Routledge, 2006), 76; Dasgupta, "Creating Corporate Warriors," 131.

[128] Slater and Galbraith, "Re-narrating social class"; Gaens, "(Re)Masculation," 224–226.

[129] Taga, *Otokorashisa*, 55–74; Dasgupta, "Performing Masculinities," 194.

[130] Dasgupta, ibid., 192.

a social-cultural construction, a state/corporate ideology and a social-historical reality.[131] The salaryman model corresponds to the process of shaping masculinity on a general level to fit the needs of the corporate economy, accompanied by an individual process of shaping masculinity to fit the needs of corporate work.[132] However, hegemonic masculinity is neither the most common model of masculinity nor the most powerful.[133] The salarymen, for example, are unanimously referred to as the hegemonic model of masculinity even though they only constituted only one third to half of the labor force.[134] Still, while not necessarily the norm, hegemonic masculinity is definitely normative.[135] Donaldson defines it ultimately as both a personal and collective project to emphasize common sense around breadwinning manhood.[136]

The salaryman as a manifestation of hegemonic masculinity wielded symbolic power over other men and women. The films in this thesis challenge this manifestation of power in a myriad of ways. Raewyn Connell proposes interrelated forms of masculinities for the existence of other. These are complicit, subordinated and marginalized masculinities. Complicity means masculinities that benefit from "the patriarchal dividend" but are not hegemonic representations of it.[137] They exist close to the circle of power but not inside it. Subordination refers to practices of expelling some groups from the "circle of legitimacy," whereas marginalization is the process of gender interacting with other structures, such as class and ethnicity, the relationships constructed within the domination of subordinated groups.[138] All of these appear in the films, posited against the cultural ideal of dominant, hegemonic masculinity. Recently, a new term of "hybrid masculinities" has also started to gain ground.[139] Generally it refers to "the selective incorporation of elements

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[131] See Roberson and Suzuki, "Introduction," 6.

[132] Connell, *Masculinities*, 164–165.

[133] Ibid., 77. Connell continues that hegemony is likely nonetheless to be established only if there is some correspondence between a cultural ideal and institutional power (ibid.).

[134] Connell, ibid., 79: Tokuhiro, *Contemporary Japanese Marriage*, 56; Taga notes that the percentage of white-collar workers reached no more than 46% by 2000, with over half of the private sector male employees being employed in small firms in 1960, 1980 and 2000 (Taga, "East Asian Masculinities," 133).

[135] Connell and Messerschmidt, "Rethinking the concept," 832.

[136] Donaldson, "What is hegemonic masculinity?," 645.

[137] The patriarchal dividend means the material advantages, such as higher incomes and easier access to education, that are enabled by men's status in patriarchal societies (Demetriou, ibid., 341).

[138] Jeff Hearn, "From Hegemonic Masculinity to the Hegemony of Men," *Feminist Theory* 5, no. 1 (2004): 55; Connell, *Masculinities*, 76–81; Demetriou, ibid., 342.

[139] See Tristan Bridges and C.J. Pascoe, "Hybrid Masculinities: New Directions in the Sociology of Men and Masculinities," *Sociology Compass* 8, no. 3 (2014): 246–258; Messner, "The Governator"; Ronald Saladin, "Between *gyaru-o* and *sōshokukei danshi:* Body discourses in lifestyle magazines for young Japanese men," *Contemporary Japan* 27, no. 1 (2015): 53–70.

of identity typically associated with various marginalized and subordinated masculinities and … femininities into privileged men's gender performance and identities."[140] While this might sound quite positive, scholars in many cases agree that it is a model that continues to reproduce and sustain existing systems of inequality, simultaneously obscuring this process.[141] Demetriou speaks of a "hegemonic bloc," which develops Connell's idea of hegemonic masculinity in a more hybrid direction, all the while entailing that these are practices from diverse masculinities that aim at reproduction of patriarchy.[142] By this he refers to the fact that whereas traditional hegemonic masculinity has been heterosexual and white, the hybrid masculine bloc can include straight, gay, black and white elements. It is thus a non-dualistic model. Contrasting opinions are available, too. Eric Anderson and Rhidian McQuire discuss Anderson's "inclusive masculinity theory," which suggests that men are indeed allowed "increased social freedom in the expression of attitudes and behaviors that were once highly stigmatized."[143]

In Japan, hybridity manifests itself, for example, in relation to two types of "new" masculinities promoted by Japanese magazines (*sōshokukei danshi*, "herbivore boys," and *gyaru-o*, the male counterpart of the *gyaru* subculture), which "while reproducing mechanisms of hegemonic masculinity… semantically expand the male habitus and body language."[144] They seem to challenge hegemonic masculinity, but a closer analysis reveals that, in fact, its mechanisms are merely reproduced with a differing exterior. It is a process of incorporating "Others" into the hegemonic model, of strategically and symbolically reframing oneself as a part of a socially subordinated group.[145] The films in this thesis, especially the more recent ones, take an opposite stance. They invert the logic of hegemony and Otherness, making hegemonic masculinity the Other by centering on alternative masculinities. The role of scientific masculinity, which I will discuss further in Section 3.3, is thus not only a means to discuss national images but also to mediate the shift in the ideology of hegemonic masculinity.

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[140] Bridges and Pascoe, "Hybrid Masculinities," 246.

[141] Ibid., 246. See also Messner "The Governator" and "'Changing men' and feminist policies in the United States," *Theory and Society* 22 (1993): 723–737.

[142] Demetriou, ibid., 337, 347–348.

[143] Eric Anderson and Rhidian McGuire, "Inclusive Masculinity Theory and the Gendered Politics of Men's Rugby," *Journal of Gender Studies* 19, no. 3 (2010): 251. They refer to these moments of allowance as moments during which homophobia has a diminished meaning in society, constructing hybridity or inclusivity as a model on the axis of homosexuality/heterosexuality.

[144] Saladin, "Gyaru-o," 53.

[145] Anderson and McGuire, "Inclusive Masculinity," 252.

3.3 SCIENCE, FICTION, NATION AND MEN

As I have established, speculative fiction is an important tool for narrating social reality. This subchapter creates a contextual framework for understanding fictions of science and scientific masculinity as imaginings of nationhood. Regarding the study of the history of science in Japan, possibly the most comprehensive take on the subject is provided by Morris Low's three-volume edited series *Science, Technology and Research and Development in Japan* (2001), which discusses a wide range of topics, from individual scientists and intercultural exchange to specific fields, institutions and the role of science in both local and global economies. Application of scientific thought and technology provides one more important framework, for example, in the discussions about eugenics,[146] bioethics,[147] robotics[148] and Japan's wartime science.[149] In addition, the topic has been approached from the point of view

[146] See Karen Schaffner, ed., *Eugenics in Japan* (Fukuoka: Kyushu University Press, 2014); Ogino Miho, "Eugenics, Reproductive Technologies, and the Feminist Dilemma in Japan," in *Dark Medicine: Rationalizing Unethical Medical Research*, ed. William R. LaFleur et al. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007), 223–232; Tessa Morris-Suzuki, "Debating Racial Science in Wartime Japan," *Osiris* 13 (1998): 354-375.

[147] See Takahashi Takao, *Taking Life and Death Seriously: Bioethics From Japan* (Amsterdam: JAI Press Inc., 2005).

[148] See Jennifer Robertson, *Robo Sapiens Japanicus: Robots, Gender, Family and the Japanese Nation* (Oakland: University of California Press, 2018); Sone Yuji, *Japanese Robot Culture: Performance, Imagination and Modernity* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017); Fredrik L. Schodt, *Inside the Robot Kingdom: Japan, Mechatronics, and the Coming Robotopia* (Tokyo and New York: Kodansha International Ltd., 1988).

[149] See Frederick Dickinson, "Biohazard: Unit 731 in Postwar Japanese Politics of National 'Forgetfulness,'" in *Dark Medicine: Rationalizing Unethical Medical Research*, ed. William R. LaFleur, Gernot Böhme and Shimazono Susumu (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007): 85-104; Tsuneishi Kenichi, "Unit 731 and the Human Skulls Discovered in 1989: Physicians Carrying Out Organized Crimes," in *Dark Medicine: Rationalizing Unethical Medical Research*, ed. William R. LaFleur, Gernot Böhme and Susumu Shimazono (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2007): 73-84.

of general history, [150] differentiated eras, [151] gender, [152] institutions, [153] technology policies and management,[154] and the relationship between Japan and other countries.[155]

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[150] See James Bartholomew, *The Formation of Science in Japan: Building a Research Tradition* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989); Alun M. Anderson, *Science and Technology in Japan* (Somerset: Longman Group Limited, 1984); Tuge Hideomi, *Historical Development of Science and Technology in Japan* (Tokyo: Japan Publications Trading Company, 1968); Hayashi Takeshi, *The Japanese Experience in Technology: From Transfer to Self-Reliance* (Hong Kong: United Nations University Press, 1990); Tessa Morris-Suzuki, *The Technological Transformation of Japan: From the Seventeenth to the Twenty-first Century* (Hong Kong: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

[151] See Morris Low, Nakayama Shigeru and Yoshioka Hitoshi, eds., *Science, Technology and Society in Contemporary Japan* (Cambridge, New York, Oakleigh and Madrid: Cambirdge University Press, 1999), Nakayama Shigeru, *Science, Technology and Society in Postwar Japan* (London and New York: Kegan Paul International, 1991); Nakayama Shigeru, David Swain and Eric Yagi, *Science and Society in Modern Japan* (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1974); Tessa Morris-Suzuki, *Beyond Computopia: Information, Automation and Democracy in Japan* (London and New York: Kegan Paul International, 1988); Timon Screech, *The Lens Within the Heart: The Western Scientific Gaze and Popular Imagery in Late Edo Japan* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press. 2002).

[152] See Low et al., *Science, Technology and Society*, 146–154, Samuel Coleman, *Japanese Science from the Inside* (London & New York: Routledge, 1999); Nakamura Masanori, ed., *Technology Change and Female Labour in Japan* (Hong Kong: United Nations University Press, 1994); Hirata Kimura Aya, *Radiation Brain Moms and Citizen Scientists: The Gender Politics of Food Contamination after Fukushima* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2016); Osumi Noriko, "Women Scientists in Japan: Their Situations and Goals," in *Life* 58, no. 5–6 (2006): 273–278; Kuwahara Motoko, "Japanese Women in Science and Technology," *Minerva* 39 (2001): 203–216.

[153] See Coleman, *Japanese Science from the Inside*; Nakayama, *Science, Technology and Society*; Low at al., *Science, Technology and Society*; Saadia M. Pekkanen and Paul Kallander-Umezu, *In Defense of Japan: From the Market to the Military in Space Policy* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010); Bartholomew, *Formation of Science*.

[154] Martin Hemmert and Chris Oberländer, eds., *Technology and Innovation in Japan: Policy and Management for the Twenty-first Century* (London & New York: Routledge, 1998); William M. Tsutsui, *Manufacturing Ideology: Scientific Management in Twentieth-Century Japan* (Princeton and Oxfordshire: Princeton University Press, 1998).

[155] See Kimura Shigeru, *Japan's Science Edge: How the cult of anti-science thought in America limits U.S. scientific and technological progress* (Lanham and London: University Press of America, 1985); Nakayama Shigeru, *Academic and Scientific Traditions in China, Japan, and the West* (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1984); Watanabe Masao, *The Japanese and Western Science* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990 [original Japanese version 1976]); Joan H. Fujimura, "Transnational Genomics: Transgressing the Boundary between the 'Modern/West' and 'Premodern/East,'" in *Doing Science + Culture*, ed. Roddey Reid and Sharon Traweek (New York & London: Routledge, 2000), 71–92. It should be noted, however, that especially these kind of considerations work as accomplices to national(ist) and/or essential(ist) ideas: Nakayama sees science as a means of freeing the Japanese from their sense of inferiority, whereas Kimura portrays Japan as a unique example in the world. Both conform to the *nihonjinron* discourse.

Science and technology provide a means for voicing concerns about "Japaneseness," "Japanese national identity," and "Japanese nationhood." As Lamarre argues, it is possible "to read Japanese cinema in terms of divergent series rather than national boundaries, which is a call not to dispense with questions about the nation and formation of national cinema but to locate the sites where cinema troubles the imposition of national values, policies, or boundaries."[156] Fictions of science provide such a site, challenging this process or nation-building through questioning and subverting. Moreover, the history of fantasy in Japan becomes almost a mirror-image of its relationship with the West.[157] In Japan, the ominous political realities of the 1920s and 1930s called for escapist fantasies, but since the war the use of fantasy has become more radical, indicating a rejection of the government and media-controlled vision of a rosy, harmonious society.[158] In the global postwar environment, science fiction cinema became a way of discussing political, social and economic opinions in a roundabout way that did not disturb the delicate status quo.[159]

According to Torben Grodal, "stories of scientific … intervention may be described in terms of the human desire for control," inventing new dangers and providing means to cope with them.[160] This human desire for control is the reason for the popularity of fictions of science, although the specific forms it takes may vary between various time-space axes. To equate science with control provides one interpretational framework for my understanding of science fiction as a vessel used for negotiating images of nationhood. In cinema, masculine agents function as important vehicles for this correlation of science, technology and national imagining, and thus some key terms regarding their study must be introduced.

3.3.1 PUTTING "SCIENCE" INTO SCIENCE FICTION: A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

Judy Wajcman argues that scientific knowledge is affected by the society in which it is developed.[161] In Japan, everything boils down to the debate about the "Western" roots of "universal" science and how this was localized and made a part of the national imagery in Japan. Western science as "established, compartmentalized edifices"[162] was introduced in Japan after the period of

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[156] Lamarre, *Anime Machine*, 15.

[157] Susan J. Napier, "The Magic of Identity: Magic Realism in Modern Japanese Fiction," in *Magical Realism: Theory, History, Community*, ed. Lois Parkinson Zamora and Wendy B. Faris (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003 [1995]), 455.

[158] Napier, ibid.

[159] Samara Lea Allsop, "Gojira / Godzilla," in *The Cinema of Japan and Korea*, ed. Justin Bowyer (London and New York: Wallflower Press, 2004), 63.

[160] Grodal, *Embodied Visions*, 28.

[161] Judy Wajcman, *Technofeminism* (Cambridge and Malden: Polity Press, 2004), 17.

[162] Nakayama, *Scientific Traditions*, 207.

isolation (*sakoku*) ended.[163] The nearest term the Japanese had for "science" was *kyūri* (the investigation of principles),[164] which was preceded by *rangaku* (Dutch studies), primarily concerned with medicine and other natural sciences.[165] The term *kagaku* (science), which first appeared in an essay in 1871, came to refer to "a spectrum of specialized research topics and methods that produce experiment-based systematic, rational knowledge of a part of the world."[166] Research in Japan, as elsewhere, began as a local practice that focused on finding problems to regionally specific problems.[167] In many cases it was the samurai who first educated themselves in Western science and technology, due to their need for a new profession after the Meiji Restoration and the subsequent redundancy of the warrior class.[168]

Modern Japanese science proceeded in three stages: a period of around 30 years after the Meiji Restoration, the World War I period and the period until the end of World War II. A so-called "scientific turn" occurred after the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905); despite the fact that the Meiji government had done its best to modernize Japan for already three decades, this marked "Japan's entry into the group of elite civilized sovereign nation-states and its strengthened embarkation onto the path of Western modernity."[169] Scott Schnell states that although "the term 'modernity' evokes images of enlightenment and progress, and of extending advanced technologies into needy backward regions … [t]hese images are so persuasive that we rarely question the purported benefits that modernization entails."[170] With emphasis on the wide-ranging questioning of the progressiveness of Western modernity, "science became the vessel through which the 'true nature' of human behavior and society could be discerned."[171] Within the first few years of its inception, the Meiji government made the promotion of science—and the importation of

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[163] Mizuno, *Scientific Nationalism*, 3; Sone, *Robot Culture*, 11.

[164] Nakayama, *Scientific Traditions*, 203; Screech, *Lens Within*, 2, 42–43; Bartholomew, *Formation of Science*, 4. See Sugimoto Masayoshi and David L. Swain, *Science and Culture in Traditional Japan* (Rutland, VT and Tokyo: Tuttle, 1989) for a detailed explanation about the history of science in premodern Japan, which was affected not only by modern Western concepts but also by Chinese ideas and traditions.

[165] Morris Low, *Japan on Display: Photography and the Emperor* (Oxon and New York: Routledge, 2006), 6.

[166] Robertson, *Robo Sapiens*, 16.

[167] Nakayama, *Scientific Traditions*, 220.

[168] Nakayama, ibid., 205–206; Morris-Suzuki, *Technological Transformation*, 23.

[169] Konishi Sho, "Provincialising the State: Symbiotic Nature and Survival Politics in Post-World War Zero Japan," in *New Worlds from Below: Informal life politics and grassroots acti on in twenty-first century northeast Asia*, ed. Tessa Morris-Suzuki and Soh Eun Jeong (Canberra: ANU Press, 2017), 17, 19.

[170] Scott Schnell, Review of *Civilization and Monsters: Spirits of Modernity in Meiji Japan*, by Gerald Figal, *Asian Folklore Studies* 61, no. 1 (2002): 186.

[171] Ibid.

technology, in particular—a top priority, as this knowledge was immediately pertinent to the industrialization and militarization of the country.[172] Science, together with imperialism, formed two dominant narratives of modernity, whereas technology as a concept constructed by Japanese engineers became a central focus only later.[173] The growing fervor for science and progress continued into the Taishō and early Shōwa eras with the 1920s being its heyday.

World War I marked the beginning of state-led science and technology mobilization for total war, as the government took the initiative to systematically fund various scientific research projects which had previously been financed by donations from private foundations.[174] Whereas science was universal, technology was considered a nation-specific product of a highly developed country. By the 1930s, *gijutsu* was deemed important for the industrialization and militarization of the nation.[175] A multitude of concepts were used to convey the will to establish Japanese technology as a national product around the universal notion of science itself. First, the concept of *fukoku kyōhei* (rich country, strong army), despite not originating in Japan, was established as a means of dissolving the feudal system and promoting modernity, and "the formal ideological foundation of industrial and technological development."[176] The ideology started to appear already in the *bakumatsu* era (the late feudal era), and the creation of a strong army soon became one of the main emphases of the newly modernized country. Technology was harnessed for that purpose. To quote Tsutsui, "In the Meiji drive for *fukoku kyōhei* the technological achievements, organizational forms, and ideological constructs of the industrial West were feverishly studied and earnestly emulated."[177]

A strong army needed strong technology. The term *wakon yōsai* (Japanese spirit/Eastern ethics, Western science) was coined in order to bridge the gap

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[172] Tetsu Hiroshige 徹広重, *Kagaku no shakaishi* 科学の社会史 [The History of Science] (Tokyo: Chūōkōronsha, 1973), quoted in Kawana, "Mad Scientists," 92.

[173] Kawana, ibid., 116; Mizuno, *Scientific Nationalism*, 75.

[174] Hiroshige, Kagaku no shakaishi, 24, 37, in Kawana, "Mad Scientists," 93; Mizuno, *Scientific Nationalism*, 43; Contradictory information is readily available, too. Nakayama, for example, states that even though "industrialized science" had emerged in relation to the mobilizations of World War I in Europe and America, Japanese government and business circles were yet to realize its potential (*Scienticic Traditions,* 228). This changed once industrial rationalization became one of the main policies advocated by the Hamaguchi cabinet between 1927–1931 (Mizuno, *Scientific Nationalism*, 39)

[175] Nakayama, *Scientific Traditions*, 208, 209; Mizuno, *Scientific Nationalism*, 26; Tetsu, *Kagaku no shakaishi*, quoted in Kawana, "Mad Scientists," 92.

[176] Richard J. Samuels, "*Rich Nation, Strong Army": National Security and the Technological Transformation of Japan* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1994), 35, 37; the concept first appears in Qin dynasty writings in China ca. 300 B.C. and was originally used in its long form in Japan (*Kuni o tomase, heiryoku wo tsuyomeru koto*) to make a country rich by strengthening its army (ibid.).

[177] Tsutsui, *Manufacturing Ideology*, 14.

between national means and universal measures and to answer the dilemma of wanting, on the one hand, to be recognized by the West as a modern, civilized nation and, on the other, to unite the people through the celebration of the nation's particularity.[178] In practice, *wakon yōsai* allowed for the strengthening of political authority by incorporating the imperial ideology, as well as the absorption of technical know-how and the latest scientific knowledge needed to build industry and a military that could compete with the West.[179] In a so-called "scientific turn" that really took off after the Russo-Japanese War and promoted increased scientism (*kagakushugi*), there emerged an unconditional faith in science and the idea that financial profits should become the servants of science and technology, rather than vice versa.[180] Scientism promoted a potentially dangerous elitist view where science was a top-down process, something for the masses to believe in, not to understand.[181] People were to be educated on the benefits of scientific advances, but the use of science was to be for the prosperity of the state. As Robertson notes, the new scientific worldview operated under nationalism and empire-building.[182]

World War I had demonstrated that science and technology were no longer things that could be reliably imported from the West because of a possible halt of exports. Rather, Japan needed homegrown science and technology.[183] Still, contradictory understanding also prevails. Nakayama, for example, states that although "industrialized science" had emerged in relation to the mobilizations of World War I in Europe and America, Japanese government and business

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[178] Koizumi Kenkichiro, "In Search of *Wakon:* The Cultural Dynamics of Manufacturing Technology in Postwar Japan," *Technology and Culture* 43, no. 1 (2002): 30; Mizuno, *Scientific Nationalism*, 2–3; Sone, *Robot Culture*, 12; Morris Low, "Technological Culture," in *The Cambridge Companion to Modern Japanese Culture*, ed. Sugimoto Yoshio (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 130; Fredrik L Schodt points out that, in fact, the ideology of *wakon yōsai* has not completely disappeared. Mori Masayuki founded the Mukta Institute, a think tank that provides consulting and education for corporations about robotization, in 1970. Its then-president Matsubara Sueo has suggested that "we need true Japanese creativity and Japanese technology … at Mukta we fuse Japanese spirit with technology" (Schodt, *Robot Kingdom*, 210). This tells about the deep ideological division of fusing Western technology with Japanese ideas. A similar approach is also visible in the concept of *kazoku kokka* (family state), which contrasted Japanese collectivism and highlighted its "spiritual superiority," as opposed to Western individualism. It was used as a political tool in the drive for imperialism (Kuwayama, *Japan's Emic Conceptions*, 48).

[179] Mizuno, *Scientific Nationalism*, 2; Low, "Technological Culture," 137 (see his study for a critique of Japan's stance).

[180] Konishi, "Survival Politics," 19; Kawana, "Mad Scientists," 90; Morris-Suzuki, *Technological Transformation*, 127.

[181] Kawana, "Mad Scientists," 98; Mizuno, *Scientific Nationalism*, 2, 3.

[182] Robertson, "Biopower: Blood, Kinship, and Eugenic Marriage," in *A Companion to the Anthropology of Japan*, ed. Jennifer Robertson (Cornwall: Blackwell Publishing, 2005), 230.

[183] Mizuno, ibid., 13.

circles were yet to realize its potential.[184] By the 1930s at the latest, and especially when Japan attacked China in 1937, the harnessing of science for military purposes became a national imperative, with the emergence of slogans such as "scientific Japan" (*kagaku Nihon*) and "do science" (*kagaku suru*).[185] This all aimed at the establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (*Dai tō-a kyōeiken*). Central to this vision was the term *kagaku gijutsu* (science and technology), which was coined by prewar technocrats in order to promote their own political power and, ultimately, to realize their vision of a scientific Japanese empire. It also emphasized the role of technology as the purpose of science, not a mere tool for science.[186] In this formula, the agents of scientific masculinity were the creators and technology the end rather than the means.[187]

The link between science, technology, nationalism and, consequently, war has been discussed by Mizuno Hiromi, Aaron Stephen Moore and Janis Mimura.[188] The state measures for the promotion of science and technology paved the way for the emergence of scientific (or technological) nationalism. Dower explains that between the ten years from 1935 to 1945, the number of technical schools increased from 11 to over 400. At the same time, "in-firm technical training designed to create a highly skilled cadre of blue-collar workers became a widespread practice."[189] Those who attended science schools were generally exempt from conscription.[190] According to Mizuno, scientific nationalism both assumes that science and technology are the most urgent and important assets for the integrity, survival, and progress of the nation, and calls for the development of science and technology for the sake of the nation, advocating national and cultural changes to further that goal.[191]

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[184] Nakayama, *Scientific Traditions*, 228. This changed once industrial rationalization became one of the main policies advocated by the Hamaguchi cabinet between 1927–1931 (Mizuno, ibid., 39).

[185] Mizuno, ibid., 2–4, 13, 43; Morris-Suzuki, ibid., 136.

[186] Janis Mimura, *Planning for the Empire: Reform Bureaucrats and the Japanese Wartime State* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011), 12; Mizuno, ibid., 6, 61–63, 130.

[187] Aaron Stephen Moore, *Constructing East Asia: Technology, Ideology, and Empire in Japan's Wartime Era, 1931–1945* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2014), 64, 69; Mizuno, ibid., 24–25, 27; Hayashi, *Japanese Experience*, 5. See Fujimura, "Transnational Genomics," 81–82 for a portrayal of how Japanese scientists, though promoting the universal nature of science, still seem to encounter this dilemma and the "fear of Japanese technology" in their international activities.

[188] See Moore, *Constructing East Asia*; Mizuno, *Scientific Nationalism*; Mizuno Hiromi, *Science, Ideology, Empire: History of the 'Scientific' in Japan from the 1920s to 1940s* (PhD Diss., University of California at Los Angeles); Mimura, *Reform Bureaucrats*.

[189] Dower, "Useful War," 60

[190] Ibid., 56; Nakayama, *Science, Technology and Society*, 89; Morris-Suzuki, *Technological Transformation*, 155.

[191] Mizuno, *Scientific Nationalism*, 181.

Throughout Japan's modern history, the government's interest in science has been tied to national interests.[192] Modernization was based on technological innovation and assimilation. Militarist imperialism did its best to harness the power of science and technology in order to proceed with the creation of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. After the war, economic growth was mainly due to the success of the Japanese manufacturing industries, which linked science, technology and Japan's role in the world closely together. Finally, with the coining of the term "information society," Japan emerged as an information technology superpower that also worked to promote itself as a robot kingdom.

However, scientific nationalism is also linked to what Sharalyn Orbaugh calls the "Frankenstein Syndrome." After the opening of Japan's borders in the 19th century, "the technology gap was a national humiliation to a proud people."[193] Ever since, the goal in relation to science and technology has always been to catch up to and surpass the West.[194] According to Orbaugh, the Frankenstein Syndrome "refers to the tendency of developing countries, those defined as 'monstrous' … by the already developed nations, to see themselves in those same terms."[195] The concept is related to the way Japan absorbed the "scientifically proven" idea of the country as "Other" to the West, a culture that was considered racially and culturally inferior. In addition, despite having become a member of the League of Nations in the wake of the First World War, Japan's otherness persisted due to the unwilling stance of the other nations to incorporate a statement of basic racial equality in the League charter. Even having achieved enormous technoscientific powers did not save the country from "the curse of monstrosity in the eyes of the West."[196]

Nonetheless, science and technology was the field where excellence could be—and indeed was—demonstrated. Even if monstrous in the eyes of the West, Japan played a completely opposite role in Asia. Intellectual discourse held that Japan displayed its cultural exceptionalism by being the first Asian nation to achieve technological excellence.[197] The fact that Japan as a non-white nation was able to achieve something like this was seen as somewhat of a threat to Western countries. This concern was especially prominent during the period of high growth,[198] which allowed Japan to overcome its suggested historical inferiority complex. But for that very reason, the fall after the burst of the bubble was all the more devastating.

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[192] Nakayama, *Postwar Japan*, 6.

[193] Schodt, *Robot Kingdom*, 67.

[194] Ibid., 225–226.

[195] Orbaugh, "Sex and the Single Cyborg," 174.

[196] Ibid., 174–175.

[197] Fujimura, "Transnational Genomics," 74.

[198] Ivy, *Discourses of the Vanishing*, 7.

3.3.2 SCIENTIFIC MASCULINITY

The term "scientific masculinity" is used by Erica Lorraine Milam and Robert A. Nye (2015) in their introduction to the volume of *OSIRIS* that deals with the topic. They define scientific masculinity as any type of masculinity that contributes to the creation of knowledge, as I have already established in the introduction. The presence of men as scientists, engineers and doctors is historically ubiquitous. Hence, although there are many other professions that also contribute to the creation of knowledge in society, scientific masculinity is often correlated with technological masculinity. This is derivative of the more general trend where "technology can be seen as belonging to a popular image of masculinity, or rather to various forms of masculinity."[199] In men's studies, this connection forms one subcategory, although Mellström argues its role it still quite small.[200]

Milam and Nye point out that early studies on science and gender emphasized the so-called "masculinist domination of nature."[201] In fiction, this finds its representation in the myth of creation.[202] Historical Japanese scientific masculinity is closely connected to this male myth of creation, which can also be seen as an answer to the biological ability of women to bear children. Scientific masculinity is posited as a cultural male form of creation, as opposed to to the maternal, natural form. This was visible in the function of engineers during the Second World War. After Japan embarked on its war with China, engineers were promoted as the brains of the empire instead of mere members of the proletariat with specialized degrees. This discourse is one of "technological patriotism" (*gijutsu hōkoku*), which placed Japanese male engineers at the center of the empire and the creation of a "scientific Japan."[203] Men of (technological) intellect were promoted as "social managers, or 'imagineers'" in prewar and wartime Japan.[204] Technocrats in prewar Japan used the word "creation" (*sōsaku*) for their work and promoted Manchuria as the place for their creation. This signified "a more grandiose and imperialist

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[199] Ulf Mellström, "Patriarchal Machines and Masculine Embodiment," *Science, Technology, & Human Values* 27, no. 4 (2002): 462; The closest thing to an analysis of scientific masculinity in fiction is by Napier, who discusses *otaku* and what she calls "technologized masculinity" or "technomasculinity," in her study of the 2005 television series *Densha otoko* (2011). The series is also touched upon by Slater and Galbraith (2011).

[200] Ulf Mellström, *Masculinity, Power and Technology: A Malaysian Ethnography* (Hampshire and Burlington: Ashgate, 2003), 18.

[201] Milam and Nye, "Introduction," 3.

[202] According to a feminist critique, science and technology not only reign over nature but also over women and their bodies, and are thus patriarchal concepts (Wajcman, *Technofeminism*, 18). See also the work of feminist scholars such as Sandra Harding, Cynthia Cockburn and Donna Haraway for further criticism.

[203] Mizuno, *Scientific Nationalism*, 7, 43–44, 58, 181.

[204] Moore, *Constructing East Asia*, 64.

role of the engineers."[205] In other words, universal science offered culture-specific technological creations in this self-made myth of male creation. Moore speaks of "technological imaginary" in order to refer to the multitude of ways in which various groups used the term "technology" to promote their own ideas and ideologies.[206] In cinema, this male myth of creation with its real-life connotations is present in the fictional representations that draw on the Frankenstein myth with the scientist-creator/monster-victim dichotomy at the center of the narrative.

The link between technology and masculinity is a socially constructed one. "Technology" has been made to mean something created and controlled by men, and engineering as a male practice is ascribed high value and female-related areas low value.[207] In other words, technology and masculinity have become intertwined because of the way in which society has created preferable spheres of action for both genders. Furthermore, this has led to the masculinizing of technology itself.

In the 1970s and 1980s, many feminists saw this as an issue of accessibility, rather than suggesting that technoscience itself was somehow gendered. Kuwahara points out that it was only after the end of the war that women were allowed to enroll at research universities, with a few exceptions, especially in the liberal Taishō era. Even this hopeful trend soon disappeared with the period of economic growth. In fact, a new policy was adopted in 1958 that strengthened traditional gender roles through one's exposure to technology: girls in junior high schools studied home economics while boys studied technology. At the start of the new millennium, Japanese women made up only 10 per cent of the scientific community and the percentage of female professorship ranged from a mere 0.4% in engineering to 2.5% in the natural sciences.[208] The language of technology and the skills that are required were embedded in the masculine culture and cast in terms of male activities. It is no wonder that the prototype inventor is still often cast as a male. [209] Consequently, whereas men have been responsible for "hard" sciences (robotics, weapon development, automation and manufacturing), women have been associated with "citizen science" (a non-state-led science where social activists use scientific tools for social change).[210]

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[205] Mizuno, *Scientific Nationalism*, 47.

[206] Moore, *East Asia*, 3. World War I, for example, raised the consciousness of elite engineers, who were unable to attain high-ranking positions reserved for legal bureaucrats because of the unequal Civil Servant Appointment Law and Civil Servant Examination Rule (Mizuno, *Scientific Nationalism*, 20, 22; Moore, *East Asia*, 65).

[207] Cockburn and Ormrod, *Gender & Technology*, 98.

[208] Kuwahara, "Women in Science," 203–206, 208.

[209] Wajcman, *Technofeminism*, 15.

[210] Hirata, *Radiation Brain Moms*, 2, 4, 105. See also Nakamura, *Science, Technology and Society*, 8 for a discussion of how citizen science (one of the four sectors of science, the others being academic, public and private) restored democracy to science.

Wajcman divides masculinities within the world of technology into two dominant forms: one based on mechanical skills (and physical toughness) and one based on professional, calculative rationality in the form of a technology specialist. Both are expressive forms of masculinity that conceptualize how men construct identity in relation to machines and technology.[211] The second especially concerns the so-called academic or rational masculinity. In society, intellectual practice has been tied to specific categories created for the exercise of this intellectual function. [212] To quote Antonio Gramsci, "all men are intellectuals but not all men have in society the function of intellectuals."[213] This corresponds to Connell's proposal that the forms of masculinity have been divided into two differing categories: those organized around direct domination (e.g., corporate management, military command) and those organized around technical knowledge (e.g., professions, science). The latter in particular, which Connell also refers to as "rational masculinity," she sees as having challenged the former for hegemony but without complete success.[214]

Milam and Nye point out that that scientific research—conceived as a masculine practice—was used to define the "bodies" that society is based on, including the physical body of an individual, the social body representing the community and, finally, the national body and its status in the world.[215] If in reality science was used to strengthen the national body, fictional scientific masculinity is used as a platform for testing out various national identities. Mimura argues that the wartime Japanese political division was not, in fact, between "militarists and peace-loving citizens," but between "advocates of technocratic reform and defenders of the capitalist status quo."[216] As the films in this thesis demonstrate, these spheres are closely interlinked, creating a thread of a techno-economic nation-building project, which calls for closer inspection as it is manifested in the forms of the characters. Scientific masculinity, it seems, is a suitable vessel for this investigation, because of the interrelated nature of science, technology and Japan's national agenda.

3.4 CONCLUSIONS

This chapter has traced the conceptual basis regarding the relationship between science, fiction, nation and gender. It is clear that gender concerns

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[211] Wajcman, *Technofeminism*, 17.

[212] Ibid. 78.

[213] Antonio Gramsci, "Hegemony, Intellectuals, and the State," in *Cultural Theory and Popular Culture: A Reader*, ed. John Storey (Essex: Pearson Education Limited, 2009), 77.

[214] Connell, *Masculinities*, 165. Gramsci, too, sees the supremacy of a social group manifesting itself in two ways, as "domination" and as "intellectual and moral leadership" (Gramsci, "Hegemony," 75).

[215] Milam and Nye, "Introduction," 7.

[216] Mimura, *Reform Bureaucrats*, 195.

remain an important hallmark of Japanese horror cinema. Supernatural femininity has been one of the leading markers of "horror," but not without inconsistencies in its application. Scientific masculinities and mad scientists, in turn, have largely appeared in literature and anime, yet underanalyzed in cinema.

Regarding masculinities, I established hegemonic salaryman masculinity as the ideological reference point that the films implicitly allude to. Hegemonic masculinity provides an anchor to reality, a consensual model which fictional representations of masculinity either deviate from or work to strengthen. It represents the "official" image of the nation, an image against which scientific masculinities are mirrored. It must be emphasized here that this is not a study of masculinities but of how ideas about masculinities are used as attributes of fictional characters, and how images of nationhood are mediated through these characters by referring to real-life ideas about masculinities. In the films featured in this thesis, national subjectivity is coded as individual subjectivity, which draws its power from science and technology, as the means of creating a modern nation. Scientific masculinity is a trait embodied by fictional characters who, in some way or another, contribute to the creation of knowledge in society.

In addition, science and technology have been indicators of Japan's abilities and worth, first after the Meiji Restoration and second after the Pacific War, and especially from the 1980s onward. Their popularity is correlate with the country's efforts to recreate its international and internal image. The history of science and technology provides a lens through which to analyze the films, providing the context needed for the understanding of the subject matter. As I have shown, scientific and technological masculinities are an important presence not only in Japan but anywhere in the world. It is through understanding both the function of scientific masculinity as opposed to supernatural femininity and the history of science and technology as an important part of Japan's nation-building project that it is possible to decipher the underlying meaning of the films.

4 REFLECTING (ON) JAPAN'S MILITARY PAST

The collapse of the Japanese Empire and the experience of being occupied by the United States are two important moments in history that cannot be overlooked. On the 14th of August, Emperor Hirohito, "the 'sovereign overseer,' [... and] the 'supreme commander,'"[1] announced that Japan was to surrender unconditionally. Devastation and defeat also marked the end of a period called *kurai tanima* (the dark valley), which referred to the decade and a half of militarism and repression from the 1930s onwards, followed by the Occupation-era idea of a demilitarized and democratized "new Japan," and finally "the Japanese miracle" achieved in the 1960s and 1970s.[2]

With sixty-six major urban centers having been heavily bombed in the last year of the war, it was estimated that the war in its entirety destroyed one-quarter of the nation's wealth.[3] In the aftermath of the war, many questioned the wartime actions of both their government and themselves. Especially prevalent was the question "why did so many educated people willingly submit to the ideals of the wartime fascist government?"[4] Science fiction provided a perfect vehicle for considerations about the topic. The main interest of this chapter is the way in which speculative cinema deals with matters related to militarism and, in some cases, imperialism. Thomas Schnellbächer points out that although postwar artists rejected military nationalism, they needed "to refer back to it because it is so intimately associated with Japan's modernization, which continued to be a mainstay of Japanese self-identification after 1945."[5]

Central to all of the films is the connection between the prewar and postwar periods. Released in the first years of the period of high economic growth, the films discussed in this chapter project a seemingly positive outlook for the future, which is later compromised by a quite tangible threat from the past. As Dower points out, the quest for identity in postwar Japan was mirrored against a broken society which, on the one hand, was finally able to embrace an individual freedom but, on the other, was very much based on the model of the

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[1] Takahashi Tetsuya, "Japanese Neo-Nationalism: A Critique of Katō Norihiro's 'After the Defeat' Discourse," in *Contemporary Japanese Thought*, ed. Richard F. Calichman (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 197.

[2] Dower, "Useful War," 49, 52.

[3] Sakai Naoki, "Two Negations: The Fear of Being Excluded and the Logic of Self-Esteem," in *Contemporary Japanese Thought*, ed. Richard F. Calichman (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 162.

[4] Kawana, *Mad Scientist*, 187.

[5] Schnellbächer, "Has the Empire Sunk Yet?," 45.

"old" Japan, rooted in "the dark valley of early Showa age."[6] Dower also points out that much of the discussion around Japan's defeat is concerned with the notion of a certain kind of total change from militarism to democracy. However, "the end of the war" in itself was a fluid notion as many continued to wait for their loved ones' return for years.[7] Second, he states that there was no "new Japan" to rise from the ruins of the old. Because of the quite developed nature of Japan's militarized economy, whole sectors of the postwar social order were able to be accelerated by building on advances made during the war.[8]

In cinema, works of a speculative nature provided a means to encounter the past in a roundabout way. There are two main ways in which the films deal with the military past: dealing with the form of the demobilized ex-soldier and emphasizing the activities of weapon development. I will analyze both in order to reveal how postwar Japanese speculative cinema made use of the famous Mad Scientist motif in order to make a statement about Japan's national image. These concerns are present in *Gojira*, *Densō ningen*, *Gasu ningen daiichi-gō* and, to some extent, *Matango*.

4.1 FEAR OF EX-SOLDIERS

After the war, possibly the most important question for both the repatriated individual and the nation-state was "who am I?" As Edwards suggests, the Japanese people's sense of national history crumbled, and people suddenly had to look for a new understanding of their past and for different ways to define who and what they were.[9] During Japan's militarization, the idea of "militaristic manliness" embodied by "the self-sacrificing soldier" was propagated in schools and through military training itself,[10] although the unquestioning willingness of self-sacrifice was, in most cases, probably due to resignation to one's fate.[11] As a symbol of shifting ideologies, demilitarized soldiers (*fukuinhei*) became one of the central concerns in postwar Japan.

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[6] Dower, "Useful War," 49, 54.

[7] John Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1999), 52.

[8] Dower, "Useful War," 55; see also Mizuno, *Scientific Nationalism*, 185 for a similar argument.

[9] Walter Edwards, "Japanese Archaeology and Cultural Properties Management: Prewar Ideology and Postwar Legacies," in *A Companion to the Anthropology of Japan*, ed. Jennifer Robertson (Cornwall: Blackwell Publishing, 2005), 45. The emperor publicly renounced his claims to divinity in January 1946; later that year, new elementary school history textbooks removed the mythic account of the nation's origins for the first time since the 1880s (ibid.).

[10] Chris Deacon, "All the World's a Stage: Herbivore boys and the Performance of Masculinity in Contemporary Japan," in *Manga Girl Seeks Herbivore Boy: Studying Japanese Gender at Cambridge*, ed. Brigitte Steger and Angelica Koch (Berlin and Zürich: LIT Verlag, 2013), 144.

[11] Dower, *Embracing Defeat,* 88–89.

There were 6.5 to 7 million Japanese distributed around Asia during the war, around 3.5 of them being soldiers. Japan's national territory, however, was reduced by 40 percent due to the loss of overseas colonies, leading to large numbers of Japanese returning home as demobilized soldiers or repatriated citizens.[12] This created an influx in the population and, as Dower notes, had a serious effect on the distribution of work because they needed to be reintegrated into the postwar economy.[13]

In cinema, the earliest prototypes of *fukuinhei* appeared in Kurosawa Akira's and Ozu Yasujirō's films. The emergence of demobilized soldiers can be seen as a site for negotiating war memories and the shift from ultranationalism to democracy. Their portrayal as threatening was in stark contrast with the portrayal of soldiers in wartime *kokusaku* (national strategy) films, where they were generally portrayed as humane.[14] In Kurosawa's *Norainu* (Stray Dog, 1949), one of the first detective films in Japan, the criminal is an ex-soldier. Ozu's *Kaze no naka no mendori* (A Hen in the Wind, 1948) in turn presents a tale of a desperate mother who is forced into prostitution in order to pay for her son's hospital bills during the war. After the end of the war she confesses this to her husband, who has returned from the fight. He pushes her down the stairs and flees. Shimura argues that by looking at the cruel back of the husband, who leaves his wife unconscious—she might be dead for all he knows—it is possible to witness the true darkness in the hearts of the demobilized soldiers.[15]

In speculative cinema, one of the first films to deal with this topic was *Tetsu no tsume* (1951), a story about an ex-soldier who had been infected with a curse of transformation (*jūka mōsō*) into a gorilla during his years of service somewhere in the South Pacific. Although the protagonist is portrayed in a sympathetic light, it is nonetheless clear that his existence is seen as a detestable and ominous reminder of the war.[16] In fact, Sandra Wilson sees demobilized soldiers as an alternative reality of the 1950s that contradicts the popular story of a new beginning.[17] Ex-soldiers were not treated as heroes. In

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[12] Ogino, "Reproductive Technologies," 224; Kanō Mikiyo 加納実紀代, "Fukuinhei to mibōjin no iru fūkei" 〈復員兵〉と〈未亡人〉のいる風景 [The space inhabited by "repatriated soldiers" and "war widowers"], in *Sengo Nihon Sutadiizu 1 – 40・50nendai* 戦後日本スタディーズ 1 －40・50 年代 [Studying Postwar Japan: The '40s and the '50s], ed. Iwasaki Minoru 岩崎稔 et al. (Tokyo: Kinokuniya shoten, 2009), 82–83; John Mock, "Hidden Behind Tokyo: Japan's Rural Periphery 東京の蔭に日本の周辺点在する農村," *The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus* 12, no. 12 (2014): 3; Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 48.

[13] Dower, "Useful War," 56.

[14] Shimura, "Hōrō suru," 220; Yomota, *Sengo no shinwa*, 100.

[15] Shimura, ibid., 222. Kurosawa Akira has suggested that "all the characters in the film are as good as dead" (cited in Shimura, ibid.).

[16] Shimura, ibid., 220.

[17] Sandra Wilson, "War, Soldier and Nation in 1950s Japan," *International Journal of Asian Studies* 5, no. 2 (2008): 189.

fact, quite the opposite: they were losers whose "unkempt appearance seemed a mockery of the heroic ideals and imagery that had saturated wartime propaganda."[18] As Kawana points out, whereas the "brave but violent soldiers" had been regarded with anxiety during the war, this soon turned to hatred.[19] Many returning soldiers who simply thought they had done their duty were shocked to find themselves referred to as monsters who had committed unspeakable acts.[20] Illuminating the reality that the demilitarized soldiers faced, Izbicki points out that on their return to Japan they "were confronted with a blighted domestic landscape, a lack of jobs, loss of families and homes due to the fire bombings, and a huge hole in what had been a well-defined notion of nation and national purpose in which they had been major actors and on which they had literally staked their lives."[21] The films play on this general imagery, portraying demobilized soldiers as a potential source of danger, especially if granted the power of science.

4.1.1 HIGHLIGHTING THE MILITARY PAST

According to Igarashi Yoshikuni, there are two central features of postwar cultural representations in Japan. First, Igarashi proposes that postwar Japanese culture was based on a so-called "foundational narrative," the main purpose of which was to render comprehensible the end of the war, the explosion of an A-bomb and the ensuing transformation of the relationship between Japan and the U.S. Second, the foundational narrative portrays Hirohito as an "enlightened yet reticent sovereign" whose "crucial decision to save Japan" is strengthened as the source of Japan's prosperity. This is, of course, very much related to the issue of war responsibility, since the foundational narrative worked first and foremost to explain the relationship between enemies-turned-allies Japan and the U.S. and to separate the emperor from political conditions and decisions.[22]

Both of these concerns are present in *Gojira*. Because there were no prior monster films made in Japan, the film was both excitingly novel and risky.[23] A mix between the newly found free expression of wartime memories and foreign catastrophe films, *Gojira* was a pureblooded horror film. As the producer Tanaka Toshiyuki notes, humans created the bomb, which took

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[18] Dower, *Embracing Defeat,* 59.

[19] Kawana, *Murder Most Modern*, 206. Wilson argues otherwise, suggesting that in the 1950s, under certain circumstances, ex-military men could in fact be quite attractive (ibid.).

[20] Dower, ibid., 60.

[21] Joanne Izbicki, "The Shape of Freedom: The Female Body in Post-Surrender Japanese Cinema," *U.S.-Japan Women's Journal* 12 (1997): 126–127.

[22] Igarashi Yoshikuni, *Bodies of Memory: Narratives of War in Postwar Japanese Culture, 1945–1970* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2000), 20–27.

[23] Peter H. Brothers, *Mushroom Clouds and Mushroom Men: The Fantastic Cinema of Ishiro Honda* (Bloomington: Author House, 2009), 43.

its revenge on humans.[24] In general it drew from two general trends: the nuclear disaster of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and popular Hollywood narratives, including giant beasts, such as *King Kong* and *The Beast from 20,000 Fathoms*. The creators of *Gojira* have readily admitted that (Hollywood) monster films with their urban destruction scenes, bombs and dialogue between military and scientific means of getting rid of the monster comprised one of the inspirations behind the emergence of *Gojira*. However, inspiration does not mean mere imitation, and the original *Gojira* ends up raising a whole different set of emotions than its American counterparts.[25]

Gojira includes two scientists: Dr. Yamane, a senior paleontologist who wishes to save the monster Gojira and study it in order to understand the effects of radiation, and the enigmatic Dr. Serizawa, a secretive and sullen ex-soldier who possesses a weapon to kill it. The narrative revolves around the stances represented by these two and the way people try to act according to their idea of "moral science." The latter is best exemplified by Dr. Serizawa's proclamation, "[T]hat's why I can't let people know until I find a peaceful use for the power. I'll destroy all the data I've compiled and kill myself."

The films of Honda Ishirō and his team often feature *fukuinhei*, presumably because Honda himself was a sergeant in the Japanese Imperial Army and a war prisoner in China.[26] In *Gojira*, this role is allotted to Dr. Serizawa, being stated as much by Ogata: "The war hurt him enough, he lost an eye." The scene where a research party led by Yamane takes off to Ōdoshima to conduct more research on the initial appearance of Gojira is the first time Dr. Serizawa appears. People on deck wave cheerfully while an upbeat marching tune plays in the background. The departure is a big event that allows Japan to celebrate the postwar peaceful proceedings of its science. Serizawa's appearance is monstrous in form, compared to those who stand around him; it is highlighted by a patch he wears on one eye, a tangible marker of loss. Wearing a black suit and sunglasses with a somber expression on his face, among the cheery folk his appearance is almost like an omen. Or, rather, his appearance is like an unwelcome breeze from the past better left untouched.

Igarashi argues throughout his book that monstrous bodies were substitutes for tangible markers of loss in 1950s Japan. Gojira itself is a reminder of Japan's fallen soldiers, being both a threat and a victim, a

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[24] Steve Ryfle, *Japan's Favorite Mon-Star: The Unauthorized Biography of the "Big G"* (Ontario: ECW Press, 1998), 20.

[25] Tsutsui, *Godzilla*, 19–20. As David Kalat puts it, "American movie monsters can be seen as some kind of reaction to the bomb. In a Japanese context, the monster is less a reaction *to* the bomb than a symbol *of* the bomb" (David Kalat, *A Critical History and Filmography of Toho's Godzilla Series* [Jefferson, North Carolina and London: McFarland & Company, 1997], 13–14).

[26] Allsop, "Gojira," 65.

metaphor arriving from the South Seas.[27] It is seen as a symbol of postwar Japan's various problems,[28] "a scar, a marker of trauma."[29] In addition, it can be seen as referring to "lost Japanese territories" and "technical expertise 'misdirected' into war."[30] But, if Gojira is a marker of a trauma, so is Serizawa. The external marks that he bears marks a possible underlying threat. As Kawana suggests, disfigured ex-soldiers in particular hinted at wartime atrocities and provoked public aversion. The body of a demobilized soldier became "both an object of curious gazes and a menace to postwar Japanese drive for renewal," as well as "a significant disadvantage in being accepted back into the community."[31] The returning soldiers represented the aggressive side of wartime Japan, and this is the function of Serizawa, too.

Serizawa's ominous scientific power, which is very much related to Japan's military past, is emphasized by a scene where a newspaper reporter asks Emiko, the daughter of Dr. Yamane and a childhood friend of Serizawa, to introduce him to Serizawa. The reporter states that he has heard from "a German friend who lives in Switzerland" that Serizawa "certainly knows how to kill Gojira."[32] This is an obvious reference to history, positing Japan and its allies as opposed to the U.S. on a scientific as well as military front. Fujino points out that Japan had looked to Germany as a model in medical matters ever since the Meiji era and saw it as natural "to follow the lead of the Third Reich."[33] This admiration toward German technological and scientific skills was also demonstrated by Kishi Nobusuke, prime minister between 1957 and 1960, who was influential in implementing state control over economic, industrial and cultural policy during the war and whose postwar aim was to

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[27] Ifukube Akira has stated that for the generation that grew into adulthood in the 1940s, *Gojira* was a clear representation of the souls of the deceased (see Igarashi, *Bodies of Memory*, 116). This point is often emphasized by analyzing Gojira's route in Tokyo (see, for example, Yomota, *Sengo no shinwa*).

[28] Takahashi, Toshio, 高橋敏夫, *Gojira no nazo – kaijū shinwa to Nihonjin* ゴジラの謎–怪獣神話と日本人 [The riddle of Gojira: Japanese and giant monster legends] (Tokyo: Kōdansha 1998), 55. Takahashi further argues that Gojira will not die because the Japanese are unable to solve the various problems that the end of the war brought (ibid., 55–56).

[29] Foster, *Pandemonium*, 160–161.

[30] Schenllbächer, "Sea as a Barrier," 28.

[31] Kawana, *Murder Most Modern*, 15.

[32] Ono sees this as an allegory to Albert Einstein, making a connection between the bomb and Serizawa's destructive experiments (*Gojira no seishinshi*, 92–93). Einstein himself enjoyed immense popularity in Japan. After his visit to Japan in December 1922 and the subsequent frenzy, or "the Einstein Cult," many scientific journals were established, including, for example, *Kodomo no kagaku*, which was meant for children and later utilized by the wartime government to get them excited about wartime science and technology (Mizuno, *Scientific Masculinity*, 9; Kawana, "Mad Scientists," 94).

[33] See Fujino Yutaka 藤野豊, *Nihon fashizumu to yūseishisō* 日本ファシズムと優生思想 [Japanese Facism and ideology of superiority] (Kyoto: Kamogawa Shuppan, 1998), quoted in Kawana Sari, "Mad Scientists and Their Prey: Bioethics, Murder and Fiction in Interwar Japan," *The Journal of Japanese Studies* 31, no. 1 (2005): 112.

rearm Japan and revise the new constitution.[34] References to Germany in the 1950s should not be left unnoticed.

Serizawa physically exhibits the invisible scars that Gojira evokes. As an explicit *fukuinhei*, Serizawa is both an antidote and a threat—a threat that is ultimately eliminated through his suicide. His oxygen destroyer is an invention "that holds philosophical, moral, destructive values," and some see Serizawa's sacrifice as an attempt to represent the conflicting views of those who developed the atomic bomb.[35] Still, *Gojira* does not permit the interpretation of Japan as purely a victim. Rather, it constantly acts as a reminder of the country's aggressive side.[36] Destructive science is not present only in the form of the Western bomb but also very much developed by "innocent" Japan itself. Hence, Serizawa's suicide at the end of the film is highly symbolic. First, it illuminates the complete loss of one's *ibasho*, the place to return to, and highlights the unwanted and problematic nature of the soldiers that actually survived the war. The "dark spell-binding force of the Emperor-system"[37] destroys Serizawa. Through the successful application of the oxygen destroyer, Serizawa redeems his value and demonstrates the victory of Japanese science. Allsop points out that Serizawa's confusion and hesitation over the use of the weapon can be seen as a reflection of the opinions of those who created the world's first nuclear bomb, the effects of which were horrifyingly felt in Japan. There were thus some very real similarities between the real-life nuclear weapon discourse and the fictive one portrayed in *Gojira*.[38] While Japanese science prevails, Serizawa as a marker of war must perish. Scientific masculinity is the lens through which to dissect the continuation between prewar and postwar periods and the underlining anxiety concerning this shift.

A more direct reference to the past is made in *Densō ningen*, a revenge story with a scientific twist. As part of Tōhō's *Henshin ningen* trilogy, the film explicitly highlights Japan's militaristic past. The film is a story of revenge about an ex-soldier, Lance Corporal Sudō from Japan's Imperial Army, going after his former comrades, who, according to him, have betrayed both him and

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[34] Robertson, *Robo Sapiens*, 23.

[35] Allsop, "Gojira," 67.

[36] Ono notes that this is visible in many scenes in the film. When the research party visits Ōdoshima in the beginning, the islanders have Japanese *katana* swords despite the fact that the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers collected Japan's weapons at the time of the occupation. In addition, Dr. Okabe, who mainly appears in this scene, has a gun instead of the Geiger counter that Dr. Yamane possesses. The underlying emphasis on guns and aggressiveness does not allow for an interpretation of Japan purely as a victim (*Gojira no seishinshi*, 46–48), yet it nonetheless works to highlight Dr. Yamane's pacifist role.

[37] Kawamoto Saburō 川本三郎, *Imahitotabi no Nihon eiga* 今ひとたびの日本映画 [A trip to Japanese films now] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1994), quoted in Igarashi Yoshikuni, *Bodies of Memory: Narratives of War in Postwar Japanese Culture, 1945–1970* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2000), 117.

[38] Allsop, "Gojira," 69.

the Japanese nation. For his revenge he uses an old telepathic machine developed by a military scientist who has been declared dead. Trying to solve the mystery are the scientist journalist Kirioka and his girlfriend, the outspoken and brave office lady Nakajō Akiko.[39] The story begins when a man is brutally stabbed in an amusement park with an old Army sword. The only lead is a military badge found at the site. As the plot progresses, it becomes clear that the murder has something to do with a group of ex-soldiers: Taki, Ryū and Ōnishi. In fact, scientific masculinity is used to create a picture where ex-soldiers not only lost their identities but returned with new monstrous ones.[40] In addition, the film paints an image of a nation whose soldiers were anything but loyal and trustworthy.

Densō ningen engages with the past in various ways. First, there is the uncanny appearance of old military badges, which appear at murder scenes and are delivered to the victims. Second, newspapers highlight the fact that the first victim was killed with a Japanese Imperial Army Ground Force blade. Third, some parts of the plot seem to revolve around a military-themed cabaret club where male employees are dressed in military attire and the menu includes drinks such as "Missile." Although it can be argued that this is a way of neutralizing—or even ridiculing—Japan's past, the fact that the club is in fact owned by the Korean military spy Ryū makes its role more ambivalent. Ryū is referred to as *sangokujin*,[41] an outsider who worked as a spy for the Japanese military. The fact that it is a *zainichi* Korean who has decided to commercialize Japan's experience of war ridicules Japan's efforts and underlines the country's defeat. Ryū is, however, soon killed by Sudō, who appears in military attire at the night club. Soon after Ryū's murder, Taki, breaking under pressure and in fear of his own life, narrates the past. One fateful day after the war, Taki, Ōnishi, Tsukamoto, Ryū and Sudō were ordered to transport gold used for weapon development under the command of the teleportation and telekinesis specialist Dr. Niki. However, Ōnishi soon makes clear that instead of helping Niki, the men aim to rob the gold. He states: "Doctor, Japan has lost. There is no space for research now – from now on, it is a world ruled by money." This leads to Sudō accusing Ōnishi, a lieutenant, of betraying not only Niki but the whole Japanese nation.

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[39] "Office lady" (OL) means "a female employee who generally has no chance for promotion and mainly serves as an assistant for male employees" (Ogasawara, *Office Ladies*, 12). Although the term was coined in 1963, no official governmental strategy made use of it, nor was it introduced by any dictionary during the release of her book. The usage has been quite open to interpretation (ibid., 23, 27).

[40] Kanō, "Fukuinhei," 93–94.

[41] A derogatory term during the postwar era that was used to describe people who were neither Japanese nor Allied occupiers, hence referring to Japan's former colonial subjects (Tessa Morris-Suzuki, *Borderline Japan: Foreigners and Frontier Controls in the Postwar Era* [New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010], 100, 240).

Dower points out that brutality and corruption among officers was no secret, especially after the war.[42] The military hierarchy was based on "authoritarian coercion that transferred oppression downward," where fear instead of loyalty was used as a means for command. After the war, murders of former officers were not unheard of; ex-soldiers felt antipathy toward military leaders due to the way they had treated not only their military subjects but the civilian population, too.[43] Sudō's narrative is reminiscent of this, or what Kanō refers to as the crimes committed by the former special forces men. To paraphrase Kawana, a part of the equation was that rumors were already widely circulated about the cruel actions of Japanese soldiers during the war. Stories about "the madness of drafted soldiers" were as popular as stories of bravery, although officials did their best to suppress them. It did not really matter if the rumors of soldiers and demilitarized soldiers were genuine; the overall sentiment "allowed people to believe them even though … extreme and bordering on implausible," and thus the general anxiety concerning any soldier quickly turned to hatred.[44]

Both Serizawa and Sudō, despite having very different histories, capitalize on these rumors. In their cases, scientific masculinity—Serizawa as a wielder of scientific power and Sudo as a symptom and manifestation of that power—is used as a means of encountering Japan's past and mediating its image as a militarist country. Despite the general sense of liberation that Dower refers to, *kaiki eiga* in this case is interested in the anxieties this liberation brought about or which could finally be addressed. Scientific masculinity proved a useful vehicle.

4.1.2 SITES OF MILITARISM

Noël Carroll proposes that monsters emerge from "marginal, hidden, or abandoned sites," and "it is tempting to interpret the geography of horror as a figurative spatialization of the notion that what horrifies is that which lies outside cultural categories, and is, perforce, unknown."[45] *Densō ningen* utilizes this idea of problematic ideologies located somewhere at the edges of society. The rural periphery of Karuizawa in the Japanese countryside enables the lingering of the imperial system away from the emerging capitalism and shining new façade of modern Tokyo. The existence of Dr. Niki, the scientist responsible for the emergence of the monster, is discovered when the two protagonists embark on a journey to Karuizawa to investigate the weird case of a radiator ordered from Akiko's company. Sudō and his mentor Niki have

[42] Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 59.

[43] Ibid., 58; Vogel, *The Salary Man*, 91.

[44] Kawana, *Murder Most Modern*, 205–206. In regard to media, Kanō, for example, highlights a serialized novel *Fukuin satsujin jiken* (1945–1960), which portrayed demobilized soldiers with uneven identities and whose return resulted in the breakdown of their families ("Fukuinhei," 94).

[45] Carroll, *Philosophy of Horror*, 35.

been living in their Karuizawa cabin for 14 years since the accident, where they were presumed dead. Their countryside life is symbolic, since many Japanese soldiers and civilians were repatriated first and foremost to the countryside because of the general lack of food in the destroyed cities.[46] The emergence of Sudō, a soldier of the Imperial Army, from the outskirts of society can be seen as a means of revenge of the nation against suppressing forces. However, this is by no means posited as a desirable outcome but rather one that is a sign of repression and the will to forget.

In *Gojira*, the love triangle between Ogata, Serizawa and Emiko is as important as the emergence of the monster, and the most important scene is played in Serizawa's underground laboratory. The scene where Serizawa slowly descends into his laboratory with Emiko in tow becomes highly emblematic. It is followed by the revelation of his destructive weapon and Emiko's fainting. During the scene of the departure to Ōdoshima, Ogata remarks: "It's a wonder he came to see us off. He rarely exits his laboratory." Sontag notes that the scientist in science fiction narratives often has a laboratory in the basement.[47] Rather than being a neutral space, this underground space connects Serizawa's scientific masculinity to the monstrous. Toward the end of the film, Ogata makes a figurative rescue when all three are in the basement. Ogata and Emiko confront Serizawa about his oxygen destroyer and the possibility of using it against Gojira, which he refuses. Ogata tries harder, which results in Serizawa punching him. This burst of violent energy from an ex-soldier leaves both Ogata and Emiko stunned, with Emiko tenderly wiping blood off of Ogata's face. In this scene it finally dawns on Serizawa that Emiko has chosen Ogata over him, despite the fact that they are already betrothed. The look on his face is one of utter betrayal and loss.

This scene marks the moment in the narrative when Serizawa ultimately loses his will to live, and Emiko's behavior is partly to blame. Stating that she still loves Serizawa like a brother, her actions tell another tale. Noël Carroll suggests that "fear, disgust, powerful physical revulsion, surprise, [and a] bodily sense of fear" are among the emotional features normally attributed to characters attacked by monsters. According to Carroll, these act as a set of instructions about the appropriate way to respond to monsters in what he calls "an emotion-mirroring effect."[48] Interestingly, while not as strong as the ones suggested by Carroll, Emiko's reaction is definitely not a reaction expected from a close childhood friend. She shies away, projects a bodily sense of fear before Serizawa's experimentation and, in the scene where Serizawa has come to the harbor to see Emiko, Ogata and Dr. Yamane off for their excursion, her stance is hesitant. Her reactions and ultimate betrayal of Serizawa highlight

[46] Mock, "Japan's Rural Periphery," 3.

[47] Sontag, "Imagination of Disaster," 40. The basement is, of course, also a popular psychoanalytic motif, probably best exemplified by Alfred Hitchcock's *Psycho* (1960), where it represents the hidden Freudian psyche of Norman Bates.

[48] Carroll, *Philosophy of Horror*, 14–19, 31.

his abject monstrosity. This illuminates the way "the uncanny aura emitted by the disfigured soldiers was quite real for those who stayed on the home front."[49] Bodily injuries symbolized psychological distance and deformities provoked public aversion.[50] In Emiko's choice to marry Ogata instead of Serizawa, *Gojira* promotes the power of the healthy over the damaged. Scientific masculinity in this case represents a national identity better forgotten, which is also manifested on the level of personal relationships.

Hutchinson and Williams point out that in the process of repatriation and reunion, many soldiers felt "a new sense of alienation … in the culture shock of arriving back in Japan."[51] While many of the soldiers were warmly welcomed back by their families, they still faced the problem of how to start rebuilding their identities. Serizawa's character draws from this contrast between the traumatized survivors of the war and those who were enjoying the democratic atmosphere and economic wealth of postwar Japan.[52] As a *fukuinhei*, Serizawa embodies what Kanō calls the loss of the place where one belongs (*jibun no ibasho*).[53] His silent suffering is constantly posited against the budding happiness of Emiko and Ogata. Through its human relationships, the film projects "characteristic postwar themes of war guilt, sense of loss, regression, and new beginning."[54]

Upon hearing a lamenting tune drifting from the radio in the aftermath of Gojira's destruction of Tokyo, Serizawa finally decides to use his weapon. He has been doubly betrayed by Emiko, first by her refusal to commit to him in a romantic sense and second by her decision to tell Ogata about Serizawa's weapon, despite her promise not to. This betrayal leads to Serizawa's suicide. Serizawa functions as a vessel through which "the audience 'returned' to and found means to exorcise the monsters of the past" in a way that allowed them to not confront the past directly, as such a practice was prohibited by the

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[49] Kawana, *Murder Most Modern*, 206.

[50] Ibid., 207; Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 61.

[51] Hutchinson and Williams, "Introduction," 1. Again, this was not the case only in Japan. In Finland, for example, the experienced sufferings and coping mechanisms of demilitarized soldiers have been and still are present in mainstream media; see, for example, "Veteraani sotii edelleen unissa – 'Täytyy elää päivä kerrallaan,'" YLE, last modified April 27, 2016, https://yle.fi/uutiset/3-8834664.

[52] Yomota, *Sengo no shinwa*, 106–108.

[53] Kanō highlights an incident from 1951 when 20 soldiers were found on the island of Anatahan in the Mariana Islands. They had lived there seven years without knowing that the war had ended. Among them was also one woman. When they returned home, five wives were already happily remarried; one had been forced by the parents of the soldier to marry his little brother ("Fukuinhei," 92–93; see also Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 60). In 1972, Yokoi Shoichi, a lance corporal of the Imperial Army, was discovered in the jungles of Guam. He had lived there ever since the war, although since the early 1950s he had known that the war had ended. He did not want to return to face the shame of having been found alive.

[54] Schnellbächer, "Has the Empire Sunk Yet," 30.

foundational narrative.[55] In other words, together with the horrors caused by the monster itself, he makes the spectator face past atrocities, which are then safely removed from the present. But at what cost? The film offers no consolation and the ending is downright gloomy. "It worked beautifully. Be happy with Emiko," echo Serizawa's last words.

Gojira ends with a shot of the ocean with everyone mourning Serizawa. Schnellbächer argues that the ocean is representative of Japan's geopolitical situation. [56] Monsters of the past have emerged from the ocean, but simultaneously it "also receives them at the end in merciful oblivion."[57] The moment of Serizawa's death is explicitly stated to be his greatest moment. Citing Schnellbächer, it "responds to the Japanese postwar myth of a new beginning, which integrates both national identity and all manner of hopes seen as progressive."[58] Also, like Carroll's monsters, it is Serizawa's fate to disappear into the great unknown; the abject, hidden space of the ocean.

4.1.3 USHIROMETASA

The notion of revenge in *kaiki eiga* has been best exemplified by the paramount avenging female motif—an archetype that represents the motif of justice through revenge.[59] In *Densō ningen*, however, the notion of revenge is tied to relationships between men and to Japan's past. It is central to the plot and understanding of the characters. The emergence of Sudō in his military attire, hailing the glory of the Emperor, could be called "the return of the repressed." This familiar theme is of importance here: this thesis uses its Japanese equivalent, *ushirometasa*, which means to feel guilty about something and/or to feel the gaze of the past behind one's back.[60] It stands for improper acts, as "anyone secretly watching would surely disapprove."[61] As Iwasaka and Toelken point out,

> *In the actions of an angry ghost, feelings of guilt, selfishness, jealousy, and betrayal can be acted out in metaphorical tableau scenes which would be repressed in everyday life. That is, human emotions which do indeed exist and animate much of the culture can be dramatized and perceived vicariously through a ghost character who represents in*

[55] Igarashi, *Bodies of Memory*, 105.

[56] Schnellbächer, "Has the Empire Sunk Yet," 27.

[57] Ibid., 35.

[58] Ibid., 31.

[59] Barrett, *Archetypes*, 98.

[60] Komatsu, interview; see also Komatsu, "Supernatural Apparitions"; Itō Kimio 伊藤公雄, "*Otokorashisa" no yukue – Danseibunka no bunkashakaigaku*「男らしさ」の行方－男性文化の文化社会学 [The direction of "masculinity": Cultural sociology of men's culture] (Tokyo: Shinyōsha, 1993), 17; Shimura, "Hōrō suru," 219.

[61] Komatsu, "Supernatural Apparitions," 1.

physical form … emotion which would normally be too volatile to express in personal interaction.[62]

Thus, monsters appear as symbols for human conscience,[63] which in this case is tied with the discourse of remembering the war. Sudō, presumed dead, is quite literally a ghost, a so-called functional spiritual entity.[64] In addition, Cohen's notion about monsters as "difference made flesh" is useful here. He proposes that "in its function as a dialectical Other […] the monster is an incorporation of the Outside, the Beyond – of all those loci that are rhetorically placed as distant but originate Within."[65]

The concept of *ushirometasa* allows us to dissect the monstrosity of Sudō, which is linked to his ties with the former militarist, nationalist and imperialist agenda. His victims, however, are no better. *Densō ningen* portrays former Japanese soldiers as beings without conscience, who only try to maximize their profits instead of dedicating themselves to the greater good. In fact, Sudō has not been wronged by an enemy but his own kin. The motive for his revenge is not oppression but betrayal.

Katō Norihiro, the writer of the influential but controversial *Haisengo-ron* (Post-Defeat Discourse, 1997), suggests that Hirohito's acceptance of his transformation represented "a shameless betrayal of those who had died in his name, and while the United States saw this as unavoidable if the democratization of Japan were to succeed, it played havoc with the nation's moral fiber."[66] *Densō ningen* deals with these emotions in a straightforward manner. Sudō's fictional betrayal becomes a representation of what Katō calls "a spectacular national betrayal." By this he refers to the fact that survivors carried on without having to face the dead.[67] In fact, many did not feel a collective sense of guilt because of the strong feeling of having been forced to go to war against their will by the militarists.[68] Sudō appears as an abandoned and vengeful *ushirometasa* of the surviving people seeking to move on, a representation of the will to forget what really existed between the wartime generations and those born afterwards.[69] While Sudō's revenge may be

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[62] Iwasaka and Toelken, *Ghosts and the Japanese*, 38.

[63] Ōkubo, "Henshin ningen," 108; Itō, *Otokorashisa*, 18.

[64] Uchida Tatsuru 内田樹, "Rei tte nan darō?" 霊って何だろう [What are spirits?], in Gendai reiseiron 現代霊正論 [Theory of Contemporary Spirituality], ed. Uchida Tatsuru 内田樹 and Shaku Tesshū 釈徹宗 (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 2010), 11–12. He also argues for a very real presence of spirits in politics, implicating that it is irrelevant if a spirit really exists—it is enough that a political decision-maker believes in the presence of a *kami* watching. This brings a tangible level of spirituality (*reisei*) to international politics and allows it to be seen as a spiritual phenomenon (ibid., 12–13).

[65] Cohen, "Seven Theses," 7.

[66] Katō, "Goodbye Gozilla."

[67] Ibid.

[68] Vogel, *The Salary Man*, 93.

[69] Itō, *Otokorashisa*, 16.

justified, he is nonetheless but a ghastly apparition from the past, which the nation more or less wants to forget. Foster calls this sort of a monster a hybrid, an oxymoron which has numerous elements that complement and contradict simultaneously, so that its meaning comes not just from the pieces that have been combined to create it but also from the complementary and contradictory aspects of those pieces.[70]

Igarashi proposes that the desire to encounter the past in an in-between location found various mass cultural expressions in the 1950s, although such encounters were not direct confrontations with past memories since "such a practice was prohibited by the foundational narrative."[71] Even *Densō ningen*, which explicitly refers to the war and the monstrous acts committed by Japanese soldiers, works within the context of the foundational narrative: it presents the enemy as coming from within Japan, not from outside in the form of the U.S. This ultimately is what makes Sudō an *ushirometasa* of Japanese society as a whole. Komatsu points out that spiritual surveillance by a deity is one layer of the concept of *ushirometasa*. As a blast from the past and an unwanted memory, Sudō brings with him the "dark spell-binding force of the Emperor-system." If the transformation of the emperor into a "people's emperor," as Morris Low suggests, emphasized the democratic nature of postwar Japan,[72] as an *ushirometasa* Sudō contrasts this, creating unwanted parallels with the past. He is the monster of Doctor Frankenstein, Frankenstein in this case being Japan itself.

Teleportation provides a scientific means for the appearance of this "spiritual" gaze, making the invisible threat visible. Without the machine Sudō, too, is nothing but an ordinary, resentful human being. This is not only a representation of a warped process of becoming a superhero, but it also highlights the general anxiety around the role of science and technology. Monsters are often evoked to explain and narrate the "correct" application of modern sciences.[73] In Sudō's case, anxiety around science and technology is present in the film through images of machinery. Sudō is a scientifically created freak who is obsessed with revenge. In a way, he incorporates both versions of Edogawa's mystery: the rational and the irrational, only in this case it is the scientific which is irrational, paving the way for the repressed past to emerge.

The film addresses this hybridity through its depiction of both scientific masculinity and the application of science. The application of science in wartime Japan is immoral. However, Niki's scientific masculinity is in fact quite moral in comparison with the other masculinities represented by the surviving soldiers. The experience of war on the front served to disorient

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[70] Foster, *Pandemonium*, 23–24.

[71] Igarashi, *Bodies of Memory*, 104–105.

[72] Low, *Japan on Display*, 94.

[73] Michael Dylan Foster, *The Book of Yōkai: Mysterious Creatures of Japanese Folklore* (Oakland: University of California Press, 2015), 70.

Japanese soldiers, shifting the reference points in relation to which their ideals of manhood were based.[74] On the one hand, Sudō represents past ideals of feudal loyalty that became forbidden in the postwar constitution. His four victims, on the other, are disloyal and monstrous in their self-centeredness. It is difficult to decide which scenario is more horrific: a postwar society ruled by monstrous, greedy and selfish ex-soldiers or the lingering notion of the past which, in some ways, is still imagined as more moral.[75] Scientific masculinity is used to convey these ambiguous feelings.

Despite conforming to a quite traditional revenge crime film format, *Densō ningen* stresses the nature of Japan's wartime techno-scientific development and thus works to problematize the narrative around Japanese science and technology in general. A monster is literally born due to military weapon development. Figuratively, as I have already discussed, he is born earlier, during the moment of betrayal. *Densō ningen* places the blame as much on military and scientific nationalism as on the emerging economic nationalism. Apart from Sudō, the monstrous is also personified in the surviving group of soldiers, whose greed was fueled by Dr. Niki's invention. It highlights the immersion into any type of nationalist ideology and also maintains a picture of the potentially unstable mental state and untrustworthiness of demilitarized soldiers.

With the introduction of Dr. Niki, *Densō ningen* stresses the familiar discourse of good and bad science. As posited against the surviving posse of Taki, Ryū and Ōnishi, Niki is actually quite moral and clear-headed. Still, it is his connection with the past and Japanese militarism that makes him a threat. Postwar speculative fiction not only discusses "the fundamental ethical ambiguity of scientific endeavor"[76] but, more importantly, it underlines the ethical ambiguity of wartime science and highlights the dangers it might pose for the democratized society. Niki is a paramount example, an ex-military scientist, who, unknown to the public, has continued his seemingly harmless scientific experimentations. Although Niki never aimed to reveal his results, they are made public by Sudō in his will to avenge. The film shows that the annihilation of such a threat is not easy. With the Japanese unable to deal with their monstrous past, as embodied by Sudō, it depends on nature to end everything. Finally it is the *deux ex machina*-like eruption of Mt. Asamayama that destroys Sudō mid-transportation. His freezing frame becomes a tangible reminder of the liminal, in-between state in which he existed. His final screams are horrible, reminiscent of the voice of Gojira itself. This is also a symbolic destruction of wartime *kagaku gijutsu*. If scientific nationalism and weapon development in prewar and wartime Japan relied heavily on

[74] Low, "Emperor's Sons," 95.

[75] This is apparent in the scene before the "murder" of Sudō and Niki, where Sudō is horrified that the others want to use the money donated by the people for the greater good for their own purposes.

[76] Kawana, "Mad Scientists," 90.

harnessing natural resources, in *Densō ningen* scientific progress is destroyed by nature's power.

As time passed, the threat of demobilized soldiers diminished. The soldier, however, did not disappear from Japanese speculative cinema. As Aaron Gerow (2006) notes, the history of Japanese cinema knows many instances of turning to war for story material.[77] Contemporary representations can be found from films like *Tetsuo* and *HAYABUSA*. Although I have decided to exclude anime, it is worth pointing out that anime narratives often tie the notion of ever-continuing war with the representation of masculinity.[78] These are narratives of future worldwide danger, where the relentless efforts of the male hero are needed.[79] Despite the heroic storyline, these fantasies are not always benign. As Mizuno argues, the fictional crew of the space battleship Yamato, for example, is related to a historical period of the past not yet tainted by the imperialist and militarist ideology. Men become beacons in this "ultimate fantasy of postwar Japan, a wish-fulfilling rewriting of the history that takes place in distant future and space" that "helps the viewer to forget [or not to learn] about Japan's role in World War II."[80] Saitō is more straightforward in suggesting that the mentality of *Yamato* is the ultra-nationalistic mentality of the old Japanese military, the revised vision of the Second World War which Japan won.[81] In both cases, masculinity is used as an ideological vessel to negotiate nationalist concerns.

4.2 HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION PROJECTS

The end of the war changed the course of Japan's social history in many ways. It also necessitated a re-evaluation of the purpose of Japanese science and technology. Nakayama explicates that because of the new postwar Constitution and its prohibition on rearmament, science was free of its military connotations in the minds of Japanese scientists themselves.[82] With wartime science being ignored and postwar science celebrated, scientists were able "to erase the connection they themselves had made."[83] However, it is necessary to bear in mind that the legacy of war was "human, not

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[77] Aaron Gerow, "Fantasies of War and Nation in Recent Japanese Cinema," *The Asia-Pacific Forum/Japan Focus* 4, no.2 (2006).

[78] See Alan Cholodenko, "Apocalyptic Animation In the Wake of Hiroshima, Nagasaki, Godzilla , and Baudrillard," in *Introducing Japanese Popular Culture*, ed. Alisa Freedman and Toby Slade (Florence: Routledge, 2017), 229–240; see also Mizuno, "Pacifist Japan Fights"; Napier, "Panic Sites"; Saitō, *Kōittenron*; Kume, "Henshin suru hiiroo"; Gill, "Transformational Magic."

[79] Saitō, *Kōittenron*, 12, 15.

[80] Mizuno, "When Pacifist Japan Fights," 108–109.

[81] Saitō, ibid., 148, 153–154.

[82] Nakayama, *Science, Technology and Society,* 31.

[83] Mizuno, *Scientific Nationalism*, 176.

organizational": with the enormous increase in the number of trained scientific and technological researchers, the postwar social order was bound to be based on the deployment of these skills, despite the fact that many of the country's institutions as such were dismantled.[84] In addition, the military nature of Japanese technology continued long into the postwar era. The GHQ had crafted Japan as a base camp during the Cold War, and the Occupation authorities (SCAP, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers) allowed and even required Japan to produce weapons during the Korean War. In fact, the Korean War indirectly boosted Japan's economy so much that the economic planning bureau pronounced that the postwar era had passed.[85]

In order to understand fictional narratives of human experimentation, it is necessary to highlight Japan's real-life experiences with the issue. In cinema, *Densō ningen* utilizes this trope to some extent, as does Teshigara Hiroshi's *Tanin no kao* (The Face of Another, 1966). I have chosen to concentrate on *Gasu ningen daiichi-gō*, a sad tale of a military scientist creating a mutated monster during the postwar era; here the motif plays an important role. It is noteworthy that these films tend to diminish the role of the scientist and emphasize the role of the monster. In *Densō ningen*, the narrative of Sudō is treated in much more depth than that of his mentor, Dr. Niki. The monster of *Gasu ningen*, Mizuno, is in fact the protagonist.

4.2.1 UNIT 731 AND THE MALE MYTH OF CREATION

The case of Unit 731, Japan's most notorious wartime research laboratory, "exposed the deadly possibilities of modern technology when harnessed to the pursuit of national glory," as noted by Tessa Morris-Suzuki.[86] As Kawana points out, too, "When a fanatical devotion of the agents of science … finds convenient allies in these destructive ideologies [nationalism and imperialism], the mission to improve human beings or create new species better equipped for survival becomes an even more relentless pursuit of scientific advancement at the expense of human ethics."[87]

Unit 731 was established for the research of bacteria and viruses and, during its heyday, it posed a potential for "creating sufficient bacteria to kill the world's population several times over."[88] The Unit is also notorious for

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[84] Morris-Suzuki, *Technological Transformation*, 155; Dower, "Useful War," 56, citing John Stuart Mill.

[85] Nakayama, *Science, Technology and Society,* 91, 119; Low, Nakayama and Yoshioka, *Science, Technology and Society*, 71; Samuels, *Rich nation*, 139–140; Igarashi, *Bodies of Memory*, 77–78; Tatsumi Takayuki, *Full Metal Apache: Transactions Between Cyberpunk Japan and Avant-Pop America* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2006), 158.

[86] Morris-Suzuki, ibid., 156.

[87] Kawana, *Murder Most Modern*, 113.

[88] David Wallace and Peter Williams, *Unit 731: Japan's Secret Biological Warfare in World War II* (New York: The Free Press, 1989), 14, 23; Matsumura Takao summarizes that in 1937, after the

experimenting on humans, a fact that has never been directly denied. In exchange for their research notes on diseases, no scientist was convicted for war crimes in the Tokyo War Trials. This was "an immunity deal in exchange for scientific knowledge."[89] Medical scientists operating on the home front also remained unscathed. As Williams and Wallace note, "they resumed their places in a reconstructed Japanese society and were, and are, numbered among the most senior and respected names in the Japanese scientific community."[90]

In addition, human experimentation in imperialist Japan was not limited to Unit 731. In 1989, bones from more than a hundred bodies of different Asian ethnicities were found at a construction site for the Ministry of Health and Welfare's Research Center for Preventive Hygiene, the area that had accommodated the Army Medical College in the prewar and wartime eras. Considering the age of the bones, Tsuneishi Kenichi concludes that not only did they belong to victims of medical crimes but also that such atrocities were widely practiced in Imperial Japan.[91] Together with Unit 731, they reveal what Tsuneishi refers to as the barbarism among military doctors. Tsuneishi suggests that through openly published research papers containing data that was obtained through brutal practices on humans, it is easy to prove the existence of widespread human experimentation during, and even after, the war. The medical community itself was indifferent to the issue, possibly because the people within the community may have considered their everyday work unrelated to such ethical and moral questions; this can also be seen as one of the leading causes for the relatively open stance regarding the highly controversial matter.[92]

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beginning of the Second Sino-Japanese War, virus and chemical warfare testing came to include human experimentation (the subjects were called *maruta*, or logs). At least 3,000 people perished, although the actual number is bound to have been much larger. Most of the victims were Chinese, but Koreans and Russians were also included. In August 1940, the Unit became known as the Epidemic Prevention and Water Purification Department of the Kwantung army, but it soon adopted the name Unit 731. When the Soviet Union declared war on Japan right before the end of WWII, the current personnel of Unit 731 destroyed everything they could and killed all the remaining *maruta*. The headquarters of Unit 731 were located in Harbin, but in December 1940 four other branches were established. It was responsible for virus and disease testing, including diseases such as cholera, plague and typhoid fever, for use in "actual warfare" with explosive bombs and grenades, but also for research in plant extinction (Matsumura Takao 松村高夫, "Kaisetsu" 解説 [Interpretation], in *Jintai jikken – 731 butai to sono shūhen* 人体実験・731部隊とその周辺証言 [Human experimentation: Testimonies of Unit 731], ed. Eda Kenji 江田憲治, Kojima Toshio 児嶋俊郎, Matsumura Takao 松村高夫 [Tokyo: Dōbunkan shuppan, 1991], 256–258).

[89] Wallace and Williams, *Unit 731*, 235–237; Matsumura, "Kaisetsu," 260; Mizuno, *Scientific Nationalism*, 173; Dickinson, "Biohazard," 87.

[90] Wallace and Williams, ibid. 235.

[91] Tsuneishi, "Human Skulls," 78–79.

[92] Ibid. 78, 81. In contrast, Robertson argues that Japan has done its best to conceal its eugenic practices (Jennifer Robertson, "Eugenics in Japan: Sanguinous Repair," in *The Oxford Handbook of the*

Although according to some accounts the existence of Unit 731 was completely hidden—at least until 1981, when *Akuma no1 hōshoku*, a non-fiction account of the Unit, was published[93] —Dickinson (2007) and Tsuneishi (2007) argue otherwise. It is true that the Japanese might have "an international reputation for historical amnesia," but, as Dickinson points out, this forgetfulness is but a result of the country's postwar politics.[94] In fact, in the 1950s many craved information about what happened during the war.[95] Dickinson also notes that the actual availability of information must be differentiated from the lack of inclusion of certain information in primary and secondary textbooks, the latter being a political decision that does not necessarily correlate to how much material regarding certain topics has been released in general. Indeed, although English-language literature on the subject has been sparse, a wide selection of material on Unit 731 is available in Japanese.[96] Morris-Suzuki suggests that the Japanese, in general, were aware of the wartime uses of science and technology, which led to the critical stance toward their use in the postwar era.[97] Thus, while the motif of human experimentation is by no means an original one, in the Japanese context, and especially in the works that in one way or another refer to the Pacific War, it is bound to raise questions. This is not only a prominent theme in *Densō ningen*, with its explicit emphasis on the lingering wartime threat under the peaceful postwar exterior, but in *Gasu ningen daiichi-gō* as well.

Gasu ningen starts with a mysterious bank robbery. After the second robbery, everything points in the direction of the Kasuga residence, a clan of famous *nō* actors. Somehow everything seems to be connected with the last of the line, the beautiful Kasuga Fujichiyo. When stolen money is found at the residence and Fujichiyo is arrested, the film moves from the realm of detective fiction to that of the fantastic by introducing Mizuno, a man who can turn into a human vapor. He has been a target of an experiment by Sano Kyūko, a university professor in the Faculty of Medicine and a board member of the Japan Space Association. Feeling bitter, he accepts Professor Sano's suggestion to become his research assistant. Sano's appearance, albeit very

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History of Eugenics, ed. Alison Bashford and Philippa Levine [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010], 430).

[93] Matsumura, "Kaisetsu," 267.

[94] Dickinson, "Biohazard," 86. Vogel explicates this by shedding light on the real-life practices of Japanese people in the 1960s. On a personal level, many might have embraced the cultural achievements of the Heian and Nara periods while downplaying the military period. This was not an official rewriting of history, but rather a means to come to terms with the past (Vogel, *The Salary Man*, 88). This is also a process of maintaining a sense of historical continuity in believing in "our own realm" as a foundation for national identity that outer elements do not threaten (Yoshino Kosaku, *Cultural nationalism in contemporary Japan: A sociological enquiry* [London and New York: Routledge, 1992], 122–123).

[95] Wilson, "War, Soldier, Nation," 189.

[96] Dickinson, ibid. 89–95.

[97] Morris-Suzuki, *Technological Transformation*, 156.

short, is the underlying cause for the emerging monstrosity, the definitive factor that ties together Japan's wartime and postwar scientific practices. His mutilated face draws a parallel between him, Dr. Serizawa and Dr. Niki, all of them demobilized soldiers. In Japan, technocrats paved the way for a sort of self-made myth of creation. In *kaiki eiga*, the male myth of creation is manifested in stories of human experimentation.

Gasu ningen illustrates how Japan's wartime research "exposed deadly possibilities of modern technology when harnessed to the pursuit of national glory."[98] Science and technology not only prove a fictional vehicle for the negotiation of Japan's past versus its present, but in fact "the practice and ideology of technocratic control … is certainly among the most conspicuous and controversial of the wartime legacies to contemporary Japan."[99] In *Gasu ningen*, Sano, a redeemed academic who has a military history, promises to enhance Mizuno's body, to build it afresh cell by cell. Mizuno is given an injection, after which he remembers sleeping a total of 240 hours. When he wakes up, he has transformed into a human vapor, which comes as a shock to Sano as well. Mizuno kills Sano in a fit of rage after discovering how many other victims Sano has sacrificed in order to create his vision of an ultimate human being. This is the dark, hidden nature of Sano, who was celebrated as a leading figure in his field. Much like in Shelley's *Frankenstein*, this exploration takes place in an institutionalized context within a university.[100] In *Gasu ningen*, the "sf topoi of the mad scientist and the failed experiment derive their power and durability from […] the way it explores the project of reason or enlightenment and its limits."[101] In addition, this can be seen as revelation of the true status quo behind Igarashi's foundational narrative, which protected Japan from its own past to the degree that even the war atrocities were transformed into useful information for the U.S. to use during the Cold War.[102]

Dr. Sano's story in *Gasu ningen* contributes to the questioning of "putting progress ahead of ethics." This is underlined by connecting scientists to *ijinden* (biographies of great men), where their dubious decisions are glorified "for the betterment of science and humankind."[103] This is exactly the framework within which Sano's narrative works. Once other scientists hear about Sano's murderous experiments, they react with shock, referring to his exemplary status within the community. Great men work for the betterment of the Japanese state but, in the postwar context, putting progress ahead of ethics could also refer to economic progress and postwar reconstruction. *Gasu ningen* acknowledges the danger in this, a danger that extends to this day.

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[98] Morris-Suzuki, *Technological Transformation,* 156.

[99] Dower, "Useful War," 62.

[100] Ibid.

[101] Rieder, "The Mad Scientist," 97.

[102] Igarashi, *Bodies of Memory*, 199.

[103] Kawana, "Mad Scientists," 95–96.

Sano's aim to create a superman is a major motif of science fiction worldwide, but when mirrored against the backdrop of the postwar, it calls for an inspection of the way in which scientists—and especially the ones at Unit 731—were treated after the war. The intention of the state is underlined by Sano's role as an elite scientist during the war and his respected status even afterwards.[104] This reconstruction of the role of both science and technology and the scientist worked to maintain the foundational narrative.

Bartlett has proposed that the victims of mad scientists should be regarded as "impossible humans" because they are "not quite human." He calls the process of humanizing the victims of mad scientists "victimary thinking," even when done with compassionate intentions.[105] In Japanese cinema there is a subcategory of sentimental war films which did not allow the voice of Japan's imperialist and militarist agenda to appear.[106] In *Gasu ningen*, and to some extent *Densō ningen*, victimary thinking is made a central feature. In fact, the film gives a voice to the victims of any -isms—militarism, imperialism, economic nationalism—that constrain an individual. The revelation of Mizuno's identity is a key moment in the narrative. Although Mizuno is first introduced as the antagonist of the story, the more his story starts to unravel, the more the spectator is invited to engage with his narrative. He is given greater psychological depth than the others, even the main protagonists, the prominent alpha male Detective Okamoto and his girlfriend Kyōko, an outspoken young reporter. His experience as a man in postwar Japan reflects the cost of democratization and the initial fervor of economic growth.

Mizuno's feelings of inferiority lead him to participate in Sano's experiment. Sano, in turn, is posited as the almighty scientist with the ability "to cure." The film promotes a scenario where natural reproduction is supplanted by its scientific, technological counterpart, exploring "the effects of techno-scientific manipulation upon the natural and social worlds."[107] However, instead of representing a holy power of creation, the subjects of the scientists' experiments, such as Mizuno, become monstrous and "unfit offspring" that the society wishes to deny. He resembles the literary character of *Hae otoko*: the subject of a heartless human experiment, he uses his extraordinary talents not to assist law enforcement, but to destroy. Mizuno, too, directs his anger at the utterly irresponsible application of science and technology,[108] the male myth of creation that works within Japan's eugenic ideas. This also makes him

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[104] In fact, in the ten years from 1935 to 1945, the number of technical schools increased from 11 to over 400. At the same time, "in-firm technical training designed to create a highly skilled cadre of blue-collar workers became a widespread practice." Those who attended science schools were generally exempt from conscription (Dower, "Useful War," 56; Nakayama, *Science, Technology and Society*, 89; Morris-Suzuki, ibid., 155).

[105] Bartlett, *Mad Scientists*, 9.

[106] Yomota, *Sengo eiga*, 139.

[107] Rieder, "The Mad Scientist," 98.

[108] Kawana "Mad Scientists," 117–118; see her study for a more detailed discussion of *Hae otoko*.

a parallel to the protagonist of Yumeno Kyūsaku's paramount book *Dogura Magura* (1935);[109] although he is a murderer, the real culprit is the scientist "who had no qualms about creating a human being solely for the purpose of scientific experimentation."[110] Such sinister representations of scientists are somewhat at odds with both the contemporary state ideology toward and the popular understanding of science.[111] However, considering Dower's proposal of the linkage of the two periods on a structural level, it makes perfect sense. The reinvention of Japan after the war took place with the materials that were already present in the prewar society: personnel, institutions and the trajectory of technological and economic development, as well as bureaucratic and technocratic activities, to mention a few. In other words, the "postwar state rested on organizational pillars that were firmly planted in the past."[112] The films highlight this issue, questioning the various what-ifs it poses.

Unit 731 is implicitly present in *Gojira*, too. Dr. Serizawa does not experiment on humans, but his self-sacrifice is an act of making sure that no one ("devils," as Serizawa refers to them) will ever find his research notes. This bears an uncanny resemblance to the situation in Unit 731, where the Occupation forces confiscated all the unit's research notes on Japan's human warfare development in order to ensure that the Russians would not find and use them. [113] This undercurrent problematizes the notion of Serizawa's victorious Japanese science.

4.2.2 EUGENIST VISIONS

Rieder has discussed the "the ideology of male self-creation" in length. According to him, the male creation myth was constructed "to naturalize male power over women, animals, and the world of objects."[114] But instead of a Judeo-Christian framework, in this case the scientist-creator is situated firmly within the discourse of social Darwinism and general scientific nationalism in Japan. Karen Schaffner locates the roots of the eugenic movement in the feelings of uncertainty that Japan faced amidst its opening to the world during the Meiji Restoration. By adopting "modern" practices and scientific ideologies, such as social Darwinism and eugenics, Japan wished to be counted among the "civilized" nations of the world and thus develop a national

[109] Kawana points out that although Yumeno does not explicitly state that he has been inspired by *Das Kabinett des Doktor Caligari*, which reached Japan in 1921, various elements suggest this to be the case ("Mad Scientists," 106–110).

[110] Ibid., 106.

[111] Ibid., 89

[112] Dower, "Useful War," 50–51.

[113] Wallace and Williams, *Unit 731*, 141.

[114] Rieder, "The Mad Scientist," 98.

identity.[115] Eugenics, science and national imagining are therefore closely related. In the early stages of its introduction, "science became the vessel through which the 'true nature' of human behavior and society could be discerned."[116] Eugenics, in turn, provided a way to apply science to social problems.[117] This is why, as Watanabe Masao points out, social Darwinism eventually came to be rooted in Japan. If science provided ways for analyzing the "true nature of human society," the theory of evolution could be used for the same purpose. Darwinism was taken as a natural law and applied to human society with the emphasis on the "struggle for survival" and "victory of the superior, defeat of the inferior." This stance was actually embraced by both reform bureaucrats and conservatives alike. The idea of natural selection soon became one of artificial selection and race improvement.[118] And, as Jennifer Robertson demonstrates, these practices gained popular ground through eugenic beauty contests or hygiene exhibitions that promoted fertile citizens and the so-called *shin-nipponjin* (the new Japanese).[119] In fiction, social Darwinism is present in the male myth of creation, which is based on the real-life happenings of 20th century Japan.

Japan started to emphasize the importance of the bodies of its citizens in the wake of the Meiji Restoration.[120] Especially before the start of the war, eugenic intervention was possible for unsound bodies.[121] A nationwide survey in 1936 had revealed how physically unfit the nation as a whole was, with many draft-age males being unfit for service because of malnutrition, diseases or job-caused disabilities.[122] In popular media, images of healthy, "normal" bodies proliferated and voices against "abnormal" and "deviant" bodies intensified.[123] Igarashi points out how members of society were pressured into adjusting their physical and psychological features in accord with what the state required—or otherwise they were mercilessly discarded. With the blossoming imperialism and militarism, Nakamura Miri paints a picture of an empire that

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[115] Karen J. Schaffner, "Introduction," in *Eugenics in Japan*, ed. Karen J. Schaffner (Fukuoka: Kyushu University Press, 2014), 7.

[116] Mizuno, *Scientific Nationalism*, 47.

[117] Robertson, "Biopower," 334.

[118] Watanabe, *Japanese and Western Science*, 70, 74.

[119] Robertson, ibid., 230; "Sanguinous Repair," 430. In fact, it cannot be denied that eugenic practices were sometimes positive: the emphasized public and private hygiene, lifestyle reforms, etc. were implemented by nations around the world ("Biopower," 334; "Sanguinous Repair," 432).

[120] See Wolfram Manzenreiter, *Sport and Body Politics in Japan* (New York and Oxon: Routledge, 2014), 66–79.

[121] Igarashi, *Bodies of Memory*, 48–50.

[122] Dower, "Useful War," 62–63. A nationwide survey in 1936 had revealed how physically unfit the nation as a whole was, with many draft-age males being deemed unfit for service because of malnutrition, diseases or job-caused disabilities. The bureaucratic response to this social crisis was swift: 1938 saw the creation of the Ministry of Health and Welfare and the expansion of medical insurance (ibid.).

[123] Nakamura, *Monstrous Bodies*, 1–2, 5.

upheld the well-trained physiques of its soldiers while monitoring the bodies of the unhealthy in an effort to efface them from the national image. The modern Japanese empire was "hell-bent on improving the bodies of its citizens" because bodies needed to be seen as "collectively constituting the nation, as something inseparable from the national body politic (*kokutai*)."[124] Originally a Meiji-era ideology, Robertson describes *kokutai* as the imperial nation-state that was imagined to have an organic, corporeal form constituted by its *kokumin*, or citizens.[125] *Kokutai* centered not on "power" but "descent," emphasizing the superiority of Japanese blood.[126] As bodies collectively constitute the nation and are inseparable from the national body politic, the health of an individual body was increasingly linked to the health of the nation.[127]

This idea was extended to the postwar society. The production of healthy bodies (both individual and national) continued into the postwar era, when the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP) regarded the ailing Japanese bodies as a threat. Thus, it was of utmost importance to produce healthy bodies that constituted the healthy, democratic society.[128] Igarashi has argued in many instances that in the postwar era, bodies were central for negotiations of the past. They retained their ambivalence even after the war. This is because of the way that both periods emphasized physical health, "a healthy nationalistic body" or "a clean democratic body" of an individual.[129] In the postwar era, the purpose of the 1948 Eugenic Protection Law, passed by the Japanese government and the Occupation administration, was "to prevent the birth of 'unfit offspring' (*furyō na shison*)."[130] It was only in 1996 that the clause regarding "unfit offspring" was removed from the law and maternal health came to be its central aim. The name of the law simultaneously changed to "Maternal Protection Law."[131]

Jennifer Robertson comments that bodies were conceived of as "plastic" that could be molded.[132] Teshigahara Hiroshi's *Tanin no kao* combines the

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[124] Nakamura, *Monstrous Bodies*, 1–2, 5.

[125] Robertson, "Biopower," 333.

[126] Mika Ko, *Japanese Cinema and Otherness: Nationalism, Multiculturalism, and the Problem of Japaneseness* (Oxfordshire: Routledge, 2010), 13.

[127] Nakamura, ibid., 2; Low, "Emperor's Sons," 83.

[128] Igarashi, *Bodies of Memory,* 65.

[129] Ibid., 71.

[130] Robertson, "Sanguinous Repair," 440; The law was passed as a means of battling the "state of national emergency" when a large number of soldiers returned and population soared in the postwar conditions of scarcity. Under this law, "Japanese women were given a de facto abortion on demand" for eugenic reasons, if a pregnancy was a result of rape, or if it represented a grave health hazard for the woman (Ogino, "Reproductive Technologies," 224). Maternal health was secondary to this (Robertson, ibid.).

[131] Robertson, "Biopower," 331–332.

[132] Robertson, "Sanguinous Repair," 437.

notion of a plastic body with the *hibakusha* discourse. It features a story of Okuyama, an engineer injured in a work-related accident. His face is badly disfigured and he is shamed, his life ruined. He visits a psychiatrist, Dr. Hira, who promises to create a bio-mask for him. Hira's omnipotence and Okuyama's role as an experimental object are foregrounded in the establishing scene of the film, where the human face is contrasted with anatomical maps and plastic body parts. Humans are nothing but living and breathing plasticine, a scientist's playdough. Kawana describes this as "a human desire to engineer a superman using the seemingly boundless power of technology."[133] Hira's intentions are good, but postwar scientific masculinity is still dangerous in its potential to create subversive monsters that challenge the normative existence of "the everyman." In Okuyama's case, this is represented by his biomask. Empowered by and hidden behind his mask Okuyama seduces his wife in a chain of events that lead to a final psychotic break.

The motif of a mask supports Nakamura's proposal that uncanny fear comes from uncertainty about whether the object of attention is normal or abnormal. [134] This is the perceived shift from metamorphosis to mentalmorphosis. Okuyama's case demonstrates this, with his mask concealing the mentalmorphosis that takes place underneath it. The mask makes him anonymous, but anonymity only works to confuse the borders of normalcy. The mask and the power of science have not cured him, and his power over the mask lasts only briefly. In the final scene of the film, his identity consumed by the biomask, Okuyama aimlessly wanders the hostile streets of Tokyo. People on the streets are all portrayed only as white faces with black eyes. They are numerous but anonymous, tangibly strangers with unrecognizable features. Referring to Abe's original vision, Napier describes it as "anarchic and despairing" with characters who are "trapped in worlds of supposed harmony or healing whose inner core is something dark and horrible."[135]

Bartlett describes the Mad Scientist as an individual who tries to repair, complete or replace what God or evolutionary processes have failed to do. These characters act out a singular desire, "to create a new set of creatures a little like humankind but better than humankind, a new race or species enough like the human to be its rival but sufficiently distinct to outdo it—outperform it, outlast it, outlive it."[136] As a representation of the male myth of creation, the Mad Scientist is also related to, and can be explained within, the framework of hubris, that is, the will and ambition to be god-like, which always results in tragedy.[137] In *Tetsuo III,* both the parents of the protagonist Anthony have

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[133] Kawana, "Mad Scientists," 115.

[134] Nakamura, *Monstrous Bodies*, 10.

[135] Napier, "Magical Realism," 467.

[136] Bartlett, *Mad Scientist*, 6.

[137] Tieteen termipankki, "Hybris," accessed March 26, 2019, https://tieteentermipankki.fi/wiki/Kirjallisuudentutkimus:hybris.

participated in a so-called Tetsuo project which, despite its initial aim of creating better bodies for sick children, has a militaristic outcome. This results in much sorrow and destruction. In *Tanin no kao*, amidst the faceless crowd Okuyama stabs and kills Dr. Hira. The notion of omnipotent scientific masculinity is originally posited as an answer to the needs of an individual which, to a great extent, are representative of the needs of the society.

In that Okuyama's burns are comparable to the scars of *hibakusha*, they recall history. Hira's scientific masculinity is used to cure this condition, to create a human able to once more contribute to the benefit of society. However, Okuyama is no longer able to get rid of his mask. This is an ultimate victory for Hira's scientific project, a total symbiosis of the man and mask, entailing the restoration of health in an individual body. However, the present does not bring Okuyama any happiness. To become a model citizen of the new Japan brings only despair, enhanced by the unfriendly streets of Tokyo. *Tanin no kao* highlights the disappearance of individual responsibility. This issue is not restricted to fictions of science. In *Yotsuya kaidan*, the true horror of the story is located not so much in the way Iemon organizes his wife's death as in the way he casts on everyone else blame for actions he himself has taken, endlessly avoiding responsibility.[138] This irresponsible behavior can be analyzed together with what Buruma calls "the diffusion of responsibility": real power is often "diffused as much as possible so that nobody has to take complete responsibility for anything."[139] In addition, responsibility is always shifted upwards until it arrives at the Emperor, who, as Tatsumi points out, is exempt from all responsibility.[140] Scientific masculinity in *Tanin no kao* is an emblem of irresponsibility: despite the will to do good, it mediates various instances in which responsibility is endlessly avoided.

The issue of responsibility is highlighted in *Gasu ningen* as well. Mizuno's anti-authority stance is also due to the fact that the scriptwriter of the film, Kimura Takeshi, used to participate in leftist movements.[141] Thus, Mizuno represents the voice of not only the victims of the war (through his victimization in the hands of Sano) but also the leftist student movements who rebelled against the postwar prosperity that stemmed from the joint treaties between Japan and the U.S. The radicalness of the human vapor is that he has the power to "accidentally" destroy the Japanese from the inside. The main responsibility lies with the militaristic past. People who were active in war continue to spread horrors, even to the next generation. This can be seen as an allegory to the way Kishi Nobusuke remained in power despite his connections with the Japanese military.[142] This is connected to the issue of trust: if a former

[138] Ōsawa, "Yotsuya kaidan," 85, 91.

[139] Buruma, *Japanese Mirror*, 151.

[140] Tatsumi, *Full Metal Apache*, 25.

[141] See Takeuchi, *Tokusatsu o meguru*, 41.

[142] See also Wilson, "War, Soldier, Nation," 194–196 for a discussion about military men who participated in local, regional or national politics in the 1950s.

campaigner of militarism was suddenly hailed as a representative of peace, what were the people to believe in?[143] Thus, the existence of the human vapor is not to be viewed merely as a problem of a differing worldview, but rather as a very physical problem that ultimately leads to his own isolation from the world.[144] This isolation can be catastrophic for the society. The overall impression is that Mizuno had no choice but to rebel. The state is to blame. Still, it is clear that the antagonist of the film, Mizuno, is "unfit" by many postwar standards.

Before his transformation, Mizuno was but a normal library assistant working at a university library. He had a dream of becoming a pilot in Japan's Self-Defense Forces (SDF) but failed the entrance exam. "What should a high-school graduate unable to enter university do?," questions Mizuno, emphasizing the harsh environment within which masculinity was expected to be performed. During the time of the film's release, the competition was starting to get increasingly intense. At the point of completion of their formal education, men were expected to move to permanent employment and change their status from a student to a full-fledged member of society. Most men were able to make this transition smoothly, but further success often depended on one's academic record.[145] Such success was denied Mizuno. He demonstrates a clear rupture from the suggested model, calling for an inspection of the process by which the most desperate members of society became its outcasts during the years after the war.[146] His failing the SDF entrance examination marginalizes him in a society where boys must study hard in order to compete in the "examination war," which will make entrance to the top universities and jobs easier for them.[147] The issue around the SDF itself is a contradictory one. The SDF was generally connoted with the word "military," and even the police were regarded with some caution.[148] As Frühstück notes, after the end of the war military heroism continued as a narrative construct in the SDF, where emphasis was placed on the will to risk one's life for the public.[149] Military men still represented leadership.[150] Mizuno is denied this, too. Instead of giving

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[143] Vogel, *The Salary Man*, 92.

[144] Ōkubo, "Henshin ningen," 114–115.

[145] Hidaka, *Salaryman Masculinity*, 104, 106; Allison, *Nightwork*, 92.

[146] Dower, "Useful War," 62–63.

[147] Robert Smith, "Gender Inequality in Japan," *Journal of Japanese Studies* 13, no. 1 (1987): 1–25, quoted in Mark McLelland, "Salarymen doing Queer: Gay men and the heterosexual public sphere," in *Genders, transgenders and sexualities in Japan*, ed. Romit Dasgupta and Mark McLelland (London and New York: Routledge, 2005), 98.

[148] Vogel, *The Salary Man*, 92.

[149] Sabine Frühstück, "After Heroism: Must Real Soldiers Die?," in *Recreating Japanese Men*, ed. Sabine Frühstück and Anne Walthall (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 2011), 103–104.

[150] Wilson, "War, Soldier, Nation," 196.

him a chance to sacrifice himself for the greater good, the public ends up being sacrificed for his purposes.

Morris-Suzuki explains that originally "[i]nterest in the science of race … did not necessarily imply a thoroughgoing belief in the importance of 'racial purity', though it did suggest a belief in the importance of genetics in determining the fate of peoples."[151] Yoshino speaks of "socially constructed races" where race is defined according to the social actors' definitions. Race, as such, has no biological basis in this case. It can be defined as "a human group that perceives itself and/or is perceived by other groups as different from other groups by virtue of innate and immutable phenotypical and genotypical characteristics."[152] It is, in a way, an imagined community. This heterogeneity is shaken by Mizuno, who ultimately internalizes his situation by proclaiming, "I am not a human being, so I won't obey rules made by humans." Whereas the end of the war was celebrated as a liberation of bodies, [153] Mizuno demonstrates that the liberation of bodily borders is ultimately related to the liberation of the mind. This is the reason why these antagonists are ultimately antisocial and unregenerate.[154] The police come to the conclusion that, having acquired a superior but monstrous existence, Mizuno causes anxiety in the orderly society just by existing. He must be exterminated. His is the storyline of abject, marginalized and oppositional masculinity, which is perceived as a threat for the whole society. Mentally unfit even before, his transformation makes him doubly monstrous. Similarly, it reveals the attitude of the general public toward anything Other.

The end of *Matango* also calls for the questioning of "hygiene": not only "racial hygiene," which, according to Morris-Suzuki, was concerned with both establishing hierarchies of racial superiority and inferiority and debating issues of "racial mixing'" but "mental hygiene." This theme continues especially in *Tetsuo III*. Japan's Mental Hygiene Act (*seishin eisei-hō*) was established in 1950. Kitagaki describes mental hygiene as a medical practice which is carried out in order to protect people's life from mental disease and illness, but also as a policy measure which protects normal people from the mentally ill or mentally disordered.[155] In *Matango*, Kenji, an embodiment of rational scientific masculinity, has been locked up at a psychiatric hospital and observed from behind the bars by a group of psychiatrists. Psychiatrists were included in the medical treatment of patients and the protection of society by isolating the patients elsewhere. [156] In the outlook of the psychiatrists, "a profound social elitism directed toward the 'lower orders' of the national

[151] Morris-Suzuki, "Debating Racial Science," 362.

[152] Yoshino, *Cultural Nationalism*, 22–23.

[153] Igarashi, *Bodies of Memory*, 52.

[154] Ōkubo, "Henshin ningen," 114–115.

[155] Kitagaki, "Psychiatric Medicine," 34–35.

[156] Ibid.

population itself"[157] can be seen. Some have called eugenics a form of "scientific racism"[158] and the "deep-rooted tendency toward social protection."[159] In *Matango*, this social exclusion is due to contact with the external, namely, the U.S. This corresponds to Noël Carroll's definition of monsters as threatening, uniformly dangerous and impure.[160] Impurity is one of the main undercurrents of Kenji's situation. His transformation is made monstrous by the clinical gaze of the onlookers, all of whom represent a form of scientific masculinity different from his own. To see these men observing each other is to see monstrosity mirrored on both sides. However, only one is deemed mentally unfit.

4.3 CONCLUSIONS

In studying the monsters of the past, we study our own demons.[161] The role of science for Japan's imperialist agenda was all but erased from the postwar narrative. Similarly, war memories continue to exert political power over the contemporary society.[162] The narrative of science without a conscience can be seen as a metaphor for the image of a nation without conscience in the films discussed in this chapter. Simultaneously they draw from the friction between masculinities organized around dominance and around expertise or technical knowledge, of which the latter had received a whole new meaning with the application of science in weapon development.[163] This demonstrates the importance of engaging with historical narratives in order to provide timely commentary on even recent films, although a simplistic approach of merely referring to "war trauma" must be avoided.

In this chapter, I have dealt with representations of Japan's militarist past in *kaiki eiga*, the encounter with which is enabled by scientific masculinity. The films, drawing from the *otoko no kaijin* tradition introduced by Shimura Miyoko, introduced a multitude of ways in which scientific masculinity was used to dissect the past. Highlighted issues included the fear and ambivalence

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[157] Morris-Suzuki, "Debating Racial Science," 361.

[158] See Morris-Suzuki, ibid.

[159] Kitagaki, "Psychiatric Medicine," 39.

[160] Carroll, *Philosophy of Horror*, 28; he draws on Mary Douglas, according to whom reactions of impurity are correlated with the transgression or violation of schemes of cultural categorization. For example, when talking about the Japanese *yūrei*, it is important to highlight, however obvious it may be, that they are dead beings. Death in Japanese culture has traditionally been associated with impurity. This is visible in many customs and manners, for example, concerning funeral behavior. After having attended a funeral service, one is required to sprinkle a small amount of salt on one's clothes and body in order to cleanse oneself.

[161] Mittman, "Introduction," 13.

[162] See Takenaka, "Japanese Memories."

[163] Connell, "The big picture," 609–610.

of ex-soldiers and their role in the postwar order, Japan's human experimentation projects and the questions of responsibility they posed, as well as Japan's eugenic policies and conceiving of a racially pure ethnicity. This is broadcast in the Golden-era films, where human beings are made to transform into vessels of bio-weapon development, but also more recent male fantasies presented in the *Tetsuo* trilogy with its subplots of human betterment. These scenarios of scientific creation toy with the idea of scientific, enlightened and rational superiority, but ultimately this fantasy is destroyed by the results of the experimentation. Simultaneously they destroy the notion of superior Japanese science and highlight its problematic nature.

Demilitarized soldiers have appeared in films such as *Gojira*, *Densō ningen* and *Gasu ningen*. In *Gojira*, Dr. Serizawa's wounded body is an ambivalent marker of the past. Depending on the point of departure, he can be seen as a hero or a monster, a symbol for victorious Japanese science or a reminder of its dangers. The latter two films, however, were more directly concerned with the potentially dangerous nature of Japanese wartime science itself, painting ambiguous or downright monstrous portrayals of science at the hands of *fukuinhei* who have not been able to fully integrate into the postwar order. Sano's and Niki's appearances are uncanny blasts from the past, highlighting the general anxiety around the process of demilitarization. In *Densō ningen*, Dr. Niki's motive was to create a superhuman soldier for the Japanese army. The same is echoed in *Gasu ningen*, where Dr. Sano works to create a superhuman able to exist in space. These films most closely correspond to the universal Frankenstein myth and the Mad Scientist narrative. In this case, Japanese is allotted a monstrous identity, bespeaking the critical way the filmmakers related to the past.

Through depictions of scientific masculinity in the above films, the military past of Japan is deemed highly problematic. The films all negotiate the issue of continuity and, to a lesser degree, responsibility. If bodies were the only thing the survivors of war managed to rescue from the destruction,[164] the scientifically created mutants or monstrous and disfigured representations of scientific masculinity appear as a total destroyal of this one sign of survival, of the continuity between the prewar and postwar cultures, and of the perceived stability. As such they elicit the forgotten past, calling for the need to counter these memories. If the American discourse sought the medicalization, sanitization, cleansing and normalization of Japanese bodies,[165] the postwar mutants, being results of militarist scientific masculinity, mock this. Similarly, they mock the Japanese eugenicist ideas of healing the unfit. The function of scientific masculinity as embodied by the *fukuinhei* scientist characters I have analyzed in this chapter is to remind the public about Japan's military past during a time when the period of high growth was already fast approaching. Their relationship to society is problematic; it is not fully oppositional, because

[164] Igarashi, *Bodies of Memory*, 47.

[165] Ibid., 48.

there has been some degree of integration in the postwar society, but as the films demonstrate this process is not without its questions. In contrast, the freaks that scientific masculinity has given birth to are fully oppositional.

5 PACIFIST JAPAN

Susan Sontag points out that the "bellicosity of science fiction is channeled into the yearning for peace."[1] This is true of many of the *kaiki eiga* released relatively soon after the end of the war. In addition, *kaiki eiga* provided a means for discussing the role of Japanese science and technology, both historically and during the era of rebuilding. This role, in fact, was quite controversial. Despite the will of the nation to promote itself as a techno-scientific superpower, the emperor himself wrote that Japan had lost the war not only because of its overconfidence but also because of the way their "armed forces put too much emphasis on the spiritual side and forgot science." This affected the attitude of the general public toward the fact that Japan had lost because of its inferior science and technology.[2] This discourse was manifested on top of the understanding of all the horrors that could be created with an immoral implemention of science and technology.

The films discussed in this chapter redeem this felt inferiority about Japan's science and technology, promoting a new identity for the country as a pacifist mediator of scientific knowledge and overall lbeing a peace-loving nation in the postwar world order. This can be seen as a means of overcoming Orbaugh's Frankenstein Syndrome. Manga artist Tezuka Osamu has pointed out that after the war, it was a wish of the publishers "to stress a peaceful future, where Japanese science and technology were advanced and nuclear power was used for peaceful purposes."[3] This is telling of the general change in the attitudes toward science and technology that is visible in the films as well.

As Mizuno points out, science was transformed overnight from a tool of war into the means for Japan's peacetime reconstruction. Especially Japanese scientists and promoters of science considered it important for the reconstruction of Japan, even though many of them had been accomplices of military science in the past.[4] The slogan of a "scientific Japan" is generally considered to be a typical idea of postwar Japan. Within this framework, the films address this shift to a democratic, peaceful use of science and technology for the benefit of not only Japan but the whole world. In the films, scientific masculinity is not embodied only by the mad scientists but also by characters possessing clear-headed and down-to-earth rationalism, a key to averting the temptations of unethical science and ideologies such as militarism.

This chapter demonstrates how the promotion of Japan as a peaceful nation took place on an international level and was aligned with nuclear narratives. The nuclear discourse, "a set of artistic and political utterances on

[1] Sontag, "Imagination of disaster," 47.

[2] Schodt, *Robot Kingdom,* 77–78.

[3] Ibid., 76.

[4] Mizuno, *Scientific Nationalism*, 173–174, 183.

the use of nuclear power for both military and peaceful purposes,"[5] for example, was utilized in order to position Japan as a victim but, more importantly, to promote its science (and Japan as a nation) as inherently pacifist. Related to these are the strategies through which this effect was achieved, such as emphasizing the role that the scientists have within a team or introducing scenes of international negotiations. Even scenarios of saving the whole Japanese race appear.

The films that most directly address these are *Bijo to ekitainingen*, *Gojira* and *Chikyū bōeigun*. A bleaker vision of postwar Japan is provided by Honda Ishirō's *Matango*. These are narratives that utilize scientific masculinity in order to reveal the inner grotesques of the "demilitarized and democratized" nation. I will approach these from the viewpoint of "unmasking" the costs of democratization and the recreation of Japan as a pacifist nation. Although the narratives discussed in Chapter 4 also dealt with this topic of unease, this chapter deals with these inner grotesques as representations of anxiety toward the present, not the militarist past.

5.1 NUCLEAR CONCERNS

In Japan, the effects of the bomb could not be discussed in the immediate postwar era and during the Occupation. In 1952, the San Francisco Treaty marked the end of the Occupation and allowed for the expression of the nuclear trauma on screen.[6] *Genbaku no ko* (Children of Hiroshima, 1952, Shindō Kaneto), the first film to discuss the trauma of the atomic bomb, was released already in August, just before the San Francisco Treaty was ratified in September. Representation of the horrors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was by no means an easy task.[7] Even today, the fear of radiation and the image of nuclear reactors have been studied more as a political protest, less in terms of artistic expression.[8] This chapter answers this gap by pointing out how the films utilized the nuclear narrative to promote an image of Japan as a pacifist nation.

As Hutchinson points out, although the fear of a nuclear attack is a universal one, there is also a parallel narrative at work, which represents nuclear power in good or at least neutral terms, as opposed to destructive weaponry. [9] Despite being the only country to have experienced the consequences of a nuclear bomb, Japan embarked on a journey to become a

[5] Rachael Hutchinson, "Nuclear Discourse in Final Fantasy VII: Embodied Experience and Social Critique," in *Introduction to Japanese Popular Culture*, ed. Alisa Freedman and Toby Slade (New York and London: Routledge, 2018), 72.

[6] See Hirano's *Mr. Smith* for a book-length study of Occupation-era film censorship in Japan.

[7] See Kapur, "History and Horror," 83.

[8] Hutchinson, "Nuclear Discourse," 74.

[9] Ibid.

nation that embraced the idea of nuclear power.[10] In fact, it is quite interesting that a country with firsthand experience of the dangers of nuclear weapons started its commercial nuclear power program almost immediately after the Occupation, becoming a world power in the development of civilian nuclear technology.[11] Yoshii (2007) argues that despite the memory of the bomb being strong in the 1950s, nuclear power was celebrated as a counterpart to the "bad" nuclear science: nuclear power plants became household examples of the peaceful and useful use of nuclear power, which directly lowered the living costs of a nation recovering from the devastating war and a housing shortage. With the help of science, the threat of the nuclear bomb had been domesticated and harnessed for the use of the people as nuclear power and "atoms for peace."[12] Important for this new application was also the terminological change from *kakujikken* (nuclear testing) to *genshiryoku* (atom energy).[13] Penney calls this "nuclear nationalism," a form of technological and economic nationalism that promoted "an unshakable official confidence in the safety of Japanese nuclear technology" in the 1980s, which also helped people in remote areas with high unemployment rates to benefit from Japan's economic miracle through the operation of nuclear power plants.[14] All this, however, was compromised by the Fukushima nuclear power plant accident in March 2011.[15]

5.1.1 THE DAIGO FUKURYŪMARU INCIDENT

A subgenre of science fiction that explored fears of nuclear war was prevalent worldwide from the late 1940s to the 1980s.[16] According to the biocultural reading, the popularity of these sorts of narratives is based on the way human

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[10] Jeff Kingston notes that the nuclear business eventually grew to the point that a so-called "nuclear village," the "imagined collective bound by solidarity over promoting nuclear energy," was created ("Japan's Nuclear Village: 日本の原子力ムラ," *The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus* 10, no. 37 [2012]). This is closely related to what Penney calls Japan's nuclear nationalism (Matthew Penney, "Nuclear Nationalism and Fukushima 各国家とフクシマ," *The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus* 10, no. 11 [2012]).

[11] Daniel Aldrich, *Site Fights: Divisive Facilities and Civil Society in Japan and the West* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2008), 120; Penney, "Nuclear Nationalism," 1.

[12] Yoshii Hiroaki 好井裕明, *Gojira, Mosura, Gensuibaku – Tokusatsu eiga no shakaigaku* ゴジラ・モスラ・原水爆ー特撮映画の社会学 [Gojira, Mothra, A- and H-bombs: Sociology of the *tokusatsu* film] (Tokyo: Serikashobō, 2007), 63–64; Nakayama, *Postwar Japan*, 31; Low, Nakayama and Yoshioka, *Science, Technology and Society*, 71.

[13] A presentation by Tino Bruno at the European Association for Japanese Studies conference in Japan, Tsukuba University, September 15, 2019.

[14] Penney, "Nuclear Nationalism," 5–6.

[15] Gavan McGormack, "Hubris Punished: Japan as Nuclear State. 驕れる者は久しからず––核国家としての日本," *The Asia-Pacific Journal* 9, no. 16 (2011), 1.

[16] David Seed, "Atomic Culture and the Space Race," in *The Oxford Handbook of Science Fiction*, ed. Rob Latham (New York: Oxford University Press 2014), 360.

cognition has been hardwired to deal with dangers in the environment.[17] In this case, nuclear attack represents an uncontrollable environmental threat. In Japan, it also has a distinctly culture-specific layer. To paraphrase Hutchinson, most of the 20th-century popular culture texts concerned with nuclear power implied atomic weaponry, Japanese victimhood at foreign hands, the importance of preserving world peace, respecting rather than abusing the formidable power of nuclear energy and avoiding the past mistakes of others, namely the U.S.[18] Kalat points out that while American monster films used radiation to get the creature up and running around, Honda Ishirō saw his monster as a narrative device to discuss the terror of the nuclear age.[19]

In the 1950s, many science fiction films revolved around the fear of radiation, not the bomb itself.[20] This threat of radiation was highlighted by the U.S. testing incident of a hydrogen bomb at Bikini Atoll in March 1954, which resulted in the radiation poisoning of Japanese fishermen on the fishing boat Daigo Fukuryūmaru.[21] Words such as "South Pacific Sea," "nuclear testing," "ashes of death" and "radiation poisoning" became popular features of some of the new Japanese films.[22] The Bikini incident not only allowed for expressions of criticism toward U.S. politics, but also marked a start of opposition toward nuclear policies, a watershed incident prior to which no anti-nuclear information had been permitted to be distributed.[23] The director of *Gojira*, Honda Ishirō, saw the incident as a chance to insert serious meaning in his films. Despite underlining that the key idea of *Gojira* was to entertain, he has admitted that nuclear symbolism was present for those who wished to see it.[24] This statement draws a connection between some of Honda's films and Japan's nuclear discourse.[25] Present in *Gojira* and *Chikyū bōeigun*, the discourse also appears in a compelling form in *Bijo to ekitainingen* and *Matango*. It should be noted, however, that in *Gojira* radiation is less of a concern than the testing of an H-bomb—an act by the U.S. which must not be mentioned. The monster Gojira is not a mutation *per se*; rather, its sleep was disturbed by the bomb.

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[17] Clasen, "Monsters Evolve," 222.

[18] Hutchinson, "Nuclear Discourse," 73.

[19] Kalat, *Toho's Godzilla*, 15.

[20] Yomota, "South Seas," 85; Kalat, *Toho's Godzilla*, 13.

[21] See Brothers, *Mushroom Clouds*, 44–45.

[22] Yoshii, *Gojira, Mosura*, 63–64. The wish to discuss the effects of radiation and the A-bomb was not limited to film directors. The composer of *Gojira*, Akira Ifukube, too, saw *Gojira* as an opportunity to address his own experiences with radiation; his brother had died from radiation exposure and Ifukube himself was made ill (Kalat, *Toho's Godzilla*, 21).

[22] Katō, "Goodbye Godzilla."

[23] Schnellbächer, "Has the Empire Sunk Yet?," 31; Nakayama, *Science, Technology and Society*, 30.

[24] Brothers, ibid., 45.

[25] These include *Densō ningen* and also Kurosawa Akira's *Yume* (Dreams, 1990), for which Honda directed an episode.

Closely related to the Bikini incident, Schnellbächer argues that especially between 1945 and 1970s the Pacific Ocean became an important metaphor for discussing Japanese national identity, because the idea of Japan as a Pacific sea power was an important attribute of the pre-1945 imperialism.[26] In addition, screenwriter Sekizawa Shinichi has also told that he implicitly incorporated his wartime experiences of starving on isolated islands in the South Pacific into his scripts.[27] This creates a real-life focal point for fictional events. In *Gojira*, this fear is made prominent in the beginning, when one fishing boat after another disappears into the sea. Samara Lea Allsop sees this also as a reminder of the naval battles lost by Japan during the Pacific War.[28] *Matango*, in turn, takes its protagonists to a faraway island in the South Seas: when a group of young (elite) Japanese get shipwrecked in a storm and drift toward a mysterious island, they find an abandoned ship with some interesting biological experiments. One by one, the crew have their mental state deteriorate, with their transformation into human-shaped mushrooms being an outward representation of this inner process. Mushroom bodies also resemble nuclear explosions.[29]

Bijo to ekitainingen is a story of mutated, men-like liquid monsters appearing in Tokyo, and how detectives and scientists must work together to solve this problem and save mankind. The story is played out against the backdrop of a more traditional crime fiction where, as Kawana argues, writers "were quick to exploit the omnipotent aura of science."[30] According to Honda himself, the thriller format found its reference points from the various drug-related stories splashed across newspapers and mass media.[31] *Bijo* starts with a hellish scene at sea: an explosion, a flash of orange light, a mushroom cloud and then a news announcement of an H-bomb test and the subsequent loss of lives in the South Pacific Sea. After a shot of an empty, eerie ship, the film cuts to rainy Tokyo where a man is hit by a car. When the driver and police inspect the scene, there is no body to be seen—just empty clothes. It is quite evident that this unnatural disappearance is somehow caused by the H-bomb test in the beginning of the film.

As in *Gojira*, real events are used as explanations for fictional fear, which transforms into a very real fear. The more the story progresses, all the more real become the references to actual occurrences.[32] The police soon discover that everything seems to be related to members of a certain drug gang. However, it soon becomes clear that something more sinister is at work. To find out the truth, the police must—unwillingly at first—collaborate with Dr.

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[26] Schnellbächer, ibid., 27.

[27] Kalat, "Toho's Godzilla," 65.

[28] Allsop, "Gojira," 64.

[29] I am thankful for Albion M. Butters for pointing this out.

[30] Kawana, *Murder Most Modern*, 34.

[31] See Takeuchi, *Tokusatsu o meguru*, 38.

[32] Yoshii, *Gojira, Mosura*, 80, 88, 93–94.

Masada, a professor at the local university. Dr. Masada is interested in the strange effect that hydrogen radiation might have on human beings. He extrapolates that there is a connection between the happenings in Tokyo and the disappearance of the sailors of Daini Ryūjinmaru (a direct reference to Daini Fukuryūmaru). The narrative offers an explanation in a flashback for the weird events that happened on board Daini Ryūjinmaru. The ship's logbook reveals that on the day of the Bikini incident, six fishermen disappeared and 23 were marked as "unknown." The number "23" is a direct reference to real events, as 23 members of the crew of Daigo Fukuryūmaru were diagnosed with radiation poisoning.[33] Although these films' visions are fictitious, because of the period of their release members of the audience "are sure to have felt a sense of the 'too real.'"[34] The effects of "too real" are enhanced by the use of words such as "Christmas Island," "caesium-137," "strontium-90" and "nuclear explosion," which can lead the audience to recollect earlier stories in the media about the possible perils of nuclear testing.[35]

Bijo also recalls the effects of the bomb and nuclear testing on people. Dower notes that a new class of "improper" people developed in Japan soon after the war, including, for example, people who had been tainted and polluted by radiation. [36] The *hibakusha* (exposed to radiation), a term generally used to describe the victims of the A-bomb,[37] are often portrayed as women, such as "a tragic young heroine suffering from atomic-related illness," which "enables a historical narrative of forgetting, where victimization replaces responsibility for aggression." [38] Interestingly, when the mutated monsters of the film, the so-called "H-men" are tainted by radiation, they are only seen as the "Second Human Race." As Igarashi argues, "Although memories may have become visible in the cultural realm of postwar Japanese society, they remained suppressed in political discourse." [39] Honda's speculative cinema politicizes these memories in the form of the monstrous bodies onscreen.

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[33] Yoshii, *Gojira, Mosura*, 92.

[34] Kanō, "Fukuinhei," 94.

[35] Yoshii, ibid., 84–85.

[36] Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 61.

[37] Alexis Dudden, "The Ongoing Disaster," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 71, no. 2 (2012): 349.

[38] Lowenstein, *Shocking Representations*, 86; Balmain sees this suffering as something very Japanese, drawing a connection between the sufferings of the *hibakusha* and the Japanese concept of *gaman*, or endurance. Because of the status of the latter as virtuous, the suffering female, too, was considered beautiful (Balmain, *Japanese Horror*, 49). However, this statement is essentialist. It is also important to remember that whereas *hibakusha* were represented in horror films to some degree, what is commonly referred to as *hibakusha cinema* comprises altogether different films. See, for example, Mick Broderick's edited volume *Hibakusha Cinema: Hiroshima, Nagasaki and the Nuclear Image in Japanese Film (*New York: Kegan Paul, 1996) and Matthew Edwards' edited volume *The Atomic Bomb in Japanese Cinema: Critical Essays* (Jefferson: McFarland & Company, 2015).

[39] Igarashi, *Bodies of Memory*, 105.

Grodal points out that films capture our attention only if they include at least one agency that has intentions and emotions. This is especially central to supernatural and counterintuitive narratives, because they abound with all sorts of weird beings. Instead of random dangers, it is intentional killers that people still fear, because the human mind has been trained to look for potentially dangerous agents.[40] When cabaret dancer Chikako, the female protagonist of *Bijo*, witnesses a human transforming into an H-man, she questions whether they remain alive or not. This is the ultimate issue concerning the H-men and underlines the general anxiety around the possible consequences of metamorphosis due to radiation. It is stated, however, that the H-men still seem to have all the mental activity of a human being, especially the intentionality of their actions. Thus, although stripped of some basic human attributes, they are not stripped of their agency.

In the final scenes of *Bijo*, the police lure the H-men into the sewers of Tokyo and scorch them. This expresses humanity's triumph over the monstrous but, as Kalat notes, this is also an ultimate sign of cruelty, where the Japanese torture their enemies.[41] Saitō calls this "world nationalism," the war to exterminate all things that are different.[42] A similar logic is visible even sixty years after the release of *Bijo*. *Nihon igai zenbu chinbotsu* (Everything Sinks But Japan, 2006) is a parody version of *Nihon chinbotsu*, where Japan is the only country to stay afloat while the rest of the world sinks away. Outsiders seek refuge in Japan, which reveals the degree of bigotry and racism that bubbles under the polite façade of the homogeneous Japanese race, which, despite shedding its *kokutai* past, was still a prominent postwar image.[43] The film evokes Bakhtinian carnivalesque laughter in the face of an extremely serious matter. The true colors of the Japanese are revealed during the disaster, and these colors are not pretty. World nationalism is presented as a will to save the world, but in fact it is nothing but ethnocentric nationalism. The antidote is provided by Dr. Masada, whose role will be discussed further in this chapter.

5.1.2 NAMING THE UNNAMEABLE

Schnellbächer's idea of the sea as a barrier is engaged in both *Gojira* and *Bijo*. A monster trespasses this barrier, but the monster itself is quite equivocal. It is a creation of foreign science but, at the same time, something very Japanese. In both cases, the monster arrives from the South Seas. Yomota explains that in Japanese mythology, the South Seas have been considered a utopia and a gate to the world of the gods. Nonetheless, the Japanese should die in their own land because otherwise the souls of the deceased will continue their wandering. In *Gojira*, the monster brings home the wandering souls killed in

[40] Grodal, *Embodied Visions*, 107–108, 148.

[41] Kalat, *Toho's Godzilla*, 60.

[42] Saitō, *Kōittenron*, 16–17.

[43] Ko, *Cinema and Otherness*, 14.

the war, reminding the democratized society of the cost of the shift from militarism to democracy.[44] *Bijo* duplicates this narrative. In addition, while both *Gojira* and *Bijo* constantly refer to the presence of the U.S., they never address it directly.

Even after the end of the Occupation, Japan was economically and politically too dependent on the U.S. to openly discuss the role it had played in Japan's defeat. Igarashi argues that popular culture provided a vessel by means of which it was possible to encounter an otherwise concealed foundational narrative that projected "continuity with Japan's past in order to mask the historical disjuncture of Japan's movement from a former enemy to an ally." This "suppression of history was an important aspect of the postwar cultural discourse."[45] In relation to cinema, this "the occupied screen," as named by John Dower, provided "a fictional world where tangible things disappeared": even English-language signs were forbidden, because the U.S., much less its role in the bombings of Nagasaki and Hiroshima, was not to be portrayed in film.[46] However, the U.S. appeared as vague images of otherness. Igarashi sees it as "a mimetic embodiment of abject" embodying both Japan's loss and the U.S. that inflicted that loss. Although inseparably tied to the U.S., this had to remain unnamed.[47] Consequently, mass culture moved back and forth between its expression of the otherness of America as "either absent or monsterized."[48] This was despite that fact that relations between the U.S. and Japan were crafted as "those of nations which, as sovereign equals, cooperate in friendly association to promote their common welfare and to maintain international peace and security."[49]

In the films, the foundational narrative manifests itself as a structure in which the presence of the U.S. is constantly hinted at but never explicitly referred to.[50] In *Bijo*, the H-men, previous to their metamorphosis, were laborers earning their living by sailing the seas. Through their monstrous metamorphosis they gain superpowers, transcending Japan's victimhood. But this superiority is not free of politics. Bartlett notes that for Victor's Frankenstein's monster, the ultimate horror is the definite fact that he now lives in a world unlike ours. It is a world "dominated by the oppressive

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[44] Yomota, *Sengo no shinwa*, 87–88.

[45] Igarashi, *Bodies of Memory*, 73.

[46] Richie, *Japanese Cinema*, 110.

[47] Igarashi, ibid., 114–115, 118.

[48] Ibid., 105.

[49] United Nations Treaty Series, "No. 1832, 1952: 46," accessed December 4, 2015, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20136/volume-136-I-1832-English.pdf.

[50] Satō Tadao points out that it was not until the late 1960s that America was finally identified and portrayed as a villain (*Currents*, 164). This motif of an ambivalent villain was not merely a postwar necessity. National strategy films (*kokusaku*) widely relied on ambivalent portrayals of the enemy because their aim was not so much to portray the enemy as an absolute evil as it was to share the moral message of the superiority of the Emperor (Richie, *Japanese Cinema*, 99).

omnipresence of Victor as the one who made him ineradicable ugly."[51] Similarly, the overarching presence of the U.S. looms over the H-men, its foreign science having made them monstrous. Despite having been given a second life, this is by no means an existence of ultimate freedom. Rather, it becomes an allegory of the real-life political situation of postwar Japan and, accordingly, a means of problematizing images of Japanese nationhood. The dreadful feeling that pervades from the H-Men can be understood in terms of this debate. Like pollution or a curse, they wander around the town, with newspapers spreading fear among the people.[52]

The H-men enable an encounter not only with the past but also with the present. This is what *Matango* does, too. The protagonist of the film is Professor Kenji Murai, the only truly rational member of the shipwrecked team. After the shipwreck the crew of the destroyed ship seek shelter from an abandoned ship, where they discover scientific samples collected by its lost crew. These include "definite examples of mutation caused by radiation." In addition, as Kenji notes, the nationality of the ship is unknown, as if it has been concealed on purpose. This is a strong statement regarding the purposeful concealment of the role of the U.S. in the creation and structuring of the postwar society. In other words, *Matango* corresponds to the logic of the foundational narrative, referring to but never mentioning it.

In this case, it is clear that scientific masculinity functions as a sign of rational superiority and the ability to stay strong in the face of adversities. The violation of nature caused by the U.S. testing is resisted by Kenji until the very last minutes of the film. In film analysis, there is always a threat of overanalyzing. In this case, however, the political nature of *Matango* is made clear by comparing the ending scenes of the original Japanese version and the English dubbed version. In the final scene, where Kenji is seen narrating his story, his words in the English and Japanese versions differ. In the Japanese version, Kenji says that he had done everything he could to protect himself and his lover Akiko from transforming. He then turns to face the spectator, yelling that it was all for nothing. It becomes clear that despite never eating the mushrooms, Kenji, too, has started to metamorphosize. The scence is highly symbolic. It highlights the unwavering nature of Kenji's rational scientific

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[51] Bartlett, *Mad Scientist*, 17.

[52] The *Henshin ningen* films expand on this, using newspapers as a mode of storytelling. It is through them that the viewer sees the discourse of the monstrous being played out against the postwar society and landscape. Although not one of the major narrational solutions of the films, the trilogy makes an ironic nod to the role of media, especially in creating social problems and a looming sense of threat. In addition, if mass media was one of the instances that helped build the Einstein cult, for example, and thus greatly contributed to the popularity of science, in *Henshin ningen* films this is used in an ironic way: it is through mass media that citizens become aware of the latest achievements of science, only this time in the form of a monster. Honda himself has stated that especially the emerging popularity of television made him interested in the portrayal of the irony of commercialism (see Takeuchi, *Tokusatsu o meguru*, 15).

masculinity as a symbol of Japan's strength. It also directly visualizes the unwritten role of the U.S. in the transformations of postwar Japan—the role that Igarashi argues was always hidden in order to maintain the image of two allied nations willingly participating in a process of mutual progress. In the English-language version, however, Kenji's words are dubbed as "I ate them, too!" Thus, the reason behind the mutation is blamed on the individual, Kenji.

Monsters challenge common knowledge because they are unknown to ordinary social intercourse.[53] Honda sees the mushroom form as a manifestation of happiness; through transformation, people would gain a greater understanding of life, forget their contemporary existence and reach the true happiness of a psyche.[54] Metamorphosis appears as a way to nirvana. At the same time, however, because of its grotesque nature, it becomes an antithesis of enlightenment. In both cases the hideous transformation is caused by American science, but in the latter case it is clear that the U.S. places the ultimate responsibility for the metamorphosis on Japan. If this is to be seen as an allegory of social change, the American version conceals the role that that nation has played in the postwar history of Japan. The Japanese version, in turn, clearly manifests the frustrated stance of a defeated nation where transformation was imposed forcefully. Metamorphosis as a representation of immersing oneself in the postwar order is resisted by Kenji until the very end. Kenji's resistance, portrayed against the gradual and willing immersion of the others, is not a critique of democracy but rather a description about the ambiguities of the process of democratization. It was also something very violent, as *Matango* demonstrates when the shipwrecked crew starts fighting—and even killing—each other. In addition, the state of contentment can only be maintained with other me(n)ta(l)morphosized people. The U.S. version, in turn, creates a picture of a people who willingly embrace the foreign. Kenji's resistance has crumbled and he, too, has voluntarily embraced the future form of life. It is because of his act of eating the mushrooms that he has started to change, not because of the destructive science developed by the U.S. It is only one sentence, but the image it carries about the Japanese nation is totally different. *Matango* not only unmasks the misery behind the glittering image of pacifism but also the role of the U.S. in the current situation.

5.2 PROMOTING WORLD PEACE

Nakayama points out that since the late 1950s, the job market for scientists flourished, leading to increased governmental policies for the promotion of technological innovations. A scientifically trained workforce came to be in huge demand by the industrial sector, one reason for which was the development and assembling of consumer durables, which had a direct

[53] Carroll, *Philosophy of Horror*, 34–35.

[54] Cited in Takeuchi, *Tokusatsu o meguru*, 42.

positive influence on people's lifestyle, as quickly and as cheaply as possible.[55] Thus, scientific masculinity was also useful for mediations of positive images of nationhood. The Association of Democratic Scientists (*Minshushugi kagakusha kyōkai*, Minka) was established in 1946 with the aim of emphasizing the role of the democratic production and dissemination of science for the future of Japan.[56]

The Daigo Fukuryūmaru incident became an important means of promoting this new identity. The scientists of Minka played an important role in disseminating information about the incident, [57] mediating scientific knowledge and expertise for the public. The incident situated them "in a pacifist position" and lent them extra leverage as political actors.[58] Similar characters appear in *Gojira*, *Bijo*, *Chikyū bōeigun* and, more recently, *Nihon chinbotsu* (2006) and *Shin-Gojira* (2016). Apart from promoting the peaceful use of science, this also symbolized new ways of influencing global politics. As argued by Billig, nations seek recognition from other established nations and, in order to be approved by other nations and to forge its own particularity and identity, a new nation must resemble these others. In other words, nationalism always involves an international perspective. If not, it is not nationalism but mere "secluded ethnocentric mentality."[59] The will in the films to promote Japan as a part of the greater world is to reconstruct its national image from one of secluded ethnocentricity to an internationally acclaimed champion for peace. This can be seen as representative of the situation faced by Japan after the war. Not being a new nation *per se* but nonetheless a nation faced with the task of constructing its national identity anew, it was vital to reassess country's role among other nations.

5.2.1 INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL IMAGES

International relations are recalled in various ways in the films discussed in this thesis. If the monster in *Gojira* represents destructive American science, Dr. Yamane and Dr. Serizawa represent both the civilian and military sides of Japanese *kagaku gijutsu*, respectively. As opposed to Serizawa, who is referred to as the successor of Yamane, the connection between war and Yamane is never made, although by his age he is bound to have participated in it. Yamane's role is to portray a humane side of scientific advances, stressing the peaceful nature of Japanese science as opposed to the destructive power of

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[55] Nakayama, *Science, Technology and Society*, 31–32, 61, 139; Morris-Suzuki, *Technological transformation*, 204; Yoshikawa Hiroshi, *Japan's Lost Decade* (Tokyo: International House of Japan, 2002), 8.

[56] Bartholomew, *Formation of Science*, 278; Nakayama, *Postwar Japan*, 18–20; Nakayama, *Science, Technology and Society*, 18–19; Mizuno, *Scientific Nationalism*, 176.

[57] Morris Low, *Science and the Building of a New Japan* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 2.

[58] Nakayama, *Science, Technology and Society*, 153; Low, ibid., 30.

[59] Billig, *Banal Nationalism*, 83, 85.

American science. He portrays a somewhat naïve scientific masculine authority, the pure will for a greater understanding of things. "Don't kill it! Learn amazing secrets of life from it," he suggests. While a greater understanding of the monster can ultimately work toward the development of an antidote for radiation sickness, for example, nothing like this is stated as Yamane's motive. Rather, his scientific knowledge is closely tied to the context of research for the sake of research, a space that is excluded from the politics of science.

Yamane's unpolitical science situates *Gojira* firmly within the foundational narrative. The continuing presence of the U.S. is referred to but never directly addressed. Especially telling is the scene where women—presumably relatives of the fallen sailors, among others—demand the exposition of Gojira, whilst the government refuses. "Everyone must know!" shouts one woman, countered by a man who asks, "How can we tell people that the H-bomb testing brought Gojira to life?" But why not? It is not Japan that did the testing; its government is not to blame. Rather, Japan and its inhabitants are (and were in real life) the victims. The following remarks make clear the workings of the foundational narrative: through making Gojira's presence known, "international relations will be harmed," which would lead to "uncontrollable economic and diplomatic confusion." It does not matter that, as pointed out by the women, it is a known fact that Gojira was awakened by the H-bomb testing. Revealing this—and accusing the U.S.—in 1954 would have had too grave an effect on the development of Japan's postwar society and the country's international relations.

Yamane's character is an attempt to return to the "innocent" history of science, an embodiment of an alternative past of positive "what-ifs." Originally, research scientists were an elite group able to dedicate their lives for the greater understanding of science itself. This purity was tainted by technocrats with their ambitions, related to Japan's military expansion,[60] symbolized by Serizawa. Yamane exorcises these malevolent spirits, all the while remaining politically untouchable. If science fiction requires "a (pseudo) rational, physical explanation for any unusual occurrence,"[61] it is Yamane's role to provide that, with comments such as "[t]he sand in Gojira's feet belongs to the Bifrocutus formation," "[a] trilobite is a prehistoric crustacean" and "analysis indicates a strong presence of Strontium-90." Only the last one only slightly refers to any current political topic. The other statements construct Yamane's scientific wisdom as something that transcends daily political battles. Whereas his humanist views are suppressed and excluded from the narrative until the very end, he reappears as the consciousness of science: "As long as they keep experimenting with deadly weapons, another [Gojira] will appear, somewhere in the world." There could not possibly be a stronger statement for pacifism.

[60] Mizuno, *Scientific Nationalism*, 19.

[61] Bowers, *Magic(al) Realism*, 30.

This ominous warning stated by a Japanese scientist is echoed in Honda's *Chikyū bōeigun*. In the film, Japan is under attack by the Mysterians, a space race whose planet has been destroyed in a nuclear war. Landing their spaceship with Mount Fuji in the background, the external threat is visualized.[62] The Mysterians tell that they attacked the Japanese in what was a demonstration of the power of their extraterrestrial science. Despite this, they state that they come in peace and wish to negotiate. Honda also makes a clear allegory to the Cold War with two superpowers that are willing to use ever bigger and more dangerous weapons, including nuclear warfare. Japanese technology, in turn, is promoted as a world-changing science. What started in Japan soon becomes an international threat, but the solution, too, is offered by Japan.

Chikyū bōeigun includes various scenarios of international negotiations about military cooperation in one huge peace-maintaining project. As Dr. Adachi states, "the unluckiness of Japan today is the unluckiness of America tomorrow." At the U.N. roundtable, everyone speaks Japanese; after all, this is speculative fiction. Interestingly, however, the main references to the West are in the form of Richardson (an ambassador from the U.S.) and Immerman (it can be deduced by his name that he is from Germany). *Chikyū bōeigun* ties Japan's wartime and postwar histories together, weaving a network of international relations of support and mutual understanding in the face of an external threat. Indeed, as Billig further points out, "The consciousness of national identity normally assumes an international context, which itself needs to be imagined as much as the national community."[63] Science and technology in science fiction are "conceived as the great unifier,"[64] but in the case of *Chikyū bōeigun*, it is Japanese science that is ultimately superior. In the 1950s and 1960s, the space race between the U.S. Soviet Union regarding military supremacy was taking place in earnest.[65] *Chikyū bōeigun* situates Japan among these two world powers as a nation promoting peace. Their interest is not in the militarization of space; they are innocent victims of the alien attack. However, they do their best to save not only Japan but the whole world. This is a promotion of a new type of national identity within the postwar world order.

This need to rebuild Japan's identity in the international context was followed by the need to reassess its internal image in the aftermath of the mishandling of the Kobe earthquake in 1995 and especially the triple disaster

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[62] Battle scenes around and on the slopes of Mount Fuji would make an interesting case study. See, for example, *King Kong vs. Gojira* (1962) or *Evangelion: 2.0 You Can (Not) Advance* (2009). In the former, the final battle between Kong and Gojira takes place on top of Mt. Fuji, whereas in *Evangelion* the three pilots (Shinji, Rei and Asuka) battle an angel descending from space into the town of Hakone with Mt. Fuji in the background.

[63] Billig, *Banal Nationalism*, 83.

[64] Sontag, "Imagination of Disaster," 47.

[65] Morris-Suzuki, *Technological Transformation*, 236.

of 2011. Historically, natural disasters have also been a prominent narrative motif in Japanese *kaiki eiga*. *Chikyū bōeigun* not only recalled war but also showed natural calamities—such as earthquakes and landslides—bound to have caused even greater anxiety in the spectator. The Mysterians are doubly horrifying, not only because of their connection to radiation, but also because of their ability to cause such natural calamities. Whereas manmade threats are often nullified by the strength of Japanese science, disasters and the power of nature are frequently portrayed as being stronger, as suggested by the ending of *Densō ningen*, where the eruption of Asamayama destroys Sudō.

In *Nihon chinbotsu*, Japanese science saves its people. A sacrifice is needed, but it is not that of the scientist. *Shin-Gojira* (2016), in turn, creates a far more complicated picture. The nuclear narrative is recalled when Kayoko Anne Patterson, a half-Japanese, half-American Special Envoy for the President of the U.S. informs Yaguchi, the Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary, of America's intent to drop an H-bomb on Japan unless Gojira is stopped. Japan's pacifist stance is highlighted, as other nations halt the U.S. in its plans, due to their trust in Japan to find a techno-scientific solution. This scene frames Japanese science and technology once more as pacifist. *Shin-Gojira* is inherently technonationalist in its way of emphasizing Japan's pacifist role in the world and its technological prowess. Just as the nationalisms of democracy are not always benign (see Billig, 1995), technonationalism is not always malign. However, the science that ultimately stops Gojira is, in fact, quite nuts and bolts, by no means something that would be expected of a "technological superpower." The scientists themselves—one of whom is portrayed by Tsukamoto Shinya—are a bit "nuts," too. Thus, *Shin-Gojira* contrasts the governmentally promoted technonationalism with a version that ironizes it.

In addition to engaging with the narrative of technonationalism, *Shin-Gojira* directly opposes military nationalism, presenting scene after scene of futile attacks by Japan's SDF. Only with a powerful shot by the U.S. forces present in Japan is Gojira harmed, before unleashing its radioactive beam and destroying not only half of Tokyo but also the helicopter that was carrying Japan's Prime Minister to shelter. This is reminiscent of the scene in the first *Gojira* film, where the monster stomps on the National Diet Building. In both cases, indecisive politicians, whose reputation in the 21st century had also become tainted with bribery and other scandals, are annihilated and order is restored with more moral leaders; this represented in *Shin-Gojira* by the ideological figure of Yaguchi. Whereas Dr. Yamane was quite idealistic in his will to merely study the monster in 1954, the contemporary society has renounced such naïve views. Coexistence is the only choice, and science must be used for that purpose. This time it is not merely about the moral scientist, but the morality of science in combination with moral politics. In *Nihon chinbotsu* (2006) and *Shin-Gojira* (2016), the confusion of the politicians in the face of a natural disaster becomes a mirror for the confusion of the nation,

because, as Billig notes, "politicians represent the nation to itself."[66] In addition, with the emergence of *shimin shakai*, or civil society, which symbolically seems to have heralded a dramatic change in the relationship between individuals and the state, it is no longer assumed that people in the position of authority are there by right.[67] They have to earn their place.

5.2.2 SCIENTISTS AS TEAM MEMBERS

Because masculinity is inherently a relational construct, scientific masculinity—and its perceived "goodness" or "badness," too—is constructed within relationships between men. The ambiguity of scientific masculinity is pointed out by Connell, who argues that "technical rationality is not completely integrated into a hierarchical social order."[68] Regarding fiction, Susan Sontag points out that an individual scientist, often bearing the image of being shut in his basement and neglecting all his familial duties, is treated negatively. This is seen in the portrayal of Dr. Serizawa in *Gojira*. In his case there is always the underlying threat of misuse of scientific knowledge, should one stray from the course of morality. However, Sontag points out that one way to nullify the threat of a scientist and integrate him into society is to situate him within a team.[69] She speaks of the "savior-scientist," who promotes reason over feelings, idealizes teamwork and takes part in the consensus-creating activities of science.[70] This universal functional bundle also becomes a culture-specific representation: the scientist as a team member corresponds to the way a (Japanese) boys' world always includes "orderly organization," a "command system" (*meirei keitō*), and "industrial technology." A boys' world, in fact, is representative as such of the postwar Japanese society, Japan, Inc. (*kigyō shakai*, or enterprise society).[71] Scientists as members of a team strengthen this ideal.

In *kaiki eiga*, the notion of a team is stressed in the way the status of a character is defined, either by how other characters speak of him or how they

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[66] Billig, *Banal Nationalism*, 98. *Nihon chinbotsu* is based on a famous science fiction novel by Komatsu Sakyō, released already in the 1970s and filmed once previously.

[67] Ibid.

[68] Connell, *Masculinities*, 174.

[69] Sontag, "Imagination of Disaster," 50.

[70] Ibid.

[71] Kume, "Henshin suru hiiroo," 162. In comparison, a girls' world clearly reflects the Japanese mother's consciousness with such notions as "deep attachment," "love," and "fashion" (ibid.). Japan, Inc. can be defined as "the state-sponsored and protected, postwar, patriarchal project of modernization, made up of a vast network of companies headed by large firms in the private sector in the manufacturing industries" (Kurihara Tomoko, *Japanese Corporate Transition in Time and Space* [New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009], 5).

react.[72] In other words, scientific masculinity is defined in the relationship between men. *Gojira* and the *Henshin ningen* films utilize this strategy. The image and meaning of the scientist are not only products of his own actions but also the words of those around him, especially in conversations held with other men. In *Gojira*, this is represented in the relationship between Dr. Serizawa and Ogata, Emiko's love interest. Ogata always explains Serizawa's character, such as the connection between him and the war and the emphasis on Serizawa's dedication to science. In turn, Serizawa has no access to any information on Ogata. In *Gojira*, Ogata wields symbolic power over Serizawa. As a sailor working in Nankai Salvage, the Japanese Coast Guard, Ogata represents a new, healthy masculinity. Generally, the heroes in the *Gojira* series tend to be figures of authority, members of elite groups, and people such as reporters, scientists, detectives, or leaders of the Self-Defense Force—brave, intelligent, resourceful individuals capable of coping with monsters and criminals of various sorts.[73] The former group also corresponds to Milam and Nye's definition of scientific masculinity.

The inclusion of the Coast Guard is an important symbolic notion, as it did the dangerous job of clearing the wartime naval mines around Tokyo.[74] Some have seen Gojira as a representation of a mine, having merely stayed put, waiting.[75] As a member of the Coast Guard, Ogata represents change and optimism, bravery and the tangible act of moving on. He is allotted the positive qualities of masculinity: a healthy body and mind, loyalty, perseverance, and diligence. Not surprisingly, these are the qualities that belong to the hegemonic Japanese salaryman model, although in 1954 that hegemonization was still at a very early stage. This is not the case with Serizawa. Although wielding the power of science and rationality, he is handicapped and implicitly traumatized. His marginalization is emphasized by the fact that throughout the narrative, it is Ogata who is worried about him, not Emiko. Indeed, Morris Low proposes that "masculinity is about both the power of men over men, and the power of men over women."[76] The love triangle between Serizawa, Ogata and Emiko is a fine representation of this. In fact, the spectator is initially invited to draw the conclusion that Emiko and Ogata are romantically involved. Only 33 minutes into the film is it revealed that, in fact, it is Serizawa who is Emiko's fiancé.[77]

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[72] Henry Bacon, *Audiovisuaalisen kerronnan teoria* (A Theory of Audiovisual Narration) (Helsinki: Suomalaisen kirjallisuuden seura, 2004), 178–179.

[73] Kalat, *Toho's Godzilla*, 56. This is in contrast with Vogel's idea that the SDF was laden with rhetorics of military Japan, which made it quite unapproachable (see *The Salary Man*).

[74] Ono Shuntarō 小野俊太郎, *Gojira no seishinshi* ゴジラの精神史 [The psychological history of Gojira] (Tokyo: Sairyūsha, 2014), 41–46.

[75] Ibid.

[76] Low, "Emperor's Sons," 91.

[77] Japan has a long tradition of adopting sons into families as husbands of daughters, in order to continue the *ie*. Called *muko yōshi*, this was a pragmatic decision, not an emotional one. The discourse

Kawana points out that in speculative fiction, science was traditionally an ally to the detective.[78] Because the National Police Reserve was established by the U.S. Occupation in 1950, only to later become the SDF Ground Forces, using policemen or detectives as heroes of the story or representations of postwar new men was not allowed in postwar works due to the underlying anxiety surrounding the police.[79] As Vogel notes, attitudes toward the military may have been transferred to the police to some extent.[80] This can be seen as one possible reason for the oft-implemented combination of a scientist and a detective, present in both *Bijo* and *Densō ningen*.

In *Densō ningen*, a team is formed when Kirioka, a journalist in charge of the science section of the newspaper, bumps into his old university friend Kobayashi, who is in charge of the Sudō murder case. Kirioka and Kobayashi's relationship highlights the differing masculinities at work. Kirioka is constructed as an intellectual through the words uttered by his "other," Kobayashi. He is, for example, "a man whose grades were always the best." Kobayashi also teases Kirioka for not drinking a lot when the two visit a cabaret club, highlighting Kirioka's solemn nature. Embodiments of "good scientific masculinity," through which men can be integrated as parts of the postwar order, are dedicated, solemn and able to resist worldly temptations.

This storyline is parallel to that of *Bijo*, where Detective Tominaga and Dr. Masada form a complementary pair. Although intellectually superior, Masada is constantly referred to as socially somehow inferior by Tominaga, although in a form of friendly banter. Tominaga, for example, is clearly amazed at the fact that Masada has been to a cabaret club, also explaining to his colleagues that Masada is a highly dedicated "research devil" (*kenkyū no oni*) who absolutely loves his work. Masada's expertise can be seen as a symbol for Japan's struggle of reestablishing itself as a member of the international community. *Bijo* establishes Japanese rational men as important—if not, in fact, the most vital—parts of postwar society. Although constructed as somewhat solemn and even innocent through the words of Tominaga, Masada nonetheless wields the ultimate power. This not only addresses the shift in masculinities after the war, but also suggests a field within which Japan could and should excel. A critical stance toward history is maintained throughout the

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of "blood" emphasized race, not blood relations within a family. In the latter case, male primogeniture was more important than individual "blood" (see Robertson, "Biopower," 331). For a further discussion about *muko yōshi*, see Allison Alexy, "The door my wife closed: Houses, families, and divorce in contemporary Japan," in *Home and Family in Japan: Continuity and Transformation*, ed. Richard Ronald and Allison Alexy (London and New York: Routledge, 2011), 236–253, and Harald Fuess, *Divorce in Japan: Family, Gender, and the State, 1600–2000* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004).

[78] Kawana, "Mad Scientists," 89.

[79] "Modern Japan in Archives," National Diet Library, accessed September 26, 2019, https://www.ndl.go.jp/modern/e/cha5/description13.html.

[80] Vogel, *The Salary Man*, 92.

narrative but, regarding science, it is Japanese science that is pacifist, as opposed to destructive American science. In *Densō ningen* this is not the case, as the narrative of Dr. Niki demonstrates.

A scientist who works as a member of a team most often gets respectful treatment.[81] Dr. Masada and the reporter Kirioka do not belong to the police force but become members of its inside circle. Teamwork is emphasized with the scientist working as an important member of the well-oiled machinery seeking to nullify the threat to the society. Simultaneously, it aims to nullify the threat of dormant imperialism through its emphasis on rationality. In *Densō ningen*, Kirioka's presence works as an antidote to a world in which vengeful imperial subjects reappear. This construction of Kirioka as the paramount wielder of scientific knowledge begins when he finds a small component from the crime scene and helps to identify its function with the help of a university professor. Kirioka's presence and knowledge are used to neutralize the threat. As a reporter of science and technology, Kirioka contrasts with the earlier use of scientific magazines in the mobilization of the Japanese.[82] In this case, scientific masculinity is mobilized as an ally for democracy, which contradicts the militarist application of science represented by Dr. Niki. Through him, Japanese wartime science can be figuratively denied while scientists themselves are simultaneously accepted as integral parts of society.

5.2.3 SAVING WOMEN AND THE JAPANESE RACE

As men returned from the war and unemployment soared, a safe option to guarantee work for the soldiers was to situate women back in the home.[83] As Anne Imamura explains, the postwar Japanese family was directed at economic growth. With the invention of the "corporation as family," the wife was also made a member of the corporate family, provided with economic security that came from her husband's job stability, which he in turn was able to attain because he did not need to concentrate on household management. This signaled a total commitment of the self to the company, which also promoted perceived gender equality, as both sexes were given a way to contribute to the benefit of society.[84] Still, despite the ideal being maintained by state policies regarding labor, education, reproduction and welfare,[85]

[81] Sontag, "Imagination of Disaster," 44.

[82] Mizuno, *Scientific Nationalism*, 144; see 95–109 for a full discussion of the role that these magazines had.

[83] Kathleen Uno, "The death of 'Good Wife, Wise Mother,'" in *Post-war Japan as History*, ed. Andrew Gordon (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 303–305; Kanō, "Fukuinhei," 83–84.

[84] Anne Imamura, "Family Culture," in *The Cambridge Companion to Modern Japanese Culture*, ed. Sugimoto Yoshio (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 80; Sugimoto, *Japanese Society*, 98.

[85] Uno, ibid., Kanō, ibid.

particularly younger women were earning wages instead of staying at home.[86] This is visible in many of the earlier films addressed here, which include a range of independent female characters. In some cases they are presented as equal to men (Kyōko in *Gasu ningen* and Akiko in *Densō ningen*), or at least as economically independent (Chikako in *Bijo*). It is made clear that Chikako earns enough to support herself, to purchase the latest technology and to consume. This seems to be in contrast with the assertion that weak women make strong men because masculinity gains power through taking control.[87] Thus, it is important to analyze the types of women the scientists engage with in order to dissect the exact gender ideals that the films try to promote. These are quite obviously related to the perceived image of Japan itself.

Attebery adds, "Once women begin to demonstrate their independent existence, males too become gendered. Men are forced to reexamine themselves, and the comforting image of a stronger, more creative, more rational sex breaks down."[88] Simultaneously, the image of Japan as a creative and rational country breaks down. In *Gasu ningen*, Mizuno, the victim of the failed human experiment, is in love with the *nō* artist Fujichiyo. The crimes he commits are to provide Fujichiyo with monetary support to practice her art. The tone of *Gasu ningen* is gloomy from beginning to end, filled with remarks that question the nature of humanity itself. In a discussion between Mizuno and Fujichiyo, both outsiders in a new society, Mizuno asks, "Is there anyone who really cares about others instead of just wanting to use them?" This seems to be the essence of the film. Mizuno is not only inferior to other men but also to women. In the end, it is Fujichiyo who destroys Mizuno in an act of betrayal that exceeds that of Emiko in *Gojira*, killing both herself and Mizuno on the night of their upcoming wedding. Symbolically, it represents the victory of tradition over side-products of modernity that are affiliated with the militaristic past. The aftertaste, however, is sour, and Mizuno's death is not cathartic. In *Gasu ningen*, it is the female journalist Kyōko's fierce independence that stands in greatest contrast against the hardships faced by Mizuno. This contrasting picture underscores how gender signals in the postwar period were sometimes radically obscured and, as a result, the postwar feeling of the emasculation of the Japanese male was once more intensified.[89]

Whereas Serizawa's abject monstrosity is highlighted by the fact that even his supposed fiancé shies away from him and Mizuno, the experimental freak with superpowers, is killed by his fiancé, Dr. Masada in *Bijo to ekitainingen* is the exact opposite. He not only demonstrates superior scientific knowledge but is also the only character in the film allowed a blossoming romantic relationship. This is an important factor if Masada is seen as embodying a new

[86] Izbicki, "Shape of Freedom," 126.

[87] Allison, *Nightwork*, 178.

[88] Attebery, *Decoding Gender*, 13.

[89] Izbicki, ibid., 127; Wee, *American Remakes*, 126; Itō, *Otokorashisa*, 19.

male ideal. According to Hidaka, marriage is perceived as an essential element of hegemonic masculinity, making men "men" and not merely adults.[90] This is denied Dr. Serizawa in *Gojira*, quite possibly because of his status as a *fukuinhei*; it is also not granted to Mizuno. In *Bijo*, there is no such connotation. Rather, the film promotes scientific masculinity as a hybrid model of masculinity, which assimilates a rational worldview as an important part of being a man. The film calls for an interpretation where Masada is ultimately provided the chance of becoming a *daikokubashira*, a privilege strongly suggested by his relationship with Chikako. He is made doubly powerful, accommodating both intellectual and human skills. He is an early manifestation of a hybrid masculinity but, as his case shows, the inclusion of softer attributes into his masculinity does not necessarily contribute to the emancipation of women. [91] Chikako is saved and her independence is symbolically neutralized.

In the 1960s, especially the *nuuberu baagu* movement was keen on making a connection between the female body and the national body. A genre called *nikutai eiga* (films of the flesh) emerged in the 1960s as a continuation of a literary genre of the same name, containing "risqué displays of female nudity" and utilizing actresses with "well-endowed bodies," all with a political purpose.[92] Dancing scenes in the *henshin ningen* films can be seen as a direct nod to the "rediscovery of sexuality and senses."[93] Joanne Izbicki (1996) has analyzed women in post-Occupation cinema. She pays special attention to "scantily clad dancers or strippers in theaters and nightclubs."[94] According to Izbicki, the emphasis on female nudity as a public and paid form of entertainment can be seen as "a vehicle for constructing a masculinized notion of liberation," where the defeated Japanese male is portrayed as a conqueror in command of the conquered woman. This seems to be the case with Dr.

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[90] Hidaka, *Salaryman Masculinity*, 89, 165.

[91] Messner, "Changing men," 725.

[92] Mitsuyo Wada-Marciano, "Ethnicizing the Body and Film: Teshigahara Hiroshi's *Woman in the Dunes* (1964)," in *Japanese Cinema: Texts and Contexts*, eds. Alastair Phillips and Julian Stringer (London and New York: Routledge, 2007), 182–187; see Igarashi, *Bodies of Memory*, 55–61 and Douglas Slaymaker, *The Body in Postwar Fiction: Japanese Fiction after the War* (New York: Routledge, 2004) for a discussion about body literature. In cinema the male body, too, received attention with the emergence of the *taiyōzoku* (sun tribe) films of the late 1950s and early 1960s. Especially prominent was the actor Ishihara Yūjirō, as Michael Raine explains. Yūjirō emerged onto the scene "impersonating the purportedly new subjectivity and the new body that the *taiyōzoku* signified," eventually becoming "the most beloved man in Japan." Yūjirō's body made him a star, although cinematographers were heard complaining that he changed the shot-scale because of his tall body ("Ishihara Yūjirō," 202–203, 216). Yomota Inuhiko agrees that Yūjirō was tall—especially his legs. In *Kurutta kajitsu* (1965), Yūjirō's long legs become the central focus, with him leaning against various surfaces in his shorts (*Sengo no shinwa*, 154–156).

[93] Igarashi, *Bodies of Memory*, 55.

[94] Izbicki, "The Shape of Freedom," 110.

Masada. In scenes of cabaret dancing, "elaborate men's stories"[95]—not only *Bijo* but the other *henshin ningen* films, too—place masculine concerns at the center. A night club provides the locus for male interaction, a tradition not so different from what Anne Allison (1994) described in her *Nightwork: Sexuality, Pleasure and Corporate Masculinity in a Tokyo Hostess Club* thirty-five years later. The freedom to look means freedom from "the debilitating effects of disintegrated codes and disrupted practices previously engaged to delineate gender and national identity."[96] This is the case with Dr. Masada, who is not only allowed to look but to conquer. In her discussion about war widows, Kanō argues that these "occupations of the flesh" represent the hardships endured by women in postwar Japan.[97] Although Chikako is quite capable of earning her own wages, Masada's symbolic possession removes her from the sphere of hardships. Masada's falling in love with Chikako redeems her as a respectable woman and Japan as a respectable nation.

However, another view attests that this dancing, fascinating, liberated female body became a contradictory sign of the guilty feelings of the men who survived the war.[98] In *Bijo*, the nightclub is the place where the H-Men wreak total chaos, killing numerous people. In the space where the re-masculated postwar male was supposed to be enjoying liberation fantasies in the form of barely clad female bodies, they fall under attack by the metamorphosed mutants. As Izbicki notes, these scenes of male liberation are ultimately only teasers, with true liberation being resisted.[99] In *Bijo*, the mutants who suddenly appear at the night club act as reminders of the presence of the U.S., the one who conquered Japan. They force historical memories into the space reserved for postwar Japanese male fantasies. American science is a disruptor of both the reconstruction of Japan and its national identity. Masada's function is to provide a solution to this very problem, nullify the threat and, in the process, promote a rational and peace-loving image of Japan. Masada is given authority as a representation of a rational form of masculinity, which becomes a symbol for what Japan in the postwar period needed in order to get back on its feet. It is Masada's expertise that beats American science, comprising a symbolic win for the Japanese nation and its men.

Masada is a hybrid: rational in order to resist destructive ideologies, dedicated to his work in order to promote the importance of economic growth and, finally, emotional in order to form families. Like other forms of hybrid masculinities, his relationship with Chikako also restores the power of patriarchy. However, it manifests in a way that is soft and "democratic," as

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[95] Izbicki, "The Shape of Freedom," 111, 116.

[96] Ibid., 130.

[97] Kanō, "Fukuinhei"; see also Koikari Mire, "Rethinking Gender and Power in the US Occupation of Japan, 1945–1952," *Gender and History* 11, no. 2 (1999): 313–335.

[98] Shimura, "Hōrō suru," 220–221.

[99] Ibid., 119.

opposed to the previous Confucian ideals. Masada's symbolic possession of Chikako relocates Izbicki's male "fantasies of possession" out of the realm of entertainment and into the realm of the everyday. In the form of the humble, likeable and dedicated Masada, scientific masculinity is promoted as a means of integrating the emasculated Japanese men back into society. This plays against the general idea of science as an integral part of the development of society.

Rescuing female bodies is also an important allegory for the rescuing of the Japanese race. Darwin is a source of inspiration for many SF writers who look for "significant scientific hooks to hang their narratives on."[100] *Chikyū bōeigun* has a narrative that is simple enough to have been entertaining to the public, especially when coated with many innovative fighting scenes. Nonetheless, the message it carries is quite dark. The Mysterians claim that they wish to have no more than one square kilometer of land—and the right to mate with Japanese women. Ethnicity, in this case, is "the symbolic boundary process of organizing significant differences between 'us' and 'them,'" a process where Japanese identity is "affirmed by formulating the images of the Other ."[101] As Saitō Minako points out, this motif of the earth versus an infiltrator can be seen as an enlargement of the motifs of Japan versus an infiltrator from another country or Japanese nationality vs. non-Japanese nationalities.[102]

In *Chikyū bōeigun*, infiltration takes place on the level of women's bodies. It is up to the scientists to save them and the Japanese nation in a quest for national identity inscribed on the issue of women's sexuality.[103] Five years after the end of the Occupation, this is a straightforward take on the issue of gender and power. The Mysterians represent real-life invaders: "a dominant figure over conquered and occupied Japan" that "brought an enormous number of foreign soldiers to postwar Japan." [104] Protecting Japanese "respectable women" from invaders became a central concern. Countermeasures included, for example, the establishment of the Recreation and Amusement Center (RAA).[105] Women, both in film and in real life, are seen as cultural artifacts, not really as human beings. As Koikari notes, this was to defend the nation from being tainted by foreign blood, to preserve "the purity of the Japanese race" and "contribute to the maintenance of the national body (*kokutai*)."[106] She points out that the democratization of Japan involved meddling with the country's gender politics. While on the one hand promoting the independence of women, on the other hand the conquerors also requested sexual services that had a large effect on the way the Japanese started to treat

[100] Attebery, *Decoding Gender*, 48.

[101] Yoshino, *Cultural Nationalism*, 11.

[102] Saitō, *Kōittenron*, 17.

[103] Koikari, "Gender and Power," 329.

[104] Ibid., 320.

[105] Ibid. 320–321.

[106] Ibid., 321.

their women. Mating with an outsider, be it a Mysterian or an American, highlighted the threat toward the national body from within.[107] At the center of the anxiety regarding the foreign intrusion—or "penetration"—was the worry about mixed blood (*konketsu*).[108] "Pure blood" and "purity" were ideas that started to spread in the late 19th century and metaphorically referred to the body (including the national body) as being free of pathogens and pollution. Ideal bodies were seen to successfully expand the empire.[109] *Chikyū bōeigun* highlights these issues.

The film includes three scientists as main characters: astrophysicist Dr. Shiraishi, astronomer Dr. Adachi and his apprentice scientist, Dr. Atsumi. According to the Mysterians, Scientists are much more trustworthy than politicians. Only scientists are invited to the spaceship, promoting a worldview in which scientific masculinity is superior to that of other types of authority. It might not be the hegemonic model if compared with the amount of power an individual has, but it can be hailed as an intellectually ideal model. The Mysterians trust that the scientists understand their call for "peace," underlining the notion of scientific masculinity as a beacon for pacifism.

However, the pacifist nature of Japanese science is compromised by the reappearance of Dr. Shiraishi, who originally found the planet and subsequently disappeared. On board the Mysterian ship, he bellows, "It is not Mysterians nor humans that will rule the Earth, but science!" This is the moment Shiraishi becomes a derailed agent of science instead of an expert provider of knowledge, which he had been referred to before. Shiraishi's megalomania is symbolically cured by Dr. Atsumi. He becomes a savior-scientist whose actions and wise words ultimately make Shiraishi change his opinions: "This is an example to all of us. Don't misuse science. Don't repeat the tragedy." It is the combined efforts of Dr. Atsumi and Dr. Shiraishi that finally save Japanese women from their horrible fate and, consequently, that prevent Japanese blood from being tainted. In a suicide mission like that of Serizawa, Shiraishi destroys the Mysterian ship and redeems himself. An external threat in the form of the Mysterians had been a portrayal of an internal ambivalence and threat all along, a metaphor for the moral layer of science and technology.

Shiraishi's narrative, like Serizawa's, is reminiscent of the "tragic hero" myth analyzed in detail by Standish. According to her, this narrative "grew to prominence after the Second World War and was instrumental in providing a figurative structure around which the Japanese people could interpret the events of the war, offering the spectators avenues of exculpation from a foreign-imposed sense of guilt that followed the War Crimes Trial."[110] As

[107] Koikari, "Gender and Power," 321

[108] Jennifer Robertson points out that Japanese eugenics has historically known thinkers who have supported mixing races in order to create a superior Japanese race ("Sanguinous Repair," 434–436).

[109] Robertson, "Biopower," 332–333.

[110] Standish, *Myth and Masculinity*, 3.

Standish points out, the tragic hero expressed Japan's purity of spirit through a willingness to die for a cause. The allegoric meaning of death increasingly became encoded as victimization and not sacrifice, as previously.[111] Thus, both Shiraishi and Serizawa align Japan with victimhood caused by an external threat. In the later works such as *Bijo*, *Densō ningen* and *Matango*, this self-sacrificing scientist disappears. Instead the quest for the status quo is channeled into the rescue of others: Masada enters the sewers moments before the torching of the H-men in order to rescue Chikako from the drug gang, Kenji tries to keep Akiko from becoming a mushroom monster, and Kirioka saves Akiko from Sudō.

However, even the almighty savior-scientist is not always able to save the Japanese race from contamination. Slowly but surely, the source of anxiety shifted from bodily fears to psychological mediations. Social events contributed to this threat. An assassination attempt on the U.S. Ambassador Edwin O. Reischauer in 1964 by an adolescent who had undergone treatment at a mental hospital caused a great sensation; for example, one heard of there being "a psychopath at large."[112] This is representative of the contemporary fear of *musabetsu hanzai jiken*, in which anyone can become a victim of a violent outburst.[113] As noted by Ōkubo, it is never just the body which changes: human relationships, status in society and individual consciousness all assume a different shape after metamorphosis.[114] The notion of changing outside is always accompanied by the notion of changing inside. Audeguy proposes that this corresponds to a wider shift in cinematic motifs, where human monsters such as psychokillers and mass murderers appeared as a new type of criminal. The essence of contemporary monstrosity is that no one knows what kind of transformation they are capable of.[115]

5.3 CONCLUSIONS

In this chapter, I have discussed scientific masculinity as a representation of pacifism in Japan. The strategies to achieve this are threefold: to frame Japan against its nuclear tragedy, to introduce scientists who promote world peace and, finally, to have scientists act as dedicated and loyal team members reminiscent even of the hegemonic salaryman ideal. In this chapter, the function of scientific masculinity has been to act as an agent of the national agenda, as a tool to mediate Japan's role with other nations, and as a face of its internal image under construction. Scientific masculinity functioned as a

[111] Standish, *Myth and Masculinity*, 3.

[112] Kitagaki Tōru, "Eugenics and Psychiatric Medicine," in *Eugenics in Japan*, ed. Karen Schaffner (Fukuoka: Kyushu University Press, 2014), 38.

[113] Satō, "Eizō bunka to wa nani ka?"

[114] Ōkubo, "Henshin ningen," 110.

[115] Audeguy, *Monstaa no rekishi*, 18, 84, 90, 92.

means to separate men from their past deeds and to reestablish Japanese men as integral parts of society. As a beacon of pacifism it was used to oppose destructive outer forces, promoting "good" Japanese science as an answer. If the depictions in the previous chapter revolved around wartime science, human experimentation and weapon development, this time the discourse is tied around the idea of democratic science and scientists who act as mediators of knowledge.

In the narratives discussed in this chapter, scientific masculinity is tested as a new model of masculinity in the postwar times, a sort of hybrid that is not easily located along oppositional, problematic or conservative axes. Rationality is promoted as an important postwar ideal, specifically when connected with the notion of pacifism. Historically, even the ideals of universal rationality and progress did not stop fascism from spreading, which in turn called for a stronger system of ethics to prevent its rise in the future.[116] In this case, rationality is correlated with pacifism in order to introduce an antidote to succumbing to destructive ideologies. This "pacifist turn" is achieved by contrasting the "bad" American science, which in the films is represented in references to the Bikini H-bomb testing and the subsequent nuclear threat, and "good" Japanese science that works to restore world peace and do away with the threat. Scientific masculinity is used to convey this peaceful message.

Some films project a twofold approach, dealing with both the wartime past and the peaceful present. One such film is *Gojira*, where Dr. Yamane is a counter to the threat posed by Dr. Serizawa. He is never connected with war and, placed truly above any underlying political agenda, he is the embodiment of pure science in contrast to Serizawa's dangerous applicable experimentations. A similar narrative thread pertains in other films, too. Both *Bijo to ekitainingen* and *Densō ningen* not only introduce dubious scientific developments but also characters that nullify this threat. In *Bijo*, this role is allotted to Dr. Masada, whose rationality is presented as an overall favorable feature. In *Densō ningen*, it is the reporter Kirioka who works as the intermediator between science and the public. It is noteworthy, however, that *Gasu ningen daiichi-gō* lacks characters whose role is to emphasize the positive side of science, instead only presenting science in a very destructive sense.

A vast array of strategies is utilized to promote an image of Japan as a peace-loving nation. Narratives that deal with the nuclear threat emphasize Japan's status as a victim, simultaneously also enabling the recreation of the nation as an important worldwide provider of knowledge. Individual scientists are presented as team members in order to avoid the threat of the renegade mad scientist and to promote a sense of fighting together with rationality for a better future. Japan is often placed on the center stage in world affairs, being present in the omnipotent scenes of international negotiations. In these

[116] Kawana, *Murder Most Modern*, 217.

narratives, Japanese scientists warn other nations of the emerging danger, glossing the international image of Japan.

On the other hand, scientists such as Serizawa are most explicitly subordinated and marginalized because of their connection with the past. Scientific masculinity in this case represents a national identity better left forgotten. This negation is manifested also on the level of personal relationships. Characters with a connection to destructive science are not allowed to reap the benefits of hegemonic masculinity. Instead, they are doubly oppressed, not only by other men but also by the women around them. They are also betrayed. The savior-scientist, a hybrid model that promotes a rational model of masculinity, in turn is shown as a new type of ideal man. Dr. Masada, for example, symbolically integrates emasculated Japanese men into the society. His possession of Chikako is soft, and the national identity in question is not only that of a pacifist nation but also a new type of hybrid, soft, democratic patriarchy. The emphasis placed on his *ability to work* promotes the future model of a salaryman as hegemonic and preferable. But why make him a scientist? It can be argued that at the time of the release of the film, there was still an underlying *scientific* threat that needed to be solved in a rational manner. Hence, in the films of the postwar era one finds an extremely polarized outlook on scientific masculinity.

6 DAIKOKUBASHIRA AND JAPAN

If the scope of the previous chapter was international, in this part it is interpersonal. Scientists in the international field were portrayed as public figures, being prominent representations of Japan's new role in the world. This chapter, however, illuminates their personal and private relationships, already touched upon briefly in the previous chapter. Scientific masculinity is used to both promote and subvert the idea of Japan as a patriarchal nation, on the one hand, and Japan as economically No. 1, on the other. Both discussions take place within the larger framework of gender relations, where "masculinity" only exists in relation to "femininity" and both concepts only make sense if women and men are treated as bearers of polarized social roles.[1] In Japan, according to the gender-based division of labor, men contribute to the economic and political spheres, subsequently wielding both economic and political power. In contrast, women have been seen as mothers who have the power at home.

There are two main trajectories along which my discussion will take place. The first part of this chapter deals with Japan's economic nationalism and the role that scientific masculinity had in it. The films question how the salaryman ideal is challenged by using alternative, technology-mediated masculinities. This questioning takes place in gender and family relations, in regard to the individual body as well as public space. This is manifested in Tsukamoto Shinya's *Tetsuo* series, where the process of "suiting-up the salaryman" highlights the subversive inner feelings of the everyman, as well as Kurosawa Kiyoshi's *Doppelgänger*, where the scientist-salaryman finds a new sort of freedom by violently tearing himself away from his former life. The second part of this chapter will focus on the way scientists are portrayed as members of the family. This highlights the role of the Japanese male as *daikokubashira*, "the great pillar that supports the house,"[2] referring to the role of the men as the main breadwinners supporting the family. As a concept, *daikokubashira* became a powerful cultural and social ideology when Japan embarked on its period of high economic growth, underpinning the privilege of postwar generations who entered the workforce. According to this ideal, the male

[1] Connell, *Masculinities*, 68.

[2] Tom Gill, "When Pillars Evaporate: Structuring Masculinity on the Japanese Margins," in *Men and Masculinities in Contemporary Japan: Dislocating the Salaryman Doxa*, ed. James Roberson and Nobue Suzuki (London: Routledge, 2003), 144; Hirai Shōko 平井晶子, *Nihon no kazoku to raifukoosu: "Ie" seisei no rekishi shakaigaku* 日本の家族とライフコース―「家」生成の歴史と社会学 [Japanese Family and life course: The history and sociology of the formation of "ie"] (Kyoto: Minerva shobō, 2008), 126.

should be a father and husband, as well as a salaryman.[3] The *Tetsuo* films continue explorations of this particular theme as well, as does Kurosawa Kiyoshi's *Sakebi*.

6.1 SUITING-UP THE SALARYMAN

In the late 1960s, the future was bright for those who swore loyalty to their companies.[4] According to Morris Low, the emasculated Japanese man was provided an escape from his weakened state and a chance to rebuild his dignity and confidence "through the activity as 'salarymen,'" who drew their force and power from the contemporary Japanese urban environment.[5] For many, the salaryman represented "a secure path to moderate success," [6] and the emerging salarymen of the late 1950s and early 1960s generally had very positive sentiments about Japan.[7] The salaryman represents "a product of the very platform of national reconstruction established to remake the country after the war through economic prosperity."[8] Furthermore, being a salaryman came to be correlated with "some kind of inherent characteristic of Japanese 'national culture', especially in the official discourses of the 1960s and 1970s."[9] The times offered a model of "bright and light" masculinity connected with leisure, recreation and few obligations, a side product of Japan's miraculous economic growth.[10]

However, the situation started to change. The country's economic success came to a halt with the burst of the economic bubble and the subsequent recession, which also brought an end to Japan's postwar social structure. Previous to that, *datsu-sara*, or "the escaping of the salaryman," had its roots in the early 1970s when, despite its overall positive image, the role of a simple salaryman was first questioned. [11] Connell and Messerschmidt refer to "a

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[3] Hidaka Tomoko, "Masculinity and the Family System: The ideology of the 'Salaryman' across three generations," in *Home and Family in Japan: Continuity and Transformation*, ed. Richard Ronald and Allison Alexy (London and New York: Routledge, 2011), 112–130.

[4] Ann Waswo, *Housing in Postwar Japan: A Social History* (Oxon and New York: Routledge, 2013 [2001]), 58–59; Shinjitsu, *Sarariiman manga*, 37.

[5] Low, "Emperor's Sons," 95.

[6] Ezra F. Vogel, *Japan's New Middle Class: The Salary Man and His Family in a Tokyo Suburb* (Berkeley, Los Angeles and Oxford: University of California Press, 1963), 9.

[7] See Vogel, *The Salary Man*.

[8] Anne Allison, *Millennial Monsters: Japanese Toys and the Global Imagination* (London, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2006), 76.

[9] Dasgupta, "Creating Corporate Warriors," 118.

[10] Vogel, *The Salary Man*, 71; Itō, *Otokorashisa*, 26; Yoshikawa, *Lost Decade*, 5.

[11] Kobayashi, Masao 小林昌夫, "Henshin (ron) to aidentitii (1) – henshin-kō" 変身(論)とアイデンティティー--変身考(1)[Identity and (theory) of henshin – concerning henshin], *OTSUMA REVIEW* 39 (2006): 31; Shinjitsu, *Sarariiman manga*, 38.

cultural figure of the 'salaryman escaping.'" [12] The so-called "crisis of masculinity" really began in the 1990s when the old ideology of *otokorashisa* (manliness) started to wane and "the contradictions centering on salaryman masculinity began to become pronounced" because "[v]arious social, economic, and cultural factors that accompanied Japan's transition to a late-capitalist society worked in combination to highlight the inherently unstable nature of this culturally privileged, apparently immutable discourse."[13] Rapid growth had already started to wane earlier, but it was now that postwar Japan's social problems really became apparent.[14]

With the bursting of the asset bubble, Japan entered what is commonly known as the "Lost Decade(s)," the longest and most severe recession in the postwar era.[15] The writings of Jeff Kingston provide an entry point to the turmoil that Japan encountered. He describes this as a period when "the economy imploded, the asset bubble collapsed, banks teetered on the edge of insolvency, unemployment skyrocketed, suicides increased and the leaders of Japan, Inc. were tarnished by exposés of pervasive corruption. The nation of the 'economic miracle' found itself looking into the abyss."[16] And what was lost? Again, to cite Kingston, simply "everything the Japanese social structure was based on: mountains of money, a sense of security, stable families, the credibility of the nation's leadership, hubris and confidence about the future. The traditional face of Japan is fast becoming unrecognizable and the social relationships, assumptions, and norms characteristic of postwar Japan began to unravel with stunning speed."[17] Yoshikawa calls this nothing less than "a human disaster."[18]

Nowadays, in a transforming national and international landscape informed by increasingly reimagined gender roles, Japanese men are faced with many challenges. Hidaka summarizes that these include economic changes related to the bursting of the Japanese bubble economy, social changes with an increasing emphasis on individuality, and changes in gender relations with the introduction of legislation and policies that promote gender equality. In addition, irregular workers nowadays provide another type of masculine working model, which points toward "the potential for changes in

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[12] Connell and Messerschmidt, "Rethinking the Concept," 835.

[13] Dasgupta, "Creating Corporate Warriors," 130; Watanabe, *Danseigaku no chōsen*, 84–86.

[14] Itō, *Otokorashisa*, 26; Yoshikawa, *Lost Decade*, 5.

[15] Yoshikawa, *Lost Decade,* 1. For studies that deal with the effects of the Lost Decade, see, for example, Jeff Kingston, *Japan's Quiet Transformation: Social Change and Civil Society in the Twenty-First Century* (Oxon: Routledge, 2004); Jeff Kingston, *Contemporary Japan: History, Politics and Social Change since the 1980s* (West Sussex: John Wiley & Sons Ltd., 2013); Yoda Tomiko and Harry Harootunian, eds., *Japan after Japan: Social and Cultural Life from the Recessionary 1990s to the Present* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2006).

[16] Kingston, *Quiet Transformation*, 1.

[17] Kingston, ibid., 1, 29.

[18] Yoshikawa, ibid., 148.

hegemonic masculinity in association with socio-economic circumstance as well as reflecting an individual pursuit of happiness or *ikigai.*"[19] But, as the relentlessly working male—the salaryman—can be seen as a symbol of Japan itself,[20] the crisis of this masculinity is first and foremost a crisis of Japan's national identity.

6.1.1 "SUITING-UP"

During the war, soldiers were constructed and promoted as the defenders of their country who fought off the hated enemy.[21] With the end of the war this ideal vanished and the general anxiety around demobilized soldiers increased. The growing economy metamorphosized Japan and the prevailing ontological darkness dissipated.[22] In the bright and positive atmosphere, stories of *fukuinhei* slowly disappeared from the media, and the salaryman replaced other models as the new masculine ideal.[23] The emphasis on "fighting" nonetheless prevailed. Salarymen came to be called *kigyō senshi* (corporate warriors), and this comprised a vital part of their identity. Itō suggests that men did not have to admit the need for re-evaluation of their identity as long as they kept figuratively fighting.[24]

This notion of *kigyō senshi* gains a whole other meaning in Tsukamoto Shinya's *Tetsuo* films. Tsukamoto, born in 1960, has suggested that the liberation of the salaryman in the film is a parallel to his own *datsu-sara*: 18 months of leading a salaryman life taught him about the hardships and costs of this hegemonic ideal.[25] Tsukamoto made his escape in 1986 when he decided to concentrate fully on independent filmmaking. In *Tetsuo*, Tsukamoto himself plays the agitator who causes the metamorphosis of the salaryman, acting like a twisted mirror for the protagonist through his own real-life experience. Fictional discourses of masculinity are thus given an extra-diegetic layer that explicitly refers to the process of *datsu-sara*, the escaping of the salaryman.

Because of the connection between the salaryman and machines, I have included the *Tetsuo* films in the group of films that explores scientific masculinity. The salaryman in the films becomes pure technology through his metalmorphosis,[26] offering an absurd picture of a country that has called for the need to create "A Science-Technological Nation" to regain economic

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[19] Hidaka, *Salaryman Masculinity*, 178–179.

[20] Roberson and Suzuki, "Introduction," 1.

[21] Katō, "Goodbye Godzilla."

[22] Igarashi *Bodies of Memory*, 130–131.

[23] Kanō, "Fukuinhei," 95; Dasgupta, "Creating Corporate Warriors," 122.

[24] Itō, *Otokorashisa*, 20.

[25] Mes, *Iron Man*, 19.

[26] Ian Conrich uses the term "metal-morphosis" in his discussion about *Tetsuo*.

power.[27] In addition, the transformation of the salaryman takes place in relation to the telepathic will of the Metal Fetishist, Yatsu. In the second and third installations, Taniguchi and Anthony are also comparable to the victims of mad scientists, with the narrative replaying that of Frankenstein and his monster.

All of the films incorporate a few basic motifs to a varying degree: the presence of the salaryman, transformation, mechanical imagery, oppressive cityscape and sexuality. The basic plot structure of each of the films is that in the beginning a salaryman is living his normal, everyday life. Through events that differ from film to film, he undergoes a transformation into a giant man-machine. In the process a loved one is killed. At the beginning the salaryman feels scared and fights his metamorphosis, but ultimately he embraces his monstrous form. These seemingly simple narratives are visualized in Tsukamoto's exhilarating style with the use of a hand-held camera, quick editing, distinctive use of color and extreme close-ups. However, whereas the first *Tetsuo* film makes use of the theme of vengeance as a sort of curse that spreads through the salaryman's body, metamorphosis in the second and the third films occurs because of the actions of a mad scientist. As Brown (2010) points out, the *Tetsuo* films are direct descendants of the *Henshin ningen* films.[28]

Tetsuo paints a grotesque but pleasurable image of a man-machine interface.[29] It is a revitalization—or reincorporation—of the theme of representing the monstrous effects that scientific discourse has on the body, which, according to Nakamura, is the true essence of the uncanny.[30] The *Tetsuo* films present "a frenzy of metamorphosis" that is ultimately empowering.[31] They can be analyzed within the framework of body horror, defined by Kelly Hurley as a hybrid genre that recombines the narrative and cinematic conventions of the science fiction, horror, and suspense film in order to stage a spectacle of the human body defamiliarized, rendered other.[32] Body horror texts tend to offer "gruesome yet crucial insights into shifting concepts of corporeal, social and national cohesion, exposing a larger socio-political

[27] This will be discussed further in the next chapter.

[28] See Brown, *Tokyo Cyberpunk*, 2010.

[29] Posthumanity is an important theme that should be analyzed in later research.

[30] Nakamura, *Monstrous Bodies*, 11.

[31] See Napier, "The Frenzy of Metamorphosis."

[32] Kelly Hurley, "Reading Like an Alien: Posthuman Identity in Ridley Scott's Aliens and David Cronenberg's Rabid," in *Posthuman Bodies*, ed. Judith M. Halberstam and Ira Livingston (Bloomington, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1995), 203. For discussions about the body in Japanese cultural products, see Michelle Osterfeld Li, *Ambiguous Bodies: Reading the Grotesque in Japanese Setsuwa Tales* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009) for Buddhist setsuwa tales and Douglas Slaymaker, *The Body is Postwar Fiction* (Oxon and New York: Routledge, 2004) for postwar literature.

body in a state of cultural crisis."[33] In this case, the cultural crisis is the dissolution of the postwar system, emblemized by the salaryman himself.

Connell suggests that true masculinity is often thought to proceed from the male body.[34] The fictional male body thus becomes not only a representation in the long line of cultural products regarding transformation but also a site where gender politics and, subsequently, national politics, too, are played out. Saitō and Kume discuss the process of *busō*, or suiting-up, a type of metamorphosis reserved for boys to make them warriors. Suiting-up is also the process of becoming a salaryman; the suit is his most important symbol. As a hegemonized form of masculinity, the salaryman must look and act like one in a highly prescribed manner.[35]

The salaryman's suit is representative of the embodied process of socialization.[36] Brian McVeigh argues that socialization into Japanese society takes place on three levels: uniformization, de-uniformization and re-uniformization. By this he refers to the way children start wearing uniforms once they enter school life and abandon them during their university years, only to re-emerge as model citizens in suits. Uniforms are used to link an individual to existing political structures. To wear the same standardized set of clothing every day is to reinforce values that "maintain the rationalizing projects of the state and economic interests," although an individual might not in fact agree with these projects.[37] The salaryman's "suiting-up"—wearing the symbols of a suit, a tie and a briefcase—conforms to the process of re-uniformization, where the self is crafted through bodily practices.

In all of the *Tetsuo* films, the salaryman's suit is replaced by the process of suiting-up for battle. This mechanization is a tangible creation of *shinjinrui*, a past buzzword referring to young people who differed from "their conservative, corporate-culture parents" in combining "[n]ihilistic attitude … with aggressive materialism."[38] The concept of "aggressive materialism" is taken to a whole another level in *Tetsuo*. The films are stories about an emerging human-machine system, where technology is integrated as a part of being a "new man" in Japan. This is done in an ironic manner, however. Watanabe and Hemmert point out that the machinery industry was one of the main sectors contributing to Japan's high economic growth rates.[39] As the man

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[33] McRoy, *Nightmare Japan*, 10. This might be true, but as stated previously, McRoy's use of source material vitiates many of his arguments, even though his readings of the texts alone might be valid.

[34] Connell, *Masculinities*, 45.

[35] Deacon, "Herbivore Boys," 145.

[36] Brian J. McVeigh, *Wearing Ideology: State, Schooling and Self-Presentation in Japan* (Oxford: Berg, 2000), 13, 109; see also Dasgupta, *Re-reading the Salaryman*.

[37] McVeigh, ibid., 40. See also Dasgupta, ibid.,

[38] Napier, "Panic Sites," 341–342.

[39] Watanabe Chihiro and Martin Hemmert, "The Interaction between Technology and Economy: Has the 'virtuous cycle' of Japan's technological innovation system collapsed," in *Technology and*

becomes machine, the two are no longer distinguishable. If "technology consistently substitutes for labor,"[40] the transformation in *Tetsuo* visualizes the ultimate extreme. A man does not create machines—a man becomes one. The salaryman's changed form is pure technology that has "maximized its potential performance … in a socio-economic system that fundamentally supports its development."[41]

Examples of scientific masculinity are said to have been adamant about categorizing female bodies, overlooking the borders and understanding of the male one.[42] *Tetsuo* remedies this situation. The body is often promoted as a "fundamental feature in forming male identities";[43] "salarymanization," too, is a process embedded in bodily practices.[44] *Tetsuo* inscribes the rebellion of a salaryman onto the body. Nakamura Miri points out that "mechanical bodies have always held a special place in the discourse of the uncanny," where "the fear of automata and robots arises from the blurring of the natural body and the artificial body, the mistaking of the machine for an actual human."[45] She calls this "the mechanical uncanny," a mode of fear that captures the incursion of the mechanical into the biological.[46] With robotics and information technology having become key growth strategies for the nation and the contemporary emergence of new digital technologies and new digital media, the contrasting emergence of Tetsuo, the *modern* mechanical uncanny, is surprising but not totally unheard of. It is, after all, "a critique of rampant economic modernization."[47] In *Tetsuo*, this is achieved by the process of re-uniformizing, which takes place as the cyborgization of an individual.

In *Tetsuo II*, the protagonist Taniguchi's original salaryman body is weak. He goes to the gym and, cheered on by his family, does his best at weightlifting. Although not directly addressed, it is implicit in the narrative that his weak body is a manifestation of his weak mind, a fine example of salarymen as "spineless slaves of the system."[48] Through the mechanization of the body the mind, too, becomes stronger. Mellström points out that especially the

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Innovation in Japan: Policy and Management for the Twenty-first Century, eds. Martin Hemmert and Christian Oberländer (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), 39.

[40] Watanabe and Hemmert, "Virtuous cycle," 41.

[41] Ibid., 42–43.

[42] Milam and Nye, "Introduction," 7.

[43] Mellström, "Patriarchal Machines," 469.

[44] See Chapter 3 in *Re-reading the Salaryman*.

[45] Nakamura, *Monstrous Bodies*, 103.

[46] See Nakamura, "Horror and Machines." This was especially true in the Taishō and early Shōwa periods, often referred to as Japan's "Age of Machines." This era saw a rapid development in the fields of technology and media and witnessed the birth of consumerism and mass production, as well as the introduction and popularization of new media (ibid., 9).

[47] Andrew Grossman, "Tetsuo: the Iron Man/Tetsuo 2: Body Hammer," in *The Cinema of Japan and Korea*, ed. Justin Bowyer (London: Wallflower Press, 2004), 145.

[48] Gaens, "(R)emasculation," 223.

professions of mechanics and engineers require bodily learning, because it is the body that creates and changes artifacts. The cultivation of the body is seen as a process of "continuous incorporation of bodily and cognitive knowledge."[49] In *Tetsuo II*, processes of bodily cultivation are supported by processes of mechanization in order to create a superior form of technologized masculinity. Robertson states that humanoid robots are used as "a rhetorical foil for highlighting social problems."[50] Nowhere is this more clearly visible than in the form of the salaryman-cyborg in *Tetsuo*. Itō points out that initially robotization had diminished the meaning that men could take in their physicality.[51] Robots replaced them and physical activities that had been connected with labor had to be found elsewhere. *Tetsuo II* presents a quest for the lost feeling of physicality, only this time through robotization.

According to Mellström, "the symbolic relationship between technology and masculinity is … a relationship filled with a number of connotations and varying forms for gendering in and gendering of technology as masculine."[52] In *Tetsuo II*, technology becomes gendered in the salaryman model, being literally injected in order to form a tangible representation of masculine technology. This is a way of reaffirming and regaining patriarchal power because, as Mellström further suggests, machines and technology are metonymical for patriarchal responsibility.[53] As a weak salaryman unconnected to technology, Taniguchi was unable to save his son from death. In fact, he killed him. Through the injection of pure machinery, however, he reestablishes his authority, symbolized by his wife who quite adoringly decides to follow him. His patriarchal power is also manifested in the way he becomes the leader of an underground bodybuilder horde. In the beginning he is psychically weak, but his transformation allows him to gain bodily power, ultimately conquering the "fascist thugs."[54] This physicality is "a primary resource for masculine power and esteem."[55] The immersion of Taniguchi into the realm of the flesh and raw emotions is what causes him to metalmorphosize. Consumed by violent emotions, Taniguchi becomes unwilling to revert back to his previous human shape. Yet, his newly found physicality is a far stretch from the idealized clean and hygiene physicality of the salaryman suit. It is cold, hard and destructive.

If the image of the salaryman paralleled Japan's national image, its metamorphosis contributed to a distorted national image. As Napier suggests,

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[49] Mellström, "Patriarchal Machines," 464.

[50] Robertson, *Robo Sapiens*, 18.

[51] Itō, *Otokorashisa*, 95.

[52] Mellström, ibid., 462.

[53] Ibid., 470.

[54] Grossman, "Tetsuo," 146.

[55] James Messerschimdt, "Men, Masculinities and Crime," in *Handbook on Studies of Men and Masculinities*, ed. Michael S. Kimmel, Jeff Hearn and R.W. Connel (Thousand Oaks and London: SAGE Publishing, 2005), 205.

portrayals of disaster have changed from negative outlooks to celebrations of it.[56] This is a celebration of alternative identities. The machine men in *Tetsuo* are ultimately symbols of solidified emotions,[57] which in this case include frustration, anger, and, ultimately, the sense of freedom that the film suggests an individual in contemporary society yearns for. These are not pacifist scenarios, where Japan is constructed as a peace-loving nation in the world. Rather, Japanese nationhood is portrayed as oppressive and exploitative. The films are a call for aggression in order to create a new—and better—world, making a new beginning through a symbolic apocalypse. However, like with all the other *Tetsuo* films, this empowerment is highly problematic. The basic condition of superhumans is that they are antithetical to the Utopia ideology, where the entire society evolves together. In the superhuman stories, an individual "evolves apart from, or even in opposition to, his society."[58] In this case, the true threat is the evolution of the salaryman—namely, the face of Japan and an important part of its national identity—into something Other. Consequently, this is bound to transform the face of Japan itself. This is, after all, all about "the externalization of personal or social identity."[59]

Tetsuo provides an entry point into a new world that is chaotic, destructive and utterly, exhilaratingly liberating. The stance toward scientific masculinity is twofold. The salaryman-cum-man-machine demonstrates not only the machine-like nature of Japan's "working bees," but because of the monstrous nature of the metamorphosis it also provides an ironic expression of liberation from state policies and the ideology of hegemonic salaryman masculinity. This is an ultimate expression of technology as an end product, only in this case the product will destroy its creators. Morris Low proposes that male dominance is encoded in the machines themselves.[60] By morphing into a machine, the salaryman in *Tetsuo* overcomes the very system that has created him. He is not a representation of scientific masculinity—he is masculine science itself.

In *Tetsuo*, scientific masculinity is something irrational and negative. Although vital for Japan's economic growth, in the post-bubble era this connection is severed in these narratives of crazy scientific masculinity that seem to destroy the salaryman. However, in Tsukamoto's opinion this destruction is not a bad thing. The function of the transformed salaryman's scientific masculinity is to offer liberation fantasies for the ones being constrained by their suits. Liberated salarymen-as-machines are destructive change agents, and this is how the fusion of man with a machine, the paramount representation of scientific masculinity, is portrayed as an oppositional alternative to the salaryman lifestyle, a crazy and freakish escape

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[56] Napier, "Panic Sites," 330.

[57] Ōkubo, "Henshin ningen," 119.

[58] Attebery, *Decoding Gender*, 51.

[59] Laura Miller, *Beauty Up: Exploring Contemporary Japanese Body Aesthetics* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2006), 126.

[60] Low, "Technological culture," 140.

from the full life of the everyday, where the true needs of an individual must be repressed. This freedom is cast in spatial terms, too, as a symbolic escape from the technologized city. *Tetsuo* allows its protagonists to become masters of the streets, but *Doppelgänger* allows its protagonist to flee, as discussed further in Chapter 6.3.

6.1.2 MENTALMORPHOSIZING HATARAKIBACHI

The mechanization of the human body in the films analyzed in this thesis takes place both psychologically and corporeally. *Tetsuo* presents scenes of the latter while Kurosawa Kiyoshi's *Doppelgänger*, a film about the bright but overworked research scientist Hayasaki who works to build a mechanized chair for the disabled, is an example of the former. Both films use the salaryman suit as an imaginary basis to convey a feeling of obedience and dedication. In *Tetsuo*, the business suit is replaced by a battle suit—an ironic expression of becoming a corporate warrior. In *Doppelgänger*, the protagonist Hayasaki, in turn, is the antithesis of the orderly salaryman in his disheveled lab coat and clothes. Constantly working under the threat of his research funding being cut, he works to the brink of madness in order to deliver an exosuit chair for people suffering from a spinal cord injury. The chair, although not really working yet, is already being promoted as the latest super-innovation from the company, to which Hayasaki has figuratively sold his soul in order to get funded. Everything changes when he meets his doppelgänger, who wrecks havoc on his life but ultimately ends up freeing him from all constraints.

One main factor behind the stagnation of the salaryman image was the effect that the recession had on Japan's labor market: the number of regular employees declined while unemployment rates rose. The young became restless and dissatisfied, faced with difficulties in finding meaningful jobs.[61] In 1993, Anne Allison proposed that the meaning of being a man in Japan is situated within the realm of work.[62] However, Slater and Galbraith call contemporary Japan "a world where work is no longer constitutive of social identity or personal fulfillment, where work no longer provides intimacy with coworkers or the social respectability that once allowed one to find a mate."[63] The idea of the white-collar lifestyle as an expression of mature manhood has ceased to be of interest for the younger generations.[64] This shift to irregular

[61] Yoshikawa, *Lost Decade*, 135–137. It should be noted that the statistical and actual unemployment rates were, in fact, worlds apart, as those "out of the labor force" (not actively looking) were not included as unemployed in the statistics (ibid., 140, 142).

[62] Allison, *Nightwork*, 91.

[63] Slater and Galbraith, "Re-narrating Social Class."

[64] Ibid.

work has brought on a wide array of anxieties, because regular work has been a mainstay of middle class identity, sociality and masculinity.[65]

This sense of crisis and turmoil has had an enormous effect on long-standing beliefs, relationships, attitudes and patterns of behavior. [66] Nakayama describes this as a situation where the Japanese people have long "sacrificed their own interests for the benefit of the state and corporations," hoping that at some point "such benefits will … be shared by the people."[67] This was not, however, the case. As Yoshikawa explains, "people were shocked and confused as a wave of anxiety and pessimism rapidly pervaded Japanese society," something which he also describes as a "feeling of being locked inside a box with no exit in sight."[68] The economic empire created by the salarymen was revealed to be a phantom.[69] While the hegemonic salaryman masculinity is still the ideal, fewer and fewer are able to reach it. Kurihara notes that the prolonged recession has led to the structural breakdown of one of Japan's fundamental institutions, the enterprise society.[70]

Doppelgänger presents Japan's structural failings as Hayasaki's personal failings. It toys with the idea of a scientifically minded salaryman. Hayasaki's position at a private research company represents the way many contemporary masculinities have absorbed aspects of the salaryman masculinity into their lifestyle. [71] Thus, scientific masculinity can also be analyzed within this framework. In fact, as Vogel points out, it is not such a far-fetched assertion to draw a parallel between scientific masculinity and the salaryman, because having gone to universities, the salarymen were, in the broad sense of the word, "scientifically trained."[72] Penney explicates that GDP growth and visions of Japan as a technological superpower were closely linked before the 1990s, and it would have indeed been difficult to draw clear distinctions between economic and technological nationalism. However, during the Lost Decade the assumption of Japan's superior technology and technological superiority became important. But, as Penney concludes, assumptions of this technological superiority only masked poor planning and structural failings.[73] In addition, the initial "strong positive interaction between capital investment

[65] Slater and Galbraith, "Re-narrating Social Class."

[66] Kingston, *Quiet Transformation*, 2.

[67] Nakayama, *Science, Technology and Society*, 239.

[68] Yoshikawa, *Lost Decade*, 1, 2.

[69] Funabiki, *Nihonjinron saikō*, 238.

[70] Kurihara, *Japanese Corporate Transition*, 5.

[71] Suzanne Vogel Hall, "Chapter XV: Beyond Success – Mamachi Thirty Years Later," in *Japan's New Middle Class: The Salary Man and His Family in a Tokyo Suburb*, by Ezra F. Vogel (Berkeley, Los Angeles and Oxford: University of California Press, 1991 [1963]), 286.

[72] Vogel, *The Salary Man*, 86.

[73] Penney, "Nuclear Nationalism," 8.

and technological advance" diminished in importance as funds for research and development were cut.[74] This is the starting scenario of *Doppelgänger*.

Whereas in *Tetsuo* liberation takes form in the mechanization of the salaryman's body, in *Doppelgänger* it is a process of breaking free from a mentally oppressive situation. Hayasaki as a figurative salaryman, who has dedicated his life to the company, creates a parallel with a man-machine of sorts, "a prototype of new robots."[75] Hayasaki can be seen as a flesh-and-blood version of a *karakuri*, or automaton. Despite being inherently different, *karakuri* are often tied together with Japan's robot discourse.[76] They were "part of the world of the strange," "denuded of function and working away in emptiness," as well as "mechanical devices that perform a single set of operations."[77] These descriptions all apply to Hayasaki. As a *karakuri* he works to the brink of collapse. He is not too different from a type that Victor Frankenstein represented, "the narrowly focused workaholic"; like Frankenstein, he is "too preoccupied with his experiment's goal to pay attention to his health," projecting "a disastrous case of tunnel vision."[78] In a way, Hayasaki can be seen as an ironic emblem of reversed techno-orientalism, which, according to Morley and Robbins (1995), originally meant that whereas Japan has become controlled by robots, the "West" maintains its humanism and cultural integrity.[79] In the world of *Doppelgänger*, people are valuable only if they work relentlessly to create surplus. There is no space for human feelings, as cultural integrity, too, is merely a technological matter.

Karakuri stands for the importance of the hidden and complex interior behind an outside form.[80] Working alone in emptiness and upon failure denuded of function, Hayasaki's existence takes on a metaphorical meaning. After meeting with his doppelgänger, Hayasaki starts to change, his insides symbolically twisting. He starts acting on his emotions, wants and needs in order to reach personal goals, to liberate himself from the restraints of contemporary society. Out of this newly found freedom, monstrosity emerges also. This challenges the popular idea and nationwide political rhetoric that science is a positive force and the agents of science are intellectually and even morally superior people to whom ordinary standards of judgment do not apply.[81] Scientific masculinity in the case of Hayasaki is a break from both Japan's technonationalist agenda and the salaryman ideal.

The dissolution of Hayasaki's mental mechanization is represented against the robot body that he works to create. Whereas in *Tetsuo* the man becomes a

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[74] Watanabe and Hemmert, "Technology and Economy," 38.

[75] Ibid.

[76] Sone, *Robot Culture*, 7; Robertson, *Robo Sapiens*, 12–13; Screech, *The Lens Within*, 65.

[77] Screech, ibid., 65–66; Robertson, ibid.

[78] Rieder, "The Mad Scientist," 94–95.

[79] See Fujimura, "Transnational Genomics," 79.

[80] Screech, ibid., 65–66, 133.

[81] Kawana, "Mad Scientists," 96–98.

machine, in *Doppelgänger* the man tries to create a machine that can merge with people. The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) report of 2015 suggests that robots should not be regarded as simple human replacements, but rather as tools that supplement humans and partner with them to help them move into a more value-added phase.[82] In a way, Hayasaki's robot chair does exactly this: it helps Hayasaki to achieve a more value-added phase in his life. Yet, there is something uncanny about it. According to the biocultural reading, robots are scary only if they demonstrate some kind of intentionality.[83] Sontag points out that it is not the result that is suspicious, but the creator, the scientist. This, as Sontag concludes, tells about how the "most ingrained contemporary mistrust of the intellect is visited, in these movies, upon the scientist-as-intellectual."[84] The intentions of Hayasaki are problematic, with the character acting as an unwanted mirror for Japanese society. In the final scene of the film, the robot chair self-destructs, demonstrating intentionality for the first time. This is the final release of Hayasaki from the constraining salaryman-like scientific masculinity used for national purposes.

6.2 FAMILY TROUBLE

Family is one of the key concepts in the understanding of contemporary Japan. This subchapter looks at the way scientific masculinity is used to discuss masculinity within the real or imaginary family, and how these images correlate with national ones. It is important to not only analyze the way characters are represented as scientists but also the way they are depicted against the dedicated others within the family: women and children. This paints a picture of the perceived state of patriarchy in a country that R.W. Connell describes as "the most impenetrable patriarchy among the major powers."[85]

The structuration of the family unit officially started with the Meiji Restoration as part and parcel of the modernization of Japan. Central to the

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[82] METI, "New Robot Strategy," 10, accessed August 8, 2018, http://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/2015/pdf/0123_01b.pdf.

[83] Grodal, Embodied Visions, 108.

[84] Sontag, "Imagination of Disaster," 45.

[85] Connell, *Masculinities*, 204. The discussion around the succession to the Imperial Throne highlights this. Despite Japan having had numerous empresses in its premodern history, the Imperial Household Law of 1947 forbids this. See "The Imperial House Law," The Imperial Household Agency, accessed April 1, 2019, http://www.kunaicho.go.jp/e-kunaicho/hourei-01.html; "Japan to begin discussions on Imperial succession system, including creation of female branches of royal family," *The Japan Times*, last modified March 18, 2019, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/03/18/national/japan-start-discussions-soon-imperial-succession-system/.

conceptualization of the Japanese family structure and Japanese masculinity was, and still is, the notion of *ie*. Hirai Shōko refers to *ie* as a psychological unit that is meant to last for eternity.[86] Although often referred to as a traditional Japanese family model, it was constructed and promoted after the Meiji Restoration as a means of institutionalizing the family and creating roles for all individuals in Japan's nation-building project.[87] Before that, as pointed out by Yuzawa (2005) and Hirai (2008), Japanese marriage traditions were varied and divorce was common. In his detailed study on the creation of the modern household in Japan, Jordan Sand points out that the form "a family" had taken in premodern Japan had been fluid because of "a network of intersecting relations of obligations" that were not connected with the family.[88] According to the new Meiji Civil Code of 1896, effective in 1899, marriage, divorce and inheritance were promoted as important parts of the law; through these reforms, the *ie* ideology started to apply to everyone in Japan.[89] In addition, Ochiai emphasizes that *ie* is first and foremost a stem family system, which can be found in other countries, too. Despite this, many Japanese scholars have promoted *ie* as the model form of a stem family, not seeing it in a global perspective. In addition, even within Japan regional diversity pertains.[90]

According to *ie* ideology, home was defined as the "microcosm of Japanese nationhood"[91] and "omnipresent beyond space and time."[92] All members were to contribute to the creation of the Japanese empire. It was a highly gendered structure with three distinctive objectives: 1) to take care of the family wealth through the occupation held by the *ie* and 2) to make sure the genealogy of the *ie* stayed untainted, which was accomplished through 3) making sure there was a proper person to inherit the *ie*.[93] This was all based on the fact that

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[86] Hirai, *Nihon no kazoku*, 4–6.

[87] Tokuhiro, *Marriage in Contemporary Japan* (Oxon and New York: Routledge, 2010) 17; Ueno, *The Modern Family in Japan: Its Rise and Fall* (Victoria: Trans Pacific Press, 2009 [1994]) 64; Ochiai Emiko, "The *Ie* (Family) in Global Perspective," in *A Companion to the Anthropology of Japan*, ed. Jennifer Robertson (Cornwall: Blackwell Publishing, 2005), 356.

[88] Jordan Sand, *House and Home in Modern Japan: Architecture, Domestic Space and Bourgeois Culture, 1880–1930* (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 2003), 21–22.

[89] Yuzawa Yasuhiko 湯沢雍彦, *Meiji no kekkon, Meiji no rikon: Kazokunai jendaa no shiten* 明治の結婚、明治の離婚 : 家庭内ジェンダーの原点 [Meiji marriages and Meiji divorces: The origins of gender in the family] (Tokyo: Kadokawa gakugei shuppan, 2005), 135–142; Imamura, "Family Culture," 77–78.

[90] Ochiai, ibid., 355–356, 361–362. See also 356–361 for an excellent summary of the studies that have regarded *ie* as a stem family.

[91] Borovoy, *Too-Good Wife*, 15.

[92] Ueno, *The Modern Family*, 69.

[93] Hirai, *Nihon no kazoku*, 4–5. In the Meiji Civil Code, the *ie* system was defined as the following: (1) *koshu* (the head of the household) ruled and supported the members of the *ie*; (2) any property the *ie* owned had to be registered in the name of the *koshu*; (3) the occupation associated with the *ie* was expected to continue and the members were expected to contribute to it; (4) relations between generations were characterized by Confucian principles of loyalty and benevolence, with less love and

household industries were the main contributors to Japan's industrialization process.[94] In addition, *ie* promoted the division of labor between the sexes, where men were expected to work outside for the family and women were supposed to take care of it as *ryōsai kenbo*, good wives and wise mothers. These expectations were quite class-specific until World War I, the subsequent urbanization and the emergence of the new middle-class with husbands that started commuting from the suburbs to the city.[95] This contributed to the nuclearization of the family. As early as the 1920s, already around 55 per cent of families were nuclear families, although *ie* was still regarded as the official structure.[96] Even now, Tomiko Yoda argues, the *ie* structure is a principal form of "tradition" popularized by the *nihonjinron* as an organizing structure of Japanese society.[97]

Whereas *ie* laid emphasis on the temporal aspect of the family and the continuation of the family line, *katei* (household) underlined its spatial dimension. Discussed at length by Sand (2003), *katei* was originally introduced by Protestant missionaries but later shed its Christian connotations. It emphasized the spatial boundary between inside and outside, *uchi* and *soto*, and served to strengthen the emerging middle-class ideal.[98] Eventually, the term *kazoku* was coined to translate the term "family," and the structure of the unit was defined administratively by *koseki*, Japan's family registration system.[99] The *koseki* is one way that the legacy of *ie* persists even

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affection and more duty and filial piety; and (5) the non-inheriting son was to start his own *ie*, which then would become a branch of the main house (Yuzawa, ibid. 155–156).

[94] Ueno, *The Modern Family*, 81.

[95] Borovoy, *Too-Good Wife*, 15, Uno, "Good Wife," 298, Sand, *House and Home*, 12; Ochiai Emiko, *The Japanese family system in transition: A sociological analysis of family change in post-war Japan* (Tokyo: LTCB International Library Foundation, 1997), 31–32; mainstream middle-class women were expected to work for the *ie*, whereas in the upper and elite classes they were able to devote their time to educating their children, the future leaders of the nation (ibid.).

[96] Iwakami Mami 岩上真珠, "Sengo Nihon no kazoku wa dō kawatta ka?" 戦後日本の家族はどう変わったか [How did the postwar family change?], in *Kazoku wa doko e iku?* [家族」はどこへいく [Where is the family going?], ed. Sawayama Mikako 沢山 美果子 et al. (Tokyo: Seikyūsha, 2007), 79.

[97] Yoda Tomiko, "The Rise and Fall of Maternal Society: Gender, Labor and Capital in Contemporary Japan," in *Japan after Japan: Social and Cultural Life from the Recessionary 1990s to the present*, ed. Yoda Tomiko and Harry Harootunian (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2006), 252. She concludes that before the popularity of *nihonjinron*, the concept was typically used in postwar critiques of traditional social organizations that arose in reaction to the wartime slogan of "family-nation" (*kazoku kokka*) and a broad range of types of nationalist propaganda that celebrated the familial unity and integrity of Japanese society, as opposed to the individualistic and egocentric West (Ibid.).

[98] Sand, *House and Home*, 10–12, 22, 53.

[99] The *koseki* has a few central features: (1) it requires all family members, including married couples, to have the same surname; (2) individuals continue to move from their current *koseki* to that of the family they are entering at marriage or adoption; (3) children are listed on the *koseki*, making their birth order and legitimacy apparent; (4) each household must have a head, who tends to be the male

in contemporary society, although it was officially abolished after the Pacific War and a new democratic model of the Japanese family was constructed.

Concepts like the "modern-style family" and "democratic family" embodied the notion of transition from the feudalistic *ie* to the modern-style democratic family envisioned in the 1948 Civil Code. According to Ochiai, the modern family structure consists of the following features: separation of the domestic and public spheres, a strong emotional relationship between family members, the centrality of children, a gender-based division of labor, strengthening of the group solidarity of the family, the establishment of privacy, exclusion of non-relatives and existence as a nuclear family.[100] Ueno, however, calls this logic a trap. *Ie* is constructed as something premodern, although it was, in fact, a modern structure: "a historical, social construct in the formative period of modernity."[101] In addition, the modern family was by no means a neutral creation. As Koikari argues in her "Gender and Power," the way the Japanese family was "democraticized" was modeled on the American family system. In other words, it was an Occupation-era political and ideological tool with which to create a certain type of family structure in Japan.

6.2.1 FATHER FIGURES

Works of the speculative spectrum often connect scientific masculinity, paternity and, to some extent, emotional detachment. In literature, Yumeno Kyūsaku's book *Dogura Magura* (1935) already featured a scientist father who, in the name of science, framed his son for the murder of his wife and the mother of the protagonist.[102] In *Tetsuwan Atomu* (Astro Boy), the seminal manga and anime work by Osamu Tezuka, the robot boy is a creation by an intelligent scientist who lacks emotional intelligence. When his son asks him to build a robot, he immerses himself in the project. With this single-minded approach he fails the most important thing: to provide emotional stability for his son, who runs away and is killed. The unfortunate robot is sold to a traveling circus and later rescued by a kind professor.[103]

Kaiki eiga, too, includes many real or symbolic fathers who embody scientific masculinity. In *Ringu*, Ryūji, the ex-husband of Asakawa Reiko, is a

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breadwinner (Imamura, "Family Culture," 79). For a detailed outline of the *koseki* system and its problems see Sugimoto, *Japanese Society*, 146–153; Robertson, *Robo Sapiens*, 124; Karl Krogness, "The ideal, the deficient, and the illogical family: An initial typology of administrative household units," in *Home and Family in Japan: Continuity and Transformation*, ed. Richard Ronald and Allison Alexy (London and New York: Routledge, 2011), 65–90.

[100] Ochiai, *Family System in Transition*, 76–77.

[101] Ueno, *The Modern Family*, 69, 83.

[102] Nakamura, "Horror and Machines," 11.

[103] Robertson, *Robo Sapiens*, 81. Kind fathers, too, appear in works such as *Cutie Honey*, an anime series of the 1970s in which a scientist father makes his daughter a cyborg in order to help her survive a car crash.

university lecturer whose rational attitude helps the duo to solve Sadako's mystery. Despite his helpfulness and dedication to the cause itself, his attitude toward his son seems to be indifferent at best. He is then killed by Sadako. In *Kōrei* (Séance, 2000), the inability of the male protagonist to care for a girl he finds hiding among his technical equipment leads to her death. The male protagonist and his supernaturally inclined wife are later arrested by the police for murder. Clasen suggests that "even the glare of scientific progress and general enlightenment are insufficient to kill off the supernatural menaces that stalk us in the stories we consume."[104]

In the second and third *Tetsuo*, the father of the salaryman protagonist is also a homegrown Mad Scientist. Especially *Tetsuo II* is quite interesting regarding this matter. On the one hand, it suggests that the salaryman transforms because of the experiment by the scientist-leader of the bodybuilders; on the other, a flashback reveals that the mutation takes place because of his inherently violent nature. Nonetheless, he is able to achieve these hidden monstrous skills because of the manipulation that he undergoes on the part of his father. He then accidentally murders his own son. These stories of detached and sometimes murderous fathers seem to suggest the idea of paternity in danger. Anne Allison traces "the collapse of the paternal authority" to the end of the Pacific War and "the desacralizing of the emperor [and] the national condemnation of the military leaders who had misled the country into a disastrous war – a discrediting of fathers that trickled down to the male soldiers who returned to the family and household, where adult men no longer commanded ultimate respect."[105] The quest for economic wealth further removed fathers from the picture, eroding patriarchy as a whole "as the grounding authority of family and state."[106] Zoya Street divides the portrayals of Japanese fatherhood into three main images: "the idealized past, when fathers received the proper respect from their families based on Confucian teachings; the dystopic present, when fathers are weak, dominated by women at home and faceless bureaucracies at work; and the future ideal, when fathers might have more fluid working patterns and be more involved with child-rearing."[107] It is clear that dealing with this dystopic present is the core concern of *kaiki eiga*.

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[104] Clasen, "Monsters Evolve," 222.

[105] Allison, *Millennial Monsters*, 12.

[106] Ibid., 58.

[107] Zoya Street, "Absent Fathers: Fatherhood in moral Education Textbooks in Post-war Japan," in *Manga Girl Seeks Herbivore Boy: Studying Japanese Gender at Cambridge*, ed. Brigitte Steger and Angelika Koch (Zürich and Münster: Lit Verlag, 2013), 103. For a discussion about representations of fatherhood and the family in contemporary anime, see also Susan J. Napier, "From Spiritual Fathers to Tokyo Godfathers Depictions of the Family in Japanese Animation," in *Imagined Families, Lived Families: Culture and Kinship in Contemporary Japan*, ed. John W. Traphagan and Hashimoto Akiko (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2008), 33–50.

Susan Sontag points out that science fiction "supplies morally acceptable fantasies where amoral, even cruel, feelings are given an outlet." [108] Furthermore, Wee points out that "the most malevolent actions are often grounded in recognizable acts of social or familial betrayal." [109] Indeed, betrayal has been one of the most recurrent motifs in the films discussed in this thesis. Kurosawa Kiyoshi's *Sakebi* (2005) portrays a chilling depiction of a 48-year-old local doctor, Sakuma, who murders his arrogant teenager son. Sakuma tries to escape by committing suicide but does not succeed. When he is arrested and interrogated by Detective Yoshioka, he flatly states that "the boy was beyond parental control. He was a good boy until junior high. It was probably my way of upbringing him that failed." In saying this, he admits a lack of paternal responsibility as the main factor in his son's behavior. In general, it can be said that the devotion of Japanese men to their work has diminished their presence at home, also affecting their role as caregivers for their children.[110] Expressions such as "working bee" (*hataraki bachi*) fathers and "gung-ho employees" (*mōretsu shain*), as well as absent fathers (*chichioya fuzai*) or the lack of paternal authority (*fusei no ketsujo*), are emphasized in discussions about paternal responsibility. [111] The practice is more universal, however. If masculinity is defined as "anything not feminine," and if femininity is linked with the private sphere, this works to define boys and men outside the family.[112]

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[108] Sontag, "Imagination of Disaster," 43.

[109] Wee, *American Remakes*, 206–207.

[110] See Yoda, "Maternal Society," 247–248; Nakatani Ayumi, "The emergence of 'nurturing fathers,'" in *The Changing Japanese Family*, ed. Marcus Rebick and Nakatani Ayumi (London: Routledge, 2006), 94–108; Tessa Carroll, "Changing Language, Gender and Family Relations in Japan," in *The Changing Japanese Family*, ed. Marcus Rebick and Nakatani Ayumi (London: Routledge, 2006), 118; Hidaka, *Salaryman Masculinity*, 180.

[111] Nakatani, "Nurturing Father," 96; Yoda, ibid. It is not only men who are regarded to be the source of problems. Ochiai argues that when gendered division of labor became a norm in the postwar system, motherhood became emphasized and internalized by the women themselves, because in that way they had a visible sign of their labor on which value was placed: the child. This education-minded modern child-rearing was structured in a way that promoted pathologies in the domestic sphere, as the mother was always taking her anxieties and stress out on the child and the child lacked the opportunity to develop social skills, forever remaining dependent on the mother. Kyūtoku Shigemori has even introduced a concept of maternally induced diseases (*bogenbyō*) into Japanese. As the number of children grows smaller, a mother needs to concentrate her love and attention intensely on each child; ultimately, this becomes a burden and the child becomes sickly. Ochiai interprets this as a chronic ailment of the modern family, caused by "a breakdown of mothers' child-rearing instincts," which Kyūtoku believed had occurred under the influence and impact of rapid social change in the era of high economic growth (Ochiai, *Family System in Transition*, 26, 125–126, 136–138).

[112] Michele Adams and Scott Coltrane, "Boys and Men in Families: The Domestic Production of Gender, Power, and Privilege," in *Handbook of Studies on Men and Masculinities* by Michael S. Kimmel, Jeff Hearn and R.W. Connel, eds. (Thousand Oaks, London, New Delhi: SAGE Publications, 2005), 237.

Sakuma's narrative calls for multiple interpretations. The child has played an important role in the nuclear family and the ascription of gender role divisions. Childbirth was a natural and inevitable outcome of marriage in the postwar generation, strengthening the role of "reproductive egalitarianism."[113] However, men were excluded from the private sphere once the modern family ideology came to be associated with the mother devoting herself to the care of the children. Despite their individual hopes and wants, men have also been largely removed from childrearing activities due to the sheer amount of work assigned them.[114] Should a father really dedicate himself to childrearing, his only option was to get an irregular job or completely drop out of Japan, Inc.[115] This would have meant becoming marginal and a loss of the power that hegemonic masculinity accorded. Nonetheless, this attitude is changing, as demonstrated by Dasgupta in his *Re-reading the Salaryman* (2008).

Emphasis on fatherhood introduces the child as the other to adult masculinity.[116] Sakuma's narrative ties the discourse of scientific masculinity to the question of responsibility. When interrogated, Sakuma finally admits that he must take responsibility for his actions. Responsibility means maturity. If posited against the narratives of the early 1960s, with their questioning of national responsibility through fictional tropes, *Sakebi* suggests that the issue has still not been addressed properly. Yoda draws from Asada Akira in stating that "while modernization was identified with the process of maturation in human history, fostering 'adult' individual subjects that bear responsibility for their actions, Japan never really matured/modernized according to this model shaped through the evolution of industrial capitalism. Moreover … Japan appears to have grown progressively infantile rather than mature."[117] This points to the central importance of Sakuma's actions. The salaryman as a representation of hegemonic masculinity represents smoothly running capitalism. Sakuma is his twisted mirror image. His scientific masculinity makes him a rational representation of responsible adult subjectivity, an exemplary of Japan's modernization. With his actions, this image of matured modernity is disrupted.

Sakuma tries to escape his responsibility twice: first by murdering his annoying son and second by trying to kill himself in order to not get prosecuted.

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[113] Hidaka, *Salaryman Masculinity*, 87; Ochiai, *Family System in Transition*, 54. This means the conformist feature of everyone marrying and producing two or three children.

[114] Itō, *Otokorashisa*, 51. On the overall efforts of the government toward easing childcare burdens in the form of the so-called Angel Plans, see Glenda Roberts, "Pinning hopes on angels: Reflections from an aging Japan's urban landscape," in *Family and Social Policy in Japan: Anthropological Approaches*, ed. Roger Goodman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 54–91.

[115] Itō, *Otokorashisa*, 78–79.

[116] See Frühstück and Walthall, "Introduction."

[117] Asada Akira, "Infantile Capitalism and Japan's Postmodernism: A Fairy Tale," in *Postmodernism and Japan*, ed. Miyoshi Masao and H.D. Harootunian (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1989), 275.

For him, this double betrayal is the only way he could make things right. "I would cancel out my responsibility," states Sakuma himself, "I owe him. That's why I was supposed to die together with him." His plans are disrupted by the emergence of his son as a ghost. Vivian Sobchack points out that the child is a privileged figure that "initiates and condenses a contemporary and pressing cultural drama, which is marked by the related disintegration and transfiguration of the … bourgeois family."[118] Child ghosts are normally what Noël Carroll would call "full of contradictions, violations of nature, metaphysical misfits."[119] The child ghost is a central figure in Japanese horror, too. Wee states that child ghosts are representative of potentially dangerous new identities that are characterized by detachment from the larger community.[120] This ties the motif together with the "youth problem" debate in Japan, which is representative of the large generation gap.[121] In addition, it highlights the issue of domestic violence.[122] When his son appears as a ghost, Sakuma loses his mind. This is a prime example of the dissolution of rational masculinity and, as such, a dissolution of the modern nation and its patriarchy on an imaginary level. This is in accord with Sobchack's realization that a powerful child suggests that patriarchy itself is in danger, whereas a powerful father points toward threatened paternity.[123]

But it is not only the young who are to blame. Sakuma can be referred to as a millennial monster, a concept developed by Anne Allison. According to her, the 1990s comprised an era during which a feeling of threat came to be associated with the inside in the form of millennial monsters. There are two prominent types. First, the youth who attack the sense of national security are

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[118] Sobchack, "Family economy," 144.

[119] Carroll, *Philosophy of Horror*, 54.

[120] Wee, *American Remakes*, 76, 110–111.

[121] In general, youth problems are discussed in relation to the definitive "monstrous" identities that they represent: *shōjo* as a continuation of the theme of the threat of a young independent woman starting with the 1920s *moga*, *NEETs*, *hikikomori* and *freeters* as representative of unwanted or lacking masculinities that refuse to contribute to society through a hegemonic model of the salaryman, and *sōshokudanshi* and *parasaito shinguru* as infantile representations of an adulthood that refuses the responsibility of starting a family. For a comprehensive take on Japanese youth problems, see, for example, *Sociology of the Japanese Youth: From Returnees to NEETs*, ed. Tuukka Toivonen, Imoto Yuki and Roger Goodman (Oxon and New York: Routledge, 2011).

[122] See Roger Goodman, "Policing the Japanese Family: Child abuse, domestic violence and the changing role of the state," in *The Changing Japanese Family*, ed. Marcus Rebick and Takenaka Ayumi (London: Routledge, 2006), 147–161; Roger Goodman, "The 'Discovery' and 'Rediscovery' of Child Abuse (*jidō gyakutai*) in Japan," in *Sociology of the Japanese Youth: Form Returnees to NEETs*, ed. Tuukka Toivonen, Imoto Yuki and Roger Goodman (New York: Routledge, 2012), 98–121; Roger Goodman, "Child abuse in Japan: 'Discovery' and the development of policy," in *Family and Social Policy in Japan: Anthropological Approaches*, ed. Roger Goodman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 131–155.

[123] Sobchack, "Family Economy," 144, 147, 150–152, 156.

the "ordinary perpetrators," stemming from the postwar social situation and family model. Second, as Allison points out, "Abundance has turned inside out, and Japan is being eaten up now by inner demons."[124] Sakuma's status as an elite rational citizen highlights the sheer despair of his actions. His actions underline what Wee sees as the core of contemporary horror: a fear linked to a widening range of collapsing boundaries. His is the narrative of the strain of maintaining the *daikokubashira* ideal in a satisfactory way, a demonstration of "the psychological instability at the center of individual men's sense of their own masculinity."[125] His is the narrative of failure. This is "a nightmare of capitalism," a depiction of the loss of social and economic stability together with "a lingering sense of masculine pride and middle class propriety."[126]

According to Sobchack, a patriarchy without power is terrifying and refuses parental responsibility if not rewarded with the benefits of patriarchal authority.[127] This is exactly the case with Sakuma. In addition, his case visualizes what Roger Goodman calls "the discovery of child abuse."[128] In the beginning of the 1990s, the majority of Japanese people believed that there was virtually no child abuse in Japan. This positive outlook shifted as a result of pressure from various interest groups, and especially because of the multitude of media stories that were published on the issue.[129] As Goodman concludes, "Parents were no longer seen as being 'naturally' and unquestionably good and it was no longer unthinkable that they might, in certain circumstances, resort to abusing their children."[130] Sakuma's character calls for an interpretation of the film as an attempt to visualize how a nation might end up abusing its subjects.

6.2.2 HOMOSEXUALITY AND HOMOSOCIALITY

Dasgupta emphasizes that in order to perform successfully as a salaryman, one needs to perform successfully as a heterosexual.[131] Allison's (1994) findings support this claim, that this is one of the cornerstones of the general definition of hegemonic masculinity. Thus, the salaryman masculinity is often negotiated vis-à-vis women. Within the job context, against the office lady he represents male privilege, dominance, and centrality in the company and society. In the family context, he is opposite from the *sengyō shufu*, or housewife.[132] This

[124] Allison, *Millennial Monsters*, 76.

[125] Messner, "The Governator," 462–463.

[126] See Slater and Galbraith, "Re-narrating Social Class" for a discussion about Honda Tōru's (2005, 2008) ideas.

[127] Sobchack, "Family Economy," 150–155.

[128] See Goodman, "Child abuse in Japan."

[129] Goodman, ibid., 133–134, 149–150.

[130] Ibid., 150.

[131] Dasgupta, "Performing Masculinities?," 198.

[132] Ibid.; Taga, "East Asian Masculinities," 132.

duality is referred to as "heterosexual complementarity," where hegemonic masculinity finds its counterpart in emphasized femininity, the way masculinities are socially constructed against real or imaginary models of femininity. Indeed, as mothers, wives, schoolmates, sexual partners, colleagues and so forth, women are central and complicit for the construction of masculinity. In particular, new configurations of femininity affect the construction of masculinities.[133] In the more specific context of Japan, emphasized femininity can also be defined as a manifestation of unequal domestic relationship maintained by the non-involvement of the salaryman in household matters due to his role as the main breadwinner.[134] Thus, the salaryman must both contribute economically to the good of the nation and perform a certain type of masculinity in the private sphere. The *Tetsuo* films combine these features in order to subvert the salaryman ideal and, consequently, the idea of Japan as an economic superpower. Issues of sexuality are central.

Yoda Tomiko calls Japan "a patriarchal but matricentric society,"[135] highlighting the important role women have played behind the scenes. The treatment of women in each film is different.[136] In the first film, the salaryman kills his girlfriend. Their relationship is sexual, foregrounded in the images within the film. After hitting Yatsu with their car, they have passionate sex at the scene of the accident. The film does not, however, promote heterosexual interpretation. A first hint is given in a fantasy dream had by the salaryman, where his girlfriend dances erotically with a giant wire attached to her groin. She penetrates the salaryman, after which he wakes up startled. It is after this scene that he finds the first metallic spike on his cheek. This is an external manifestation of an inner corruption—or "penetration." The salaryman is then lustfully chased by a female metal-mutant at the train station and once back at home with his girlfriend he rapidly starts to transform. Escaping to the bathroom in the throes of his shameful transformation, his girlfriend tries to assure him that she will not go anywhere. The salaryman then emerges in a mutated form with a giant drill-penis.

Laura Miller (2006) discusses cultural forms of masculinity that are "constructed in relation to imagined female desire." These are often comfortable but still subversive portrayals of masculine sexuality.[137] In *Tetsuo*, this notion is taken a step further. The salaryman drills his girlfriend to death in a grotesque form of lovemaking. This scene presents an exploding monstrous masculine sexuality, as opposed to Miller's subversive yet beautiful

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[133] Connell and Messerschmidt, "Rethinking the concept," 848; Low, "Emperor's Sons," 81.

[134] Hidaka, *Salaryman Masculinity*, 2; Charlebois, *Japanese Femininites*, 22.

[135] Yoda, "Maternal Society," 205.

[136] Tsukamoto has stated that his mother was an important character for his own development and thus he seeks to include a certain kind of central female characters in his films (Mes, *Iron Man*, 18–19).

[137] Miller, *Beauty Up*, 127.

forms.[138] It recalls the hidden sexual nature of salaryman masculinity.[139] As Allison notes, the hard-working, loyal man of the company is required to participate, if not in the act of having sex itself, at least in situations where it is strongly implied. This logic also works in an opposite way, as Slater and Galbraith point out in their description of the "sexualization of failure" where the failure to attain the status of a regular worker is linked to failure as a man.[140] The ability to perform economically is related to the ability to perform sexually, which is already visible in the films of the previous period: the most respectable of the men were those with proper girlfriends. *Tetsuo* both visualizes and subverts this hidden aspect of the hegemonic salaryman masculinity. If Japan is based on a system generated by heterosexual males engaging in friendships,[141] *Tetsuo* dissects this very system by offering an escape from homosociality to homosexuality in "an undoing of the fantasy of domination over nature and individual autonomy that cluster together under the alibi of 'natural' systems of patriarchal kinship and hetero-normative sexuality."[142] It is thus a symbolic destroying of the patriarchal ideology that has accompanied Japan's economic growth.

Hegemonic masculinity sees women as potential sexual objects for men, whereas other men are strongly negated as sexual objects for men.[143] *Tetsuo* strongly disrupts this image. The aforementioned homoerotic scene of penetration is the first to imply this, and the theme is taken further in the relationship between the salaryman and Yatsu. *Tetsuo* starts with a man, referred to as the metal fetishist (or Yatsu) and played by Tsukamoto himself, first walking the streets of Tokyo and then stabbing himself with a piece of scrap metal and inserting a screw into the wound. All the while, the camera shows photos of sports athletes and their virile and strong bodies, which are pasted on the walls of this place, filled with wires and metallic paraphernalia. Yatsu then realizes that his wound is infected with maggots and runs to the street, only to be hit by a car driven by the salaryman. The camera pans to a text saying "NEW WORLD."

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[138] Miller highlights Kimura Takuya, whose "frank sexuality does not easily endorse an uncomplicated portrayal of traditional masculinity" (ibid., 125–126). Men can be sexy and subversive if they nonetheless maintain the hegemonic ideal.

[139] See, for example, Allison, *Nightwork* and McLelland, "Salarymen doing queer," 81–82 for discussions about the way the salarymen are supposed to enjoy women in a homosocial context in their afterwork gatherings with other salarymen from the same company. These include hostess clubs and even soaplands. Popular culture also includes portrayals of the more sexually charged salaryman, such as the protagonist of the *Shima Kōsaku* salaryman manga series.

[140] Slater and Galbraith, "Re-narrating Social Class."

[141] Kaizuma and Hosoya, "Sekusharuna homosooshariti," 34–35.

[142] Rieder, "The Mad Scientist," 178.

[143] Donaldson, "What is hegemonic masculinity?," 645

Like many other cyberpunk works of the 1980s and 1990s, *Tetsuo* also demonstrates "themes of body and mind invasion."[144] After the salaryman has killed his girlfriend, Yatsu emerges from her corpse. This is a quite tangible replacement of the feminine object of desire with a masculine one. In the end, after their seemingly endless battle, Yatsu and the salaryman fuse into a huge, phallic, tank-like entity with two heads (upper and "lower"); an uncontrollably monstrous phallus parody.[145] In his discussion on the connection between the state, masculinity and nationalism, Morris Low suggests that the battlefield and encounters with the enemy served as alternative masculine reference points (both racial and cultural) for Japanese soldiers. These encounters challenged the basis on which the ideal of Japanese manhood were based.[146] *Tetsuo* visualizes this. The merging of the salaryman and Yatsu into a giant battle-machine is the battlefield promotion of an alternative identity that significantly differs from the hegemonic salaryman ideal.

After the fusion of Yatsu and the salaryman, the latter grunts in a satisfied tone that he "feels awesome." Yatsu, in turn, proclaims that with their love they will turn the world into metal and rust. The text NEW WORLD appears once more. In various instances throughout the film, Yatsu is seen beckoning the salaryman, who is responsible for the accident, to "come on," to enter the new world; these are the lines he utters right before the final encounter between the two, which ends up in their fusion. This is a new world in which the future is technological. Reproductive sexuality and the male creation myth are replaced by a form that problematizes them both. If gayness is "symbolically expelled from hegemonic masculinity," Tsukamoto's vision is an ironic one: with the help of technology, the hardworking male—the cornerstone of the Japanese economic miracle and key feature of state policies—is now out of control, having immersed itself in homosexual desire. This is about symbolically queering the established national image.[147] In addition, the coupling of the two has contributed to the creation of both personal knowledge of the world and knowledge of something new that the man-machine is willing to spread. The definition of scientific masculinity thus applies.

6.3 MORPHING SPACES

If daikokubashira ideology ties masculinity together with the home, another important space is present as well. The relationship between filmic

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[144] Ross Farnell, "Body Modification," in *The Oxford Handbook of Science Fiction*, ed. Rob Latham (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 412.

[145] Grossman, "Tetsuo," 144.

[146] Low, "Emperor's Sons," 95.

[147] This idea could be developed further in light of Anderson and McGuire's inclusive masculinity theory, according to which society's attitudes toward homosexuality either allow or refuse the manifestation of various inclusive masculinities.

representations of the capital of Japan, Tokyo, and the middle-class, white-collar salaryman who often occupies a critical position in fictional narratives is highlighted by Romit Dasgupta. According to him, snapshots of Tokyo provide "very real, indeed sensory, insight into the socio-cultural dynamics at play at particular moments in Japanese history, including dynamics of gender, sexuality, family, work, and other societal institutions and discourses."[148] Moreover, the representations of Tokyo in relation to scientific masculinity can be located across Cybwrisky's (2005) timeline of the three rebuildings of Tokyo. *Matango* and *Tanin no kao* can be understood within the process of "Tokyo's second rebuilding," which took place before the Olympic Games of 1964.[149] *Matango* was released a year before the Olympics; while *Tanin no kao* was released only in 1966, Abe's original novel was published in 1964, the same year as the Olympics.

The Tokyo Olympics became a drama of Japan's recovery staged by the nation itself, a sign of bodies that were finally detached from memories of loss and cleansed of the nation's dirt. The city itself was also tangibly cleaned.[150] The official image of Tokyo in the wake of the Olympics was one of progress. Nonetheless, as I have already pointed out in Chapter 4, *Tanin no kao* presents the city as a place where no one really cares. This is especially prevalent in the final scene, where Okuyama murders Hira. In the final shot of *Matango*, too, Tokyo itself—a cleansed space ready for a worldwide spectacle—is made ugly, unattractive and hostile to everyone, especially those who differ in their looks or thoughts. If Kenji had stayed on the mushroom island, his liberation would have been perfect. However, because of his unfortunate return to the city, it is ultimately blocked. The postwar society, so adamant about economic development, has no space for deviations. Nowhere is this better described than in the process of a university professor becoming monstrous—a professor responsible for socializing young Japanese into society. The manifestation of his scientific masculinity is not comparable with the present city.

While in the films analyzed in this thesis some of the monsters are visibly different, many are not. Rather, their monstrosity is found on the level of the perceived difference from social norms and values. The word "monster" thus comes to mean not only weird creatures marked by bodily difference but something—or someone—that goes against the current knowledge and perceived status quo. In addition, the meaning of the monster is not "monstrous" in the conventional sense in all cases. Through the acquisition of a monstrous identity, Kenji finally understands the futility of his contemporary life in Tokyo. In the process he becomes "other" than the postwar democratic citizen and, because of the implicit origins of the mushroom men as radiation monsters, a gruesome reminder of past horrors

[148] Dasgupta, "Emotional Spaces," 373.

[149] Roman Cybriwsky, "Tokyo's Third Rebuilding: New Twists on Old Patterns," in *A Companion to the Anthropology of Japan*, ed. Jennifer Robertson (Cornwall: Blackwell Publishing, 2005), 219.

[150] Igarashi, *Bodies of Memory*, 143–153.

during a time when memories like this should have been hidden beneath the preparations for the Olympics.

John Mock argues that this "other" Japan "remains an important arena of identity politics in a nation that has experienced massive socio-economic convulsions."[151] Kenji is an embodiment of this otherness. After the doctors note that he should be happy to be back, he answers by stating that "Tokyo is not very different. People are inhuman." Kenji's last words echo in the viewers' ears as the camera pans across dark, nightly Tokyo with its neon signs: "I would have been happier there." The implicit message is that the postwar society is still recovering, faced with its inner grotesques. The image of Japan's superior progress is thus unmasked with narratives of me(n)ta(l)morphosized individuals, who lose themselves to the postwar society.

The *Tetsuo* films, in turn, are to be analyzed in the aftermath of "Tokyo's third rebuilding," in which old neighborhoods were torn down in order to maximize the profits of the real-estate industry during the 1970s.[152] Both processes provide a spatial framework for the construction of monstrosity. In *Tetsuo II*, the traditional landscape of the first version has changed into an unwelcoming blue-hued corporate world with high-rise office buildings as its landmarks. In particular, regarding the urbanization of the Greater Tokyo Area, "the concentration of offices, forms and stores makes communication between organizations less costly and time-consuming, and promotes efficiency in interorganizational networking and coordination."[153] Especially in this case, the urban scenery is important for the construction of masculinity, foregrounding the "modern man's relation to his lifeless and numbing urban environment."[154] Taniguchi the salaryman finds his liberation from the underworld; it is representative of the way Serizawa existed in his underground laboratory. Tong Lam suggests that "abandoned places seem to be the antithesis of Japan's ultramodern image," and that the economic miracle has "actualized landscapes of devastation and unfulfilled promises."[155] These images and sites of industrial ruins, created by the recession and population decline, lie beneath the official image of cherry blossoms. They are the "scars of industrialization."[156] With Taniguchi's metalmorphosis, it is not only the image of Japan as an economic world power that is destroyed, but also

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[151] Mock, "Japan's Rural Periphery," 1.

[152] Cybriwsky, "Tokyo's third Rebuilding," 219; for an interesting discussion about the streets and neighborhoods of Tokyo as shared spaces and community-building movements in the face of city development, see also André Sorensen, "Neighborhood Streets and Meaningful Spaces: Claiming Rights to Shared Spaces in Tokyo," *City & Society* 21, no. 2 (2009): 207–229.

[153] Sugimoto, *Japanese Society*, 67–68.

[154] Mes and Sharp, *Midnight Eye*, 81.

[155] Tong Lam, "Japan Lost and Found: Modern Ruins as Debris of the Economic Miracle," in *Introducing Japanese Popular Culture*, ed. Alisa Freedman and Toby Slade (Florence: Routledge, 2017), 356.

[156] Ibid., 361, 363.

the technological feature upon which it was largely based. After a stint in the underworld, this technological, mechanical man-machine travels the streets of Tokyo, regaining control of the streets that had engulfed and oppressed its previous self.

All the *Tetsuo* films are representative of the "industrial dehumanization of an anonymous, middle-class, post-industrial businessman."[157] The portrayal of the city recalls Kawana's modern concerns that the haphazard growth of Tokyo and the constant influx of people from rural areas made long-time city dwellers feel like strangers in their own town, creating many "uncanny"—familiar but unfamiliar—places.[158] According to Wada-Marciano, these in-between spaces are derelict. On the one hand, they enrich the megalopolis with "history and nostalgia"; on the other, they are "dysfunctional and archaic." They are uncanny, contradicting spaces that are both familiar but foreign, relics of disappearing history waiting to be discarded in order to introduce something new.[159] To posit the metalmorphosis of the salaryman against these already destroyed symbols of economic superiority doubly underlines the imaginary construct of the ideology and the sacrifices needed to uphold it.

In *Kairo*, addressed further in the next chapter, every home becomes a dysfunctional, uncanny space. The film ties together discourses of technological advancement, scientific masculinity, consumption and spatiality. In *Kairo*, the people located inside the multiplying *akazu no ma* (forbidden rooms) ultimately commit suicide. One of the most disturbing images the protagonists Harue and Kawashima encounter on a computer screen is of a boy with his head in a plastic bag. He is sitting on a chair in front of a wall, on which he has written "*Tasukete"* in ragged kanji a number of times. Harue seems fascinated and watches as the boy slides closer with his chair, takes off the paper bag and shoots himself. This is exactly the same way in which Harue later kills herself.

Akazu no ma have the function of public space "as a source of mystery for urbanites," trivial spaces of transition that become disturbing sites of transgression.[160] They represent a technological prison that can be escaped only through death. Chikako Ozawa-de Silva argues that "the rising rate of 'Internet suicide pacts'—a new type of suicide in Japan—has led to widespread concern about the presence of such Internet sites and questions about the

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[157] Grossman, "Tetsuo," 139–140.

[158] Kawana, *Murder Most Modern*, 13. For Freud, "an uncanny effect is often and easily produced when the distinction between imagination and reality is effaced, as when something that we have hitherto regarded as imaginary appears before us in reality, or when a symbol takes over the full functions of the thing it symbolizes, and so on" (Sigmund Freud, "The 'Uncanny,'" in *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XVII (1917–1919): An Infantile Neurosis and Other Works*, ed. James Strachey (London: The Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psychoanalysis, 1955), 243).

[159] Wada-Marciano, "New Media's Impact," 19.

[160] Kawana, ibid.

nature of group suicides and suicide pacts in Japan."[161] Furthermore, "Internet suicides" are "characterized by severe existential suffering, a loss of the 'worth of living' (*ikigai*), or its absence in the case of many Japanese adolescents and young adults, and a profound loneliness and lack of connection with others."[162] In *Kairo*, one of the very tangible ghosts rattles *"shi wa eien no kodoku da"* (death is eternal loneliness) upon encountering Kawashima in an abandoned warehouse. As Ozawa-de Silva points out:

> *Loneliness and an absence of meaning in life seem to be closely connected … and both are given as reasons for suicide. There is often a sense of inner conflict: on the one hand, they experience intense loneliness when by themselves, but on the other hand, they feel mistrustful of others and do not like to be in social settings. In certain cases, these feelings seem to combine in the wish to die with others—in other words, to escape the pain of loneliness and absence of meaning in this life but, at the same time, to do so in connection with another person or persons, because to die alone would be too painful.*[163]

The representation of information technology in *kaiki eiga* directly addresses these fears. It reflects Marshall McLuhan's scenario, where new technologies impose themselves on societies long habituated to older technologies, resulting in anxieties of all kinds.[164] This can be analyzed as the shift to an information society that relies on the latest technology. *Kairo* illustrates the anxieties of this process, painting a culture-specific picture of a universal feeling of uneasiness. Instead of wanting to contribute to the creation of a better nation, young men and women merely want to vanish. This is the end of Japan.

If *Kairo* paints a bleak picture of possible absolution, *Doppelgänger* ends on a more positive note. Liberation is correlated with spatiality and spatial freedom. Whereas corporate warriors are often so dependent on their companies that they can lose their sense of self after retiring,[165] Hayasaki's response is exactly the opposite. He feels relief after his symbolic retirement. He decides to leave his old life behind, corresponding to the wider notion of desired masculinity, to become a wanderer.[166] Tom Gill notes that Japanese

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[161] Chikako Ozawa-de Silva, "Too Lonely to Die Alone: Internet Suicide Pacts and Existential Suffering in Japan," *Cult Med Psychiatry* 32 (2008): 518.

[162] Ibid., 520.

[163] Ibid., 529.

[164] Marshall McLuhan, "The Agenbite of Outwit," in *Marshall McLuhan Essays: Media Research, Technology, Art, Communication*, ed. Michael A. Moos (Amsterdam: G+B Arts International, 1997): 125.

[165] Hidaka, *Salaryman Masculinity*, 180–181.

[166] For a general discussion about the fantasy of mobile masculinity, see Gill, "Pillars Evaporate"; for a discussion about *matatabimono* (the wandering samurai/masterless yakuza, a subgenre of *jidaigeki*), which questioned male alienation, see Standish, *Myth and Masculinity*, 158–192; for a discussion about

masculine fantasies frequently stress the mobile: the sportsman, the traveler, the man of action, the magically endowed superhero. One paramount example is Tora-san of the *Otoko wa tsurai yo* series.[167] This is because in real life, masculinity is very much located in relation to the home: the role of *daikokubashira* promotes not only the ideals of reliability and strength but also stasis.[168] As Vogel points out, the "daily life of the salaryman is the essence of regularity."[169] This is in contrast to the premodern era, when the male life course, in fact, often consisted of a large amount of mobility.[170]

The end of *Doppelgänger* challenges this, promoting a picture of masculine mobility that is different from the singular way in which salarymen have been able to achieve mobility: the *tanshin funin* system.[171] Hayasaki's embarking onto the life of a wanderer parallels the role of drifters, who, as wandering outsiders and *rōnin*, are located on the fringes of society as symbolic others against "a modern, conformist and compromising citizen."[172] Hayasaki is a contemporary *rōnin*, a masterless scientist unwilling to work for the good of the state, which has traditionally been the most important feature of *kagaku gijutsu*. The scientific masculinity he represents is presented as an alternative to the hegemonic model, an alternative through which to immerse oneself in mobile fantasies that are in stark contrast with the reality of the salaryman. For most men today, masculine mobility is an escapist fantasy; immobility, or involuntary mobility, is a dull, immovable reality.[173] Scientific masculinity seems to provide some means to combat this dreaded feeling, even if it means abandoning the quest for economic power.

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the archetype of The Wanderer, see Barrett, *Archetypes*, 77–96; for a discussion about Tora-san of the *Otoko wa tsurai yo* series, see Yomota, *Sengo no Shinwa*, 107–129 and Buruma, *Japanese Mirror*, 209–218.

[167] *Otoko wa tsurai yo* was one of Japan's longest film series, including 48 films between 1969 and 1995. The popularity of the series is based on its ability to give the audience the best of two worlds: free wandering and a safe return home to one's family (ibid.; Gill, "Transformational Magic," 144, 157; Buruma, *Japanese Mirror*, 216).

[168] Buruma, ibid., 218; Gill, ibid., 2.

[169] Vogel, *The Salary Man*, 34.

[170] Hirai, *Nihon no kazoku*, 126.

[171] *Tanshin funin* means that men were transferred to faraway branches of their companies for a year or more, often leaving their families behind, in order to enable their children to continue their education (Carroll, "Changing Language," 118).

[172] Standish, *Myth and Masculinity*, 85–86; Tokuhiro, *Contemporary Japanese Marriage*, 60; Buruma, ibid., 213; Napier, "Panic Sites," 344.

[173] Gill, "Pillars Evaporate," 3.

6.4 CONCLUSIONS

Whereas some postwar films still provided quite favorable imaginings of savior-scientists, more recent films question the rationality of scientific masculinity and, even more importantly, the relationship between men and technology. Shifting Japanese masculinities call for an analysis of shifting national images. Even more than in the previous two chapters, the characterization of scientists and their monsters can be located on the ideological axis of hegemonic masculinity and its counterparts.

The salaryman model of masculinity has been problematized as a result of the social and personal costs of contributing to the creation of Japan as an economic superpower.[174] Scientific masculinity is used to challenge this ideal in a multitude of ways, such as via technologized cyborgs and research scientists that either embrace or escape the hegemonic ideal of a work-oriented and dedicated individual male. Representations of scientific masculinity are also related to the differing aspects of the *daikokubashira* ideology: that of a diligently working member of a society as well as a husband-father. Regarding the first, the salaryman ideal and its downfall provide a real-life context in the aftermath of the bursting of the economic bubble. Husbands and fathers, in turn, are discussed within the framework of the history of the family in Japan. These spheres have contributed to both the upholding of the patriarchal ideal and the image of "Japan as No. 1."

The *Tetsuo* films used technology to allow their protagonists to rebel against the system that upholds the salaryman lifestyle. In *Doppelgänger*, the robot-building project of the overworked scientist was, in fact, an identity-building project that ended with the self-destruction of the old and introduction of the new. Both narratives called for an analysis of the role of individual sacrifice in light of Japan's economic growth. In both cases, the ultimate result of the mechanization of the self—or the process of becoming monstrous—is the liberation of an individual from his prescribed social role. Especially *Doppelgänger* correlates with advances by the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry in robotics.[175] Hence, to abandon the project means liberation from state norms and the idea of Japan as an economic and technological superpower.

Both the *Tetsuo* and *Doppelgänger* films should be seen as contributing to the overall challenging of the national image of Japan as an economic superpower. Strongly present are the worries and anxieties caused by the recession of the 1990s and Japan's Lost Decade. As Audeguy points out, monsters change shape according to time and need. They are both made of beliefs and continue to represent these beliefs.[176] In other words, as beliefs

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[174] Dasgupta, "Performing Masculinities," 18.

[175] These include a five-year (1998–2002) Humanoid Robotics Project, the Next Generation Intelligent Robots Project and the Living Assist Robots Project (Robertson, *Robo Sapiens*, 11).

[176] Audeguy, *Monstaa no rekishi*, 18, 62.

change, monsters change as well. Both films ultimately subvert the idea of the dedicated salaryman. In a society that works to create robots, even individuals become robotized. They become what Robertson refers to as "Robo Sapiens Japanicus." This is formalized as the iconic "suiting-up" of the salaryman in the three *Tetsuo* films, an ironic reference to the term "corporate warrior." These narratives, together with *Doppelgänger*, visualize the will to "escape the salaryman" (*datsu-sara*). Hayasaki's mentalmorphosis clearly demonstrates the unleashing of subversive potential, namely, the transformation of an automaton to an individual. Unlike women, who do not receive the benefits of the lifetime employment system and have been freer to criticize the system,[177] men have been pressured to conform. It is this process of deviation from the norm, from the state-supported scientific masculinity, that finally allows Hayasaki the possibility for criticism. The image of a techno-nationalist superpower is problematized because of the toll it takes on the individual.

On a more private note, Japan's status as an economic superpower is also subverted by the way in which the *Tetsuo* films and *Sakebi* illustrate the downfall of the patriarchal head of the household. The films critique the system that created a norm out of absent fathers and a lack of paternal authority, a theme that is especially prevalent in *Sakebi*. *Tetsuo* is also free from the state-required heterosexual role that the salaryman-as-*daikokubashira* was supposed to perform. Highlighting the relationship between men and machines, it discusses not only the salaryman ideal in general, but the underlying heterosexual ideology in particular.

Finally, in *Matango* the city oppresses everyone, fitting them into the same mold, providing a spatial framework and a spatial context for the personification of the monstrous of the esteemed male figure. In *Matango*, this is the final survivor, Professor Kenji Murai, whose wish to have remained on the island with the other metamorphosized people echoes in the audience's ears. More recently, the function of scientific masculinity in *Tetsuo* and *Doppelgänger* is to contrast the ideals of techno-economic nationalism and promote freer existence and mobility. This corresponds to the trend that appeared in salaryman manga in the late 1980s, where the escape was not only about chasing freedom but also chasing *dreams*.[178] It was a perfect fantasy in the period of economic upheavals, where permanent employment and serving as the primary breadwinner of the family were becoming more and more difficult.[179]

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[177] See Ogasawara, *Office Ladies*, 11–12 for a discussion.

[178] Shinjitsu, *Sarariiman manga*, 71.

[179] Romit Dasgupta, "The 'lost decade' of the 1990s and the shifting masculinities in Japan," *Culture, Society and Masculinities* 1, no. 1 (2009): 83–84; Hidaka, *Salaryman masculinity*, 89.

7 TECHNOLOGICAL FUTURES

In the previous chapter I analyzed scientific masculinity as the representation of a multitude of national images: imperialist-militarist, pacifist, and being economically superior. The scope ranged from international to interpersonal, from an admiring perspective to a highly critical one. This chapter deals with the representations of scientific masculinity that most clearly subvert, challenge and, interestingly, also sustain the way Japan has promoted itself as a techno-scientific superpower. If technology was seen as vital for the development of a modern nation, this chapter illustrates some concerns regarding its application in the future, as well as the potential cost for both individuals and nation.

Samuels points out that the discourse of becoming a technological superpower started with imperialist "military technonationalism," which aimed at strengthening both the economy and the military.[1] Between 1945 and 1973, the growing economy was supported by industrial development, technological innovation (*gijutsu kakushin*) and capital investment that promoted the application of new technologies. Promoted as a national mandate in an Economy White Paper in 1956, the idea of connecting postwar economics with technological innovation was something that the postwar citizens themselves agreed on.[2] Before the war, the goal had been to make Western technology "fit" Japan, but the postwar understanding was such that technology could and should be improved and adapted. This provided a basis for a form of *wakon* (Japanese spirit) that allowed a new sense of national pride to emerge.[3] This "virtuous cycle" between the economy and technology mobilized the postwar Japanese "for the process of creating surplus" through the introduction of a range of technologies, creating a brand-new psychological framework and purpose for one's life, fueled by displays of American materialist affluence.[4] Najita Tetsuo even argues that postwar Japan

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[1] Samuels, *Rich Nation*, 33; Koizumi points out that whereas in the U.S. technological development took place in the spheres of both the military and consumer goods, it was only in the postwar era and with the introduction of goods from the U.S. during the Occupation that the latter came to be regarded as an important factor in Japan ("In Search of *Wakon*," 33).

[2] Morris-Suzuki, *Technological Transformation*, 208; Koizumi, "In Search of *Wakon*," 31; Yoshikawa, *Lost Decade*, 7, 133; Penney, "Nuclear Nationalism," 5; Anderson, *Science and Technology*, 26; Watanabe and Hemmert, "Technology and Economy," 37. Koizumi points out that since Japanese prewar technological policies had not emphasized the improvement of technology, Japanese language initially lacked the word "innovation" ("In Search of *Wakon*," 43).

[3] Koizumi, ibid., 30–31.

[4] Watanabe and Hemmert, "Technology and economy," 37; Ross Mouer, "Work Culture," in *The Cambridge Companion to Modern Japanese Culture*, ed. Sugimoto Yoshio (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 114; Koizumi, ibid., 31, 41.

started to ideologize technology in terms of "culture," drawing a parallel between "technological excellence" and "cultural exceptionalism."[5]

The creation of a scientific Japan is a vision employed exclusively for present-day Japan.[6] Because of the oil shocks in 1973 and 1978, the industrial structure of Japan changed from heavy industry to high technology based on knowledge. In other words, Japan transformed into an information society.[7] A new type of scientific nationalism was deeply built into this ideal. As the Japanese government sees it, the future of Japan lies in becoming a "technology-oriented" nation or "a country built on science and technology," a nation that continues to both carry out innovative technical research and export it to other advanced countries.[8] A MITI report in 1980 was the first to use the word *gijutsu rikkoku* (techno-nation).[9] *Gijutsu rikkoku* as a national policy "carries a nationalistic implication," leveraging Japan's technology as a bargaining tool against the technology of the U.S., which was conceived of as "an enemy." All in all, as Nakayama points out, the vocabulary of the new policy was quite warlike.[10] In the 1990s, similar opinions were combined into a national imperative, the building of a Science-Technological Nation (*kagaku gijutsu sōzō rikkoku*). This all-encompassing national strategy was a continuation of what Penney defines as "conservative technological nationalism," the unyielding trust in Japanese technology even decades earlier, a trust that has made accidents seem impossible.[11] Resource-poor Japan only

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[5] Najita Tetsuo, "On Culture and Technology in Postmodern Japan," in *Postmodernism and Japan*, ed. Miyoshi Masao and Harry D. Harootunian (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1989), 13. The emphasis on technological excellence is by no means limited to Japan but rather a feature of many a modern society.

[6] Mizuno, *Scientific Nationalism*, 40, 182, 186–187.

[7] Kuwahara, "Women Scientists," 209; Morris-Suzuki, *Beyond Computopia*, 8–9; Morris-Suzuki, *Technological Transformation*, 211; Low, Nakayama and Yoshioka, *Science, Technology, and Society*, 134–140. The postwar society was an "export or die" society. Because of the shock, the price of oil rose, which affected the price of raw materials and, consequently, manufacturing costs. With the Japanese economy being heavily supported by and reliant on international trade, industrial robots were first introduced as a means of cutting costs and increasing productivity (Schodt, *Robot Kingdom*, 92, 120).

[8] See Penney, "Nuclear Nationalism," 3–4; Anderson, *Science and Technology*, 29; Schodt, *Robot Kingdom*, 43. Cockburn and Ormrod demonstrate this with a statement by a British advertiser working for a Japanese client: "The Japanese … fascination with technology for its own sake" (*Gender & Technology*, 80). Fredrik Schodt, in turn, quotes a comment from a producer of the Japan Expo of 1985, who suggests, "As a race the Japanese are extremely receptive to technology" (*Robot Kingdom*, 13–14). This tells about the way in which this ideology of promoting science and technology was internalized by the people.

[9] Morris-Suzuki, *Technological Transformation*, 211.

[10] Nakayama, *Science, Technology and Society*, 200.

[11] Penney, "Nuclear Nationalism," 4, 10.

had technology to strengthen its role in the world,[12] and it serves as a "powerful horizon to mobilize people's hopes and dreams."[13] Robertson calls this a form of "technology-mediated 'nationalist internationalism,'" which works toward the creation of so-called *gijutsuteki sakoku*, a technologically closed country.[14]

Technological nationalism is discussed in three specific ways: in relation to Japan's robot policies, the redefinition of gender and science, and the newly found scientific glory present in advances of Japan's space technology. *Tetsuo III* deals with the first issue, whereas discourses of gender and technology are reworked in Kurosawa Kiyoshi's *Kairo*. Finally, the *HAYABUSA* films create an imagined community based specifically on glorious masculine agents of science and Japan's technological superiority.

7.1 ROBOTS OVER OTHERS

Robotics is one of the central fields of the techno-nationalist agenda, being designated as a "target" industry under the 1971 Extraordinary Measures Law for the Promotion of Specific Electronic and Machinery Industries, as well as the 1978 Extraordinary Measures Law for the Promotion of Specific Machinery and Information Industries.[15] Historically, in "the export-or-die economy" and with "a national goal of catching up with the west economically and in science and technology," big businesses were better equipped to understand the full power of robots.[16] Like with any other national goal, the benefits of the companies had to benefit the state. The government aggressively began to promote robotization in 1980 with the introduction of the term *robotto fukyū gannen* (the wish to propagate robots), coined by a former employee of MITI.

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[12] Morris-Suzuki, *Technological Transformation*, 211; Nakayama, *Science, Technology and Society*, 201; Samuels, *Rich Nation*, 34. For a summary of how technology was used to achieve "a sustainable development despite numerous handicaps," see Watanabe and Hemmert, "Technology and Economy," 42.

[13] Moore, *Constructing East Asia*, 233.

[14] Robertson, *Robo Sapiens*, 27. This is closely tied to nationalism, as is apparent in the *Innovation 25* project, where a fictional "Lee-kun" from China narrates how his family has been able to continue farming in a deserted area because of advanced Japanese biotechnology. In the future, Lee wants China to become a country like Japan, which can harmoniously combine environmental protection schemes and economic development. Japanese technology as internationally superior underlies the project. For a detailed discussion about the *Innovation 25* project, see Robertson, ibid., 33–79 and Sone, *Robot Culture*, 81. For the actual report, see "'Inobeeshon 25' nakama torimatome" 「イノベーション 25」仲間とりまとめ [Innovation 25: Putting together its comrades], Cabinet Office, accessed August 5, 2018, http://www.cao.go.jp/innovation/action/conference/minutes/minute_intermediate/chukan.pdf. For the original version of the fictional manga, see "Inobeke no ichinichi" Cabinet Office, accessed August 5, 2018, http://www.cao.go.jp/innovation/action/conference/minutes/inobeke.html.

[15] Schodt, *Robot Kingdom*, 122.

[16] Ibid., 122, 125.

This raised the national consciousness around robots and robotization,[17] and it was not long before both small and big businesses in Japan started to use robots; their manufacturers mainly remained large corporations.[18]

Despite the fact that the majority of robots are industrial robots, the very image of a robot for many is that of a humanoid. Robertson (2018) points out that whereas humanoid robots are generally manufactured and distributed less than industrial robots, their existence and presence "serve as technological indices of the country's dominance."[19] However, as in many other robot and cyborg narratives worldwide, these humanoid robots do not always act according to their creators' wishes.

In the *Tetsuo* films, robotics is correlated with the exploration of gender and nationality. Robertson points out that "the discourse on robots [...] is as much, if not more, about social engineering as about nuts-and-bolts robotics."[20] Flowers argues, "The focus on external Others reinforces the idea of a homogeneous Japan and suggests that multicultural policies can contain external Others and perhaps provide an opening to recognizing internal Others."[21] Racial issues reappear in relation to the robot discourse in *Tetsuo III*. The protagonist of the film is Anthony, a half-Japanese salaryman married to a Japanese woman. The central premise of postwar *nihonjinron* writings, especially in the 1970s and 1980s, is that the Japanese are a homogeneous people (*tan'itsu minzoku*) who constitute a racially unified nation (*tan'itsu minzoku kokka*).[22] This image is maintained by consciously ignoring the presence of minorities in Japan.[23] Chris Burgess mentions that *tan'itsu minzoku* has been an important political tool even throughout the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s. This was an answer to the postwar considerations of what it means to be Japanese, which reflected "not only the need to recover a sense of identity and pride amongst the Japanese after the loss of empire and the experience of occupation but also the increased visibility of the 'Other'."[24] Consequently, "Postwar Japan is neither an immigrant-friendly nor an

[17] Schodt, *Robot Kingdom,* 122, 125

[18] The Advanced Robot Technology (ART) project, which started in 1983, introduced a model where corporations that participated in the project were able to use the results to benefit their businesses, whereas the know-how and patents reverted to the state (Schodt, ibid., 114–115, 213, 222).

[19] Robertson, *Robo Sapiens*, 17. However, it must be noted that the hype around robots, especially humanoid ones, must be separated from their actual status (Robertson, ibid., 31).

[20] Robertson, ibid., 62.

[21] Petrice Flowers, "From Kokusaika to tabunka kyousei: Global norms, discourses of difference and multiculturalism in Japan," *Critical Asian Studies* 44, no. 4 (2012): 523.

[22] Ross E. Mouer and Sugimoto Yoshio, *Images of Japanese society: A study in the structure of social reality* (London: KPI, 1986), 406; Robertson, ibid., 122. Yoshino defines *tan'itsu* as "uniracial" (*Cultural Nationalism*, 24).

[23] Yoshino, *Cultural Nationalism*, 24–25.

[24] Burgess, "Homogenous Japan," 2. He refers to *zainichi* Koreans in this particular case.

immigrant-dependent nation-state."[25] This does not apply only to postwar Japan: in the Meiji period, the idea of foreigners as dangerous was widely circulated, and it was heightened by the lack of government control over foreigners due to international agreements. Furthermore, difference in general is considered a threat in Japan.[26]

Tetsuo III toys with the aforementioned idea. A result of a scientific experiment made by his megalomaniac American father, Anthony ties the irregular form of the "foreign salaryman" to the irregular form of Japanese national identity. He is a racial Other to the Japanese. *Tetsuo III* focuses on external others in order to strengthen the idea of inner homogeneity. The importance of robots lies in the way automation in general is preferred over migration, especially in elderly care. This is because, unlike migrant workers, humanoid robots know no cultural differences, nor do they inhabit any historical (wartime) memories. [27] Because robots are preferred above foreigners, the mutation of Anthony into a cyborg, or the revelation of him as a cyborg, is a warped process of incorporation into society. Simultaneously, this process unleashes his subversive power to challenge the nation from inside, revealing the underlying militaristic nature of his robotization. Following Robertson's insights, robots can be Japanese, while foreigners are eternally Others. Anthony's machinic origins must be made visible because "a machine" is preferred to "a half-Japanese," a very explicit Other. This is demonstrated by the fact that a foreigner cannot be registered in the Japanese family register (*koseki*) as such, although he can be mentioned as a spouse or a father of a half-Japanese offspring in the "remarks" section.[28] However, as Robertson notes, in 2010 the seal-shaped care robot Paro received his own *koseki*, granted by Nanto City in Toyama Prefecture, confirming the robot's citizenship as Japanese. [29] Although half-Japanese and not completely a foreigner, Anthony gains his subversive powers only through his robotization.

Whereas the first two *Tetsuo* films ended with the rampage of the man-machines, the third installment allows for the reversal of the monstrous masculine form, leading to a situation where a character appears to be ordinary but the spectator knows he is actually somehow different. It is, however, impossible to decide if this is true or not since his bodily difference

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[25] Robertson, *Robo Sapiens*, 122.

[26] Flowers, "Tabunka kyousei," 523. More recently, *tabunka kyōsei* (multicultural community building/multicultural integration/multicultural coexistence) has become an important part of policy discussions about diversity and difference in Japan (ibid., 529).

[27] Jennifer Robertson, "Gendering Humanoid Robots: Robo-Sexism in Japan," *Body & Society* 16, no. 2 (2010): 9; Robertson, *Robo Sapiens*, 19.

[28] See "Kokusaikekkon, kaigai de no shussei nado ni kansuru koseki Q&A," 国際結婚、海外での出生等に関する戸籍 Q&A [Koseki Q&A regarding international marriages and births abroad], Ministry of Justice, accessed August 5, 2018, http://www.moj.go.jp/MINJI/minji15.html.

[29] Robertson, *Robo Sapies*, 138–141. As noted, the concept of universal human rights and the process of their actual distribution over Japanese and non-Japanese residents is quite dubious (ibid., 142).

is never obvious. This confusion leads to anxiety that permeates the narrative.[30] In *Tetsuo III*, it is only in the very final scene that it is suggested that Anthony has changed from the inside, despite the fact that he has reverted to his human form. The anxiety that permeates does not concern the fictional narrative but the real society. It is something very alike to the concerns present in the *Henshin ningen* films and *Tanin no kao*. To draw from Nakamura, as a result of mechanization—which itself in *Tetsuo III* is a parody of acquiring citizenship —the identity of both the individual and nation become uncertain. Anthony comes to realize he is not what he thinks he is (a normal salaryman). Subsequently, the image of a nation, too, is not as it is promoted. Rather, it is a split national identity, the revelation of the heterogeneous nature behind the official image.[31] Tsukamoto's metalmorphosis is a parody of a society that grants rights to robots but not foreigners. In order to gain rightful status in Japan, one has to become a cyborg, a hybrid. As a man-machine, Anthony is symbolically Japanized. However, this is not a tame sort of Japaneseness but a destructive, alternative, oppositional one. It is, in a way, an incorporation of the old thematic of "their dangerous science," except in this case there is no brilliant Japanese science to conquer the threat. If the narrative (as anime, manga, fantasy and robot expos, among others) manifests what Sone calls "an anticipation of relationships with robots" as "products and producers of the social," the anticipated relationship is quite monstrous, placing the monstrous salaryman as its center. If robots are used for "spectacularly showcasing Japanese science and technology,"[32] all the *Tetsuo* films act as ironic and twisted counterparts.

The robotics industry is trusted with the addressing of the country's labor shortage in the face of a shrinking and rapidly aging society (*shōshi kōreika)*.[33] In *Tetsuo III*, it is not only the salaryman who is robotized; his wife, too, is symbolically robotized. Recently, Deputy Prime Minister Asō Tarō suggested that one of Japan's biggest problems consists of "those who didn't give birth."[34] In 2007, the health, labor and welfare minister Yanagisawa Hakuo unfortunately used (and glorified) the term *umu kikai* (child-bearing machine) when talking about the role of women.[35] In *Tetsuo III*, Anthony is a machine-

[30] Nakamura, *Monstrous Bodies*, 2.

[31] Nakamura, "Horror and Machines," 11.

[32] Sone, *Robot Culture*, 61.

[33] Ibid., 2.

[34] "Deputy PM Taro Aso apologizes after blaming childless for rising social security costs and graying population," *The Japan Times*, last modified February 5, 2019, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/02/04/national/taro-aso-blames-women-not-having-babies/.

[35] Robertson, *Robo sapiens*, 75. This is closely related to the wartime policy of treating women as *kodakara butai* (fertile womb battalions) with the duty to produce offspring for the nation (Jennifer Robertson, "Robo Sapiens Japanicus: Humanoid Robots and the Posthuman Family," *Critical Asian*

bodied offspring and his wife presumably works to create a new generation of machine-bodied offspring. The film thus utilizes not only the male myth of creation in the narrative between Anthony and his father, but also the socially questionable idea of women as child-bearing machines in the narrative between Anthony and his mother. Anthony's second child, who is biracial, emphasizes the discussion around national borders and citizenry[36] through the trope of a cyborg, much like his father.

In 1937, pro-eugenicists called for the legalization of eugenics and racial improvement (*minzoku yūsei hogo hōan*), a proposal that was later implemented in 1940 as the National Eugenics Law (*kokumin yūsei hō*). With a long war looming on the horizon, the law promoted the nurturing of strong soldiers through healthy maternal bodies.[37] *Tetsuo III* brilliantly ironizes this discourse. It should be noted that although eugenics *as such* belongs to history, contemporary society is by no means unaffected.[38] Tessa Morris-Suzuki has put this brilliantly in the following:

> *It would be more comforting … to believe that Japan's wartime expansion was driven by simple and unquestioned myths of a racially pure "family state" with the emperor as father figure. Such an image allows us to draw reassuring lines between past and present and between Japan and the rest of the world. Even if wartime myths of racial purity are seen as having survived into postwar Japanese society, this image still enables us to envisage such myths simply as bizarre relics of a receding past, whose influence might be expected to weaken over time. A closer look at wartime debates about race, however, forces us to confront the complexities of prejudice, ethnocentrism, and nationalist ideology and the multiplicity of the legacies of midcentury ideology for the late twentieth-century world.*[39]

Possibly the most important point that Robertson makes in her research on Japanese robotics is that they are currently being introduced into society and the consciousness of the general public as adopted members of the household.

Studies 39, no.3 [2007]: 371), as well as the *ume yo, fuyase yo* (propagate and multiply) movement by the Ministry of Welfare during the war (Robertson, "Biopower," 337).

[36] Koikari, "Gender and Power," 329.

[37] Fujino, *Nihon fashizumu*, quoted in Kawana, "Mad Scientists," 112.

[38] See, for example, Ogino, "Reproductive Technologies" and Sone, *Robot Culture*. The postwar history of eugenics can be divided into three distinctive periods: from 1948 to 1970 (enactment of the Eugenic Protection Law, with the legalization of abortion as a means of population control), from 1970 to the early 2000s (the establishment of bioethics due to the development of life sciences and reproductive medicine) and from 2003 (the time when new genetics and eugenics began after the success of decoding the human genome, when eugenic selection began to spread as the development of techniques for prenatal diagnostics) (Chūman, "Eugenics: Its Spread and Decline," in *Eugenics in Japan*, ed. Karen J. Schaffner [Fukuoka: Kyushu University Press, 2014], 97).

[39] Morris-Suzuki, *Racial Science*, 374.

Such is the role of Anthony. In addition, household robots are especially important for the government's agenda, because they are seen as a means for providing elderly and child care, thereby making marriage and motherhood a more attractive choice for women.[40] This is a neat manifestation of the general understanding of the way social circumstances shape technological change.[41] *Tetsuo III* robotizes both the mother and the wife of Anthony, making them an *umu kikai*. They become household robots. But this narrative is questioned through a sub-narrative where robot-girls give birth to internal others.

The *Tetsuo* films are about evolution. In fact, Grossman calls the whole *Tetsuo* series "a Darwinian tango of natural selection."[42] And this is never merely a masculine matter. Society evolves with the help of robotics, but not necessarily in the direction willed by the government and enabled by science and technology. Historically, the overenthusiasm of scientists and the fervor that surrounded science has led to overconfidence in scientists and their methods, causing some real-life scandals regarding ethical medical practices. Consequently, the idea of science as omnipotent shifted to a more cautious stance.[43] In 1989, a connection between Unit 731 and two respected postwar institutions, the Green Gross Corporation and the Institute for Preventive Medicine, was discovered. Especially what is referred to as "The Green Cross Corporation Scandal" set the public opinion against science; it was considered that for scientific purposes human life is taken too lightly.[44] A similar stance is visible in the attitudes toward new reproductive technologies, as argued by Ogino (2007). According to her, there is a possibility that new reproductive technologies "can be utilized conveniently by either the state [sic], market, medicine, or even women themselves in such a way as to legitimize choices that are discriminatory or exploitative of some people."[45]

Released over fifty years after *Chikyū bōeigun*, the picture *Tetsuo III* paints of Japan's attitude toward racial mixing is problematic. Whereas in *Chikyū bōeigun* Japanese women were ultimately saved from their horrible destinies by scientists, and they maintained their status as respectable women, *Tetsuo III* does not allow this to happen. Women lose their respectability due to their willingness to mate with foreigners and bear biracial offspring who, in the case of *Tetsuo III*, are doubly monstrous because of their blood has been tainted by scientific experimentations as well as foreign blood.[46] Indeed, the mixing of races comprises the mixing of blood. As Yoshino points out, "The idiom

[40] Robertson, *Robo Sapiens*, 11, 29.

[41] Wajcman, *Technofeminism*, 33.

[42] Grossman, "Tetsuo," 140–141.

[43] Kawana, *Murder Most Modern*, 123–124.

[44] See Igarashi, *Bodies of Memory*, 179, 180. In 1999, hemophiliac patients received blood contaminated with the human immunodeficiency virus, resulting in 200 people becoming infected.

[45] Ogino, "Reproductive Technologies," 228.

[46] See Robertson, "Biopower," for a detailed discussion about the history of so-called eugenic marriages and how they were used as a national strategy.

'Japanese blood' is used in popular speech to refer to that aspect of Japanese identity which tends to be perceived as immutable by the Japanese."[47] This ideology is linked to imperialism and the idea of Japan as a nation state where everyone is related to each other and the emperor by blood. Jennifer Robertson notes that blood is a metaphor for shared heredity or ancestry, and that even the postwar constitution of 1947 underlined that Japanese nationality and citizenship were "matters of blood."[48] Although a social construction itself, "Japanese blood" evokes a sense of stable national identity, an "us."[49]

7.2 CONSUMER MASCULINITIES

To paraphrase Yoshino, after the war Japan lost its national pride and purpose because those were tied to the imperialist agenda and institution. Business and economic growth were seen as new national goals, beginning in the mid-1950s. This can be called "economic nationalism," where GNP growth was used as a symbol for restored national pride.[50] Economic nationalism, however, is challenged through the portrayals of masculinities that are not concerned with economic activities. These perceived problematic forms of masculinities include *hikikomori* and consumer masculinities such as *otaku*. *Hikikomori*, a term originally coined by Saitō Tamaki in 1998, refers to "the phenomenon of social withdrawal or reclusiveness."[51] The phenomenon itself is quite new, because the act of being isolated as a model form of behavior has had different meanings over time. In the 1960s, because the labor market, schools and the family were all very different, the idea of *hikikomori* as currently conceptualized would probably have received little attention. Thus, the connotations represented by the *hikikomori* "are specific to a particular time and process," with the notion of being isolated itself changing "according to historical and spatial location."[52]

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[47] Yoshino, *Cultural Nationalism*, 24.

[48] Robertson, "Biopower," 333.

[49] Yoshino, ibid., 26–27.

[50] Ibid., 163–164. In the late 1960s, with the emerging popularity of *nihonjinron*, economic nationalism was, if not totally replaced, at least supported by cultural nationalism (ibid.).

[51] See Sone, *Robot Culture*, 151; Horiguchi Sachiko, "*Hikikomori:* How Private Isolation Caught the Public Eye," in *Sociology of the Japanese Youth: From Returnees to NEETs*, Imoto Yuki, Tuukka Toivonen and Roger Goodman, eds. (Oxon and New York: Routledge, 2012), 122–138; Horiguchi Sachiko, "Coping with *Hikikomori:* Socially Withdrawn Youth and the Japanese Family," in *Home and Family in Japan: Continuity and Transformation*, ed. Richard Ronald and Allison Alexy (London and New York: Routledge, 2011), 216–235.

[52] Horiguchi, "*Hikikomori*," 123. Social withdrawal became a buzzword in the very late 1990s after crimes allegedly committed by such people. Families are often identified as primary causes of *hikikomori*, with *amae* and the centrality of children as the basis for the formation of the condition.

Kurosawa Kiyoshi's existential *kaiki* film *Kairo* illustrates the *hikikomori* problem, tying the discourse together with considerations of national images and a model of scientific masculinity not previously discussed in this thesis. Whereas in the films discussed previously agents of scientific masculinity were social creators and producers, in *Kairo* they are consumers.

In Japan, the meaning of a man's home has shifted from a symbol of good-natured workaholism to a place of consumption. According to Tessa Carroll, "the devotion of young Japanese to mobile phones, text-messages and the expansion of e-mail have increased concerns that they are less comfortable with face-to-face communication, which could be true especially in the absent father/working mother families."[53] These are obviously normal features of contemporary family life all over the world, but also "consequences of social, economic, cultural and technological change."[54] The uncanny emergence of mass media in one's living conditions has transformed the home: it becomes "both ordinary and familiar, and yet isolated, neglected, and dreadful."[55] This technological invasion has led to a situation where Others can no longer be avoided,[56] disturbing the "belief in the sanctity of the home, the inside, the space inhabited by family, the familiar, the trusted, which exists in opposition to the dangerous, corrupted, unknown, threatening outside."[57]

In *Kairo*, everything seems to be related to computers and the menacing digital world of the Internet. The plot is structured along two parallel storylines of Kudō Michi and Kawashima Ryōsuke. First, Michi's workmates start disappearing or committing suicide. Then Kawashima buys a computer with Internet access. Eventually Kawashima's computer logs into a weird website, asking if he is willing to meet a ghost (*yūrei*). While looking for help for his IT problems, he meets a fellow student, Harue, to whom he becomes attached. Despite the two growing closer, Harue also vanishes. Michi and Kawashima meet by accident in a deserted Tokyo, where the apocalypse is about to occur, and escape together to a small ship with an unknown destination.

In *Kairo*, Kawashima is unwilling to become a "proper" salaried worker. While not a *hikikomori per se*, the discourse is recalled as a symbol of this exclusion from the activities of society. As Horiguchi, drawing from Saitō, points out, the most critical part of the *hikikomori* condition is the inability or

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However, this is a *post hoc* reconstruction of history. In addition, what has largely been missing in the *hikikomori* debate is the voice of the *hikikomori* themselves (Horiguchi, "Coping with *Hikikomori*," 215, 217–218).

[53] Carroll, "Changing Language," 119.

[54] Ibid.

[55] Wada-Marciano, "New Media's Impact," 19.

[56] Sobchack, "Family economy," 145–146; Kinoshita, "Mummy Complex," 106; Carroll, "Changing Language," 117–119.

[57] Wee, *American Remakes*, 134.

unwillingness to participate in society.[58] Concepts such as *hikikomori*, *otaku* and *sōshokukei danshi* (herbivore man)[59] call for an investigation of the moral panic around young men's resistance to the hegemonic salaryman idea. As Slater and Galbraith point out, "Masculinity in Japan is not about exercising natural or animal potentials, but rather being willing to take part in, and contribute to, some collective project."[60] In these cases, the projects can be seen as a contribution to the economic growth of Japan, or a contribution to the tackling of its demographic crisis. The rise of irregular workers, according to Slater and Galbraith, showcases "the dissolution of key components of the postwar Japan national project in an age of precarious labor."[61]

This is exemplified by Kawashima. Instead of producing technology, he consumes it. Clammer describes late-1990s Japan as a society "apparently committed to consumption as a way of life."[62] This is also related to class and stratification, which, according to Clammer, is based on symbolic status competition heavily implicated in acts of consumption in everyday life. Clammer sees status competition being pursued largely through the acquisition, display and exchange of things in everyday life.[63] This role has traditionally been reserved for women, because men have been the creators of goods that women consume. As noted by Itō, the emergence of Japanese consumer society (together with service and information society) initially meant the promotion of women as important economic agents, and it worked to diminish male power.[64] In fact, Asada Akira locates the feminine (maternal principle) at the very heart of Japanese capitalism.[65]

Related to the postwar national imagery is the symbolic "feminization" of Japan. Japanese feminist scholar Ueno Chizuko argues that both the policy of opening up the country by force during the Meiji Restoration and imposing unequal treaties which favored the West and U.S. Occupation were comparable to the rape of Japan.[66] Koikari Mire opts to use the rhetoric of an invader versus the invaded.[67] The logic continues in Igarashi Yoshikuni's writings, which argue that in the immediate postwar period, the United States

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[58] Horiguchi, "Coping with *Hikikomori*," 129.

[59] The term *sōshokukei danshi* (herbivore boy) was first used in a humorous way in 2006 by freelancer writer Fukasawa Maki, only to become a buzzword with a problematic connotation in 2009. See Deacon, "Herbivore Boys," 133; Taga, *Dansei mondai no jidai*, 2; Saladin, "Gyaru-o," 56.

[60] Slater and Galbraith, "Re-narrating Social Class."

[61] Ibid.

[62] John Clammer, *Contemporary Urban Japan: A Sociology of Consumption* (Oxford and Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers, 1997), 2–3.

[63] Clammer, ibid., 4, 6.

[64] Itō, *Otokorashisa*, 83.

[65] See Asada, "Infantile Capitalism."

[66] Ueno Chizuko, "In the Feminine Guise: A Trap of Reverse Orientalism," *U.S.-Japan Women's Journal: English Supplement* 13 (1997): 230.

[67] See "Gender and Power."

was gendered as a male who rescued and converted Japan who played the role of a desperate woman. Hirohito's so-called divine decision to end the war participated in this drama by accepting the superior power of the United States.[68] This process of feminization was halted by the period of high economic growth and the image of the *kigyō senshi*, the fighting Japanese salarymen. However, as Japan was faced with the serious recession of the 1990s, this masculinized nature of Japan itself came to be questioned. Slater and Galbraith propose that such instability symbolically "feminizes" men, which is why compromised class and work statuses erode the foundations of male respectability.[69]

If Japanese masculinity has been about escaping the perceived feminization after WWII, to place emphasis on the consumer side of masculinity stands in exact contrast. Already in the 1960s, the way Japanese dandies paid attention to their looks was a departure from traditional masculinity. Men were not supposed to care about their style, nor were they supposed to consume. This illustrates a shift from the state-promoted ideal of corporate masculinity to market masculinity, which also posits men once more as feminine.[70] Hence, consumer masculinities are problematic. They contradict the idea of patriarchy, supported in everyday life by the *daikokubashira*.

In *Kairo*, contemporary anxiety spreads through computers as a curse of loneliness. Nakayama highlights unemployment, work alienation and infringement of privacy in a controlled society as the main three types of negative social impact of computers.[71] All are highlighted in *Kairo* in an ironic take on what Moore calls "technological imaginary," the means of power that operates also on the level of people's hopes and desires, directing them toward nationalist objectives by harnessing technology.[72] In *Kairo*, technology and technological nationalism work with exactly opposite logic. Technology becomes a form of power of excluding oneself from productive social practices, a means of consumption, in complete opposition to the ideal of men as creators, which has persisted in the real-life ideologies and fictional narratives discussed in this thesis. As Iles points out, "this lost feeling of 'being at home' is in fact a lost sense of self, a lost sense of identity operational within one particular generational group which had previously been highly motivated by a strong sense of devotion to a national agenda of growth and reclamation of economic stability."[73]

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[68] Igarashi, *Bodies of Memory*, 20.

[69] Slater and Galbraith, "Re-narrating Social Class."

[70] Ibid.

[71] Nakayama, *Science, Technology and Society*, 165.

[72] Moore, *Constructing East Asia*, 11.

[73] Timothy Iles, "The Problem of Identity in Contemporary Japanese Horror Films," *Electronic Journal of Contemporary Japanese Studies*, Discussion Paper 4 (2005), last modified October 6, 2005, https://www.japanesestudies.org.uk/discussionpapers/2005/Iles2.html.

Consumer masculinities such as Kawashima's are especially worrisome because, as suggested by Billig, through patterns of consumption national identities can be transcended. Because consumers can change these patterns, they can switch between identities. This leads to the diminishing of "the nationally imagined identity," because consumers are no longer loyal to the national community but their "imagined 'life-style' groups of consumers." Billig concludes that "the processes of globalization, which are diminishing differences and spaces between nations, are also fragmenting the imagined unity within these nations."[74] If the transformation of Japan to a consumer-oriented nation started as early as the immediate postwar era, [75] the transformation is complete in *Kairo*.

In one scene of the film, Kawashima is in a game center; once exiting, however, he finds it completely empty. Lam argues that the entertainment venues and leisure businesses symbolized the bubble economy (1986–1991) and were hit the hardest by the following recession.[76] Kawashima's solitary moment in the game center, surrounded only by the bling of the machines themselves, emphasizes the loss caused by economic nationalism. This vanishing of the patriarchal imagery and, subsequently, of the image of Japan as No. 1 is especially prominent in the way Kawashima simply fades away at the end of the film, paving way for the emergence of strong women in creating the Japan of the new millennium. *Kairo* presents the connection between technological nationalism and scientific masculinity as absurd. In fact, when discussing the character of Kawashima, it can be argued that what he represents is in fact "unscientific masculinity." Kawashima can be regarded as symptomatic of the *otaku* phenomenon, promoted as one of the new leading developments of masculinity in Japan. [77] Previously, Susan Napier has analyzed *Densha otoko*, a television series from 2005, whose protagonist she sees as an embodiment of so-called "technologized masculinity" or "technomasculinity." The series promotes technomasculinity of *otaku* as something lighthearted—a vision where technology can be an important way of mediating human emotions such as love.[78] Napier sees the message of the

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[74] Billig, *Banal Nationalism*, 132.

[75] Koizumi, "In Search of *Wakon*," 42. This process itself could be attributed not only to the American example but to SCAP's policies (ibid.). Thus, for the Japanese, consuming inherently has to do with an attribution of an external ideology.

[76] Lam, "Japan Lost and Found," 363.

[77] See Tanaka, *Danseigaku no shintenkai* for a detailed discussion. At this point it suffices to define *otaku* as a dedicated adult fan of anime, manga and video games, etc., who is attracted to some form of adolescent "transitional object" (Saitō Tamaki, "Otaku Sexuality," in *Robot Ghosts and Wired Dreams: Japanese Science Fiction from Origins to Anime*, ed. Christopher Bolton, Istvan Csicsery-Ronay and Tatsumi Takayuki [Durham: University of Minnesota Press, 2007], 226; Slater and Galbraith, "Re-narrating Social Class").

[78] Susan Napier, "Where Have All the Salarymen Gone? Masculinity, Masochism, and Technomobility in *Densha Otoko*," in *Recreating Japanese Men*, ed. Sabine Frühstück and Anne

series as "a national wish-fulfilling fantasy" that tries to ensure that humanity still exists behind all recent applications of technology.[79]

The outlook by *Kairo*, released four years before *Densha otoko*, is quite the opposite. *Kairo* portrays a technological apocalypse. The film uses Kawashima's unscientific masculinity to highlight the fact that the ideal of a technological utopia has failed, that technology has transformed preferable gender roles into ones that no longer support societal growth. In *Kairo*, consumer masculinities trespass on virtual boundary spaces and use them to create transnational identities that no longer work for the concrete purpose of strengthening national interests. Schnellbächer points out that in hard science fiction, the role occupied by oceans, interstellar space and cyberspace is essentially the same. [80] In addition, Lowenstein explains that while technologies are marketed as strategies for erasing boundaries between people, "in the process it is not just the boundaries that are erased, but people as well.[81] Thus, the shift from cyberspace to the vast, empty ocean is symbolic. This draws a parallel to Schnellbächer's commentary about the Pacific as one of the most important topoi in Japanese science fiction. The ocean symbolizes a new beginning, not a past system. The current order must be annihilated in order for something new to be born.

7.3 SCIENTIFIC FEMININITY

Technology and gender hegemony are closely tied together. In this case, technology can refer to the sphere of science as a whole, quite distinctly lacking a female presence, as demonstrated previously in this thesis. The situation is illuminated by *Gojira*, which, despite being politically critical, takes a conservative stance toward gender. Rational men want to keep secret Gojira's emergence and the connection between the H-bomb, radioactivity and the monster, while women want to inform the public. A quarrel ensues. The scene not only demonstrates the effects of the foundational narrative, but also points to the way in which women were pioneers in the anti-nuclear movement in Japan in the 1950s, demanding action against the United States in the wake of the Bikini incident. [82] As Dudden points out, the Bikini crisis was a manifestation of the government's failure to provide official compensation for the victims of common disasters.[83] Thus, women represent the victimized side,

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Walthall (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 2011), 155–156. See also Slater and Galbraith, "Re-narrating Social Class."

[79] Napier, "*Densha otoko*," 174.

[80] Schnellbächer, "Has the Empire Sunk Yet?," 27.

[81] Lowenstein, *Dreaming of Cinema*, 83.

[82] Mizuno, "When Pacifist Japan Fights," 122 (notes); Dudden, "The Ongoing Disaster," 249.

[83] Dudden, ibid., 249.

whereas the whole discourse works to promote a state-led mission of scientific excellence.

Comparing the original *Gojira* and *Shin-Gojira* also makes clear the changing attitudes toward gender. In the first film, women are quite directly excluded from the sphere of science. In *Shin-Gojira*, however, an alternative way of participation is promoted by Yaguchi, the only politician who, once facing the huge wreckage and destruction caused by Gojira's first form, pays his respects to the dead. He is helped by (Japanese) scientists who, in this case, are no longer only male. Rather, one of the central scientists is a female, comparable in status with the men around her. *Shin-Gojira* promotes hybrid models of gender in contemporary Japan, emphasizing one's abilities over sex and age. Furthermore, in *Nihon chinbotsu* (2006), despite being somewhat of a pastiche, order is taken by a female politician upon the death of the Prime Minister. She then works together with a masculine agent of science (her ex-husband) in order to solve the crisis, creating a multileveled model of male/female participation in areas previously deemed masculine (politics and science).

Frühstück and Walthall argue that *hikikomori* is a crisis of masculinity that demonstrates the oppression of men by other men.[84] *Kairo* suggests that *hikikomori* and other problematic young masculinities are also representative of the oppression of men by women. Wee proposes that contemporary horror privileges technology, emotion, uncontrollable femininity, supernatural anger, and death over more stereotypical views of technology as implicitly masculine, scientific, and rational.[85] This corresponds to what Connell states as a common theme in the patriarchal ideology, namely, that men are rational and women are emotional.[86] This subsection argues otherwise. Technology is a system of power: [87] "While technology might appear gender neutral, technological innovations often serve to empower some groups in society and marginalize others."[88] In *Kairo*, men are subordinated and marginalized while women are empowered. By highlighting the fact that suicide images on computers are masculine, it is clear that the film is willing to disturb the notion of technology as a predominantly masculine domain. It promotes a situation where Japan's "knowledge-intensive" society disintegrates.[89]

To paraphrase feminist scholar Donna Haraway, technologies and scientific discourses can be understood as instruments for enforcing meanings. Especially new technologies reformulate "expectations, culture, work, and

[84] Frühstück and Walthall, "Introduction," 8.

[85] Wee, *American Remakes*, 197–200.

[86] Connell, *Masculinities*, 164.

[87] Moore, *Constructing East Asia*, 5.

[88] Low, "Technological Culture," 138.

[89] Morris-Suzuki, *Technological Transformation*, 211.

reproduction."[90] As Haraway and Shioda discuss, rapid technologization of the growth era meant the development of robotics and automated technologies that replaced the experienced male workforce with unskilled female labor. This means that men in advanced industrial societies have become vulnerable to job loss and it is this vulnerability—the possibility of being disassembled, reassembled, and exploited—that comes to signify the feminization of work.[91] This feminization takes place in *Kairo*, where Kawashima and Harue's relationship proceeds to disturb the coding of gender in relation to technology.

Kawashima represents an antithesis of the rational, intellectual scientific masculinity that especially the 1950s and 1960s films projected. His masculinity is a type of "unscientific masculinity," an alternative not only to the hegemonic masculinity in Japan but also to the rational, scientific masculinity demanded by technological nationalism. He does not contribute to the creation of knowledge, he consumes it. In breaking away from both visions, Kawashima becomes an antithesis to Japan's vision of becoming a technological superpower. Interestingly, his whole existence is portrayed as a counterpart to that of Harue. In Japan, men wield symbolic power, but women have the micro-power that controls everyday life.[92] As Attebery notes, constructing the masculine self is immensely more complicated when women become autonomous, when being a man does not only mean being not womanish.[93] Thus, to exaggerate by generalizing, the postwar ideal of a corporate warrior might have been an easy choice because manliness, in that model, equaled not being womanish. In the recent light, however, Kawashima, although sympathetic, also portrays many characteristics that are considered problematic.

Emma Cook points out that masculinity is not merely parallel to one's job status, but "the provision of stability and ability to care for families."[94] However, as Mathews demonstrated, playing the role of a breadwinner is no longer enough.[95] Despite this, men who for some reason or other do not achieve the status of a salaryman may face a variety of social pressures, because, as McLelland puts it, "social respectability" is achieved in the act of conforming to social expectations.[96] Martinez points out that men in the margins are considered dangerous, and this danger is neutralized by their

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[90] Donna Haraway, "A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist-Feminism in the Late Twentieth Century," in *Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention of Nature*, ed. Donna Haraway (New York: Routledge, 1991), 164, 169.

[91] Haraway, "Cyborg Manifesto," 166–169; Shioda Sakiko, "Innovation and Change in the Rapid Economic Growth Period," in *Technology Change and Female Labour in Japan*, ed. Nakamura Masanori (Hong Kong: United Nations University Press, 1994), 168, 171–172.

[92] Clammer, *Sociology of Consumption*, 4–5.

[93] Attebery, *Decoding Gender*, 13.

[94] Cook, *Adult Masculinities*, 36.

[95] Mathews, "Being a Man in Straitened Japan," 64.

[96] McLelland, "Salarymen doing queer," 80.

becoming white-collar workers.[97] Thus, men are attributed the double responsibility of providing both emotional and economic support. Although Kawashima excels at the former, he lacks in the latter. In a way conforming to Barrett's archetype of "a weak, passive male," his are not the shoulders on which the future of Japan lies.[98]

Kurosawa promotes an answer in the form of his women. Low notes that gendered socialization can sometimes be seen in differential access to new technologies.[99] Because of the Internet's ability to "transform conventional gender roles," it can be thought of as a site where freedom is gained from the traditional patriarchal world.[100] In *Kairo*, Harue is portrayed as a tech-savvy and even economically independent young woman, her *manshon* being thrice the size of Kawashima's small *apaato*.[101] She incorporates the technological knowledge traditionally received for men.[102] To paraphrase Kuwahara, the nationalistic promotion of science and technology in the 1980s was combined with the deep-rooted notion of gender that promoted science and technology as men's sphere. This "techno-nationalism combined with masculine ideology" led to many women losing interest in science and technology and thus, to their exclusion from the field. However, Japan cannot afford this any longer. The Third Industrial Revolution, also known as the Digital Revolution, is at hand, calling for fundamental changes in the nature of labor. Kuwahara concludes that it just might be that under these circumstances, "the barriers that have limited the participation of women may collapse."[103] Consequently, this might change society at large; as Cockburn and Ormrod note, "The more women engineers, the more likely it is that the technological outcome will be different."[104]

Drawing from Huyssen (1986), Sone discusses the female robot in Fritz Lang's *Metropolis* (1927). Some of these insights about women and technology can be adjusted to fit the debate about *Kairo*. Harue is portrayed as a machine-

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[97] Martinez, "Introduction," 8.

[98] Actually, in showing the impossibility of these reversed gender roles, Kurosawa seems to manifest a conservative streak at the core of the film—if it was not for the third protagonist Michi. She is an independent individual, having both the characteristics of a hard-working traditional male and nursing, empathetic woman. She survives the curse of the loneliness, and in her character Kurosawa places the hope of the future Japanese.

[99] Low, "Technological Culture," 138.

[100] Wajcman, *Technofeminism*, 66, 71.

[101] *Manshon* refers to a relatively new Japanese block of flats, whereas *apaato* are generally small and older apartments whose structures are wooden.

[102] This can be seen as a continuation of a historical situation presented by Yoda where women, often marginalized in the labor market, "were expected to fulfill increasingly demanding and complex duties of modern and rational household management, overseeing family finances, maintaining the family's psychological and physical health, and supervising children's education" ("Maternal Society," 247).

[103] Kuwahara, "Women Scientists," 204, 215–216.

[104] Cockburn and Ormrod, *Gender & Technology*, 75.

woman, an emblem of the wish to create "an ideal woman through technological means."[105] This practice, however, is "fraught with anxiety about both woman and technology,"[106] as Harue's case demonstrates. Whereas the machine-woman has symbolized the harnessing of the feminine (creational) power by men, Harue transcends this, mastering the use of technology herself. This is not a narrative of creating an ideal woman through technological means—the ideal woman becomes the technological means, the creator. She exceeds men in her capabilities, incorporating both modes of creation into herself. She is the beacon for the future of Japan. However, Harue's technological abilities do not save her from the curse of loneliness and death. Kurosawa directly addresses not only the gender-specificity of science and technology but also the situation in society. Morris Low suggests that, ultimately, there "are aspects of Japanese society and culture that work against the Japanese realizing their hopes for a hi-tech future."[107]

Kairo ends after Michi and Kawashima, having accidentally met, find out that Harue, too, has succumbed to the wave of suicides. They manage to escape to a ship heading for Latin America. Affected by Harue's suicide, Kawashima loses his will to live and becomes but a stain on the wall of the ship. During an era when, despite all the alternatives, the notion of "becoming a man" (*ichininmae ni naru*) seems to be fundamentally unchanged, Kawashima's silent revolution is to no avail.[108] Reality of the contemporary Japan has never been portrayed more bleakly than through Kurosawa's fantastic lens. Kawashima is too far gone to even become a monster. He just disappears. His unscientific masculinity that goes against every state ideal—except, perhaps, the fact that he is more *kind* than anyone else—does its best to reveal the cost of a particular image of a nation that Japan has done its best to uphold.

7.4 SPACE FANTASIES

Space research in Japan has been carried out simultanously at academic institutions and at the Science and Technology Agency, but only recently have serious attempts been made to coordinate all Japan's space activities.[109] HAYABUSA is one of the most prominent successes Japan has achieved in the field. HAYABUSA was a Muses-C project space probe created by the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA). It was launched in 2003 and reached its destination, the asteroid Itokawa, in September 2005. It managed to collect samples from the asteroid but was damaged in the process. Various system

[105] Sone, *Robot Culture*, 150.

[106] Ibid.

[107] Low, "Technological Culture," 137.

[108] Taga points out that *ichininmae ni naru* means taking a decent job and getting married to a woman at some point in the future ("East Asian Masculinities," 136).

[109] Anderson, *Science and Technology*, 194.

malfunctions, such as an engine failure, led to HAYABUSA's prolonged journey back home, the probe reaching Earth only in June 2010. A four-year mission had turned into a seven-year one. The story of the probe was barely known to the public during its early years, although the collecting of samples from Itokawa managed to attract some attention. However, because of the challenging and adventurous nature of its mission, a "world's first" mission of a sort, its imminent landing on Earth drew the full attention of the public.[110] With the aim of filming the probe's success story, JAXA immediately started collaboration with no less than three production companies. *HAYABUSA*, *Hayabusa – haruka naru kikan* and *Okaeri Hayabusa* were released within the space of six months.

The three *HAYABUSA* films were released during a period when Japan was under the admonishing gaze of the rest of the world. This gaze was centered not only on the country's politics but also on its technology. As McGormack puts it, referring to the catastrophic unraveling of events at Fukushima in 2011, "for the country whose scientific and engineering skills are the envy of the world to have been guilty of the disastrous miscalculations and malpractices … and then to have been reduced to desperate attempts with fire hoses and buckets to prevent a catastrophic melt-down in 2011, raises large questions not just for Japan but for humanity."[111] The reputation of Japan as a technological superpower was at stake.

The films introduce an intriguing combination of economic, cultural and technological nationalisms in order to create the picture of a contemporary savior-scientist, who symbolizes Japan as a phoenix rising from the ashes of the recession. Morris Low argues that once businessmen were promoted as "modern-day warriors," attention was taken away from the role scientists played in the making of a new Japan.[112] This is despite the fact that capitalism is inherently interested in the application of new technologies, because with their help it can control the labor force and maximize profitability. Technological revolution itself can be seen as a feature of the capital accumulation process. [113] The *HAYABUSA* films redeem this situation, promoting Japanese scientists as the nation's modern-day heroes and warriors. As opposed to the models of alternative masculinities and liberation fantasies provided by many other *kaiki eiga*, *HAYABUSA* films strengthen the idea of hegemonic masculinity and the power of patriarchy.

I have categorized the *HAYABUSA* films as fictions of science rather than science fiction. The notion of speculation will be addressed later. The films should be analyzed as a cluster in order to construct a picture of 21st-century Japanese society, including its challenges and scenarios for the future. In the

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[110] Yoshikawa Makoto, "Preparing for HAYABUSA's Successor," accessed August 2, 2018, http://global.jaxa.jp/article/special/hayabusareturn/yoshikawa02_e.html.

[111] McGormack, "Hubris Punished," 8.

[112] Low, *New Japan*, 2.

[113] Wajcman, *Technofeminism*, 25.

first one (*HAYABUSA*), the main character is a young woman who finds purpose for her life through her employment at JAXA. Shōchiku's *Okaeri Hayabusa*, in turn, is reminiscent of Shōchiku's production strategy of *shomingeki* films, established already in the 1950s when Kido Shirō became CEO of the company.[114] The importance of family becomes a key element, while as an outside force manipulated by Japanese superior scientists HAYABUSA makes these familial bonds stronger. On the contrary, *Hayabusa – Haruka naru kikan* is possibly most concerned with the issue of masculine working ethics and the battle of science between the U.S. and Japan. Families are referred to but not really addressed, apart from the relationship between the female journalist Inoue and her space-enthusiast father.

7.4.1 THE SAVIOR-SCIENTIST RE-EMERGES

In the previous subchapters I have demonstrated how the underlining anxiety around symbolic "feminization" appears to be an important part of the postwar model of masculinity. There is always the threat of feminization, unless a man dedicates himself to his work as a *kigyō senshi*. The *HAYABUSA* films halt this process of feminization, providing empowerment fantasies mediated by scientific masculinity. This discourse is especially prominent in *Haruka naru kikan*, which thoroughly works toward the remasculation of the Japanese male and the reestablishment of power and authority at his hands.

The *HAYABUSA* films present the complete transformation of a Japanese male from emasculated salaryman to an empowered individual who leads the Japanese toward new glory. All of the films are situated against the backdrop of scientific nationalism or technonationalism. In the films, Japan is represented as a mighty technological world power created through the hard work of scientifically minded men. The probe itself is a manifestation of "the staging of Japanese technologies against the West for the Japanese audience, with ideological goals."[115] As Schodt notes, "Having adjusted to Japan's 'overnight' economic miracle [the rest of the world] must now come to terms with the emerging Japanese technological superstate."[116] If economic success solved Japan's immediate postwar problems, technological success will solve its 21st-century problems. To cite Tsutsumi Yukihiko, the director of *HAYABUSA*,

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[114] This style is referred to as Shōchiku-chō, Kido-chō or Ōfuna-chō. The main aim was to forget originality and concentrate on creating popular narratives of the middle and lower middle classes that appealed to the young. In particular, love between generations became a key thematic element. In addition, emphasis was placed on the creation of sympathetic characters, with the aim of lighting up the spectator's life (Satō, *Currents*, 214). Examples can be found in the films of Ozu Yasujirō and Yamada Yōji, the creator of the Tora-san films.

[115] Sone, *Robot Culture*, 13.

[116] Schodt, *Robot Kingdom*, 235.

> *I think the relentless spirit of the project team as they pushed ahead made an impression on us all. There was a time in Japan when we said "Japan is Number One," but after the economic bubble collapsed in the late 1980s, they say that we lost hope. I believe that sort of thinking is still extremely prominent in Japanese society nowadays, but I think the effect of this project, which started out with some serious disadvantages, is that it gave hope to the Japanese people. I myself received a message of hope from HAYABUSA.*[117]

Hope, in this case, is not merely about "rescuing" Japan, but also establishing the country as a worthy technological opponent of the U.S. The awe before Japanese technology is echoed and internalized by Yoshikawa of JAXA: "All the asteroids the United States has explored are tens of kilometers in diameter, while Itokawa is only 535 meters wide. Itokawa is so different from the ones I've seen, maybe because it's such a small asteroid. Anyway, I was astonished."[118] Even Tsutsumi commented, "The budget was small. There were all kinds of factors against Japan being able to launch a space probe. Another thing is that Japan's space exploration program is small compared to America's and Russia's. I think the really wonderful thing about the HAYABUSA project is that it used good ideas to overcome all these disadvantages."[119] This tells about the deep-rooted belief in Japan's technonationalism, which should be mediated by men, that lies at the center of the films.

The poster of *Hayabusa – Haruka naru kikan* showcases a bunch of Japanese engineers with Watanabe Ken pompously standing in the middle with the sleeves of his uniform, the eponymous white shirt, rolled up. One has to look very closely to see "the token female," the reporter Inoue, standing among the men. Above the group there is a text: "*Nihon no otoko wa, akiramenai"* (Japanese men don't give up). By putting a comma between the theme clause and the verb *akiramenai*, even more emphasis is placed on the fact that it is specifically Japanese men who do not give up. In the course of the film, these men fight for their nation via the means of science. Their existence provides hope for the ever-ailing Japanese people.[120]

In *Okaeri Hayabusa*, families are shown watching the television broadcast on HAYABUSA's return to Earth. One of the "families" consists of a lone Japanese middle-aged man, who sits alone in front of his computer. His position is eerily similar to the sealed-off people in Kurosawa's *Kairo*.

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[117] Tsutsumi Yukihiko, "Film Director Shows Human Drama Behind HAYABUSA's Success," accessed September 24, 2019, http://global.jaxa.jp/article/interview/vol66/index_e.html.

[118] Yoshikawa, "HAYABUSA's Successor."

[119] Tsutsumi, "Film Director Shows Human Drama."

[120] Messner points out that a similar idea of "real men as decisive, strong, and courageous" was present in the U.S. after the Vietnam War and the sense of national humiliation, a crisis strengthened by the emergence of the women's and gay liberation movements. This ideal found its representations in the 1980s' action cinema. ("The Governator," 464–465).

However, with the success of HAYABUSA, everything changes. "I will go back to work!" he shouts out loud after hearing about the extraordinary achievements of Japanese men. If being a *hikikomori* is defined as "the struggle with or resistance to growing up,"[121] then Japanese science and technology is posited as the vessel for maturity. In *HAYABUSA*, the female protagonist also journeys through a metamorphosis, from an awkward girl to an experienced lecturer with an aura of expertise. Her metamorphosis is obviously a result of the superiority of the characters around her, who embody scientific masculinity.

The function of scientific masculinity is that of a *ganbariya*,[122] to encourage the Japanese (men) to work harder because only hard work brings results and pride to the nation. Scientists are there to elicit emotions of loyalty toward the state and pride in a very *ie*-esque sense. Thus, their stance toward the hegemonic ideal is utterly conservative. The emphasis on "Japanese" in "Japanese men" also calls for an inspection about the "J-culture." The critic Asada Akira (2000) has argued that the use of the letter "J" helps to anchor anything including it into a certain time of Japanese history. He sees the emergence of the so-called "J-culture" as a response to the postmodern cosmopolitan capitalism of the 1980s during the economically unstable Lost Decade of the 1990s.[123] Asada talks about *J-kaiki*, "the return to the J," obviously referring to the "*Nihon e no kaiki"* movement of the 1920s and 1930s, which, according to Hutchinson and Williams, meant "the return to Japan" after years of Westernization, leading to a situation where "the often obsessive patriotism of the war years elevated 'Japaneseness' to an almost consecrated state of being."[124] In the context of the HAYABUSA narrative, this process should be seen not merely as a process of empowering Japanese men but, in the larger context, as a process of promoting a strong national identity after a period of adversities. Out of the films discussed in this thesis, the *HAYABUSA* films most prominently engage with the creation of a certain type of an imagined community.

The process of empowerment is portrayed not only at the level of the characters, but also at the level of the probe itself. In the first film *HAYABUSA*, on the arrival of the probe on Earth, it is noted that the project director Kawabuchi called HAYABUSA "HAYABUSA-kun" for the first time. The suffix *-kun* is normally reserved for addressing young males, and hence it is clear that HAYABUSA is finally masculinized.[125] *HAYABUSA* offers insight into this process by visualizing the journey of the probe in almost an eroticized manner. After its launch, HAYABUSA sheds its outer layers in what I call "a techno-

[121] Frühstück and Walthall, "Introduction," 5.

[122] A person who works hard and persists.

[123] Asada Akira 浅田彰, "J-kaiki no yukue," 「J 回帰」の行方 "The destination of the return to J," *Voice* (March 2000).

[124] Hutchinson and Williams, "Introduction," 1.

[125] In some cases, most often in a business environment, *-kun* can be used for junior females, too.

representation" of an act of undressing. The camera revolves around the probe, creating an almost voyeuristic tone in the scene. Scientists are shown admiring the probe like men admire the female body. HAYABUSA has also been given a voice of its own—a clearly female voice although it does refer to itself as *boku*, the "I" that young males commonly use. As long as HAYABUSA malfunctioned and experienced technical difficulties, it was primarily associated with the feminine. At the point of its final success, however, it became masculinized.[126] This event is noteworthy enough to be highlighted by various lines, such as "Director Kawabuchi finally called 'him' HAYABUSA-*kun*!" This is only after HAYABUSA's return, once the mission has been accomplished.

7.4.2 STASIS AND RETRO-TECH

Sone argues that robots provide a fantasized medium "that perversely reveals something of Japan's reluctance in the present to let go of its once-gleaming dreams for the future."[127] In *Tetsuo*, the robotized male cyborg and the destruction of the salaryman mark the end of these dreams. HAYABUSA-as-a-robot, in turn, emphasizes these dreams. In the films, robots can be seen as metaphors "for the relationship between the Japanese people and their technology."[128] It is clear that the view offered by the *HAYABUSA* films is a way to connect "Japan's cultural past to its technologized future."[129] This technologized future, however, is very retro-tech.[130] Regarding the *Innovation 25* project discussed at length by Robertson, technology is used not to create new solutions but to renew old values. Robertson calls this "a future imagined as an improved [...] version of the past" and "the application of advanced technology in the service of traditionalism."[131] As Schodt notes, technology is becoming less and less culture-specific, but "the application of technology, the way in which it is approached, and the direction in which it is pushed can be profoundly influenced by people's collective expectations, their history, and their culture."[132] This is exactly the goal of the films. In the process they create an image of a nation that is trying to build a future based on past glory. This is exemplified by the ways in which scientific masculinity is constructed as a type of rational, salaryman-based ideal—an ideal that the young nowadays question.

Gordon Mathews has explored the shifting Japanese masculinity during a span of twenty years. Around the year 1990, being a man in Japan consisted

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[126] This "queering" of the probe yields itself to a further analysis which is not, however, possible in the space of this study. In this case, motifs such as crossdressing, which have been present already in *Nihonshoki* (720), could be taken into account.

[127] Sone, *Robot Culture*, 108.

[128] Schodt, *Robot Kingdom*, 235.

[129] Ibid., 13.

[130] This term was first used by Jennifer Robertson.

[131] Robertson, *Robo Sapiens*, 23, 35–36, 79.

[132] Schodt, ibid., 28.

of working for the family with no room for personal hopes and needs. Twenty years later, the same men stressed the growing importance of the family for manhood. As Mathews notes, it might be assumed that this shift is an unambiguously good thing: both husbands and wives are freed from their separate spheres and can thus become more equal and finally share their lives fully with each other. However, in many cases the disconnection between old expectations and new ideologies has only created interpersonal strains.[133] Men feel like they have been forced to change more than women, because The Lost Decade has seriously cut their prospects and possibilities; [134] permanent lifetime employment, for example, is no longer so certain, even for employees of relatively elite organizations.[135] The family is still a site of potentially large personal failures. Greater choice brings about greater existential pain, as is visible in the films analyzed in this thesis. Hence, the *HAYABUSA* films place its protagonists purely in the sphere of work, where no new anxieties can be felt.

As Dasgupta notes, "Sites of pop culture serve to produce and reproduce the hegemonic discourse."[136] The *HAYABUSA* films offer a fantastic view on this. The protagonists of *HAYABUSA* are middle-aged men devoid of any youthful sentiments of rebellion. They are the very models of what Sontag describes as a "technocratic man, purged of emotions, volitionless, tranquil, obedient to all others."[137] In the *HAYABUSA* films, space technology offers a means for promoting hard-working, scientific masculinity as superior to other masculinities. The fictional boys' world can be seen to function as what Dasgupta calls "an important means of instruction in how to correctly perform salaryman masculinity both within and outside the workplace."[138] Young men learn a lesson in the ways of the future corporate soldiers and the logic of Japan, Inc. through fights in the boys' world. A similar point is made by Kume Yoriko, according to whom the boys' and girls' worlds function as imitations of their mothers' and father's lives. Suiting-up—wearing the salaryman's tie and suit—is their metamorphosis, a transformation for which the only aim is to maintain conservative social values.[139] This is one more expression of the inherent cultural essentialism in the films.

Timothy Iles notes that gender in Japanese cinema "is often understood as a device to maintain the privilege of masculinist hegemony." [140] The *HAYABUSA* films paint a picture of a patriarchal culture which is simultaneously male-dominated (cultural institutions are overrepresented by

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[133] Mathews, "Being a Man in Straitened Japan," 64.

[134] Muriel Jolivet, *Japan: The Childless Society* (London and New York, Routledge, 1997), 165.

[135] Dasgupta, "Performing Masculinities?," 199.

[136] Dasgupta, "Creating Corporate Warriors," 123.

[137] Sontag, "Imagination of Disaster," 49.

[138] Dasgupta, ibid., 124.

[139] Dasgupta, ibid., 162–163.

[140] Iles, *The Crisis of Identity*, 53.

men), male-identified (people utilize male norms to determine values and the worthiness of a human being) and male-centered (members of a culture largely focus on men's activities).[141] Hidaka argues that the reason behind Japan's strong patriarchal system is that men from the mid-1920s to the present day are socialized in various contexts (families, schools, work) into thinking that they are superior merely because they are male. This also means socialization into the idea that paternity is based on their ability to provide for the family, which subsequently leads to the strong will to maintain their status as "corporate warriors." This not only retains their position in the family but in society.[142] And, as this thesis shows, this is ultimately representative of the will to retain the position of Japan in the world.

While the works analyzed in this study generally subvert this model, the *HAYABUSA* films explicitly promote it. Herein lies their antithetical stance. They are not antithetical in relation to science and technology, but in relation to inexorable changes in society. They represent exactly "the persistence of the middle-class masculine ideals."[143] While projected as an ideal model of contemporary Japanese masculinity, this static view of middle-agedness is, in fact, quite uncanny in a literal sense of the word. It is a model that is not only terrifying but terrifying exactly because of the eerie feeling of familiarity. The worldview of the films is drawn from Saitō's "boys' world," where the central feature is an international military organization in which all the members from top to the bottom are Japanese. Technology often equals weapons and robots, and the ones who develop them are genius scientists; these doctors and senior researchers are bound to cause awe in everyone. Like true geniuses, they do everything from planning to building themselves—and within a very limited time. In addition, the social structure of these organizations is not a democratic one, but instead takes a pyramid shape and is thus representative of a *tate-shakai*.[144]

The *HAYABUSA* films promote masculine superiority and authority, as well as a lingering sense of *ie*-esque loyalty. *Haruka naru kikan* emits an aura of distinctive nationalism, where technology is used as a means of revitalizing the Japanese society and the hierarchical relations that were also promoted by the *ie* model.[145] After a breakthrough in solving the difficulties encountered by the probe, *sempai* Fujinaka invites his *kōhai* Kamata to share a bottle of wine

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[141] Allan G. Johnson, *The Gender Knot: Unraveling Our Patriarchal Legacy* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1997), quoted in Jack S. Kahn, *An Introduction to Masculinities* (Oxford & West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell, 2005), 24–25. This is despite the fact that the protagonist of the first film, *HAYABUSA*, is in fact female.

[142] Hidaka, *Salaryman Masculinity*, 163.

[143] Slater and Galbraith, "Re-narrating Social Class."

[144] Saitō, *Kōittenron*, 17, 19.

[145] Robertson, *Robo Sapiens*, 20.

with him, bestowed upon them by Yamaguchi.[146] Kamata declines, stating that he has promised to help his son with his mathematics homework. Fujinaka rolls his eyes and with a stern voice states that "your son has a genius as a father, he needs no help!" Having been assured of the lack of necessity of returning home, Kamata looks somewhat relieved. "Okay," he says, and the two wander off to enjoy the wine.[147] This particular scene emphasizes the importance of homosociality. In order to gain the full status of a salaryman, the relationships between colleagues and bosses became more important than those with the family.[148] Broken promises mean nothing if the alternative is the perfection of a masculine corporate relationship. Women exist but only men can save Japan. This suggestion seems to be very fantastic indeed.

Technology as such is neither scary nor monstrous. In Grodal's terms, it lacks intentionality. But it can be made to represent some monstrous life form of its own, a situation where "the increasing penetration of (digital) technologies" is seen as greatly affecting the younger generation.[149] Cockburn and Ormrod refer to this as "technofear," "an alienation towards technology; a fear of its unknown powers; and a nervousness concerning one's ability to understand and use it."[150] Still, there is nothing unusual about this so-called "anti-science disease," because it has, in fact, been with mankind ever since the earliest applications of technology.[151] This fearful stance toward the application of technology is, however, in stark contrast with Japan's vision of becoming a technological superpower. Based on the discussion above, I am willing to suggest that in this case it is actually about technology in relation to repressed forms of masculinity that is inherently worrisome. As Yoshikawa argues, "Our image of the future does rely on technology."[152] This technology, however, needs to be free from gender politics.

It should be noted, however, that the *HAYABUSA* films do, in a way, challenge the hegemonic salaryman ideal despite promoting patriarchal hegemony. This is where the idea of a hybrid masculinity comes under closer scrutiny. Although not really salarymen *per se*, the scientists work for their (big) company (JAXA) and sacrifice their family and personal lives in the process. With a stable income, their role as a *daikokubashira* is implied. As a

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[146] *Sempai* and *kōhai* are Japanese terms that denote the hierarchy between two people. *Sempai* is the "upperclassman," the senior at work, or, for example, parenting. *Kōhai* is the more unexperienced person. Situations in which these terms appear are varied, but in all cases they emphasize seniority and hierarchy.

[147] In this particular scenario, the compulsory drinking is emphasized. A closer inspection of this custom and its social effects is called for. It is analyzed in detail, for example, by Borovoy (2007) and touched upon by Allison (1993), but it is out of the scope of this thesis, however.

[148] Shinjitsu, *Sarariiman manga*, 45.

[149] Wee, *American Remakes*, 77.

[150] Cockburn and Ormrod, *Gender & Technology*, 121.

[151] Kimura, *Science Edge*, 28.

[152] Yoshikawa, *Lost Decade*, 219.

machine, HAYABUSA is a symbol of "a long-lasting homosociality among men and between men and machines," a form of masculinity where "machines and the knowledge of machines serve as a focal point in which different forms of hegemonic masculinity are maintained."[153]

This new ideal is a fusion of scientific rational masculinity and salaryman masculinity, a model that is shown to supersede all other masculinities. Hybrid masculinities are often suggested to promote models where men are free to assimilate nontraditional attributes into their masculinities without losing their patriarchal power and status as "men." In the *HAYABUSA* films, the new hybrid model is one that is based on the previous model of the hegemonic salaryman masculinity, spiced up with a techno-scientific understanding that strengthens Japan's status as a technological superpower among world nations. Men create "truly gendered spaces through their interaction and relationships with machines," constructing "a form of hegemonic masculinity based mostly on mechanical skills."[154] This is a call for a real-life superman, whose basis in reality should be seriously questioned.

This hybrid model of masculinity promotes the image of a nation that relentlessly works to be the best. This is also a call for a hybrid form of national identity, a mixing of economic and technological policies to create a superior state. However, science fiction scholar Tatsumi Takayuki does not see it in such a positive light. In fact, he refers to the "hybridized" Japanese people as "Japanoids," meaning a shift of national identity from something divine into something monstrous and hybrid.[155] If some parts of the realism of science fiction "resides in the fact that we can recognize it as a possibility for our future,"[156] this is not the case with the *HAYABUSA* films. Or, if it is, this reality is quite worrisome. The films reflect a reality that blindly promotes "old" values and fails to acknowledge the shifting nature of gender role expectations. By juxtaposing "reality" and fiction, the films offer solutions that the "real" world cannot.[157] The question remains, what do these solutions tell about the reality of 21st-century Japan? Attebery sees science fiction as "an essentially realist mode" that, through its convincing construction of faked histories, is able to explore "history's shifting alignments of power."[158] A similar point is promoted by Martinez in her "Introduction" to *The Worlds of Japanese Popular Culture*. *HAYABUSA* narratives do not construct a fake history but rather a fake present.

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[153] Mellström, "Patriarchal Machines," 475–476.

[154] Ibid.

[155] Tatsumi, *Full Metal Apache*, 25.

[156] Bowers, *Magic(al) Realism*, 30.

[157] Ibid., 46.

[158] Attebery, "Decoding Gender," 14.

7.4.3 THE RETURN OF THE REPRESSED

If hybrid masculinities ultimately contribute to the maintaining of the patriarchal hegemony, the image of Japan as a hybrid nation aligns the country as superior to other countries. The films draw from the concept of hybrid masculinity in order to project an image of a hybrid nation that relentlessly works toward nationalist goals. In his discussion about Japanese disaster and monster movies, Kalat notes, "The message that we can all unite, overcome our differences, and save each other through science and progress, is uniquely Japanese."[159] Whether true or not in comparison with the science fiction films of other countries, the *HAYABUSA* films underscore this. They promote a strand of cultural nationalism that is seemingly innocent enough but, in fact, deals with a topic that is highly loaded in contemporary Japan: the ever-continuing sense of battle. It is necessary to bear in mind that the space industry is "a strategic sector that underpins civil, commercial, scientific, and security concerns for all great nations." Thus, the dual nature of space technology (civil/military, defensive/offensive, scientific/commercialist) should never be forgotten.[160] HAYABUSA was originally built as "a technology demonstration spacecraft," its main goal being the establishment of new technologies. [161] However, it is heavily interwoven with militaristic connotations. First, "Hayabusa" was the name of a fighter jet produced by Japan during World War II.[162] Second, as Pekkanen and Kallander-Umezu argue at length, despite Japan never making it explicit that she had any will at all toward the militarization of space, it nonetheless has acquired advanced space-technological prowess that draws attention to its space-based military capabilities. In fact, Pekkanen and Kallander-Umezu see HAYABUSA's reentry capsule amounting to the testing of "an extremely high-speed ballistic reentry technology."[163] This seems to correspond to Samuels' realization that the Japanese technology process has been characterized by the fusion of civilian and military technologies. [164] And, as pointed out by Robertson, "robotic components are now being weaponized in university and corporate laboratories. Academics might be ambivalent about the military applications of robotics, yet they appreciate the financial incentives offered by the Ministry of Defense at the time of deep budgetary cutbacks."[165]

Because of the military connotations briefly illuminated above, the uncritical celebration of the scientist-savior in the *HAYABUSA* films should

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[159] Kalat, *Toho's Godzilla*, 95.

[160] Pekkanen and Kallander-Umezu, *In Defense of Japan*, 2, 8, 206, 223. In addition, this draws attention to the right-wing political reassessment and reinterpretation of Article 9, the non-war clause, of the Japanese Constitution (see Takenaka, "Japanese Memories," for a further discussion of the topic).

[161] Yoshikawa, "HAYABUSA's Successor."

[162] See Samuels, *Rich Nation*, 126.

[163] Pekkanen and Kallander-Umezu, *In Defense of Japan*, 206.

[164] Robertson, *Robo Sapiens*, 49.

[165] Ibid., 16.

not go unnoticed. In addition, the films engage with the ever-lingering notion of two worldpowers—Japan and the U.S.—constantly in battle. Mizuno points out that in some postwar anime, such as *Uchūsenkan Yamato*, the American presence is eliminated and Japanese men are cast as protectors. She calls this a "fantasy against the dominant narrative of postwar Japan."[166] Some films, too, as I have demonstrated, project Japanese men as protectors. They do not, however, suggest the victory of Japan in the war but rather scientific masculinity and technological development as a means for success in the postwar world. Indeed, speculative anime envisions the victory of Japan; more importantly, this is not just any fantasy but rather a male fantasy.[167]

HAYABUSA takes this male fantasy one step further. Japan is not merely the provider of scientific knowledge; rather, the contemporary narrative directly challenges the United States. *Haruka naru kikan* (and *Okaeri Hayabusa*, to a lesser degree) directly names the U.S. as Japan's competitive Other and construct a picture of the U.S. as Japan's symbolic enemy. Even 60 years after the Occupation, the Japanese present is still shown to be dominated by the overarching presence of the United States. *Haruka naru kikan* boldly challenges the U.S., promoting Japan as *the* science-technological superpower in the world. This is a reinforcement of the 1970s' theme of "the threat of Japanese technology" and the American conceiving of Japan in the 1980s as an "economic hypothetical enemy" due to the rising power of its science and technology.[168] HAYABUSA creates a success story that strengthens the role of robotics as "*the* industry that will *sukuu* (rescue) Japan,"[169] and it reimagines its national image within the world. Fredrik L. Schodt refers to this as "collective infatuation with advanced technology that is supported by Japan's government and corporations."[170]

If cultural nationalism "aims to regenerate the national community by creating, preserving or strengthening a people's cultural identity when it is felt to be lacking, inadequate or threatened,"[171] the *HAYABUSA* films quite directly confirm this. Saitō suggests that the hero in the male narratives is a "soldier" who is loyal to his organization. In the *HAYABUSA* films, he is a corporate warrior fighting for Japan within a web of international relations. This strong scientific masculinity, which correlates with a strong national identity, is best embodied by astrophysicist Yamaguchi Shunichirō, the leader of the team in *Haruka naru kikan*. In the beginning of *Haruka naru kikan*, a member of NASA is seen visiting the launch site in Japan. A contrast is made between the great technological advancement of the probe itself and the shabby

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[166] Mizuno, "When Pacifist Japan Fights," 110.

[167] Ibid.

[168] Fujimura, "Transnational Genomics," 79; Anderson, *Science and Technology*, 19; Morris-Suzuki, *Beyond Computopia*, 3; Nakayama, *Science, Technology and Society*, 199.

[169] Robertson, *Robo Sapiens*, 34.

[170] Schodt, *Robot Kingdom*, 23.

[171] Yoshino, *Cultural Nationalism*, 1.

surroundings of the site. The team's low budget is underscored and emphasized by the conversation between the NASA member and Yamaguchi. Implicitly the scene projects an aura of scientific superiority that can, despite the lack of resources, create internationally acclaimed technology. This is all embodied by Watanabe Ken's omnipotent character, who functions to convey a highly distinct vision of cultural excellence.[172]

Later on in the film, when HAYABUSA runs into problems that have affected the funding of the project, Yamaguchi is seen visiting the NASA headquarters. Embodying a role similar to businessmen who are constantly in contact with non-Japanese people, Yamaguchi is able to "participate in the construction of the image of the Japanese."[173] Maruyama Masao and Katō Norihiro explain Japan's "cultural hybridity" as an idea conceived as an answer to the changes after the Pacific War, which led to an imaginary cultural idea that the West was incapable of understanding Japan whereas Japan was able to understand the West.[174] During a meeting where Yamaguchi is presented alone with many members of NASA, he manages to convince the Americans to keep contributing to the project by letting JAXA use their communication satellites. With his rolled-up sleeves and bulging muscles, he stares at them and, in clear English, utters, "We don't give up!" Afterwards a NASA team member comes to Yamaguchi, sharing his surprise and awe before Yamaguchi's steely demeanor and dedication. This is an imaginary portrayal of the awe that America feels toward Japan.

The films project an image of "our difference" from the world, the "particularistic cultural differences of Japan from the universal civilization."[175] Japan is seen as a country existing outside the East/West binary,[176] which directy makes the tone of the films quite nationalistic. Within the *nihonjinron* genre, some works promote Japan as unique because of its "cultural hybridity." Igarashi argues that the creation of such an ideology was due to the enormous historical disjuncture of the relationship between Japan and the U.S. after the Pacific War and the subsequent Allied Occupation.[177] Japan longed to keep its past traditions, although it was subjected to a democratization process and Western influences by the Occupation. This stance is quite worrisome, because

[172] Watanabe Ken is one of the most popular Japanese Hollywood actors of all time, having starred in blockbusters such as *The Last Samurai* (2003), *Memoirs of a Geisha* (2005), *Inception* (2010) and *Godzilla* (2014), among others. Fluent in English, he is the embodiment of a Japanese cultural success story in the world.

[173] Yoshino, *Cultural Nationalism*, 165.

[174] Igarashi, *Bodies of Memory*, 82.

[175] Yoshino, ibid, 11–12.

[176] Igarashi, *Bodies of Memory*, 11–12.

[177] Ibid., 75.

it tells about the popularity of such fictional images of nationhood and cultural myths. This can be seen as "cultural essentialism in reverse form."[178]

However, if the nation is "an imagined political community," [179] this imagining, according to Orbaugh, is colored with a hue of inferiority and self-imposed othering. The *HAYABUSA* films are an answer to this inferiority complex—or the Frankenstein complex, in Orbaugh's terms. The films create a simplified picture of a very complex struggle for domination between two nations whose histories have become intertwined. They simultaneously contribute to the neo-conservative creation of the history of contemporary Japan, which "should present the kind of narrative that Japanese youths can be proud of—that is, a narrative devoid of any wrongdoing by the Japanese state."[180] The *HAYABUSA* films, in other words, overturn the Frankenstein syndrome. The probe became not only a demonstration of the capability of JAXA and Japan's space sciences, but also the superiority of Japanese men. Political rhetoric does not define national identity, but politicians attempt to set the tone for an acceptable public expression of what constitutes community, norms, and values.[181] Robots represent commitment to advanced science and technology, and HAYABUSA-as-a-robot corresponds to the need for Japan to achieve what the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry refers to as Japan's robot revolution.[182] This is clearly also about revolutionizing the image of Japan in the face of the world after the decades of recession.

The heroes in the *HAYABUSA* films are "ultimately the heroic victims of this world, which is exactly the way many Japanese like to picture themselves." [183] They are like the heroes of *ninkyō yakuza* films, where Japanese men (as opposed to a foreign threat) are portrayed as "virtuous, loyal and pure," their spirit being stronger than the flesh. [184] Especially

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[178] Igarashi, *Bodies of Memory*, 75. In her "In the Feminine Guise: A Trap of Reverse Orientalism," Ueno explains that Edward Said's *Orientalism* (1978) provides one way of explaining this "difference": in the colonial discourse the Occident was coded as masculine, whereas the Orient was coded as feminine. Japan lacked military power to fight for the role of the masculine, and thus the discourse of "an exotic, feminine Orient" was embraced instead as a sign of the country's difference from the West, all of course due to the underlining inferiority complex caused by the forceful opening of the country. This is what Ueno refers to as "reverse Orientalism." To this day, many *nihonjinron* discourses continue to posit Japan as feminine, for example, emphasizing the special bond between Japanese mothers and their sons, like Doi Takeo.

[179] Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 6.

[180] Takenaka, "Japanese Memories."

[181] Penney, "Nuclear Nationalism," 3.

[182] Schodt, *Robot Kingdom*, 18–19, 21; Sone, *Robot Culture*, 61; "The New Robot Strategy," METI report, accessed August 8, 2018, http://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/2015/pdf/0123_01b.pdf; see also Sone, ibid., 76–77 for a summary about works in Japanese that discuss the phenomenon with techno-nationalist undertones.

[183] Buruma, *Japanese Mirror*, 188.

[184] Ibid., 172, 176.

representative is Watanabe's Yamaguchi. Like the *ninkyō* heroes, he, too, is essentially a loner. He is portrayed with a wedding band but not once is his family shown. Neither does he participate in company dinners and drinking, but instead is pictured sitting solemnly alone at a Shinto shrine. The *HAYABUSA* films represent prime examples of science fiction as "a form of popular romance" that "exploits, channels, and stimulates desires."[185] In this case, this is a desire to reinforce a past social structure and intermittently continue with the current order. It is also a projection of a fantasy where Japan finally beats the U.S. and gains true legitimacy as a global superpower. This is achieved through the success of scientific masculinity. Thus, the *HAYABUSA* films speculate, which is why I ultimately included them in this thesis. For each idealized, even naïve, narrative there has to be a counter-narrative, because the consequences of these heroic fantasies can be serious, as demonstrated by the discussion on anime and war. The *HAYABUSA* films, however, provide retro-nationalist fantasies in the realm of the real. Engineers reemerge as creators of a sense of national pride and technology—again—emerges as a rational means of improving society. Considering the history of scientific nationalism and war in Japan, this is an uncanny return of the repressed from the past.

7.5 CONCLUSIONS

Despite decades having passed, the idea of contemporary Japanese society as being to some extent based on Western modernity, the anxiety regarding foreign nations and Japan's role in the world, as well as a felt sense of crisis, seem not to be easily dissolved.[186] The films in this chapter centered on these concerns. On the one hand, there were the ironic portrayal of Japan's robot policies, correlated with the will to internalize external and internal others, and the general confusion around the changing gender roles in society, represented here as the changing gender roles within the sphere of science and technology. On the other hand, some films explicitly provided positive alternative scenarios, where Japan finally "beats" the U.S. and resumes its status as a technologically—and economically—superior country.

First, *Tetsuo III* presented a scenario where the dangerous Other, Anthony the half-American, was symbolically tamed in the context of Japan's robot policies. Having become one of the key areas of *kagaku gijutsu sōzō rikkoku*, the building of a scientific-technological nation, robotics is used as a means of unifying people living in Japan as homogeneously "Japanese." The question of technological futures is also present in some re-considerations of the relationship between technology and gender. Drawing from the context of Japan's robot policies, it is possible to analyze the wife of the half-Japanese

[185] Attebery, *Decoding Gender*, 9.

[186] Funabiki, *Nihonjinron saikō*, 39–40, 45.

salaryman Anthony as a so-called *umu kikai*, a shell whose role is to give birth. This also concerns his mother. Tsukamoto parodies this notion, showcasing a scenario where it is exactly the external Others that are important for the future of Japan, despite the country's resistance.

The relationship between technology and gender is also examined, especially in Kurosawa Kiyoshi's *Kairo*. If technological nationalism is based on a myth of creation where male scientists and engineers create exportable technology that is used to construct an image of Japan as a technological superpower, *Kairo* problematizes this, first by correlating femininity and this very myth. In addition, it relates masculine consumption with technological advances. *Kairo* not only problematizes gender roles within the field of science and technology, but it also reverses these roles. Despite their relationship with technology, consumer masculinities cannot be analyzed as a form of scientific masculinity. They do not contribute to the creation of knowledge; they consume it. This is, thus, a complete annihilation of the function of scientific masculinity in society. *Kairo* suggests that a society created by men is a society of the past. It locates "the scientific" within the realm of the feminine, calling for a category of a knowledge-creating female presence. Harue's brilliance is not left unnoticed, but the film ultimately portrays a society that is not prepared for this change. Masculine technology overcomes her and results in her death. The essence of *Kairo* is about presenting fictional accounts of a role-reversal in society, which, were it to exist in real life, would greatly affect the future of Japan.

Alternatives to the common understanding are also present in the *HAYABUSA* films. The *HAYABUSA* narrative provides a fantasy of scientifically minded hegemonic masculinity, where men relentlessly work for the company and for the good of the nation. In other words, they project a hybrid masculinity that maintains the hegemonic ideal and patriarchal power. This hybrid masculinity is also used as a symbol for a superior national identity, which, given the history of Japan, is quite troublesome. The films present an alluring array of scenarios that emphasize the role of Japan as a scientific superpower: international negotiations, the ability of HAYABUSA to draw *hikikomori* from their homes, and the overall emphasis on patriarchy as the fundamental organizing structure for a future Japan. These films promote not only scientific nationalism but in many cases mere "good old" nationalism. Ideas of *nihonjinron* are engaged with and implemented. In addition, these films build an essentialist representation of ideal Japanese masculinity. The function of scientific masculinity in this case is to encourage Japanese men to work harder, because only hard work brings results and pride to the nation. It can be questioned, however, whether this really is the reality of 21st-century Japan.

Hybridity in *HAYABUSA* maintains the institutional nature of gender regimes, contributing to the pertaining overall dominance of men over women and some men over other men. They are not emergent revolutionary new

models, but in fact residual expressions of gender and sexual inequality.[187] During a time when fewer and fewer men are able to access hegemonic masculinity in Japan, the ideal is anchored by "the play of masculine imagery in the symbolic realm."[188] Thus, instead of fictional fantasies the *HAYABUSA* films provide some very real fantasies indeed, portraying the Japanese engineer not only as "as a master of machines but as a potential manipulator of all industrial relationships."[189] These are, in other words, stories of the Japanese male scientist figuratively saving the entire nation. Reality and ideologies, however, do not often meet. The picture painted by the films of Japan is quite scary. It is a picture where women have no role and where work is only meaningful for an individual. In a way, HAYABUSA as a state-led robot project works to cyborgize everyone around it. Implicitly, the picture the films paint of Japan is one of a country that wants total control and the absolute dedication of its citizens, without any nails that should be hammered down. I find the national image portrayed by the *HAYABUSA* films to be, in fact, the most disconcerting of all the films. First, the wholly uncritical way the films deal with the subject matter is alarming. It tells about the deep will to internalize this given image. Second, the story is not just any fantasy—it is a very real fantasy that affects the future of Japanese society.

[187] See Bridges and Pascoe, "Hybrid Masculinities," 247.

[188] Messner, "The Governator," 475.

[189] Charles S. Maier, *In Search of Stability: Explorations in Historical Political Economy* (Cambridge, New York, New Rochelle, Sydney and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 28.

8 DISCUSSION

This thesis has traced the depictions of scientific masculinity in Japanese *kaiki eiga*. All of the films discussed in this thesis have relied on techno-scientific imaginary in order to negotiate possible futures for Japan. These negotiations have taken place in the form of mad and other scientists, as well as their monsters. Ranging from the outright lunatic Dr. Sano to the astute but troubled Dr. Serizawa, from the overworked Dr. Hayasaki to the savior-like scientists in the HAYABUSA project, scientific masculinity and especially the results of their experiments narrate imaginings of themes central to postwar Japanese social and cultural history. It is clear that *kaiki eiga* actively participates in negotiating a multitude of salient national images: imperialist, pacifist, racial, technological, economic and, last but not least, patriarchal. These images reflect the changes Japanese society has undergone after the end of the Pacific War, as well as those that, according to the filmmakers, the society should undergo.

I set out with the ambitious task of tying together several interrelated fields: the study of the history of science in Japan, the study of Japanese cinema in general and Japanese horror cinema in particular, the study of the fantastic and weird, the study of Japanese postwar cultural and social history, and the study of masculinities. Research gaps were plenty. First, the field of Japanese film studies has acknowledged Japanese horror cinema as an important field of study only in the last 15 years or so. Within Japanese horror film studies, in turn, emphasis has been on certain types of films, such as ghost stories. Films with scientifically created male monsters have yet to receive full attention. Second, the history of science in Japan seems to have existed as its own, quite separate field. Apart from a few seminal studies, it is rarely mentioned in popular culture studies, although the works themselves might involve a myriad of portrayals of techno-scientific innovations and scientists. This particular history becomes interlinked with the general history of postwar Japan, including its successes and challenges.

At the outset of this research I had three particular research objectives, which fundamentally stemmed from my dedicated field of focus. First, my aim was to contest the canonical approach to the material by redefining *kaiki eiga* as an all-encompassing category of speculative cinema within which it is possible to analyze works that contain both the supernatural and the scientific. This also helps to understand the trans/crossmedial nature of the topic. Second, this thesis put the previously underanalyzed men of horror at the center of the study, arguing that it is through them that fictional narratives portray and mediate potential, past or future images of nationhood. An exploration of these images through scientific tropes became the third objective of this thesis.

8.1 FINDINGS

In the introduction, I outlined three specific research questions that I set out to answer. First, how should one define *kaiki* and what is it actually? Second, what is scientific masculinity and what kind of function does it have in the films? Third, what kind of contexts do the films draw from? My main hypothesis—that scientific masculinity is used as a means of navigating national images—stemmed from these. I found this to be the case, and I will now elaborate on the results.

8.1.1 REFLECTING ON THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Japanese *kaiki eiga* presents a topic that is immensely wonderful and intriguingly multilayered. Many of the narratives in the films under study are closely connected with the Japanese literary tradition and overall discourse of the weird and the fantastic. The departure point for this research came when I encountered *Henshin ningen* films. Although not "lost" in the literal sense of the word, these films were generally not referred to within the horror film discourse. I wanted to dissect the meaning of these films, but first I had to find a context within which they could be properly approached. It was quite clear that Japanese horror film studies, despite its prevalence and recent popularity, did not offer a suitable interpretative framework. Thus, one of the overarching aims of this study was to be able to together analyze works that had previously been placed within separate generic categories, and which had been missing from the more traditional field of Japanese horror film studies.

The answer to my first research question appeared already in Chapter 2. I drew from previous literature in fantastic studies, as well as from science fiction and horror film studies, in order to discuss the general nature of fictional weirdness. I came to the conclusion that the best definition for *kaiki eiga* is speculative fiction. It is not only about departing from what we consider real; it is also about speculating what could be. To analyze *kaiki eiga* as speculative fiction allows for the inclusion of works that share similar themes and motifs, but which have been regarded as different genres. Thus, *kaiki eiga* is an umbrella term for a wide array of weird, speculative, fantastic and horrific narratives, as suggested by the approach in Uchiyama Kazuki's seminal volume. Despite the social constructivist approach that underlies this thesis, I also utilized Torben Grodal's biocultural framework to deepen the understanding of how and why certain motifs—fantastic, scientific, and monstrous—travel across cultures. This is related to the overall question of the popularity of such narratives. According to this reading, these motifs help us as human beings to deal with things that are related to our living environment. The fear of losing and regaining control, for example, is a paramount feature of fictions of science. This can be seen as analogous with losing and regaining national identities.

Within speculative cinema there exists a body of works that places men in the center of the narrative. These films are, more often than not, techno-scientific in nature. Even when they are not, at least the male character seems to be scientifically inclined. My second research question of what is scientific masculinity arose from this observation. As part of my conceptual framework, I promoted terminology with which to discuss masculinities in cinema in general, as well as scientific masculinity in particular. First, scientific masculinity primarily means male characters that embody a rational worldview: academics, research scientists, university lecturers, doctors and, in some cases, even detectives. They contribute to the creation of knowledge in society. I also discovered that the concept of hegemonic masculinity, as discussed at length by R.W. Connell, James Messerschmidt and Romit Dasgupta, among others, was quite important for the understanding of the male characters in the films. Scientific masculinity revolved around this concept, sometimes intersecting while sometimes directly opposing and challenging. I came to the conclusion that within scientific masculinities there were models that contributed to the hegemonic ideal, promoted hybrid forms of masculinities that nonetheless worked to reinstate patriarchy, or actually disrupted the ideal with subordinated and marginalized male forms. Especially the monsters of the scientists conformed to the last type, not necessarily incorporating scientific masculinity themselves but rather being outward manifestations of possibly dangerous (national) identities mediated via science. Like in the case of Mizuno and Sano in *Gasu ningen*, this disruption could be interpreted as a questioning of the emerging hegemonic masculine ideal. In other words, the films track the emergence of the idea of hegemonic masculinity, ending with the despairing scenarios of recessionary Japan, where this hegemonic form of masculinity has been made an Other, inverting the very logic of "hegemony." *Kaiki eiga* provides the vehicle for subversion and struggle.

I deduced that since science and technology have been paramount features of the modern nation-building project in Japan, like Chapter 3 demonstrated, men that deal with these in fiction can be analyzed as embodiments for testing various, even contrasting, images of nationhood or national identities. If narratives that center around the feminine often belong to the realm of the private and that of the family, male narratives highlight public concerns. The relationship between characters and reality could be defined as oppositional, conservative or problematic, as Gregory Barrett suggested. Underlying almost all of the fictions was the Frankenstein myth and the underlying assumption of succumbing to Sharalyn Orbaugh's so-called Frankenstein Syndrome. Both have continued to exert power over fictional narratives. I also came to the conclusion that the films portray Japan as haunted by a need to constantly reassess its role in the world, never allowing for merely one simplistic interpretation of the country as "a victim," "a hero" or "a monster."

In the films, scientific masculinity was used to negotiate these ambiguities, providing a micro-level representation of the macro-level concerns. These

macro-level workings are manifested as national concerns regarding Japan's militarist past, its pacifist stance vis-à-vis the postwar society, the way it embarked on the path of high economic growth only to be shaken to its core by the Lost Decade and, finally, how techno-scientific nationalism was starting to be promoted as an answer for creating a better—and more superior—future. Thus, scientific concerns correlated with the wider framework of social change from a militaristic society to a democratic one, as well as the more recent shift from an economic superpower to a society battling stagnation and various social anxieties. On a more "micro" level, it became clear that individual men, through the shift in their roles from soldiers to demilitarized soldiers to corporate warriors, were constantly used to negotiate these broader societal shifts.

8.1.2 ELABORATING THE RESULTS

The analytical chapters started with an exploration of how Japan's military past was engaged with and recalled in speculative cinema. Chapter 4 dealt with scientific masculinity as a way of encountering Japan's military past. The films, drawing from the *otoko no kaijin* tradition introduced by Shimura Miyoko, introduced a multitude of methods of using scientific masculinity to negotiate the image of Japan as a militarist and aggressive nation. Central issues included the fear and ambivalence surrounding the presence and role of ex-soldiers in the postwar order and questions of responsibility. The scientists in *Gojira*, *Densō ningen* and *Gasu ningen* were promoted as *fukuinhei* and the science practiced by them as destructive. In many cases, the films also portrayed the lurking imperial system in the democratized society, a system that was still terrifying despite the democratization of the Emperor himself. With weapons development and subsequent human victims comprising the main narrative material, these films most closely correspond to the universal Frankenstein myth and the Mad Scientist trope.

In some cases, an unsound or physically damaged body, such as Dr. Serizawa's, played an important role. His wounded body became an ambivalent marker of the past: a hero or a monster, a symbol of victorious Japanese science or a reminder of its dangers. *Gasu ningen* and *Densō ningen*, in turn, were more directly concerned with the potentially dangerous nature of Japanese wartime science. The films painted downright monstrous portrayals of science at the hands of *fukuinhei* unable to fully integrate into the postwar order. And, whereas Dr. Serizawa himself was a monstrous reminder of the past, this destructive science also paved the way for external monsters, such as Mizuno and Sudō. Thus, scientific masculinity functioned to make the audience ponder the consequences of Japan's militarist agenda. The human experimentation projects present in fiction, such as in *Tanin no kao*, mediated the issue around (wartime) responsibility.

In the 1950s and 1960s, portrayals of scientific masculinity could be contradictory even within the same film, as is the case with *Gojira*. The will to

negotiate both pacifist and militarist images tells not only about the inherent ambivalence regarding science itself but also the changing Japanese national image. Chapter 5 illuminated how the underlying ambiguity of postwar society and the sudden shift in the roles between the U.S. and Japan were manifested in the films of the 1950s and 1960s through images of Japan as a pacifist nation. These considerations functioned to make people reassess Japan's relationship with the West and its role in the new world order. An ultimate beacon for this newly found identity was Dr. Yamane of *Gojira*, completely excluded from the sphere of politics and promoting science only for the sake of science.

In addition, pacifist narratives can often be located on the axis of "us" versus "them": the savior-scientists save "us" from "them" or promote a positive picture of "us" in front of "them." Consequently, films such as *Bijo to ekitainingen* and *Chikyū bōeigun* introduced the character of a savior-scientist. Both *Bijo* and *Densō ningen* featured not only dubious scientific developments but also characters that nullified that threat. In *Bijo*, this role was allotted to Dr. Masada, whose rationality was presented as an overall favorable feature. He was even given the chance of becoming a *daikokubashira*, the new favorable type of working male. In *Densō ningen*, it was the reporter Kirioka who worked as the intermediary between science and the public. Important for the promotion of Japan as a pacifist nation was the nuclear discourse and the way it allowed Japan to conceive of itself as a victim. The films present scenarios of bad (American) nuclear science, which is countered with world-saving Japanese science in the nation's striving for democracy. But not everything is as rosy and harmonious as it seems. *Matango* twists the use of the nuclear narrative to portray Japan's inner grotesques instead. Scientific masculinity is used to reveal the price ordinary Japanese had to pay for the emerging economic growth and to maintain the image of a pacifist nation. Whereas in the late 1950s scientific masculinity functioned as a means to separate men from their past deeds and to reestablish Japanese men as integral parts of society, the picture became more despairing and hard to support by the mid-1960s.

Chapter 6 dealt with the image of Japan as an economic superpower, being "No. 1." This period of high growth started in the late 1950s, along with the earliest moments of the hegemonization of the salaryman. The films discussed in this chapter all challenged this notion. In addition, scientific masculinity was also used to dissect the two differing aspects of the *daikokubashira* ideology: that of a working (salaryman) masculinity and that of a husband-father. The films take these two forms of masculinities, place them within the realm of science and manage to destroy the idea of Japan as a patriarchal nation where men wield ultimate power. This is a direct representation of the concerns that were present during the Lost Decade(s) and the long recession. These are scenarios where scientific masculinity becomes an embodiment of Anne Allison's "millennial monstrosity." Scientific masculinity in these films is also used to address concerns around the idea of the husband-father. The scene in *Sakebi* where Dr. Sakuma murders his own son becomes highly

representative of the suppressed feelings of contemporary citizens. *Tetsuo*, in turn, challenged the *daikokubashira* ideology by promoting homosexuality instead of homosociality, an important attribute of the salaryman masculinity.

The image of Japan as a nation with its members dedicated to working and economic growth is questioned in *Tetsuo* and *Doppelgänger*. In *Tetsuo*, the stance toward scientific masculinity is twofold. On the one hand, the salaryman-cum-machine demonstrates the machine-like nature of Japan's "working bees." On the other hand, because of the monstrous nature of the metamorphosis it becomes an ironic expression of liberation from state policies and hegemonic salaryman masculinity. Bodily transformation results in the total liberation of the self, although in the process the self becomes monstrous in a social context. This liberation takes place in *Doppelgänger*, too. Dr. Hayasaki's anxious scientific salaryman masculinity is deconstructed through his encounter with his own identical doppelgänger and his own research project: an exo-suit chair for the disabled. In both films, scientific masculinity functions as a form of liberation fantasy from the suited-up form of a salaryman. In *Tetsuo*, the salaryman is literally re-suited.

Chapter 7 mediated attitudes around Japan's technological nationalism, where technology is promoted as the means of rescuing Japan from the recession and establishing it as an important world power in a compelling way. First, in *Kairo*, the image of Japan as a technological utopia is dissected by the *hikikomori*-like characters. In the film, scientific masculinity is correlated with consuming, not producing. Considering the export-or-die nature of the Japanese economy, this picture is alarming, and it also correlates with the worldwide fear around new technologies. Second, *Kairo* revolutionizes the gender discourse around technology, suggesting that Japan needs its women in order to thrive. Harue becomes a fine representation of scientific femininity, a form that is yet to fully manifest on the real-life stage. In a similar way, robo-nationalism is recalled in order to pacify possibly dangerous Others as members of Japanese society. The films paint a picture of a patriarchal and closed nation that will not allow its technological future to fully materialize. In addition, these narratives tell about the deep-rooted concerns around the future workforce in an aging society.

Interestingly, if the stance against hegemonic ideas is oppositional or at least problematic in the previous narratives regarding technonationalist ideas, the *HAYABUSA* films promote an exactly opposite logic. They use scientific masculinity as a conservative model of masculinity that promotes science and technology not only as the primary means of "bettering" Japan but also as a means of enforcing a retroactive idea of the relentlessly working male. Scientific masculinity functions to encourage the Japanese (men) to work harder—only hard work brings results and pride to the nation. The image of the nation that the film builds is indeed glorious. It is a nation that has the characteristics of a salaryman: loyalty and diligency. But, on top of this, it is also ambitious and possesses top-notch knowledge. Scientific masculinity in the *HAYABUSA* films mediates this extremely positive societal outlook in an

extremely retroactive way. With the need to look forward and promote new models of working and acting out genders, the films speculate on a highly disjointed vision of the future.

As I have demonstrated, scientific masculinity in speculative cinema is used in a multitude of ways to discuss the past and present of Japan and how the country sees its role in the world. Always teetering on the brink of the horrific, these narratives do not allow for purely positive national images to emerge. Rather, they challenge the spectator, highlighting the ever-important and always ambiguous nature of both the nation and science itself. They promote ways in which science can either save or destroy a nation and, finally, how masculine agents wield the power of science in fiction as in real life. Quite often these masculine agents are comparable to salarymen. This is the ultimate meaning I have located in these works. The films definitely call for a further exploration of the relationship between nation, science, gender and cinema.

8.1.3 SUBFINDINGS

Apart from my main findings, this thesis also provided a few interesting subfindings. First, it is evident that the concept of mutation in cinema has shifted. Whereas the films of the 1950s and 1960s were concerned with a corporeal transformation, contemporary cinema often illustrates the change of the psyche. It was not merely the outer appearance that had changed, but rather the individual identity had been replaced by something completely different. This can be seen to be due to differences in bodily paradigms. In prewar and wartime society, there was great emphasis on the creation of the healthy body, both individual and national. However, despite the fact that this emphasis on a healthy body continued into the postwar era, there was the possibility of mutation caused by radiation. Bodily ambiguity was thus a central feature of 1950s' and even 1960s' society, disappearing later with the introduction of consumable bodies. The psychological sense of threa remained, however. In the films, this is visible regarding the shift from the H-Men, seemingly devoid of any real psychological layer, to the salarymen in *Tetsuo*, whose outside transformation was an indicator of psychological change.

Second, spatiality figured greatly in the consideration of national images. Many of the films are also concerned with boundary spaces—the ocean, interstellar space and cyberspace—and posit scientific masculinity against them. Works such as *Bijo to ekitainingen*, *Gojira*, *Chikyū bōeigun*, *Matango*, *Kairo* and the *HAYABUSA* films all utilize this boundary-crossing motif. The films of the 1950s and 1960s most often use the first two in their discussions about postwar Japan, whereas cyberspace appears in a threatening form in some works of the 2000s. As spaces that separate Japan from the rest of the world, their representations in cinema should not go unnoticed. All the aforementioned films are explicitly interested in the different types of national identities promoted by Japan: military, pacifist and techno-supremist. They all refer to the world beyond Japan's borders, positioning the nation against

this symbolic "Other." This is not to say, however, that the image of Japan is always positive—quite the opposite. In addition, spatiality also plays a role in the containing of Japan's internal others, most prominently in the pictures of Tokyo in *Matango*, *Tanin no kao* and *Tetsuo*. The urban atmosphere of Tokyo, the center of Japan's economic activity, becomes an oppressive entity against which the struggle of the agents of scientific masculinity is posited.

8.2 FURTHER RESEARCH AND RECOMMENDATIONS

There are multiple directions into which this research could be developed. First, I have deduced that many Japanese fantastic films make use of commonly known characters—or types—which are used to convey the director's views about the society around them. The roles and functions of these characters may change in due course of time but this change, too, provides valuable information about what is perceived as socially acceptable or problematic behavior. The types I have found to exist in Japanese *kaiki eiga* are the Scientist, the Detective, the Husband-Father, the Instrumental Woman and, possibly, the Salaryman. In this thesis I have discussed, to some extent, all of the above and how scientific masculinity is manifested in them (or obviously not, in the case of the Instrumental Woman). A more in-depth study of these characters is needed within a framework that does not emphasize science only, but rather takes into account other areas of Japanese culture and society, too. This would develop the theme in the directions already established by Gregory Barrett, Isolde Standish and Ian Buruma.

Second, excavating the field of masculinity studies or critical men's studies more deeply could be highly beneficial for an in-depth understanding of the characters and their social meanings. This is also related to the first point, as many other types of masculinities apart from scientific masculinity are also present. At this point I have largely decided to exclude global studies of fictional or cinematic masculinities, concentrating mainly on studies of Japanese men, as well as the study of fictional types, such as the Mad Scientist motif. A more in-depth reading of the films could yield a deeper understanding of how cinematic masculinities have been analyzed worldwide and how these ideas have traveled to and from Japan. Hence, a cross-cultural study of scientific masculinity in world cinema is direly needed. Also to be explored are potential correlations between the director's own experiences and the fictional material. Inclusion of anime should also be considered.

Third, regarding the field of science, there is room for a deeper understanding of the history of science in Japan and how, beyond the films discussed here, it is related to the topic matter of other products of popular culture. For example, the cyborg narrative as it is played out in the *Tetsuo* films would make an interesting comparison with many works of anime. Being a vast field in itself, I did not have enough space to include cyborg studies in this thesis, although *Tetsuo*—and quite possibly *Doppelgänger*—could easily be

included in that category. Naturally, this line of research would also take into account the various anime adaptations that discuss the themes I have reviewed in this chapter but which I have decided to exclude from this particular study.

I am personally interested in further developing the connection between science and popular culture in Japan, establishing it as a relatively new field of research within the field of history of science as well as the field of popular culture studies. This thesis utilized an interdisciplinary approach that introduced and incorporated multiple fields of research, any one of which could yield material for a lifetime of scholarly research. I hope many scholars—myself included—will be able to follow this new path, which this thesis has illuminated.

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APPENDIX: PLOT SUMMARIES OF MAIN WORKS

***Gojira* (Godzilla, 1954)**

The films begins with the destruction of a ship in the sea near Ōdoshima island. The islanders tell the story of an ancient sea monster Gojira who later appears and wrecks havoc. The Japanese government decides to look into the strange events and sends an expedition to the island. The investigation team is led by paleontologist Yamane (Shimura Takashi) and also includes his daughter Emiko (Kōchi Momoko) and Emiko's friend Ogata (Takarada Akira). On the island they find radioactive footprints before Gojira attacks again.

Back in Tokyo, Yamane shares the results of the investigation: Gojira is a large sea creature that has been disturbed by hydrogen bomb testing. The government is not keen on disclosing any information but as ships keep disappearing at sea it becomes impossible to hide the truth. Yamane is not happy with the military counter-attack measures taken against the monster. He wants it studied. His daughter, Emiko, however, escorts a newspaper reporter to Yamane's apprentice Dr. Serizawa (Hirata Akihiko) to whom she is betrothed and whose work is implied to provide a solution to the Gojira problem. He blandly refuses to tell the reporter anything. After the reporter leaves, Serizawa demonstrates Emiko what he has been working on. Emiko faints with a scream.

Gojira attacks Tokyo again and the SDF plan action. At this point it also becomes clear that Emiko and Ogata are in a relationship. Emiko decides to tell his father about her intentions of marrying Ogata instead but is interrupted when Yamane and Ogata start arguing over whether to study Gojira or to kill it. Yamane tells Ogata to leave. At the same time Gojira attacks Tokyo again in the paramount scene of the film, emerging from the sea and stomping across Tokyo, destroying the National Diet Building in the process. The destruction is shown in immaculate detail as are the counter-measures by the SDF. These are futile and Gojira returns to the sea, leaving a trail of destruction and wounded behind.

Emiko decides to break her promise to Serizawa and tells Ogata about a weapon, oxygen destroyer, created by Serizawa. The couple faces Serizawa over the use of his weapon. Serizawa and Ogata fight and, when Emiko tends to a wound on Ogata's head, it dawns on Serizawa that Emiko has no interest in marrying him. At the same time a television program broadcasts the tragedy of Japan while a girl choir laments in the background. Serizawa changes his mind but throws all his research notes into a fire in order to make sure no one will be able to rebuild the weapon. In the final scene Ogata and Serizawa descend into the ocean to use the oxygen destroyer. Serizawa, upon unleashing the weapon, cuts off his oxygen and tells Ogata to be happy with Emiko. Gojira is destroyed together with Serizawa. When people onboard the naval ship

mourn Serizawa, Yamane issues an ominous warning that another Gojira might appear if humans continue with H-bomb testing.

***Chikyū bōeigun* (The Mysterians, 1957)**

The film begins with a local festival near Mt. Fuji. Attendees include astrophysicist Dr. Shiraishi (Hirata Akihiko) and his friend Dr. Atsumi (Sahara Jōji), accompanied by both Shiraishi's fiancé Hiroko (Kōchi Momoko) and his sister (Shirakawa Yumi). Shiraishi behaves in an aloof manner, telling Atsumi that the relationship between him and Hiroko is over. He gives no other reason. The festival is interrupted when a huge fire starts in a forest. Shiraishi disappears. The next day the village is destroyed in a huge earthquake, followed by the emergence of a giant robot with superior weapon technology. Atsumi investigates the incident with the police, but the robot kills everyone except Atsumi and one other police officer. The SDF, too, are unable to fight it with their weapons. The robot is finally destroyed when it crosses a bridge that is detonated.

The giant war robot seems to be connected to a newly-found asteroid called Mysteroid which Shiraishi had been studying. Atsumi briefs governmental officers that the robot contains materials that are not from this world. It is not before long when Mysterians emerge near Mt. Fuji, tearing the ground open with their huge ship. They ask for a meeting with five top scientists, one of whom is Atsumi's supervisor Adachi (Shimura Takashi). At the spaceship they tell their story; how their planet was destroyed by a nuclear war and the inhabitants were forced to escape to Mars. Because of the presence of strontium-90, much of their population was left deformed. They request a small area of land as well as a right to mate with the women of the Earth in order to re-create their race in a healthy way. Japan, of course, refuses. It is then revealed that some women, including Shiraishi's sister, have already been captivated. A battle ensues but Japan is unable to fight back with their inferior weaponry. Instead, they send a request for help to the United Nations. Help is readily given but to no avail. Instead, a video manifest from the derailed Dr. Shiraishi, in which he rambles about the victory of science itself, is broadcast.

Atsumi decides to embark on a solitary mission himself. He finds an entrance to the ship and the captivated women. When they try to escape, they are encountered with Shiraishi in a Mysterian costume. He tells Atsumi and the women that he had been led astray by the Mysterians who must be destroyed. He sacrifices himself and rescues his comrades, also helping the United Nations to use a specially-built weapon from inside the ship. Before his sacrifice he hands his research results to Atsumi, telling him to hand them to Adachi. The ship is destroyed but a few spaceships escape. Humankind must be prepared, states Adachi.

Bijo to ekitainingen (The H-Man, 1958)[1]

Bijo to ekitainingen begins with a scene straight out from hell: an explosion, a flash of orange light and then a news announcement of the many lives this nuclear experiment has taken in the South Pacific sea. The film cuts to Tokyo, where rain is pouring down. A man, Misaki (Itō Hisaya), is suddenly hit by a car, but there is no body to be seen – just empty clothes and a stash of drugs. The lead takes the police to Misaki's girlfriend, cabaret singer Arai Chikako (Shirakawa Yumi). At the cabaret club Detective Tominaga (Hirata Akihiko) sees his old friend from the university, Masada (Sahara Jōji), approaching Chikako. He decides to interrogate them both. Masada, who is currently a professor at a local university, explains that he is interested in the strange effect hydrogen radiation might have on human beings; that a human body might melt under strange conditions. Only after Masada takes Tominaga with other members of the police to meet two victims of the nuclear explosion they really believe him. The unfortunate events of the ship are introduced in a horror-filled flashback where a human being after another mutates into a fear-inducing liquid being. After that Masada demonstrates this on a test animal.

The H-Men then appear in Tokyo with newspapers spreading fear among people. The film's finale starts when the H-Men appear at Chikako's cabaret club. It is finally revealed that Misaki, too, has become one of the monsters. In the end Chikako, who has gotten closer to Masada along the way, is kidnapped and taken into the very sewer system where the police is planning on scorching the H-Men. It is up to Masada to save Chikako. After a high intensity rescue scene, Tokyo is in flames. The film ends with the ominous promise of the return of the H-Men.

Densō ningen (The Secret of the Telegian, 1960)[2]

When a man is brutally murdered in an amusement park attraction, newspaper reporter Kirioka (Tsuruta Kōji) and his girlfriend Akiko (Shirakawa Yumi) are some of the first ones to try to solve case together with the police. Their only lead is a military badge found from the site. It seems that the murder has something to do with a group of ex-soldiers: Taki (Sakai Sachio), Ryū (Tajima Yoshibumi), Ōnishi (Kawazu Seizaburō) and the murdered Tsukamoto (Ōtomo Shin). They have all been sent a badge similar to what Tsukamoto had with him. The three gather together in a club owned by Ryū and try to tackle the issue of their own imminent deaths. Once they start listening to a voice recording adhered to them, a voice from the past begins to haunt them again. 'I am Sudō, the one you killed during the war,' tells the voice, after which Sudō (Nakamaru Tadao) himself appears. He shoots Ryū but once the police start chasing Sudō, he disappears.

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[1] This description is modified from my chapter in *The Encyclopedia of Japanese Horror Cinema,* edited by Salvador Murguia (Lanham, Boulder, New York, London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016).

[2] Ibid.

Even though Ryū, Ōnishi and Taki have initially promised not to reveal anything about the past, Taki, in the presence of Ōnishi, finally tells the police what happened during one fateful day after the Second World War. Taki's story is shown in a flashback. He, Ōnishi, Tsukamoto, Ryū and Sudō were all working at a military laboratory under the command of teleport and telekinesis specialist Dr. Niki (Sasaki Takamaru). Ōnishi wants to sell the gold used in building the experimental machines, but Sudō and Niki refuse. Both are seemingly killed in the following battle and the collapse of the cave where the men were. Ōnishi and his companions survive but find no bodies in the cave. Instead, now Sudō is there to take revenge against those who wronged him.

Kirioka and Akiko investigate the cabin in idyllic Karuizawa where Sudō and his mentor Niki have been living since the accident. Sudō kills Niki who already has lost both of his legs in the previous accident. Nearby a volcano is showing signs of an eruption and the following earthquake almost destroys Niki's underground laboratory. This doesn't prevent Sudō from realizing his plan, first killing Taki and then going after Ōnishi. Ōnishi, surrounded by his loyal men, has sought safety in his country house. The police, too, is after Sudō but he manages to stab Ōnishi with a sword. But when Sudō tries to teleport himself back to the Karuizawa cabin, the volcano finally erupts and destroys Niki's house. Sudō dies in the liminal space he is currently in.

***Gasu ningen daiichi-gō* (The Human Vapor, 1960)[3]**

A bank in downtown Tokyo is robbed, but the perpetrator is nowhere to be seen. A quick-paced chase follows, but the police is at their wits end when he vanishes into thin air. After the second robbery everything points to the direction of the Kasuga residence. The Kasuga clan is one of the most famous clans of Nō actors in Japan. Currently upholding the name is the last of the line, beautiful Fujichiyo Kasuga (Yachigusa Kaoru). Detective Okamoto (Mihashi Tatsuya), the main character of the film, tries questioning her, but Fujichiyo only provides vague answers. Okamoto's girlfriend Kyōko (Sata Keiko), a magazine reporter for a local paper, does not succeed any better. Okamoto, however, cannot shake off the feeling that Fujichiyo is somehow connected to the robberies and starts following her one day when she drives to a library in downtown Tokyo. In spite of his efforts Fujichiyo spends her time only conducting research on Nō plays. Later, however, the stolen money is found from the Kasuga residence and Fujichiyo is arrested. Angered by the unfair arrest of Fujichiyo, the real culprit, Mizuno (Tsuchiya Yoshio), materializes in front of the police and the bank representatives. He can not only transform into gas himself, but also use gas as a weapon. 'I'm not a human being, so I won't obey rules made by humans,' he states and kills the general manager of one targeted bank by strangling him with electric blue smoke.

[3] This description is modified from my chapter in *The Encyclopedia of Japanese Horror Cinema,* edited by Salvador Murguia (Lanham, Boulder, New York, London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016).

Mizuno's ultimate aim is to free Fujichiyo from prison. He strangles the guards and helps the prisoners to escape, but the innocent Fujichiyo decides to stay in prison. She is eventually released.

Little by little Mizuno's horrifying story, too, starts to unravel. Before his transformation he was just a normal library assistant working at a university library. He had a dream of becoming a pilot in Japan's Self-Defense Forces, but failed the entrance exam. Feeling bitter and fed up with his life he accepts researcher Kyūko Sano's (Murakami Fuyuki) suggestions of becoming his research assistant in a space development project. Sano promises to enhance Mizuno's body, to build it afresh cell by cell. Mizuno is given an injection after which he remembers sleeping a total of 240 hours. When he wakes up, he has transformed into a human vapor, which comes as a shock to Sano as well. Mizuno kills Sano in a fit of rage after discovering how many other victims Sano has sacrificed in order to create his vision of an ultimate human being. The police come to the conclusion that just by existing, Mizuno causes anxiety in the orderly society and must be killed.

In the meanwhile Fujichiyo is planning to use all her money on her final Nō show. The Kasuga clan has been suffering economically. Mizuno came to know Fujichiyo from his days as a library assistant, fell in love and now wants nothing more than to use his new abilities to support. The connection between Mizuno and Fujichiyo is revealed in the press, and Fujichiyo's prestigious Nō show is turned into an exhibition which people only attend in order to catch a glimpse of Mizuno. The police, in turn, plan on destroying Mizuno after the show, but Fujichiyo beats them to it. After her brilliant final dance she and Mizuno embrace, after which she blows up the whole building, herself and Mizuno included.

Matango (1963)

Matango begins with a shot of a hospital, where university professor Murai Kenji (Kubo Akira) is locked behind bars. He starts narrating his story to the listeners on the other side. Kenji, together with his student and girlfriend Akiko (Yashiro Miki), has been on a sailing trip with his assistant Koyama (Sahara Kenji), writer Yoshida (Tachikawa Hiroshi), singer Sekiguchi Mami (Mizuno Kumi) and Kasai Masafumi (Tsuchiya Yoshio), a celebrity owner of the yacht. Together with them is also the skipper of the yacht, Sakuda (Koizumi Hiroshi). A pleasant sail turns into something else as a storm engulfs the ship, resulting in a shipwreck on a mysterious faraway island. The group starts exploring the island and finds a forest of mysterious mushrooms which Sakuda warns them not to eat despite their hunger. Further on they find a shipwreck where they seek shelter. Days pass and the crew grows anxious and hungry. In addition, they start wondering about the possibility of the ship being a part of a nuclear experimentation. There are quite a many mysterious jars and diary remarks that support the claim.

Hunger causes conflicts among the crew. Kasai steals food from their storages whilst Yoshida resorts to eating the mushrooms. They are also

attacked by freakish mushroom-like humanoids. Ultimately, Yoshida threatens the rest of the crew with a gun. He is then locked away, later to be freed by Mami. They try to overtake the ship, killing Koyama. Kenji and Akiko manage to drive the two away from the ship but later Mami returns, luring Kasai with him to the mushroom forest. There Kasai realizes that everyone who eats the mushrooms turns into one himself. He is attacked by the mushroom people in the lush and wet forest. When Sakuda, too, kills himself, only Kenji and Akiko remain on the ship. Akiko is attacked and kidnapped by the mushroom people. When Kenji finally finds her, he realizes she, too, has eaten the mushrooms and fallen to the curse. She smiles and asks Kenji to do the same so that the two can remain happily together on the island. Kenji, rational to the end, escapes both Akiko and other mushrooms, finally fleeing the island by himself. Days after he is rescued and taken to the hospital in Tokyo. The film ends when Kenji turns to face the listeners – and spectators – in order to reveal his half-mutated face. He states that he would have been happier there on the island with Akiko as humans and the mushroom monsters are not so different at all. The film ends with a shot of Tokyo and its neon signs.

***Tanin no kao* (The Face of Another, 1966)**

Tanin no kao starts with the film showcasing a selection of plastic body parts, charts of the human anatomy and a talking x-ray of a human skull. After these the film introduces its main characters, Okuyama (Nakadai Tatsuya) and his wife (Kyō Machiko). Okuyama's face has been destroyed in a work-related accident and he has bandages wrapped around his head. Only the eyes are visible. Okuyama's marriage is in crisis because of the accident and the shame Okuyama feels about his face. Depressed Okuyama decides to visit Dr. Hira (Hira Mikijirō), a psychiatrist, from whom he seeks help. Hira promises to help Okuyama by creating a bio-mask for him. Okuyama would then be able to start a new life. After visiting his former workplace and discussing with his former colleague, he decides to accept Hira's idea of a mask. Together with Hira they start looking for a model face and, after finding a suitable candidate, Hira creates the mask. With Okuyama's new face finally in place, the two go out celebrating.

Finally liberated, Okuyama visits malls, restaurants and bars, sometimes accompanied by Hira. His identity is however compromised when he meets a girl he has helped when wearing the bandages. Not remembering his new face he accidentally mentions the meeting between the two but is able to talk his way out of this. The incident nonetheless makes him realize that he might not be as anonymous as he would like to be. Renting a new flat, Okuyama decides to seduce his wife while wearing the mask. After the two get intimate, Okuyama breaks down, reveals himself and blames her for cheating on him. His wife, however, says that she knew it was him all along and that she thought the mask was there only to make her more comfortable. Even though Okuyama is willing to make amends, his wife leaves angrily. Okuyama is left alone. The

finale of the film portrays him wandering the streets of Tokyo. He tries to violate a woman but is caught, which does not bother him. The police call Hira, who says Okuyama is a patient from his hospital and of no danger. Okuyama disagrees, begging the police to take him into custody. When released with Hira's help, he then kills Hira in the middle of an anonymous crowd.

Intersecting the actual story, the film also introduces a young girl whose face has been mutilated in the bombing of Nagasaki. Working at a group home for war veterans, her life is full of hardships. Ultimately she drowns herself in the ocean.

***Tetsuo: The Iron Man* (1988)**

The film opens up with Yatsu (Tsukamoto Shinya) thrusting a giant metal rod into his thigh. The wound is then infected with maggots. Running to the streets, he is hit by a car and left to die. The next scene is of the salaryman (Taguchi Tomorowo) shaving. Suddenly a metal thorn appears from his cheek. All attempts of the salaryman to remove the thorn are futile. Everything seems to be connected to his weird industrial dreams. On his way to work he is chased by a metal-mutated lady with glasses. She follows the salaryman to a public toilet where the salaryman is finally able to escape by stabbing the woman with a pen. He later defeats her once and for all.

The next scene is of the salaryman dreaming of his girlfriend (Fujiwara Kei) dancing erotically with a giant penis-like hose attached to her crotch. The couple have sex with the girlfriend using her paraphernalia to penetrate the salaryman. He wakes up and discovers that his transformation has escalated. Rather than worrying, his girlfriend finds the transformation sexy. The couple have sex, after which the salaryman mutates with a greater speed. Ultimately his penis mutates into a giant drill-penis with which he kills his girlfriend. Yatsu emerges from her corpse, taunting the salaryman. At this point it is finally revealed that the salaryman and his girlfriend are the ones responsible for hitting Yatsu with their car. They hid his body in the woods and proceeded to have sex on the scene. Everything leads to the final encounter between Yatsu and the salaryman, where Yatsu declares he will show "New World" to the salaryman. Finally the two merge into a huge phallic tank-like creature that takes the roads of Tokyo on a mission of turning the world into metal and rust.

***Tetsuo II: The Body Hammer* (1992)**

Taniguchi (Taguchi Tomorowo) is a salaryman living with his wife Kana (Kanaoka Nobu) and their son (Tomioka Keinosuke). He has lost memory of his early childhood. One day, after having breakfast and leaving for work, Taniguchi is followed by two skinheads. This soon becomes a wild chase across streets, corridors and escalators until Taniguchi is injected with some substance. Taniguchi spends time with his family, trying to build up some muscle at the gym. One day, however, he finds his son gone. He chases the two skinheads taking his son to the rooftop of his building. He ultimately kills his son with a gun emerging from his arm.

Taniguchi is then taken to an underground hideout of skinhead bodybuilders, where a mad scientist (Utazawa Toraemon) wants to build a horde of human weapons. He uses Taniguchi's body as a test object. A man, Yatsu (Tsukamoto Shinya), then kills the scientist and gains control of the group of bodybuilders. They lure Taniguchi's grieving wife to the hideout, simultaneously revealing mutating Taniguchi's history to both Kana and Taniguchi himself in a flashback. Yatsu and Taniguchi are, in fact, brothers with a father (Kim Sujin) who is trying to create a bio-mutant human weapon. Taniguchi kills both of their parents in a fit of rage when finding them violently having sex. This violent nature is now utilized to form a man-machine, a perfect human weapon. Yatsu and Taniguchi battle and the already tank-like Taniguchi finally kills his brother. He rides into the streets of Tokyo with Kana sitting on his lap and the bodybuilders on tow.

***Tetsuo III: The Bullet Man* (2009)**

Anthony (Eric Bossick) is a normal exhausted salaryman with a wife and a child, riding a full rush hour train that smells of sweat and makes Anthony gag. Similarly, people at the office smell and disgust him. Work exhausts him. However, he loves his wife Yuriko (Monō Akiko) and Yuriko loves him. This is the reason why Anthony is able to go on with his miserable working life. Whenever Anthony has time off, he likes to spend time with his son. One day the two are out when a car emerges. At the same time Anthony's phone rings. It is his boss who even calls him on his day off. Looking frustrated, Anthony answers. Upon finishing, he sees a Western man smirking at him from the car window, after which the man drives his car into Anthony's son, killing him instantly.

Anthony mutates from rage. His limbs become guns and overall he starts resembling a machine gun man. He starts chasing the laughing killer intending on not only killing him but also taking his anger out on innocent bystanders. It is revealed that in the past, both Anthony's father and his mother had participated in a so-called "Tetsuo project". When Anthony's mother became sick with cancer she wanted Anthony's father to have a child with the Tetsuo cyborg. That child was Anthony. Despite his rage, Anthony is able to return to normal because of an apocalyptic vision he receives should he kill Yatsu (Tsukamoto Shinya), who has kidnapped his wife. The film ends with Yuriko being pregnant once more and Anthony, seemingly in human form, going about his life. However, something in the very last expression in his face makes the spectator think that The Bullet Man is still lurking inside him. Unlike his predecessors, Anthony is able to contain this side.

***Doppelgänger* (2006)**

A young woman, Yuka (Nagasaku Hiromi), sees her brother while on a grocery run. Surprisingly, her brother is also at home when she gets back. A phone rings and Yuka is informed that her brother has just passed away. She realizes that the figure at home is, in fact, a mysterious double. The story then cuts to

a promotion video by Medical SciTech, a company where Dr. Hayasaki Michio (Yakusho Kōji) develops an innovative artificial chair that could mobilize paralyzed people. Stressed and constantly in a bad mood, it's been ten years since Hayasaki last invented breakthrough technology. He is pushed on by his superiors, who promise to get him funding, but only if he agrees on giving a demonstration of the chair. Ultimately the demonstration goes well, although the chair is nowhere near finished.

Burdened Hayasaki then encounters his doppelgänger, who nonchalantly enters his life and takes control. His team member Takano (Satō Hitomi) tells him about Yuka, who also has experience with doppelgängers. The two meet. Meanwhile it becomes apparent that Hayasaki's doppelgänger is anything but him in nature. He gets Hayasaki fired by breaking into his lab. He drinks, smokes and seduces. After having been let go, Hayasaki steals the chair from his old lab and gets a new assistant with whose help (and that of the doppelgänger) he is finally able to finish the chair. Yuka becomes a team member, too, also falling in love with Hayasaki himself. When Hayasaki, Yuka and his assistant, Kimishima (Yūsuke Santamaria), finally kill Hayasaki's double, they embark on a road trip with the finalized chair. On their trip they encounter a former boss of Hayasaki, Murakami (Emoto Akira), who has been fired for embezzling development funds. He wants to partner with Hayasaki in order to economically benefit from the chair. Hayasaki declines. Kimishima then steals the chair, leaving Hayasaki and Yuka to chase after him. When Hayasaki reaches him, Kimishima drives his van over Hayasaki, supposedly killing him. After this he steals Murakami's billions and continues his escape with the chair. Yuka is then saved by Hayasaki, but at this point it is impossible to say which one of the Hayasakis it is, as both have seemed to die in the course of the film. The final scene between Hayasaki and Kimishima sees the two fighting in an abandoned house and finally chased by an enormous disco ball.

The film ends when Hayasaki takes his chair to a rival company Medicom Industry. After hearing that they want to utilize it to their market benefit and in the process maybe also help the disabled, Hayasaki changes his mind. He and Yuka drive to a seaside cliff and take the chair out of their van. The chair starts gliding towards the cliff, ultimately self-destructing. Hayasaki and Yuka walk into the sunset, hand in hand.

***Sakebi* (Retribution, 2006)**

Detective Yoshioka (Yakusho Kōji) is assigned to a case where a victim after another is found drowned in sea water. The first murder is that of a woman in high heels and a red dress. The murder is shown but the killer's face is not known. Yoshioka's team starts investigating the murder, finding on the body a fingerprint that belongs to Yoshioka. They deduce that Yoshioka has touched the body without gloves and continue on. The second murder is of a youngster, killed by his father, Dr. Sakuma (Nakamura Ikuji). The boy had asked Sakuma for drugs to pay for his debt, which he refuses. Instead he kills his son, drowning him into a pool of water. Next day Yoshioka and his team place

Sakuma under arrest, suspecting him of the first murder, too. Sakuma breaks down during the interrogation, seeing ghosts and ultimately losing his mind.

In the night Yoshioka is visited by a ghastly woman in red (Hazuki Riona). "Why didn't you stay with me?" she asks before exiting through the door. She later appears in front of Yoshioka when he is alone by a wharf, declaring that Yoshioka killed her. Puzzled and terrified, Yoshioka seeks comfort from his girlfriend (Konishi Manami). The next scene is of Ms. Yabe Miyuki (Okunuki Kaoru) and her manager Onoda (Nomura Hironobu), with whom she has been having an affair. Onoda tells her he is going to leave his wife. Later that day Miyuki is witnessed filling canister after canister with sea water, pouring everything into her bathtub. When Onoda comes there and starts talking about their future and future children, Miyuki hits him with a club and drowns him in the bath. The identity of the first victim, Shibata Reiko (Akiyoshi Sakiko), is also discovered. When Yoshioka talks to her mother, she describes her as a wild child without a stable income, blaming herself for everything. Yoshioka and his team ultimately arrest Reiko's ex-boyfriend for the murder.

However, the ghost in red keeps appearing to Yoshioka. She is a figure he has seen from afar while riding a ferry. She blames him for leaving her to die alone. The police then figure out that all of the culprits have taken the same ferry route that Yoshioka when he saw the ghost in red, except Miyuki, who encountered her in a mirror. Yoshioka sends his girlfriend away and takes a ferry to the building where he first saw the ghost. He finds her remains there and she tells him she forgives him. Back at home, however, he discovers yet another ghost – that of Harue, his girlfriend. Yoshioka, too, has been affected by the ghastly rage and killed his girlfriend whose body is there in his apartment. She forgives Yoshioka who disappears into a lonely existence with the bones of the ghost in red.

Kairo (Pulse, 2001)

Kudō Michi (Asō Kumiko) is an employee of a botanical company where she works together with Yabe (Matsuo Masatoshi), Junko (Arisaka Kurume) and Taguchi (Mizuhashi Kenji). Taguchi has been absent for a few days and Michi goes looking for him. At his home she witnesses him hanging himself. She also discovers a disc from Taguchi's computer which includes a shot of him staring blankly at the screen with a ghost staring at him. Elsewhere Kawashima Ryōsuke (Katō Haruhito) has purchased a computer which, upon establishing an Internet connection, takes him to an unknown website asking him if he would like to meet a ghost. In the night the computer logs onto the site by itself. Puzzled, Kawashima goes to the computer lab of his university where he meets Karasawa Harue (Koyuki). She suggests he prints the page in order for her to be able to see what is really happening with Kawashima's computer.

The film then cuts to Yabe, who gets a phone call saying "Help me". He goes to Taguchi's apartment to find a black stain on the wall and a 'forbidden room' sealed with red tape, which he then enters. He encounters a ghost, becomes depressed and later vanishes. The same pattern happens with Junko. Michi

tries to help her but in vain. Kawashima, in turn, is unable to get a screen cap or use the print screen command. Harue comes to help him after which the two go to the computer lab. Harue explains an installation made by her *sempai* where dots move across screen bouncing off or self-destroying if coming too close. This is, according to her, representative of human relationships. Kawashima then goes to the university library where he meets a child ghost. At the same time forbidden rooms multiply all over Tokyo and people vanish. Kawashima goes to find Harue out of control. He begs her to escape with him, which she does, but ultimately runs away from Kawashima.

Michi and Kawashima meet in a deserted Tokyo where a ghastly apocalypse is about to occur. When getting gasoline from an abandoned warehouse, Kawashima finds Harue. She shoots herself in the head. Kawashima then encounters yet another ghost in a forbidden room. "Death is eternal loneliness," rattles the ghost. Kawashima loses his will to live, but with Michi's help is able to escape. They drive through burning Tokyo and continue their escape by a boat, further rescued by a ship heading towards Latin America with a few survivors. Similar events are, nonetheless, happening all over the world. Kawashima vanishes while Michi continues on living.

***HAYABUSA* (2011)**

In 2002, nerdy and clumsy Mizusawa Megumi (Takeuchi Yūko) attends a public talk by Matoba Yasuhiro (Nishida Toshiyuki), a chief of JAXA's PR section. Her late brother had always been a space enthusiast, a reason behind Mizusawa's interest. Later, she is hired by JAXA. Mainly, her job is to explain about JAXA's technology to young children. She does this by drawing manga about the experiences of the team working with HAYABUSA. Pages of Megumi's manga are turned into fantastic narrations on screen throughout the film. The probe's story is illuminated through these images. The launch of HAYABUSA successfully takes place in May 2003 despite the limited budget of the project. Two years later HAYABUSA reaches the asteroid Itokawa and manages to take a photo. Mizusawa rejoices together with the rest of the team. The probe, however, is unable to make a proper landing and a quarrel ensues whether the probe should immediately return to Earth to avoid further damage, or continue its mission of acquiring a sample. The team goes for the latter option, after which the probe disappears from the radar.

After HAYABUSA's disappearance the project is in a state of confusion and Mizusawa's feelings are torn. She confronts her fears and insecurities on her brother's grave, where her mother tells her to keep on exploring space and science not for her brother, but for herself. Soon after HAYABUSA is found, its engine broken. The JAXA team is able to re-program it for a long return home. The film ends with Mizusawa giving a public talk about HAYABUSA, having grown from a shy and withdrawn young woman into a confident expert.

***Hayabusa – Haruka naru kikan* (2012)**

Haruka naru kikan starts with the launch of HAYABUSA. Members of NASA are seen visiting the base at Kagoshima, where the project leader Yamaguchi (Watanabe Ken) constantly apologizes for their shabby base. It is made clear that this is a world's first-type of a mission, a project for exploring the origins of the Earth. The launch is successful. Watching it from afar is also reporter Inoue Mari (Natsukawa Yui). The plot follows not only the project team, but also Inoue's life. She is a single mother who has an estranged relationship with her widowed father (Yamazaki Tsutomu).

The film follows HAYABUSA's trip to space quite meticulously. Failure and success follow each other, Yamaguchi's team solving the problems as they go. Yamaguchi is seen visiting NASA in order to request JAXA's use of their communication satellites. His team members Fujinaka (Eguchi Yōsuke) and Moriuchi (Yoshioka Hidetaka), on the other hand, are able to solve some large problems regarding the probe, celebrating with a bottle of wine given by Yamaguchi. Yamaguchi himself, a solitary leader often seen visiting a *jinja* shrine, makes the final decision of trying to get HAYABUSA back. The mission succeeds with the whole team celebrating it. Inoue, too, who has been covering the travel of the probe, is able to make amends with her father, both of them uniting over the wish for HAYABUSA's success.

***Okaeri Hayabusa* (2012)**

It is the year 2003 and the launch of HAYABUSA is at hand. Responsible for the project is Dr. Emoto (Ōsugi Ren) with junior staff, including the protagonist assistant space engineer Ōhashi Kento (Fujiwara Tatsuya). Kento's father, Ōhashi Isao (Miura Tomokazu), has been in charge of the previous Nozomi project, where the team tried sending the probe Nozomi to Mars. The project fails and Kento's father becomes depressed and leaves JAXA. Two years later Kento's colleague Iwamatsu Daigo (Tanaka Naoki) is giving a speech about HAYABUSA at a school. Soon after HAYABUSA's engine fails. With Kento's resourceful thinking and engineering skills, the team is able to overcome the trouble, but not everyone is happy with the situation. Kento is encountered by a new female member of the team, who reprimands him for treating the probe like a toy and blaming Kento for his arrogance.

It becomes then clear that Daigo's wife Tami (Moriguchi Yōko) is critically ill. Meanwhile HAYABUSA approaches Itokawa, takes a picture, approaches it and manages to collect a sample at the price of losing some of its vital technology. Kento's father Isao is still mourning the failed Nozomi project, facing unhappy public opinion of wasting tax payers' money on nothing. Kento visits his father who is in the throes of an existential crisis, having dedicated his whole life to a failed project. The film then takes a darker turn. When Kento's ideas are applied once more on the HAYABUSA project, he hears some members of his team bad-mouthing him and his father. The illness of Daigo's wife worsens as well. Together with his son they dream about HAYABUSA's success. Daigo ends up leaving JAXA because the family needs to travel to The

U.S. for an organ donation. Emoto seeks advice from Isao, who states that there is nothing they can do. Kento confronts his father about his fixation with the Nozomi project.

Suddenly, the JAXA team is able to get into contact with HAYABUSA. Together they come up with a way of getting the probe back to Earth. Upon the probe's return, Kento calls his father to thank him for everything. Daigo's family, too, is happily waiting for HAYABUSA's return after Tami's successful operation. Hope is also present in a scene where a hikikomori-like salaryman states that he will finally get a job.